Commit | Line | Data |
---|---|---|
3e1c2515 | 1 | /* Common capabilities, needed by capability.o. |
1da177e4 LT |
2 | * |
3 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
4 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
5 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
6 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
7 | * | |
8 | */ | |
9 | ||
c59ede7b | 10 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
3fc689e9 | 11 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
12 | #include <linux/module.h> |
13 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
14 | #include <linux/kernel.h> | |
15 | #include <linux/security.h> | |
16 | #include <linux/file.h> | |
17 | #include <linux/mm.h> | |
18 | #include <linux/mman.h> | |
19 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> | |
20 | #include <linux/swap.h> | |
1da177e4 LT |
21 | #include <linux/skbuff.h> |
22 | #include <linux/netlink.h> | |
23 | #include <linux/ptrace.h> | |
24 | #include <linux/xattr.h> | |
25 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> | |
b5376771 | 26 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
b460cbc5 | 27 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
3898b1b4 AM |
28 | #include <linux/prctl.h> |
29 | #include <linux/securebits.h> | |
3486740a | 30 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
40401530 | 31 | #include <linux/binfmts.h> |
51b79bee | 32 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
72c2d582 | 33 | |
b5f22a59 SH |
34 | /* |
35 | * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in | |
36 | * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities. | |
37 | * However if fE is also set, then the intent is for only | |
38 | * the file capabilities to be applied, and the setuid-root | |
39 | * bit is left on either to change the uid (plausible) or | |
40 | * to get full privilege on a kernel without file capabilities | |
41 | * support. So in that case we do not raise capabilities. | |
42 | * | |
43 | * Warn if that happens, once per boot. | |
44 | */ | |
d7627467 | 45 | static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) |
b5f22a59 SH |
46 | { |
47 | static int warned; | |
48 | if (!warned) { | |
49 | printk(KERN_INFO "warning: `%s' has both setuid-root and" | |
50 | " effective capabilities. Therefore not raising all" | |
51 | " capabilities.\n", fname); | |
52 | warned = 1; | |
53 | } | |
54 | } | |
55 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
56 | int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
57 | { | |
1da177e4 LT |
58 | return 0; |
59 | } | |
60 | ||
1d045980 DH |
61 | /** |
62 | * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability | |
3699c53c | 63 | * @cred: The credentials to use |
3486740a | 64 | * @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability |
1d045980 DH |
65 | * @cap: The capability to check for |
66 | * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not | |
67 | * | |
68 | * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst | |
69 | * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not. | |
70 | * | |
3699c53c DH |
71 | * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable() |
72 | * and has_capability() functions. That is, it has the reverse semantics: | |
73 | * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the | |
74 | * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. | |
a6dbb1ef | 75 | */ |
6a9de491 EP |
76 | int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, |
77 | int cap, int audit) | |
1da177e4 | 78 | { |
3486740a | 79 | for (;;) { |
783291e6 | 80 | /* The owner of the user namespace has all caps. */ |
078de5f7 | 81 | if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && uid_eq(targ_ns->owner, cred->euid)) |
3486740a SH |
82 | return 0; |
83 | ||
84 | /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */ | |
c4a4d603 | 85 | if (targ_ns == cred->user_ns) |
3486740a SH |
86 | return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM; |
87 | ||
88 | /* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */ | |
89 | if (targ_ns == &init_user_ns) | |
90 | return -EPERM; | |
91 | ||
92 | /* | |
93 | *If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have | |
94 | * it over all children user namespaces as well. | |
95 | */ | |
aeb3ae9d | 96 | targ_ns = targ_ns->parent; |
3486740a SH |
97 | } |
98 | ||
99 | /* We never get here */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
100 | } |
101 | ||
1d045980 DH |
102 | /** |
103 | * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock | |
104 | * @ts: The time to set | |
105 | * @tz: The timezone to set | |
106 | * | |
107 | * Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone | |
108 | * information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied. | |
109 | */ | |
1e6d7679 | 110 | int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz) |
1da177e4 LT |
111 | { |
112 | if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME)) | |
113 | return -EPERM; | |
114 | return 0; | |
115 | } | |
116 | ||
1d045980 | 117 | /** |
9e48858f | 118 | * cap_ptrace_access_check - Determine whether the current process may access |
1d045980 DH |
119 | * another |
120 | * @child: The process to be accessed | |
121 | * @mode: The mode of attachment. | |
122 | * | |
8409cca7 SH |
123 | * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target |
124 | * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. | |
125 | * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace | |
126 | * access is allowed. | |
127 | * Else denied. | |
128 | * | |
1d045980 DH |
129 | * Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission |
130 | * granted, -ve if denied. | |
131 | */ | |
9e48858f | 132 | int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode) |
1da177e4 | 133 | { |
c69e8d9c | 134 | int ret = 0; |
8409cca7 | 135 | const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; |
c69e8d9c DH |
136 | |
137 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
8409cca7 SH |
138 | cred = current_cred(); |
139 | child_cred = __task_cred(child); | |
c4a4d603 | 140 | if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && |
8409cca7 SH |
141 | cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) |
142 | goto out; | |
c4a4d603 | 143 | if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) |
8409cca7 SH |
144 | goto out; |
145 | ret = -EPERM; | |
146 | out: | |
c69e8d9c DH |
147 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
148 | return ret; | |
5cd9c58f DH |
149 | } |
150 | ||
1d045980 DH |
151 | /** |
152 | * cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current | |
153 | * @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer | |
154 | * | |
8409cca7 SH |
155 | * If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's |
156 | * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed. | |
157 | * If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace | |
158 | * access is allowed. | |
159 | * Else denied. | |
160 | * | |
1d045980 DH |
161 | * Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current |
162 | * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
163 | */ | |
5cd9c58f DH |
164 | int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
165 | { | |
c69e8d9c | 166 | int ret = 0; |
8409cca7 | 167 | const struct cred *cred, *child_cred; |
c69e8d9c DH |
168 | |
169 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
8409cca7 SH |
170 | cred = __task_cred(parent); |
171 | child_cred = current_cred(); | |
c4a4d603 | 172 | if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns && |
8409cca7 SH |
173 | cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted)) |
174 | goto out; | |
c4a4d603 | 175 | if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) |
8409cca7 SH |
176 | goto out; |
177 | ret = -EPERM; | |
178 | out: | |
c69e8d9c DH |
179 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
180 | return ret; | |
1da177e4 LT |
181 | } |
182 | ||
1d045980 DH |
183 | /** |
184 | * cap_capget - Retrieve a task's capability sets | |
185 | * @target: The task from which to retrieve the capability sets | |
186 | * @effective: The place to record the effective set | |
187 | * @inheritable: The place to record the inheritable set | |
188 | * @permitted: The place to record the permitted set | |
189 | * | |
190 | * This function retrieves the capabilities of the nominated task and returns | |
191 | * them to the caller. | |
192 | */ | |
193 | int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
194 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1da177e4 | 195 | { |
c69e8d9c | 196 | const struct cred *cred; |
b6dff3ec | 197 | |
1da177e4 | 198 | /* Derived from kernel/capability.c:sys_capget. */ |
c69e8d9c DH |
199 | rcu_read_lock(); |
200 | cred = __task_cred(target); | |
b6dff3ec DH |
201 | *effective = cred->cap_effective; |
202 | *inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable; | |
203 | *permitted = cred->cap_permitted; | |
c69e8d9c | 204 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1da177e4 LT |
205 | return 0; |
206 | } | |
207 | ||
1d045980 DH |
208 | /* |
209 | * Determine whether the inheritable capabilities are limited to the old | |
210 | * permitted set. Returns 1 if they are limited, 0 if they are not. | |
211 | */ | |
72c2d582 AM |
212 | static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) |
213 | { | |
72c2d582 | 214 | |
1d045980 DH |
215 | /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP |
216 | * capability | |
217 | */ | |
c4a4d603 | 218 | if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, |
6a9de491 | 219 | CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) |
1d045980 | 220 | return 0; |
1d045980 | 221 | return 1; |
1209726c | 222 | } |
72c2d582 | 223 | |
1d045980 DH |
224 | /** |
225 | * cap_capset - Validate and apply proposed changes to current's capabilities | |
226 | * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here | |
227 | * @old: The current task's current credentials | |
228 | * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set | |
229 | * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set | |
230 | * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set | |
231 | * | |
232 | * This function validates and applies a proposed mass change to the current | |
233 | * process's capability sets. The changes are made to the proposed new | |
234 | * credentials, and assuming no error, will be committed by the caller of LSM. | |
235 | */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
236 | int cap_capset(struct cred *new, |
237 | const struct cred *old, | |
238 | const kernel_cap_t *effective, | |
239 | const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, | |
240 | const kernel_cap_t *permitted) | |
1da177e4 | 241 | { |
d84f4f99 DH |
242 | if (cap_inh_is_capped() && |
243 | !cap_issubset(*inheritable, | |
244 | cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, | |
245 | old->cap_permitted))) | |
72c2d582 | 246 | /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ |
1da177e4 | 247 | return -EPERM; |
d84f4f99 | 248 | |
3b7391de | 249 | if (!cap_issubset(*inheritable, |
d84f4f99 DH |
250 | cap_combine(old->cap_inheritable, |
251 | old->cap_bset))) | |
3b7391de SH |
252 | /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */ |
253 | return -EPERM; | |
1da177e4 LT |
254 | |
255 | /* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ | |
d84f4f99 | 256 | if (!cap_issubset(*permitted, old->cap_permitted)) |
1da177e4 | 257 | return -EPERM; |
1da177e4 LT |
258 | |
259 | /* verify the _new_Effective_ is a subset of the _new_Permitted_ */ | |
d84f4f99 | 260 | if (!cap_issubset(*effective, *permitted)) |
1da177e4 | 261 | return -EPERM; |
1da177e4 | 262 | |
d84f4f99 DH |
263 | new->cap_effective = *effective; |
264 | new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable; | |
265 | new->cap_permitted = *permitted; | |
1da177e4 LT |
266 | return 0; |
267 | } | |
268 | ||
1d045980 DH |
269 | /* |
270 | * Clear proposed capability sets for execve(). | |
271 | */ | |
b5376771 SH |
272 | static inline void bprm_clear_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
273 | { | |
a6f76f23 | 274 | cap_clear(bprm->cred->cap_permitted); |
b5376771 SH |
275 | bprm->cap_effective = false; |
276 | } | |
277 | ||
1d045980 DH |
278 | /** |
279 | * cap_inode_need_killpriv - Determine if inode change affects privileges | |
280 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry in being changed with change marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV | |
281 | * | |
282 | * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV | |
283 | * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should | |
284 | * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected? | |
285 | * | |
286 | * Returns 0 if granted; +ve if granted, but inode_killpriv() is required; and | |
287 | * -ve to deny the change. | |
288 | */ | |
b5376771 SH |
289 | int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) |
290 | { | |
291 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
292 | int error; | |
293 | ||
acfa4380 | 294 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) |
b5376771 SH |
295 | return 0; |
296 | ||
297 | error = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, NULL, 0); | |
298 | if (error <= 0) | |
299 | return 0; | |
300 | return 1; | |
301 | } | |
302 | ||
1d045980 DH |
303 | /** |
304 | * cap_inode_killpriv - Erase the security markings on an inode | |
305 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry to alter | |
306 | * | |
307 | * Erase the privilege-enhancing security markings on an inode. | |
308 | * | |
309 | * Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. | |
310 | */ | |
b5376771 SH |
311 | int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) |
312 | { | |
313 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
314 | ||
acfa4380 | 315 | if (!inode->i_op->removexattr) |
b5376771 SH |
316 | return 0; |
317 | ||
318 | return inode->i_op->removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS); | |
319 | } | |
320 | ||
1d045980 DH |
321 | /* |
322 | * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached | |
323 | * to a file. | |
324 | */ | |
c0b00441 | 325 | static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, |
a6f76f23 | 326 | struct linux_binprm *bprm, |
4d49f671 ZL |
327 | bool *effective, |
328 | bool *has_cap) | |
b5376771 | 329 | { |
a6f76f23 | 330 | struct cred *new = bprm->cred; |
c0b00441 EP |
331 | unsigned i; |
332 | int ret = 0; | |
333 | ||
334 | if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE) | |
a6f76f23 | 335 | *effective = true; |
c0b00441 | 336 | |
4d49f671 ZL |
337 | if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) |
338 | *has_cap = true; | |
339 | ||
c0b00441 EP |
340 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { |
341 | __u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i]; | |
342 | __u32 inheritable = caps->inheritable.cap[i]; | |
343 | ||
344 | /* | |
345 | * pP' = (X & fP) | (pI & fI) | |
346 | */ | |
a6f76f23 DH |
347 | new->cap_permitted.cap[i] = |
348 | (new->cap_bset.cap[i] & permitted) | | |
349 | (new->cap_inheritable.cap[i] & inheritable); | |
c0b00441 | 350 | |
a6f76f23 DH |
351 | if (permitted & ~new->cap_permitted.cap[i]) |
352 | /* insufficient to execute correctly */ | |
c0b00441 | 353 | ret = -EPERM; |
c0b00441 EP |
354 | } |
355 | ||
356 | /* | |
357 | * For legacy apps, with no internal support for recognizing they | |
358 | * do not have enough capabilities, we return an error if they are | |
359 | * missing some "forced" (aka file-permitted) capabilities. | |
360 | */ | |
a6f76f23 | 361 | return *effective ? ret : 0; |
c0b00441 EP |
362 | } |
363 | ||
1d045980 DH |
364 | /* |
365 | * Extract the on-exec-apply capability sets for an executable file. | |
366 | */ | |
c0b00441 EP |
367 | int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps) |
368 | { | |
369 | struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode; | |
b5376771 | 370 | __u32 magic_etc; |
e338d263 | 371 | unsigned tocopy, i; |
c0b00441 EP |
372 | int size; |
373 | struct vfs_cap_data caps; | |
374 | ||
375 | memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data)); | |
376 | ||
acfa4380 | 377 | if (!inode || !inode->i_op->getxattr) |
c0b00441 EP |
378 | return -ENODATA; |
379 | ||
380 | size = inode->i_op->getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps, | |
381 | XATTR_CAPS_SZ); | |
a6f76f23 | 382 | if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
c0b00441 EP |
383 | /* no data, that's ok */ |
384 | return -ENODATA; | |
c0b00441 EP |
385 | if (size < 0) |
386 | return size; | |
b5376771 | 387 | |
e338d263 | 388 | if (size < sizeof(magic_etc)) |
b5376771 SH |
389 | return -EINVAL; |
390 | ||
c0b00441 | 391 | cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc); |
b5376771 | 392 | |
a6f76f23 | 393 | switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) { |
e338d263 AM |
394 | case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1: |
395 | if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1) | |
396 | return -EINVAL; | |
397 | tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_1; | |
398 | break; | |
399 | case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2: | |
400 | if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2) | |
401 | return -EINVAL; | |
402 | tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2; | |
403 | break; | |
b5376771 SH |
404 | default: |
405 | return -EINVAL; | |
406 | } | |
e338d263 | 407 | |
5459c164 | 408 | CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { |
c0b00441 EP |
409 | if (i >= tocopy) |
410 | break; | |
411 | cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted); | |
412 | cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable); | |
e338d263 | 413 | } |
a6f76f23 | 414 | |
c0b00441 | 415 | return 0; |
b5376771 SH |
416 | } |
417 | ||
1d045980 DH |
418 | /* |
419 | * Attempt to get the on-exec apply capability sets for an executable file from | |
420 | * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being | |
421 | * constructed by execve(). | |
422 | */ | |
4d49f671 | 423 | static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap) |
b5376771 SH |
424 | { |
425 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
426 | int rc = 0; | |
c0b00441 | 427 | struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; |
b5376771 | 428 | |
3318a386 SH |
429 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); |
430 | ||
1f29fae2 SH |
431 | if (!file_caps_enabled) |
432 | return 0; | |
433 | ||
3318a386 | 434 | if (bprm->file->f_vfsmnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) |
b5376771 | 435 | return 0; |
b5376771 SH |
436 | |
437 | dentry = dget(bprm->file->f_dentry); | |
b5376771 | 438 | |
c0b00441 EP |
439 | rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry, &vcaps); |
440 | if (rc < 0) { | |
441 | if (rc == -EINVAL) | |
442 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", | |
443 | __func__, rc, bprm->filename); | |
444 | else if (rc == -ENODATA) | |
445 | rc = 0; | |
b5376771 SH |
446 | goto out; |
447 | } | |
b5376771 | 448 | |
4d49f671 | 449 | rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap); |
a6f76f23 DH |
450 | if (rc == -EINVAL) |
451 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", | |
452 | __func__, rc, bprm->filename); | |
b5376771 SH |
453 | |
454 | out: | |
455 | dput(dentry); | |
456 | if (rc) | |
457 | bprm_clear_caps(bprm); | |
458 | ||
459 | return rc; | |
460 | } | |
461 | ||
1d045980 DH |
462 | /** |
463 | * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). | |
464 | * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds | |
465 | * | |
466 | * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being | |
467 | * constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered, | |
468 | * which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. | |
a6f76f23 DH |
469 | */ |
470 | int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1da177e4 | 471 | { |
a6f76f23 DH |
472 | const struct cred *old = current_cred(); |
473 | struct cred *new = bprm->cred; | |
7d8db180 | 474 | bool effective, has_cap = false; |
b5376771 | 475 | int ret; |
18815a18 | 476 | kuid_t root_uid; |
1da177e4 | 477 | |
a6f76f23 | 478 | effective = false; |
4d49f671 | 479 | ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap); |
a6f76f23 DH |
480 | if (ret < 0) |
481 | return ret; | |
1da177e4 | 482 | |
18815a18 EB |
483 | root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); |
484 | ||
5459c164 | 485 | if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { |
b5f22a59 SH |
486 | /* |
487 | * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs | |
488 | * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it | |
489 | * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin. | |
490 | */ | |
18815a18 | 491 | if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) { |
b5f22a59 SH |
492 | warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename); |
493 | goto skip; | |
494 | } | |
5459c164 AM |
495 | /* |
496 | * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root | |
497 | * executables under compatibility mode, we override the | |
498 | * capability sets for the file. | |
499 | * | |
a6f76f23 | 500 | * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit. |
5459c164 | 501 | */ |
18815a18 | 502 | if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) { |
5459c164 | 503 | /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */ |
a6f76f23 DH |
504 | new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset, |
505 | old->cap_inheritable); | |
1da177e4 | 506 | } |
18815a18 | 507 | if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) |
a6f76f23 | 508 | effective = true; |
1da177e4 | 509 | } |
b5f22a59 | 510 | skip: |
b5376771 | 511 | |
d52fc5dd EP |
512 | /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ |
513 | if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) | |
514 | bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; | |
515 | ||
516 | ||
a6f76f23 | 517 | /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised |
259e5e6c AL |
518 | * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. |
519 | * | |
520 | * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs. | |
a6f76f23 | 521 | */ |
18815a18 EB |
522 | if ((!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || |
523 | !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) || | |
a6f76f23 DH |
524 | !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) && |
525 | bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) { | |
526 | /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ | |
259e5e6c AL |
527 | if (!capable(CAP_SETUID) || |
528 | (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS)) { | |
a6f76f23 DH |
529 | new->euid = new->uid; |
530 | new->egid = new->gid; | |
1da177e4 | 531 | } |
b3a222e5 SH |
532 | new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted, |
533 | old->cap_permitted); | |
1da177e4 LT |
534 | } |
535 | ||
a6f76f23 DH |
536 | new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid; |
537 | new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; | |
1da177e4 | 538 | |
4bf2ea77 EP |
539 | if (effective) |
540 | new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; | |
541 | else | |
542 | cap_clear(new->cap_effective); | |
a6f76f23 | 543 | bprm->cap_effective = effective; |
1da177e4 | 544 | |
3fc689e9 EP |
545 | /* |
546 | * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set | |
547 | * | |
548 | * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: | |
549 | * 1) cap_effective has all caps | |
550 | * 2) we are root | |
551 | * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) | |
552 | * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. | |
553 | * | |
554 | * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think | |
555 | * that is interesting information to audit. | |
556 | */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
557 | if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) { |
558 | if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) || | |
18815a18 | 559 | !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || |
a6f76f23 DH |
560 | issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { |
561 | ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); | |
562 | if (ret < 0) | |
563 | return ret; | |
564 | } | |
3fc689e9 | 565 | } |
1da177e4 | 566 | |
d84f4f99 | 567 | new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); |
a6f76f23 | 568 | return 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
569 | } |
570 | ||
1d045980 DH |
571 | /** |
572 | * cap_bprm_secureexec - Determine whether a secure execution is required | |
573 | * @bprm: The execution parameters | |
574 | * | |
575 | * Determine whether a secure execution is required, return 1 if it is, and 0 | |
576 | * if it is not. | |
577 | * | |
578 | * The credentials have been committed by this point, and so are no longer | |
579 | * available through @bprm->cred. | |
a6f76f23 DH |
580 | */ |
581 | int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) | |
1da177e4 | 582 | { |
c69e8d9c | 583 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
18815a18 | 584 | kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, 0); |
b6dff3ec | 585 | |
18815a18 | 586 | if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, root_uid)) { |
b5376771 SH |
587 | if (bprm->cap_effective) |
588 | return 1; | |
a6f76f23 | 589 | if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_permitted)) |
b5376771 SH |
590 | return 1; |
591 | } | |
592 | ||
18815a18 EB |
593 | return (!uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) || |
594 | !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid)); | |
1da177e4 LT |
595 | } |
596 | ||
1d045980 DH |
597 | /** |
598 | * cap_inode_setxattr - Determine whether an xattr may be altered | |
599 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered | |
600 | * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed | |
601 | * @value: The value that the xattr will be changed to | |
602 | * @size: The size of value | |
603 | * @flags: The replacement flag | |
604 | * | |
605 | * Determine whether an xattr may be altered or set on an inode, returning 0 if | |
606 | * permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
607 | * | |
608 | * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get updated or set by those | |
609 | * who aren't privileged to do so. | |
610 | */ | |
8f0cfa52 DH |
611 | int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, |
612 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) | |
1da177e4 | 613 | { |
b5376771 SH |
614 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
615 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
616 | return -EPERM; | |
617 | return 0; | |
1d045980 DH |
618 | } |
619 | ||
620 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
c5b60b5e | 621 | sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && |
1da177e4 LT |
622 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
623 | return -EPERM; | |
624 | return 0; | |
625 | } | |
626 | ||
1d045980 DH |
627 | /** |
628 | * cap_inode_removexattr - Determine whether an xattr may be removed | |
629 | * @dentry: The inode/dentry being altered | |
630 | * @name: The name of the xattr to be changed | |
631 | * | |
632 | * Determine whether an xattr may be removed from an inode, returning 0 if | |
633 | * permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
634 | * | |
635 | * This is used to make sure security xattrs don't get removed by those who | |
636 | * aren't privileged to remove them. | |
637 | */ | |
8f0cfa52 | 638 | int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
1da177e4 | 639 | { |
b5376771 SH |
640 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
641 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) | |
642 | return -EPERM; | |
643 | return 0; | |
1d045980 DH |
644 | } |
645 | ||
646 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, | |
c5b60b5e | 647 | sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) && |
1da177e4 LT |
648 | !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) |
649 | return -EPERM; | |
650 | return 0; | |
651 | } | |
652 | ||
a6f76f23 | 653 | /* |
1da177e4 LT |
654 | * cap_emulate_setxuid() fixes the effective / permitted capabilities of |
655 | * a process after a call to setuid, setreuid, or setresuid. | |
656 | * | |
657 | * 1) When set*uiding _from_ one of {r,e,s}uid == 0 _to_ all of | |
658 | * {r,e,s}uid != 0, the permitted and effective capabilities are | |
659 | * cleared. | |
660 | * | |
661 | * 2) When set*uiding _from_ euid == 0 _to_ euid != 0, the effective | |
662 | * capabilities of the process are cleared. | |
663 | * | |
664 | * 3) When set*uiding _from_ euid != 0 _to_ euid == 0, the effective | |
665 | * capabilities are set to the permitted capabilities. | |
666 | * | |
a6f76f23 | 667 | * fsuid is handled elsewhere. fsuid == 0 and {r,e,s}uid!= 0 should |
1da177e4 LT |
668 | * never happen. |
669 | * | |
a6f76f23 | 670 | * -astor |
1da177e4 LT |
671 | * |
672 | * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99 | |
673 | * A process may, via prctl(), elect to keep its capabilities when it | |
674 | * calls setuid() and switches away from uid==0. Both permitted and | |
675 | * effective sets will be retained. | |
676 | * Without this change, it was impossible for a daemon to drop only some | |
677 | * of its privilege. The call to setuid(!=0) would drop all privileges! | |
678 | * Keeping uid 0 is not an option because uid 0 owns too many vital | |
679 | * files.. | |
680 | * Thanks to Olaf Kirch and Peter Benie for spotting this. | |
681 | */ | |
d84f4f99 | 682 | static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
1da177e4 | 683 | { |
18815a18 EB |
684 | kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0); |
685 | ||
686 | if ((uid_eq(old->uid, root_uid) || | |
687 | uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) || | |
688 | uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) && | |
689 | (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && | |
690 | !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) && | |
691 | !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid)) && | |
3898b1b4 | 692 | !issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) { |
d84f4f99 DH |
693 | cap_clear(new->cap_permitted); |
694 | cap_clear(new->cap_effective); | |
1da177e4 | 695 | } |
18815a18 | 696 | if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) |
d84f4f99 | 697 | cap_clear(new->cap_effective); |
18815a18 | 698 | if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) |
d84f4f99 | 699 | new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted; |
1da177e4 LT |
700 | } |
701 | ||
1d045980 DH |
702 | /** |
703 | * cap_task_fix_setuid - Fix up the results of setuid() call | |
704 | * @new: The proposed credentials | |
705 | * @old: The current task's current credentials | |
706 | * @flags: Indications of what has changed | |
707 | * | |
708 | * Fix up the results of setuid() call before the credential changes are | |
709 | * actually applied, returning 0 to grant the changes, -ve to deny them. | |
710 | */ | |
d84f4f99 | 711 | int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags) |
1da177e4 LT |
712 | { |
713 | switch (flags) { | |
714 | case LSM_SETID_RE: | |
715 | case LSM_SETID_ID: | |
716 | case LSM_SETID_RES: | |
1d045980 DH |
717 | /* juggle the capabilities to follow [RES]UID changes unless |
718 | * otherwise suppressed */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
719 | if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) |
720 | cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old); | |
1da177e4 | 721 | break; |
1da177e4 | 722 | |
1d045980 DH |
723 | case LSM_SETID_FS: |
724 | /* juggle the capabilties to follow FSUID changes, unless | |
725 | * otherwise suppressed | |
726 | * | |
d84f4f99 DH |
727 | * FIXME - is fsuser used for all CAP_FS_MASK capabilities? |
728 | * if not, we might be a bit too harsh here. | |
729 | */ | |
730 | if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) { | |
18815a18 EB |
731 | kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0); |
732 | if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid)) | |
d84f4f99 DH |
733 | new->cap_effective = |
734 | cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective); | |
1d045980 | 735 | |
18815a18 | 736 | if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid)) |
d84f4f99 DH |
737 | new->cap_effective = |
738 | cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective, | |
739 | new->cap_permitted); | |
1da177e4 | 740 | } |
d84f4f99 | 741 | break; |
1d045980 | 742 | |
1da177e4 LT |
743 | default: |
744 | return -EINVAL; | |
745 | } | |
746 | ||
747 | return 0; | |
748 | } | |
749 | ||
b5376771 SH |
750 | /* |
751 | * Rationale: code calling task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, and | |
752 | * task_setnice, assumes that | |
753 | * . if capable(cap_sys_nice), then those actions should be allowed | |
754 | * . if not capable(cap_sys_nice), but acting on your own processes, | |
755 | * then those actions should be allowed | |
756 | * This is insufficient now since you can call code without suid, but | |
757 | * yet with increased caps. | |
758 | * So we check for increased caps on the target process. | |
759 | */ | |
de45e806 | 760 | static int cap_safe_nice(struct task_struct *p) |
b5376771 | 761 | { |
c69e8d9c DH |
762 | int is_subset; |
763 | ||
764 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
765 | is_subset = cap_issubset(__task_cred(p)->cap_permitted, | |
766 | current_cred()->cap_permitted); | |
767 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
768 | ||
769 | if (!is_subset && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) | |
b5376771 SH |
770 | return -EPERM; |
771 | return 0; | |
772 | } | |
773 | ||
1d045980 DH |
774 | /** |
775 | * cap_task_setscheduler - Detemine if scheduler policy change is permitted | |
776 | * @p: The task to affect | |
1d045980 DH |
777 | * |
778 | * Detemine if the requested scheduler policy change is permitted for the | |
779 | * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
780 | */ | |
b0ae1981 | 781 | int cap_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) |
b5376771 SH |
782 | { |
783 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
784 | } | |
785 | ||
1d045980 DH |
786 | /** |
787 | * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if I/O priority change is permitted | |
788 | * @p: The task to affect | |
789 | * @ioprio: The I/O priority to set | |
790 | * | |
791 | * Detemine if the requested I/O priority change is permitted for the specified | |
792 | * task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
793 | */ | |
794 | int cap_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) | |
b5376771 SH |
795 | { |
796 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
797 | } | |
798 | ||
1d045980 DH |
799 | /** |
800 | * cap_task_ioprio - Detemine if task priority change is permitted | |
801 | * @p: The task to affect | |
802 | * @nice: The nice value to set | |
803 | * | |
804 | * Detemine if the requested task priority change is permitted for the | |
805 | * specified task, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied. | |
806 | */ | |
807 | int cap_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) | |
b5376771 SH |
808 | { |
809 | return cap_safe_nice(p); | |
810 | } | |
811 | ||
3b7391de | 812 | /* |
1d045980 DH |
813 | * Implement PR_CAPBSET_DROP. Attempt to remove the specified capability from |
814 | * the current task's bounding set. Returns 0 on success, -ve on error. | |
3b7391de | 815 | */ |
d84f4f99 | 816 | static long cap_prctl_drop(struct cred *new, unsigned long cap) |
3b7391de SH |
817 | { |
818 | if (!capable(CAP_SETPCAP)) | |
819 | return -EPERM; | |
820 | if (!cap_valid(cap)) | |
821 | return -EINVAL; | |
d84f4f99 DH |
822 | |
823 | cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap); | |
3b7391de SH |
824 | return 0; |
825 | } | |
3898b1b4 | 826 | |
1d045980 DH |
827 | /** |
828 | * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module | |
829 | * @option: The process control function requested | |
830 | * @arg2, @arg3, @arg4, @arg5: The argument data for this function | |
831 | * | |
832 | * Allow process control functions (sys_prctl()) to alter capabilities; may | |
833 | * also deny access to other functions not otherwise implemented here. | |
834 | * | |
835 | * Returns 0 or +ve on success, -ENOSYS if this function is not implemented | |
836 | * here, other -ve on error. If -ENOSYS is returned, sys_prctl() and other LSM | |
837 | * modules will consider performing the function. | |
838 | */ | |
3898b1b4 | 839 | int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, |
d84f4f99 | 840 | unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5) |
3898b1b4 | 841 | { |
d84f4f99 | 842 | struct cred *new; |
3898b1b4 AM |
843 | long error = 0; |
844 | ||
d84f4f99 DH |
845 | new = prepare_creds(); |
846 | if (!new) | |
847 | return -ENOMEM; | |
848 | ||
3898b1b4 AM |
849 | switch (option) { |
850 | case PR_CAPBSET_READ: | |
d84f4f99 | 851 | error = -EINVAL; |
3898b1b4 | 852 | if (!cap_valid(arg2)) |
d84f4f99 DH |
853 | goto error; |
854 | error = !!cap_raised(new->cap_bset, arg2); | |
855 | goto no_change; | |
856 | ||
3898b1b4 | 857 | case PR_CAPBSET_DROP: |
d84f4f99 DH |
858 | error = cap_prctl_drop(new, arg2); |
859 | if (error < 0) | |
860 | goto error; | |
861 | goto changed; | |
3898b1b4 AM |
862 | |
863 | /* | |
864 | * The next four prctl's remain to assist with transitioning a | |
865 | * system from legacy UID=0 based privilege (when filesystem | |
866 | * capabilities are not in use) to a system using filesystem | |
867 | * capabilities only - as the POSIX.1e draft intended. | |
868 | * | |
869 | * Note: | |
870 | * | |
871 | * PR_SET_SECUREBITS = | |
872 | * issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED) | |
873 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT) | |
874 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NOROOT_LOCKED) | |
875 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP) | |
876 | * | issecure_mask(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED) | |
877 | * | |
878 | * will ensure that the current process and all of its | |
879 | * children will be locked into a pure | |
880 | * capability-based-privilege environment. | |
881 | */ | |
882 | case PR_SET_SECUREBITS: | |
d84f4f99 DH |
883 | error = -EPERM; |
884 | if ((((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS) >> 1) | |
885 | & (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/ | |
886 | || ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ | |
887 | || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ | |
6a9de491 | 888 | || (cap_capable(current_cred(), |
c4a4d603 | 889 | current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, |
3699c53c | 890 | SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ |
3898b1b4 AM |
891 | /* |
892 | * [1] no changing of bits that are locked | |
893 | * [2] no unlocking of locks | |
894 | * [3] no setting of unsupported bits | |
895 | * [4] doing anything requires privilege (go read about | |
896 | * the "sendmail capabilities bug") | |
897 | */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
898 | ) |
899 | /* cannot change a locked bit */ | |
900 | goto error; | |
901 | new->securebits = arg2; | |
902 | goto changed; | |
903 | ||
3898b1b4 | 904 | case PR_GET_SECUREBITS: |
d84f4f99 DH |
905 | error = new->securebits; |
906 | goto no_change; | |
3898b1b4 | 907 | |
3898b1b4 AM |
908 | case PR_GET_KEEPCAPS: |
909 | if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) | |
910 | error = 1; | |
d84f4f99 DH |
911 | goto no_change; |
912 | ||
3898b1b4 | 913 | case PR_SET_KEEPCAPS: |
d84f4f99 | 914 | error = -EINVAL; |
3898b1b4 | 915 | if (arg2 > 1) /* Note, we rely on arg2 being unsigned here */ |
d84f4f99 DH |
916 | goto error; |
917 | error = -EPERM; | |
918 | if (issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED)) | |
919 | goto error; | |
920 | if (arg2) | |
921 | new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); | |
3898b1b4 | 922 | else |
d84f4f99 DH |
923 | new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); |
924 | goto changed; | |
3898b1b4 AM |
925 | |
926 | default: | |
927 | /* No functionality available - continue with default */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
928 | error = -ENOSYS; |
929 | goto error; | |
3898b1b4 AM |
930 | } |
931 | ||
932 | /* Functionality provided */ | |
d84f4f99 DH |
933 | changed: |
934 | return commit_creds(new); | |
935 | ||
936 | no_change: | |
d84f4f99 DH |
937 | error: |
938 | abort_creds(new); | |
939 | return error; | |
1da177e4 LT |
940 | } |
941 | ||
1d045980 DH |
942 | /** |
943 | * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted | |
944 | * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made | |
945 | * @pages: The size of the mapping | |
946 | * | |
947 | * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current | |
948 | * task is permitted, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if not. | |
949 | */ | |
34b4e4aa | 950 | int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) |
1da177e4 LT |
951 | { |
952 | int cap_sys_admin = 0; | |
953 | ||
6a9de491 | 954 | if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, |
3699c53c | 955 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) |
1da177e4 | 956 | cap_sys_admin = 1; |
34b4e4aa | 957 | return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin); |
1da177e4 | 958 | } |
7c73875e EP |
959 | |
960 | /* | |
d007794a | 961 | * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr |
7c73875e | 962 | * @addr: address attempting to be mapped |
7c73875e | 963 | * |
6f262d8e | 964 | * If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need |
7c73875e EP |
965 | * CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the |
966 | * capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed | |
967 | * -EPERM if not. | |
968 | */ | |
d007794a | 969 | int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) |
7c73875e EP |
970 | { |
971 | int ret = 0; | |
972 | ||
a2551df7 | 973 | if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { |
6a9de491 | 974 | ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, |
7c73875e EP |
975 | SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); |
976 | /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ | |
977 | if (ret == 0) | |
978 | current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; | |
979 | } | |
980 | return ret; | |
981 | } | |
d007794a | 982 | |
e5467859 AV |
983 | int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
984 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) | |
d007794a | 985 | { |
e5467859 | 986 | return 0; |
d007794a | 987 | } |