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arm/arm64: KVM: Fixup incorrect config symbol in comment
[deliverable/linux.git] / security / selinux / hooks.c
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1/*
2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
3 *
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
5 *
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
10 *
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
20 *
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
24 */
25
26#include <linux/init.h>
27#include <linux/kd.h>
28#include <linux/kernel.h>
29#include <linux/tracehook.h>
30#include <linux/errno.h>
31#include <linux/sched.h>
32#include <linux/security.h>
33#include <linux/xattr.h>
34#include <linux/capability.h>
35#include <linux/unistd.h>
36#include <linux/mm.h>
37#include <linux/mman.h>
38#include <linux/slab.h>
39#include <linux/pagemap.h>
40#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41#include <linux/swap.h>
42#include <linux/spinlock.h>
43#include <linux/syscalls.h>
44#include <linux/dcache.h>
45#include <linux/file.h>
46#include <linux/fdtable.h>
47#include <linux/namei.h>
48#include <linux/mount.h>
49#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51#include <linux/tty.h>
52#include <net/icmp.h>
53#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54#include <net/sock.h>
55#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
56#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
57#include <net/net_namespace.h>
58#include <net/netlabel.h>
59#include <linux/uaccess.h>
60#include <asm/ioctls.h>
61#include <linux/atomic.h>
62#include <linux/bitops.h>
63#include <linux/interrupt.h>
64#include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
65#include <net/netlink.h>
66#include <linux/tcp.h>
67#include <linux/udp.h>
68#include <linux/dccp.h>
69#include <linux/quota.h>
70#include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71#include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
72#include <linux/parser.h>
73#include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74#include <net/ipv6.h>
75#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
76#include <linux/personality.h>
77#include <linux/audit.h>
78#include <linux/string.h>
79#include <linux/selinux.h>
80#include <linux/mutex.h>
81#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
82#include <linux/syslog.h>
83#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
84#include <linux/export.h>
85#include <linux/msg.h>
86#include <linux/shm.h>
87
88#include "avc.h"
89#include "objsec.h"
90#include "netif.h"
91#include "netnode.h"
92#include "netport.h"
93#include "xfrm.h"
94#include "netlabel.h"
95#include "audit.h"
96#include "avc_ss.h"
97
98/* SECMARK reference count */
99static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100
101#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102int selinux_enforcing;
103
104static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105{
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
109 return 1;
110}
111__setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
112#endif
113
114#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116
117static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118{
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
122 return 1;
123}
124__setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125#else
126int selinux_enabled = 1;
127#endif
128
129static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
130
131/**
132 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
133 *
134 * Description:
135 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
136 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
137 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
138 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
139 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
140 *
141 */
142static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143{
144 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
145}
146
147/**
148 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
149 *
150 * Description:
151 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
152 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
153 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
154 * is always considered enabled.
155 *
156 */
157static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
158{
159 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
160}
161
162static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
163{
164 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
165 sel_netif_flush();
166 sel_netnode_flush();
167 sel_netport_flush();
168 synchronize_net();
169 }
170 return 0;
171}
172
173/*
174 * initialise the security for the init task
175 */
176static void cred_init_security(void)
177{
178 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
179 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
180
181 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
182 if (!tsec)
183 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
184
185 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
186 cred->security = tsec;
187}
188
189/*
190 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
191 */
192static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
193{
194 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
195
196 tsec = cred->security;
197 return tsec->sid;
198}
199
200/*
201 * get the objective security ID of a task
202 */
203static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
204{
205 u32 sid;
206
207 rcu_read_lock();
208 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
209 rcu_read_unlock();
210 return sid;
211}
212
213/*
214 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
215 */
216static inline u32 current_sid(void)
217{
218 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
219
220 return tsec->sid;
221}
222
223/* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
224
225static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
226{
227 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
228 u32 sid = current_sid();
229
230 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
231 if (!isec)
232 return -ENOMEM;
233
234 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
235 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
236 isec->inode = inode;
237 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
238 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
239 isec->task_sid = sid;
240 inode->i_security = isec;
241
242 return 0;
243}
244
245static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
246{
247 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
248
249 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
250 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
251}
252
253static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
254{
255 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
256 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
257
258 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
259 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
260 list_del_init(&isec->list);
261 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
262
263 /*
264 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
265 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
266 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
267 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
268 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
269 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
270 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
271 */
272 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
273}
274
275static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
276{
277 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
278 u32 sid = current_sid();
279
280 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
281 if (!fsec)
282 return -ENOMEM;
283
284 fsec->sid = sid;
285 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
286 file->f_security = fsec;
287
288 return 0;
289}
290
291static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
292{
293 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
294 file->f_security = NULL;
295 kfree(fsec);
296}
297
298static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
299{
300 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
301
302 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
303 if (!sbsec)
304 return -ENOMEM;
305
306 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
307 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
308 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
309 sbsec->sb = sb;
310 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
312 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
313 sb->s_security = sbsec;
314
315 return 0;
316}
317
318static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
319{
320 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
321 sb->s_security = NULL;
322 kfree(sbsec);
323}
324
325/* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
326
327static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
328 "uses xattr",
329 "uses transition SIDs",
330 "uses task SIDs",
331 "uses genfs_contexts",
332 "not configured for labeling",
333 "uses mountpoint labeling",
334 "uses native labeling",
335};
336
337static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
338
339static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
340{
341 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
342}
343
344enum {
345 Opt_error = -1,
346 Opt_context = 1,
347 Opt_fscontext = 2,
348 Opt_defcontext = 3,
349 Opt_rootcontext = 4,
350 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
351 Opt_nextmntopt = 6,
352};
353
354#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
355
356static const match_table_t tokens = {
357 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
358 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
359 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
362 {Opt_error, NULL},
363};
364
365#define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
366
367static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
368 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
369 const struct cred *cred)
370{
371 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
372 int rc;
373
374 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
375 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
376 if (rc)
377 return rc;
378
379 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
380 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
381 return rc;
382}
383
384static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
385 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
386 const struct cred *cred)
387{
388 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
389 int rc;
390 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
391 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
392 if (rc)
393 return rc;
394
395 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
396 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
397 return rc;
398}
399
400static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
401{
402 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
403
404 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
405 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
406 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK)
407 return 1;
408
409 /* Special handling for sysfs. Is genfs but also has setxattr handler*/
410 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs", sizeof("sysfs")) == 0)
411 return 1;
412
413 /*
414 * Special handling for rootfs. Is genfs but supports
415 * setting SELinux context on in-core inodes.
416 */
417 if (strncmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs", sizeof("rootfs")) == 0)
418 return 1;
419
420 return 0;
421}
422
423static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
424{
425 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
426 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
427 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
428 int rc = 0;
429
430 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
431 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
432 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
433 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
434 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
435 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
436 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
437 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
438 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
439 rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
440 goto out;
441 }
442 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
443 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
444 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
445 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
446 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
447 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
448 else
449 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
450 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
451 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
452 goto out;
453 }
454 }
455
456 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
457 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
458 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
459 else
460 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
461 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
462 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
463
464 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
465 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
466 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
467
468 /* Initialize the root inode. */
469 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
470
471 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
472 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
473 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
474 populates itself. */
475 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
476next_inode:
477 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
478 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
479 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
480 struct inode_security_struct, list);
481 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
482 list_del_init(&isec->list);
483 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
484 inode = igrab(inode);
485 if (inode) {
486 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
487 inode_doinit(inode);
488 iput(inode);
489 }
490 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
491 goto next_inode;
492 }
493 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
494out:
495 return rc;
496}
497
498/*
499 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
500 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
501 * mount options, or whatever.
502 */
503static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
504 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
505{
506 int rc = 0, i;
507 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
508 char *context = NULL;
509 u32 len;
510 char tmp;
511
512 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
513
514 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
515 return -EINVAL;
516
517 if (!ss_initialized)
518 return -EINVAL;
519
520 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
521 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
522
523 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
524 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
525 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
526 if (tmp & 0x01)
527 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
528 tmp >>= 1;
529 }
530 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
531 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
532 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
533
534 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
535 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
536 rc = -ENOMEM;
537 goto out_free;
538 }
539
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
541 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
542 rc = -ENOMEM;
543 goto out_free;
544 }
545
546 i = 0;
547 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
548 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
549 if (rc)
550 goto out_free;
551 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
552 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
553 }
554 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
555 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
556 if (rc)
557 goto out_free;
558 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
559 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
560 }
561 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
562 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
563 if (rc)
564 goto out_free;
565 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
566 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
567 }
568 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
569 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
570 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
571
572 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
573 if (rc)
574 goto out_free;
575 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
576 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
577 }
578 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
579 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
580 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
581 }
582
583 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
584
585 return 0;
586
587out_free:
588 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
589 return rc;
590}
591
592static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
593 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
594{
595 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
596
597 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
598 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
599 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
600 (old_sid != new_sid))
601 return 1;
602
603 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
604 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
605 */
606 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
607 if (mnt_flags & flag)
608 return 1;
609 return 0;
610}
611
612/*
613 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
614 * labeling information.
615 */
616static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
617 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
618 unsigned long kern_flags,
619 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
620{
621 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
622 int rc = 0, i;
623 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
624 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
625 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
626 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
627 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
628 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
629 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
630 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
631 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
632
633 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
634
635 if (!ss_initialized) {
636 if (!num_opts) {
637 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
638 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
639 server is ready to handle calls. */
640 goto out;
641 }
642 rc = -EINVAL;
643 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
644 "before the security server is initialized\n");
645 goto out;
646 }
647 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
648 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
649 * place the results is not allowed */
650 rc = -EINVAL;
651 goto out;
652 }
653
654 /*
655 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
656 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
657 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
658 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
659 *
660 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
661 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
662 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
663 * will be used for both mounts)
664 */
665 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
666 && (num_opts == 0))
667 goto out;
668
669 /*
670 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
671 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
672 * than once with different security options.
673 */
674 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
675 u32 sid;
676
677 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
678 continue;
679 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
680 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
681 if (rc) {
682 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
683 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
684 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
685 goto out;
686 }
687 switch (flags[i]) {
688 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
689 fscontext_sid = sid;
690
691 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
692 fscontext_sid))
693 goto out_double_mount;
694
695 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
696 break;
697 case CONTEXT_MNT:
698 context_sid = sid;
699
700 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
701 context_sid))
702 goto out_double_mount;
703
704 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
705 break;
706 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
707 rootcontext_sid = sid;
708
709 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
710 rootcontext_sid))
711 goto out_double_mount;
712
713 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
714
715 break;
716 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
717 defcontext_sid = sid;
718
719 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
720 defcontext_sid))
721 goto out_double_mount;
722
723 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
724
725 break;
726 default:
727 rc = -EINVAL;
728 goto out;
729 }
730 }
731
732 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
733 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
734 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
735 goto out_double_mount;
736 rc = 0;
737 goto out;
738 }
739
740 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
741 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
742
743 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
744 /*
745 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
746 * filesystem type.
747 */
748 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
749 if (rc) {
750 printk(KERN_WARNING
751 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
752 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
753 goto out;
754 }
755 }
756 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
757 if (fscontext_sid) {
758 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
759 if (rc)
760 goto out;
761
762 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
763 }
764
765 /*
766 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
767 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
768 * the superblock context if not already set.
769 */
770 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
771 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
772 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
773 }
774
775 if (context_sid) {
776 if (!fscontext_sid) {
777 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
778 cred);
779 if (rc)
780 goto out;
781 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
782 } else {
783 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
784 cred);
785 if (rc)
786 goto out;
787 }
788 if (!rootcontext_sid)
789 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
790
791 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
792 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
793 }
794
795 if (rootcontext_sid) {
796 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
797 cred);
798 if (rc)
799 goto out;
800
801 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
802 root_isec->initialized = 1;
803 }
804
805 if (defcontext_sid) {
806 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
807 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
808 rc = -EINVAL;
809 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
810 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
811 goto out;
812 }
813
814 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
815 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
816 sbsec, cred);
817 if (rc)
818 goto out;
819 }
820
821 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
822 }
823
824 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
825out:
826 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
827 return rc;
828out_double_mount:
829 rc = -EINVAL;
830 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
831 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
832 goto out;
833}
834
835static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
836 const struct super_block *newsb)
837{
838 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
839 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
840 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
841 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
842
843 if (oldflags != newflags)
844 goto mismatch;
845 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
846 goto mismatch;
847 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
848 goto mismatch;
849 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
850 goto mismatch;
851 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
852 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = oldsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
853 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = newsb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
854 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
855 goto mismatch;
856 }
857 return 0;
858mismatch:
859 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
860 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
861 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
862 return -EBUSY;
863}
864
865static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
866 struct super_block *newsb)
867{
868 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
869 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
870
871 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
872 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
873 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
874
875 /*
876 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
877 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
878 */
879 if (!ss_initialized)
880 return 0;
881
882 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
883 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
884
885 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
886 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
887 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
888
889 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
890
891 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
892
893 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
894 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
895 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
896
897 if (set_context) {
898 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
899
900 if (!set_fscontext)
901 newsbsec->sid = sid;
902 if (!set_rootcontext) {
903 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
904 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
905 newisec->sid = sid;
906 }
907 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
908 }
909 if (set_rootcontext) {
910 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
911 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
912 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
913 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
914
915 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
916 }
917
918 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
919 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
920 return 0;
921}
922
923static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
924 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
925{
926 char *p;
927 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
928 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
929 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
930
931 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
932
933 /* Standard string-based options. */
934 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
935 int token;
936 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
937
938 if (!*p)
939 continue;
940
941 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
942
943 switch (token) {
944 case Opt_context:
945 if (context || defcontext) {
946 rc = -EINVAL;
947 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
948 goto out_err;
949 }
950 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
951 if (!context) {
952 rc = -ENOMEM;
953 goto out_err;
954 }
955 break;
956
957 case Opt_fscontext:
958 if (fscontext) {
959 rc = -EINVAL;
960 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
961 goto out_err;
962 }
963 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
964 if (!fscontext) {
965 rc = -ENOMEM;
966 goto out_err;
967 }
968 break;
969
970 case Opt_rootcontext:
971 if (rootcontext) {
972 rc = -EINVAL;
973 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
974 goto out_err;
975 }
976 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
977 if (!rootcontext) {
978 rc = -ENOMEM;
979 goto out_err;
980 }
981 break;
982
983 case Opt_defcontext:
984 if (context || defcontext) {
985 rc = -EINVAL;
986 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
987 goto out_err;
988 }
989 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
990 if (!defcontext) {
991 rc = -ENOMEM;
992 goto out_err;
993 }
994 break;
995 case Opt_labelsupport:
996 break;
997 default:
998 rc = -EINVAL;
999 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
1000 goto out_err;
1001
1002 }
1003 }
1004
1005 rc = -ENOMEM;
1006 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
1007 if (!opts->mnt_opts)
1008 goto out_err;
1009
1010 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
1011 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
1012 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1013 goto out_err;
1014 }
1015
1016 if (fscontext) {
1017 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1018 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1019 }
1020 if (context) {
1021 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1022 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1023 }
1024 if (rootcontext) {
1025 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1026 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1027 }
1028 if (defcontext) {
1029 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1030 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1031 }
1032
1033 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1034 return 0;
1035
1036out_err:
1037 kfree(context);
1038 kfree(defcontext);
1039 kfree(fscontext);
1040 kfree(rootcontext);
1041 return rc;
1042}
1043/*
1044 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1045 */
1046static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1047{
1048 int rc = 0;
1049 char *options = data;
1050 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1051
1052 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1053
1054 if (!data)
1055 goto out;
1056
1057 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1058
1059 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1060 if (rc)
1061 goto out_err;
1062
1063out:
1064 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1065
1066out_err:
1067 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1068 return rc;
1069}
1070
1071static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1072 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1073{
1074 int i;
1075 char *prefix;
1076
1077 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1078 char *has_comma;
1079
1080 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1081 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1082 else
1083 has_comma = NULL;
1084
1085 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1086 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1087 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1088 break;
1089 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1090 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1091 break;
1092 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1093 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1094 break;
1095 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1096 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1097 break;
1098 case SBLABEL_MNT:
1099 seq_putc(m, ',');
1100 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1101 continue;
1102 default:
1103 BUG();
1104 return;
1105 };
1106 /* we need a comma before each option */
1107 seq_putc(m, ',');
1108 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1109 if (has_comma)
1110 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1111 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1112 if (has_comma)
1113 seq_putc(m, '\"');
1114 }
1115}
1116
1117static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1118{
1119 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1120 int rc;
1121
1122 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1123 if (rc) {
1124 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1125 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1126 rc = 0;
1127 return rc;
1128 }
1129
1130 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1131
1132 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1133
1134 return rc;
1135}
1136
1137static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1138{
1139 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1140 case S_IFSOCK:
1141 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1142 case S_IFLNK:
1143 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1144 case S_IFREG:
1145 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1146 case S_IFBLK:
1147 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1148 case S_IFDIR:
1149 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1150 case S_IFCHR:
1151 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1152 case S_IFIFO:
1153 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1154
1155 }
1156
1157 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1158}
1159
1160static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1161{
1162 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1163}
1164
1165static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1166{
1167 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1168}
1169
1170static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1171{
1172 switch (family) {
1173 case PF_UNIX:
1174 switch (type) {
1175 case SOCK_STREAM:
1176 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1177 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1178 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1179 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1180 }
1181 break;
1182 case PF_INET:
1183 case PF_INET6:
1184 switch (type) {
1185 case SOCK_STREAM:
1186 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1187 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1188 else
1189 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1190 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1191 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1192 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1193 else
1194 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1195 case SOCK_DCCP:
1196 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1197 default:
1198 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1199 }
1200 break;
1201 case PF_NETLINK:
1202 switch (protocol) {
1203 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1204 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1205 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1206 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1207 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1208 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1209 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1210 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1211 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1212 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1213 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1214 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1215 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1216 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1217 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1218 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1219 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1220 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1221 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1222 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1223 default:
1224 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1225 }
1226 case PF_PACKET:
1227 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1228 case PF_KEY:
1229 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1230 case PF_APPLETALK:
1231 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1232 }
1233
1234 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1235}
1236
1237#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1238static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1239 u16 tclass,
1240 u32 *sid)
1241{
1242 int rc;
1243 char *buffer, *path;
1244
1245 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1246 if (!buffer)
1247 return -ENOMEM;
1248
1249 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1250 if (IS_ERR(path))
1251 rc = PTR_ERR(path);
1252 else {
1253 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1254 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1255 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1256 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1257 path[1] = '/';
1258 path++;
1259 }
1260 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1261 }
1262 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1263 return rc;
1264}
1265#else
1266static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1267 u16 tclass,
1268 u32 *sid)
1269{
1270 return -EINVAL;
1271}
1272#endif
1273
1274/* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1275static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1276{
1277 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1278 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1279 u32 sid;
1280 struct dentry *dentry;
1281#define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1282 char *context = NULL;
1283 unsigned len = 0;
1284 int rc = 0;
1285
1286 if (isec->initialized)
1287 goto out;
1288
1289 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1290 if (isec->initialized)
1291 goto out_unlock;
1292
1293 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1294 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1295 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1296 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1297 server is ready to handle calls. */
1298 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1299 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1300 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1301 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1302 goto out_unlock;
1303 }
1304
1305 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1306 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1307 break;
1308 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1309 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1310 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1311 break;
1312 }
1313
1314 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1315 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1316 if (opt_dentry) {
1317 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1318 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1319 } else {
1320 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1321 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1322 }
1323 if (!dentry) {
1324 /*
1325 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1326 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1327 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1328 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1329 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1330 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1331 * be used again by userspace.
1332 */
1333 goto out_unlock;
1334 }
1335
1336 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1337 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1338 if (!context) {
1339 rc = -ENOMEM;
1340 dput(dentry);
1341 goto out_unlock;
1342 }
1343 context[len] = '\0';
1344 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1345 context, len);
1346 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1347 kfree(context);
1348
1349 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1350 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1351 NULL, 0);
1352 if (rc < 0) {
1353 dput(dentry);
1354 goto out_unlock;
1355 }
1356 len = rc;
1357 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1358 if (!context) {
1359 rc = -ENOMEM;
1360 dput(dentry);
1361 goto out_unlock;
1362 }
1363 context[len] = '\0';
1364 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1365 XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1366 context, len);
1367 }
1368 dput(dentry);
1369 if (rc < 0) {
1370 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1371 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1372 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1373 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1374 kfree(context);
1375 goto out_unlock;
1376 }
1377 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1378 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1379 rc = 0;
1380 } else {
1381 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1382 sbsec->def_sid,
1383 GFP_NOFS);
1384 if (rc) {
1385 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1386 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1387
1388 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1389 if (printk_ratelimit())
1390 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1391 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1392 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1393 } else {
1394 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1395 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1396 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1397 }
1398 kfree(context);
1399 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1400 rc = 0;
1401 break;
1402 }
1403 }
1404 kfree(context);
1405 isec->sid = sid;
1406 break;
1407 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1408 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1409 break;
1410 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1411 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1412 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1413
1414 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1415 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1416 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1417 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1418 if (rc)
1419 goto out_unlock;
1420 isec->sid = sid;
1421 break;
1422 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1423 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1424 break;
1425 default:
1426 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1427 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1428
1429 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1430 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1431 * procfs inodes */
1432 if (opt_dentry)
1433 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1434 * d_splice_alias. */
1435 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1436 else
1437 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1438 * find a dentry. */
1439 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1440 /*
1441 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1442 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1443 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1444 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1445 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1446 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1447 * could be used again by userspace.
1448 */
1449 if (!dentry)
1450 goto out_unlock;
1451 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1452 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
1453 dput(dentry);
1454 if (rc)
1455 goto out_unlock;
1456 isec->sid = sid;
1457 }
1458 break;
1459 }
1460
1461 isec->initialized = 1;
1462
1463out_unlock:
1464 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1465out:
1466 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1467 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1468 return rc;
1469}
1470
1471/* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1472static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1473{
1474 u32 perm = 0;
1475
1476 switch (sig) {
1477 case SIGCHLD:
1478 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1479 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1480 break;
1481 case SIGKILL:
1482 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1483 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1484 break;
1485 case SIGSTOP:
1486 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1487 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1488 break;
1489 default:
1490 /* All other signals. */
1491 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1492 break;
1493 }
1494
1495 return perm;
1496}
1497
1498/*
1499 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1500 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1501 */
1502static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1503 const struct cred *target,
1504 u32 perms)
1505{
1506 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1507
1508 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1509}
1510
1511/*
1512 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1513 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1514 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1515 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1516 */
1517static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1518 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1519 u32 perms)
1520{
1521 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1522 u32 sid1, sid2;
1523
1524 rcu_read_lock();
1525 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1526 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1527 rcu_read_unlock();
1528 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1529}
1530
1531/*
1532 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1533 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1534 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1535 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1536 */
1537static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1538 u32 perms)
1539{
1540 u32 sid, tsid;
1541
1542 sid = current_sid();
1543 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1544 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1545}
1546
1547#if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1548#error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1549#endif
1550
1551/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1552static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1553 int cap, int audit)
1554{
1555 struct common_audit_data ad;
1556 struct av_decision avd;
1557 u16 sclass;
1558 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1559 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1560 int rc;
1561
1562 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1563 ad.u.cap = cap;
1564
1565 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1566 case 0:
1567 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1568 break;
1569 case 1:
1570 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1571 break;
1572 default:
1573 printk(KERN_ERR
1574 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1575 BUG();
1576 return -EINVAL;
1577 }
1578
1579 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1580 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1581 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1582 if (rc2)
1583 return rc2;
1584 }
1585 return rc;
1586}
1587
1588/* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1589static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1590 u32 perms)
1591{
1592 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1593
1594 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1595 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1596}
1597
1598/* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1599 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1600 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1601static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1602 struct inode *inode,
1603 u32 perms,
1604 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1605{
1606 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1607 u32 sid;
1608
1609 validate_creds(cred);
1610
1611 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1612 return 0;
1613
1614 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1615 isec = inode->i_security;
1616
1617 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1618}
1619
1620/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1621 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1622 pathname if needed. */
1623static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1624 struct dentry *dentry,
1625 u32 av)
1626{
1627 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1628 struct common_audit_data ad;
1629
1630 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1631 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1632 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1633}
1634
1635/* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1636 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1637 pathname if needed. */
1638static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1639 struct path *path,
1640 u32 av)
1641{
1642 struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
1643 struct common_audit_data ad;
1644
1645 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1646 ad.u.path = *path;
1647 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1648}
1649
1650/* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1651static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1652 struct file *file,
1653 u32 av)
1654{
1655 struct common_audit_data ad;
1656
1657 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1658 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1659 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1660}
1661
1662/* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1663 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1664 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1665 check a particular permission to the file.
1666 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1667 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1668 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1669 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1670static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1671 struct file *file,
1672 u32 av)
1673{
1674 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1675 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1676 struct common_audit_data ad;
1677 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1678 int rc;
1679
1680 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1681 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1682
1683 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1685 SECCLASS_FD,
1686 FD__USE,
1687 &ad);
1688 if (rc)
1689 goto out;
1690 }
1691
1692 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1693 rc = 0;
1694 if (av)
1695 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1696
1697out:
1698 return rc;
1699}
1700
1701/* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1702static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1703 struct dentry *dentry,
1704 u16 tclass)
1705{
1706 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1707 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1708 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1709 u32 sid, newsid;
1710 struct common_audit_data ad;
1711 int rc;
1712
1713 dsec = dir->i_security;
1714 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1715
1716 sid = tsec->sid;
1717 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1718
1719 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1720 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1721
1722 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1723 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1724 &ad);
1725 if (rc)
1726 return rc;
1727
1728 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
1729 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1730 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1731 if (rc)
1732 return rc;
1733 }
1734
1735 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1736 if (rc)
1737 return rc;
1738
1739 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1740 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1741 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1742}
1743
1744/* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1745static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1746 struct task_struct *ctx)
1747{
1748 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1749
1750 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1751}
1752
1753#define MAY_LINK 0
1754#define MAY_UNLINK 1
1755#define MAY_RMDIR 2
1756
1757/* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1758static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1759 struct dentry *dentry,
1760 int kind)
1761
1762{
1763 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1764 struct common_audit_data ad;
1765 u32 sid = current_sid();
1766 u32 av;
1767 int rc;
1768
1769 dsec = dir->i_security;
1770 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1771
1772 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1773 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1774
1775 av = DIR__SEARCH;
1776 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1777 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1778 if (rc)
1779 return rc;
1780
1781 switch (kind) {
1782 case MAY_LINK:
1783 av = FILE__LINK;
1784 break;
1785 case MAY_UNLINK:
1786 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1787 break;
1788 case MAY_RMDIR:
1789 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1790 break;
1791 default:
1792 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1793 __func__, kind);
1794 return 0;
1795 }
1796
1797 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1798 return rc;
1799}
1800
1801static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1802 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1803 struct inode *new_dir,
1804 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1805{
1806 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1807 struct common_audit_data ad;
1808 u32 sid = current_sid();
1809 u32 av;
1810 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1811 int rc;
1812
1813 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1814 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1815 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1816 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1817
1818 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1819
1820 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1821 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1822 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1823 if (rc)
1824 return rc;
1825 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1826 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1827 if (rc)
1828 return rc;
1829 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1830 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1831 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1832 if (rc)
1833 return rc;
1834 }
1835
1836 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1837 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1838 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1839 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1840 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1841 if (rc)
1842 return rc;
1843 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1844 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1845 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1846 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1847 new_isec->sclass,
1848 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1849 if (rc)
1850 return rc;
1851 }
1852
1853 return 0;
1854}
1855
1856/* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1857static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1858 struct super_block *sb,
1859 u32 perms,
1860 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1861{
1862 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1863 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1864
1865 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1866 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1867}
1868
1869/* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1870static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1871{
1872 u32 av = 0;
1873
1874 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1875 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1876 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1877 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1878 av |= FILE__READ;
1879
1880 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1881 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1882 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1883 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1884
1885 } else {
1886 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1887 av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1888 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1889 av |= DIR__WRITE;
1890 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1891 av |= DIR__READ;
1892 }
1893
1894 return av;
1895}
1896
1897/* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1898static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1899{
1900 u32 av = 0;
1901
1902 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1903 av |= FILE__READ;
1904 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1905 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1906 av |= FILE__APPEND;
1907 else
1908 av |= FILE__WRITE;
1909 }
1910 if (!av) {
1911 /*
1912 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1913 */
1914 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1915 }
1916
1917 return av;
1918}
1919
1920/*
1921 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1922 * open permission.
1923 */
1924static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1925{
1926 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1927
1928 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1929 av |= FILE__OPEN;
1930
1931 return av;
1932}
1933
1934/* Hook functions begin here. */
1935
1936static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1937 unsigned int mode)
1938{
1939 int rc;
1940
1941 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
1942 if (rc)
1943 return rc;
1944
1945 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1946 u32 sid = current_sid();
1947 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1948 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1949 }
1950
1951 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1952}
1953
1954static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1955{
1956 int rc;
1957
1958 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
1959 if (rc)
1960 return rc;
1961
1962 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1963}
1964
1965static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1966 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1967{
1968 int error;
1969
1970 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1971 if (error)
1972 return error;
1973
1974 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1975}
1976
1977static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1978 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1979 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1980 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1981{
1982 int error;
1983
1984 error = cap_capset(new, old,
1985 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1986 if (error)
1987 return error;
1988
1989 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1990}
1991
1992/*
1993 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
1994 * which was removed).
1995 *
1996 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
1997 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
1998 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
1999 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2000 */
2001
2002static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2003 int cap, int audit)
2004{
2005 int rc;
2006
2007 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
2008 if (rc)
2009 return rc;
2010
2011 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
2012}
2013
2014static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2015{
2016 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2017 int rc = 0;
2018
2019 if (!sb)
2020 return 0;
2021
2022 switch (cmds) {
2023 case Q_SYNC:
2024 case Q_QUOTAON:
2025 case Q_QUOTAOFF:
2026 case Q_SETINFO:
2027 case Q_SETQUOTA:
2028 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2029 break;
2030 case Q_GETFMT:
2031 case Q_GETINFO:
2032 case Q_GETQUOTA:
2033 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2034 break;
2035 default:
2036 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2037 break;
2038 }
2039 return rc;
2040}
2041
2042static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2043{
2044 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2045
2046 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2047}
2048
2049static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2050{
2051 int rc;
2052
2053 switch (type) {
2054 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2055 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2056 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2057 break;
2058 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2059 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2060 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2061 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2062 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2063 break;
2064 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2065 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2066 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2067 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2068 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2069 default:
2070 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2071 break;
2072 }
2073 return rc;
2074}
2075
2076/*
2077 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2078 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2079 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2080 *
2081 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2082 * processes that allocate mappings.
2083 */
2084static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2085{
2086 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2087
2088 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2089 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2090 if (rc == 0)
2091 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2092
2093 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2094}
2095
2096/* binprm security operations */
2097
2098static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2099 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2100 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2101{
2102 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2103 int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2104 int rc;
2105
2106 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2107 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2108
2109 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2110 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2111
2112 /*
2113 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2114 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2115 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2116 * of the current SID.
2117 */
2118 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2119 if (rc) {
2120 /*
2121 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2122 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2123 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2124 */
2125 if (nnp)
2126 return -EPERM;
2127 else
2128 return -EACCES;
2129 }
2130 return 0;
2131}
2132
2133static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2134{
2135 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2136 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2137 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2138 struct common_audit_data ad;
2139 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2140 int rc;
2141
2142 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2143 if (rc)
2144 return rc;
2145
2146 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2147 * the script interpreter */
2148 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2149 return 0;
2150
2151 old_tsec = current_security();
2152 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2153 isec = inode->i_security;
2154
2155 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2156 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2157 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2158
2159 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2160 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2161 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2162 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2163
2164 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2165 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2166 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2167 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2168
2169 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2170 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2171 if (rc)
2172 return rc;
2173 } else {
2174 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2175 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2176 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2177 &new_tsec->sid);
2178 if (rc)
2179 return rc;
2180
2181 /*
2182 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2183 * transition.
2184 */
2185 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2186 if (rc)
2187 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2188 }
2189
2190 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2191 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2192
2193 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2194 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2195 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2196 if (rc)
2197 return rc;
2198 } else {
2199 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2200 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2201 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2202 if (rc)
2203 return rc;
2204
2205 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2206 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2207 if (rc)
2208 return rc;
2209
2210 /* Check for shared state */
2211 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2212 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2213 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2214 NULL);
2215 if (rc)
2216 return -EPERM;
2217 }
2218
2219 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2220 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2221 if (bprm->unsafe &
2222 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2223 struct task_struct *tracer;
2224 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2225 u32 ptsid = 0;
2226
2227 rcu_read_lock();
2228 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2229 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2230 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2231 ptsid = sec->sid;
2232 }
2233 rcu_read_unlock();
2234
2235 if (ptsid != 0) {
2236 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2237 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2238 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2239 if (rc)
2240 return -EPERM;
2241 }
2242 }
2243
2244 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2245 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2246 }
2247
2248 return 0;
2249}
2250
2251static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2252{
2253 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2254 u32 sid, osid;
2255 int atsecure = 0;
2256
2257 sid = tsec->sid;
2258 osid = tsec->osid;
2259
2260 if (osid != sid) {
2261 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2262 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2263 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2264 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2265 SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2266 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2267 }
2268
2269 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2270}
2271
2272static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2273{
2274 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2275}
2276
2277/* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2278static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2279 struct files_struct *files)
2280{
2281 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2282 struct tty_struct *tty;
2283 int drop_tty = 0;
2284 unsigned n;
2285
2286 tty = get_current_tty();
2287 if (tty) {
2288 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2289 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2290 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2291
2292 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2293 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2294 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2295 open file may belong to another process and we are
2296 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2297 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2298 struct tty_file_private, list);
2299 file = file_priv->file;
2300 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2301 drop_tty = 1;
2302 }
2303 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2304 tty_kref_put(tty);
2305 }
2306 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2307 if (drop_tty)
2308 no_tty();
2309
2310 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2311 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2312 if (!n) /* none found? */
2313 return;
2314
2315 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2316 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2317 devnull = NULL;
2318 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2319 do {
2320 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2321 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2322 if (devnull)
2323 fput(devnull);
2324}
2325
2326/*
2327 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2328 */
2329static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2330{
2331 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2332 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2333 int rc, i;
2334
2335 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2336 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2337 return;
2338
2339 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2340 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2341
2342 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2343 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2344
2345 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2346 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2347 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2348 *
2349 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2350 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2351 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2352 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2353 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2354 */
2355 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2356 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2357 if (rc) {
2358 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2359 task_lock(current);
2360 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2361 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2362 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2363 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2364 }
2365 task_unlock(current);
2366 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2367 }
2368}
2369
2370/*
2371 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2372 * due to exec
2373 */
2374static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2375{
2376 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2377 struct itimerval itimer;
2378 u32 osid, sid;
2379 int rc, i;
2380
2381 osid = tsec->osid;
2382 sid = tsec->sid;
2383
2384 if (sid == osid)
2385 return;
2386
2387 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2388 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2389 * flush and unblock signals.
2390 *
2391 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2392 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2393 */
2394 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2395 if (rc) {
2396 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2397 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2398 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2399 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2400 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2401 __flush_signals(current);
2402 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2403 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2404 }
2405 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2406 }
2407
2408 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2409 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2410 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2411 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2412 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2413}
2414
2415/* superblock security operations */
2416
2417static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2418{
2419 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2420}
2421
2422static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2423{
2424 superblock_free_security(sb);
2425}
2426
2427static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2428{
2429 if (plen > olen)
2430 return 0;
2431
2432 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2433}
2434
2435static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2436{
2437 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2438 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2439 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2440 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2441 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2442}
2443
2444static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2445{
2446 if (!*first) {
2447 **to = ',';
2448 *to += 1;
2449 } else
2450 *first = 0;
2451 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2452 *to += len;
2453}
2454
2455static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2456 int len)
2457{
2458 int current_size = 0;
2459
2460 if (!*first) {
2461 **to = '|';
2462 *to += 1;
2463 } else
2464 *first = 0;
2465
2466 while (current_size < len) {
2467 if (*from != '"') {
2468 **to = *from;
2469 *to += 1;
2470 }
2471 from += 1;
2472 current_size += 1;
2473 }
2474}
2475
2476static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2477{
2478 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2479 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2480 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2481 int open_quote = 0;
2482
2483 in_curr = orig;
2484 sec_curr = copy;
2485
2486 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2487 if (!nosec) {
2488 rc = -ENOMEM;
2489 goto out;
2490 }
2491
2492 nosec_save = nosec;
2493 fnosec = fsec = 1;
2494 in_save = in_end = orig;
2495
2496 do {
2497 if (*in_end == '"')
2498 open_quote = !open_quote;
2499 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2500 *in_end == '\0') {
2501 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2502
2503 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2504 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2505 else
2506 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2507
2508 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2509 }
2510 } while (*in_end++);
2511
2512 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2513 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2514out:
2515 return rc;
2516}
2517
2518static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2519{
2520 int rc, i, *flags;
2521 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2522 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2523 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2524
2525 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2526 return 0;
2527
2528 if (!data)
2529 return 0;
2530
2531 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2532 return 0;
2533
2534 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2535 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2536 if (!secdata)
2537 return -ENOMEM;
2538 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2539 if (rc)
2540 goto out_free_secdata;
2541
2542 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2543 if (rc)
2544 goto out_free_secdata;
2545
2546 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2547 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2548
2549 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2550 u32 sid;
2551 size_t len;
2552
2553 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2554 continue;
2555 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2556 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
2557 GFP_KERNEL);
2558 if (rc) {
2559 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2560 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2561 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2562 goto out_free_opts;
2563 }
2564 rc = -EINVAL;
2565 switch (flags[i]) {
2566 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
2567 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2568 goto out_bad_option;
2569 break;
2570 case CONTEXT_MNT:
2571 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2572 goto out_bad_option;
2573 break;
2574 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2575 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2576 root_isec = sb->s_root->d_inode->i_security;
2577
2578 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2579 goto out_bad_option;
2580 break;
2581 }
2582 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2583 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2584 goto out_bad_option;
2585 break;
2586 default:
2587 goto out_free_opts;
2588 }
2589 }
2590
2591 rc = 0;
2592out_free_opts:
2593 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2594out_free_secdata:
2595 free_secdata(secdata);
2596 return rc;
2597out_bad_option:
2598 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2599 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2600 sb->s_type->name);
2601 goto out_free_opts;
2602}
2603
2604static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2605{
2606 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2607 struct common_audit_data ad;
2608 int rc;
2609
2610 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2611 if (rc)
2612 return rc;
2613
2614 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2615 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2616 return 0;
2617
2618 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2619 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2620 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2621}
2622
2623static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2624{
2625 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2626 struct common_audit_data ad;
2627
2628 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2629 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2630 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2631}
2632
2633static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2634 struct path *path,
2635 const char *type,
2636 unsigned long flags,
2637 void *data)
2638{
2639 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2640
2641 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2642 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2643 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2644 else
2645 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2646}
2647
2648static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2649{
2650 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2651
2652 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2653 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2654}
2655
2656/* inode security operations */
2657
2658static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2659{
2660 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2661}
2662
2663static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2664{
2665 inode_free_security(inode);
2666}
2667
2668static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2669 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2670 u32 *ctxlen)
2671{
2672 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2673 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2674 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2675 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2676 struct inode *dir = dentry->d_parent->d_inode;
2677 u32 newsid;
2678 int rc;
2679
2680 tsec = cred->security;
2681 dsec = dir->i_security;
2682 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2683
2684 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2685 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2686 } else {
2687 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2688 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2689 name,
2690 &newsid);
2691 if (rc) {
2692 printk(KERN_WARNING
2693 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2694 __func__, -rc);
2695 return rc;
2696 }
2697 }
2698
2699 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2700}
2701
2702static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2703 const struct qstr *qstr,
2704 const char **name,
2705 void **value, size_t *len)
2706{
2707 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2708 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2709 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2710 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2711 int rc;
2712 char *context;
2713
2714 dsec = dir->i_security;
2715 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2716
2717 sid = tsec->sid;
2718 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2719
2720 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2721 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2722 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2723 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
2724 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2725 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2726 qstr, &newsid);
2727 if (rc) {
2728 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2729 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2730 "ino=%ld)\n",
2731 __func__,
2732 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2733 return rc;
2734 }
2735 }
2736
2737 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2738 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2739 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2740 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2741 isec->sid = newsid;
2742 isec->initialized = 1;
2743 }
2744
2745 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2746 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2747
2748 if (name)
2749 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2750
2751 if (value && len) {
2752 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2753 if (rc)
2754 return rc;
2755 *value = context;
2756 *len = clen;
2757 }
2758
2759 return 0;
2760}
2761
2762static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2763{
2764 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2765}
2766
2767static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2768{
2769 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2770}
2771
2772static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2773{
2774 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2775}
2776
2777static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2778{
2779 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2780}
2781
2782static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2783{
2784 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2785}
2786
2787static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2788{
2789 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2790}
2791
2792static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2793{
2794 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2795}
2796
2797static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2798 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2799{
2800 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2801}
2802
2803static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2804{
2805 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2806
2807 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2808}
2809
2810static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2811{
2812 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2813
2814 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2815}
2816
2817static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2818 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2819 int result,
2820 unsigned flags)
2821{
2822 struct common_audit_data ad;
2823 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2824 int rc;
2825
2826 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2827 ad.u.inode = inode;
2828
2829 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2830 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2831 if (rc)
2832 return rc;
2833 return 0;
2834}
2835
2836static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2837{
2838 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2839 u32 perms;
2840 bool from_access;
2841 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2842 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2843 u32 sid;
2844 struct av_decision avd;
2845 int rc, rc2;
2846 u32 audited, denied;
2847
2848 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2849 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2850
2851 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2852 if (!mask)
2853 return 0;
2854
2855 validate_creds(cred);
2856
2857 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2858 return 0;
2859
2860 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2861
2862 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2863 isec = inode->i_security;
2864
2865 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2866 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2867 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2868 &denied);
2869 if (likely(!audited))
2870 return rc;
2871
2872 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
2873 if (rc2)
2874 return rc2;
2875 return rc;
2876}
2877
2878static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2879{
2880 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2881 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2882 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2883
2884 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2885 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2886 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2887 ATTR_FORCE);
2888 if (!ia_valid)
2889 return 0;
2890 }
2891
2892 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2893 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2894 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2895
2896 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2897 av |= FILE__OPEN;
2898
2899 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2900}
2901
2902static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2903{
2904 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2905 struct path path;
2906
2907 path.dentry = dentry;
2908 path.mnt = mnt;
2909
2910 return path_has_perm(cred, &path, FILE__GETATTR);
2911}
2912
2913static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2914{
2915 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2916
2917 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2918 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2919 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2920 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2921 return -EPERM;
2922 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2923 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2924 Restrict to administrator. */
2925 return -EPERM;
2926 }
2927 }
2928
2929 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2930 ordinary setattr permission. */
2931 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2932}
2933
2934static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2935 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2936{
2937 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2938 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2939 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2940 struct common_audit_data ad;
2941 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2942 int rc = 0;
2943
2944 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2945 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2946
2947 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2948 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2949 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2950
2951 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
2952 return -EPERM;
2953
2954 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2955 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
2956
2957 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2958 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2959 if (rc)
2960 return rc;
2961
2962 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
2963 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2964 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
2965 struct audit_buffer *ab;
2966 size_t audit_size;
2967 const char *str;
2968
2969 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
2970 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
2971 if (value) {
2972 str = value;
2973 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
2974 audit_size = size - 1;
2975 else
2976 audit_size = size;
2977 } else {
2978 str = "";
2979 audit_size = 0;
2980 }
2981 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
2982 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
2983 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
2984 audit_log_end(ab);
2985
2986 return rc;
2987 }
2988 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2989 }
2990 if (rc)
2991 return rc;
2992
2993 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2994 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2995 if (rc)
2996 return rc;
2997
2998 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2999 isec->sclass);
3000 if (rc)
3001 return rc;
3002
3003 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3004 sbsec->sid,
3005 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3006 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3007 &ad);
3008}
3009
3010static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3011 const void *value, size_t size,
3012 int flags)
3013{
3014 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
3015 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3016 u32 newsid;
3017 int rc;
3018
3019 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3020 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3021 return;
3022 }
3023
3024 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3025 if (rc) {
3026 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3027 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3028 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3029 return;
3030 }
3031
3032 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3033 isec->sid = newsid;
3034 isec->initialized = 1;
3035
3036 return;
3037}
3038
3039static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3040{
3041 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3042
3043 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3044}
3045
3046static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3047{
3048 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3049
3050 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3051}
3052
3053static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3054{
3055 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3056 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3057
3058 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3059 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3060 return -EACCES;
3061}
3062
3063/*
3064 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3065 *
3066 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3067 */
3068static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3069{
3070 u32 size;
3071 int error;
3072 char *context = NULL;
3073 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3074
3075 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3076 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3077
3078 /*
3079 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3080 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3081 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3082 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3083 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3084 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3085 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3086 */
3087 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3088 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3089 if (!error)
3090 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3091 &size);
3092 else
3093 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3094 if (error)
3095 return error;
3096 error = size;
3097 if (alloc) {
3098 *buffer = context;
3099 goto out_nofree;
3100 }
3101 kfree(context);
3102out_nofree:
3103 return error;
3104}
3105
3106static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3107 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3108{
3109 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3110 u32 newsid;
3111 int rc;
3112
3113 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3114 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
3115
3116 if (!value || !size)
3117 return -EACCES;
3118
3119 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3120 if (rc)
3121 return rc;
3122
3123 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3124 isec->sid = newsid;
3125 isec->initialized = 1;
3126 return 0;
3127}
3128
3129static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3130{
3131 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3132 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3133 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3134 return len;
3135}
3136
3137static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3138{
3139 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3140 *secid = isec->sid;
3141}
3142
3143/* file security operations */
3144
3145static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3146{
3147 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3148 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3149
3150 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3151 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3152 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
3153
3154 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3155 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3156}
3157
3158static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3159{
3160 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3161 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3162 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3163 u32 sid = current_sid();
3164
3165 if (!mask)
3166 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3167 return 0;
3168
3169 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3170 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3171 /* No change since file_open check. */
3172 return 0;
3173
3174 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3175}
3176
3177static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3178{
3179 return file_alloc_security(file);
3180}
3181
3182static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3183{
3184 file_free_security(file);
3185}
3186
3187static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3188 unsigned long arg)
3189{
3190 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3191 int error = 0;
3192
3193 switch (cmd) {
3194 case FIONREAD:
3195 /* fall through */
3196 case FIBMAP:
3197 /* fall through */
3198 case FIGETBSZ:
3199 /* fall through */
3200 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3201 /* fall through */
3202 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3203 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3204 break;
3205
3206 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3207 /* fall through */
3208 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3209 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3210 break;
3211
3212 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3213 case FIONBIO:
3214 /* fall through */
3215 case FIOASYNC:
3216 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3217 break;
3218
3219 case KDSKBENT:
3220 case KDSKBSENT:
3221 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3222 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3223 break;
3224
3225 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3226 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3227 */
3228 default:
3229 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3230 }
3231 return error;
3232}
3233
3234static int default_noexec;
3235
3236static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3237{
3238 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3239 int rc = 0;
3240
3241 if (default_noexec &&
3242 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3243 /*
3244 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3245 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3246 * This has an additional check.
3247 */
3248 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3249 if (rc)
3250 goto error;
3251 }
3252
3253 if (file) {
3254 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3255 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3256
3257 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3258 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3259 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3260
3261 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3262 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3263
3264 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3265 }
3266
3267error:
3268 return rc;
3269}
3270
3271static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3272{
3273 int rc;
3274
3275 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3276 rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3277 if (rc)
3278 return rc;
3279
3280 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3281 u32 sid = current_sid();
3282 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3283 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3284 }
3285
3286 return rc;
3287}
3288
3289static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3290 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3291{
3292 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3293 prot = reqprot;
3294
3295 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3296 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3297}
3298
3299static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3300 unsigned long reqprot,
3301 unsigned long prot)
3302{
3303 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3304
3305 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3306 prot = reqprot;
3307
3308 if (default_noexec &&
3309 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3310 int rc = 0;
3311 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3312 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3313 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3314 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3315 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3316 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3317 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3318 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3319 /*
3320 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3321 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3322 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3323 * modified content. This typically should only
3324 * occur for text relocations.
3325 */
3326 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3327 }
3328 if (rc)
3329 return rc;
3330 }
3331
3332 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3333}
3334
3335static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3336{
3337 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3338
3339 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3340}
3341
3342static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3343 unsigned long arg)
3344{
3345 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3346 int err = 0;
3347
3348 switch (cmd) {
3349 case F_SETFL:
3350 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3351 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3352 break;
3353 }
3354 /* fall through */
3355 case F_SETOWN:
3356 case F_SETSIG:
3357 case F_GETFL:
3358 case F_GETOWN:
3359 case F_GETSIG:
3360 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3361 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3362 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3363 break;
3364 case F_GETLK:
3365 case F_SETLK:
3366 case F_SETLKW:
3367 case F_OFD_GETLK:
3368 case F_OFD_SETLK:
3369 case F_OFD_SETLKW:
3370#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3371 case F_GETLK64:
3372 case F_SETLK64:
3373 case F_SETLKW64:
3374#endif
3375 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3376 break;
3377 }
3378
3379 return err;
3380}
3381
3382static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3383{
3384 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3385
3386 fsec = file->f_security;
3387 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3388}
3389
3390static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3391 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3392{
3393 struct file *file;
3394 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3395 u32 perm;
3396 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3397
3398 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3399 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3400
3401 fsec = file->f_security;
3402
3403 if (!signum)
3404 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3405 else
3406 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3407
3408 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3409 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3410}
3411
3412static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3413{
3414 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3415
3416 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3417}
3418
3419static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3420{
3421 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3422 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3423
3424 fsec = file->f_security;
3425 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3426 /*
3427 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3428 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3429 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3430 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3431 * struct as its SID.
3432 */
3433 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3434 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3435 /*
3436 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3437 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3438 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3439 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3440 * new inode label or new policy.
3441 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3442 */
3443 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3444}
3445
3446/* task security operations */
3447
3448static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3449{
3450 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3451}
3452
3453/*
3454 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3455 */
3456static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3457{
3458 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3459
3460 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3461 if (!tsec)
3462 return -ENOMEM;
3463
3464 cred->security = tsec;
3465 return 0;
3466}
3467
3468/*
3469 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3470 */
3471static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3472{
3473 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3474
3475 /*
3476 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3477 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3478 */
3479 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3480 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3481 kfree(tsec);
3482}
3483
3484/*
3485 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3486 */
3487static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3488 gfp_t gfp)
3489{
3490 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3491 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3492
3493 old_tsec = old->security;
3494
3495 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3496 if (!tsec)
3497 return -ENOMEM;
3498
3499 new->security = tsec;
3500 return 0;
3501}
3502
3503/*
3504 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3505 */
3506static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3507{
3508 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3509 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3510
3511 *tsec = *old_tsec;
3512}
3513
3514/*
3515 * set the security data for a kernel service
3516 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3517 */
3518static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3519{
3520 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3521 u32 sid = current_sid();
3522 int ret;
3523
3524 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3525 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3526 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3527 NULL);
3528 if (ret == 0) {
3529 tsec->sid = secid;
3530 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3531 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3532 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3533 }
3534 return ret;
3535}
3536
3537/*
3538 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3539 * objective context of the specified inode
3540 */
3541static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3542{
3543 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3544 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3545 u32 sid = current_sid();
3546 int ret;
3547
3548 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3549 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3550 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3551 NULL);
3552
3553 if (ret == 0)
3554 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3555 return ret;
3556}
3557
3558static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3559{
3560 u32 sid;
3561 struct common_audit_data ad;
3562
3563 sid = task_sid(current);
3564
3565 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3566 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3567
3568 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3569 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3570}
3571
3572static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3573{
3574 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3575}
3576
3577static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3578{
3579 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3580}
3581
3582static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3583{
3584 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3585}
3586
3587static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3588{
3589 *secid = task_sid(p);
3590}
3591
3592static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3593{
3594 int rc;
3595
3596 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3597 if (rc)
3598 return rc;
3599
3600 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3601}
3602
3603static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3604{
3605 int rc;
3606
3607 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3608 if (rc)
3609 return rc;
3610
3611 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3612}
3613
3614static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3615{
3616 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3617}
3618
3619static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3620 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3621{
3622 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3623
3624 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3625 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3626 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3627 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3628 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3629 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3630
3631 return 0;
3632}
3633
3634static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3635{
3636 int rc;
3637
3638 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3639 if (rc)
3640 return rc;
3641
3642 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3643}
3644
3645static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3646{
3647 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3648}
3649
3650static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3651{
3652 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3653}
3654
3655static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3656 int sig, u32 secid)
3657{
3658 u32 perm;
3659 int rc;
3660
3661 if (!sig)
3662 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3663 else
3664 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3665 if (secid)
3666 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3667 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3668 else
3669 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3670 return rc;
3671}
3672
3673static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3674{
3675 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3676}
3677
3678static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3679 struct inode *inode)
3680{
3681 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3682 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3683
3684 isec->sid = sid;
3685 isec->initialized = 1;
3686}
3687
3688/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3689static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3690 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3691{
3692 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3693 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3694
3695 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3696 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3697 if (ih == NULL)
3698 goto out;
3699
3700 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3701 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3702 goto out;
3703
3704 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3705 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3706 ret = 0;
3707
3708 if (proto)
3709 *proto = ih->protocol;
3710
3711 switch (ih->protocol) {
3712 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3713 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3714
3715 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3716 break;
3717
3718 offset += ihlen;
3719 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3720 if (th == NULL)
3721 break;
3722
3723 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3724 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3725 break;
3726 }
3727
3728 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3729 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3730
3731 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3732 break;
3733
3734 offset += ihlen;
3735 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3736 if (uh == NULL)
3737 break;
3738
3739 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3740 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3741 break;
3742 }
3743
3744 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3745 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3746
3747 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3748 break;
3749
3750 offset += ihlen;
3751 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3752 if (dh == NULL)
3753 break;
3754
3755 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3756 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3757 break;
3758 }
3759
3760 default:
3761 break;
3762 }
3763out:
3764 return ret;
3765}
3766
3767#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3768
3769/* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3770static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3771 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3772{
3773 u8 nexthdr;
3774 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3775 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3776 __be16 frag_off;
3777
3778 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3779 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3780 if (ip6 == NULL)
3781 goto out;
3782
3783 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3784 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3785 ret = 0;
3786
3787 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3788 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3789 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3790 if (offset < 0)
3791 goto out;
3792
3793 if (proto)
3794 *proto = nexthdr;
3795
3796 switch (nexthdr) {
3797 case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3798 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3799
3800 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3801 if (th == NULL)
3802 break;
3803
3804 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3805 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3806 break;
3807 }
3808
3809 case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3810 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3811
3812 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3813 if (uh == NULL)
3814 break;
3815
3816 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3817 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3818 break;
3819 }
3820
3821 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3822 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3823
3824 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3825 if (dh == NULL)
3826 break;
3827
3828 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3829 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3830 break;
3831 }
3832
3833 /* includes fragments */
3834 default:
3835 break;
3836 }
3837out:
3838 return ret;
3839}
3840
3841#endif /* IPV6 */
3842
3843static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3844 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3845{
3846 char *addrp;
3847 int ret;
3848
3849 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3850 case PF_INET:
3851 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3852 if (ret)
3853 goto parse_error;
3854 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3855 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3856 goto okay;
3857
3858#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3859 case PF_INET6:
3860 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3861 if (ret)
3862 goto parse_error;
3863 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3864 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3865 goto okay;
3866#endif /* IPV6 */
3867 default:
3868 addrp = NULL;
3869 goto okay;
3870 }
3871
3872parse_error:
3873 printk(KERN_WARNING
3874 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3875 " unable to parse packet\n");
3876 return ret;
3877
3878okay:
3879 if (_addrp)
3880 *_addrp = addrp;
3881 return 0;
3882}
3883
3884/**
3885 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3886 * @skb: the packet
3887 * @family: protocol family
3888 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3889 *
3890 * Description:
3891 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3892 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3893 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3894 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3895 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3896 * peer labels.
3897 *
3898 */
3899static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3900{
3901 int err;
3902 u32 xfrm_sid;
3903 u32 nlbl_sid;
3904 u32 nlbl_type;
3905
3906 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3907 if (unlikely(err))
3908 return -EACCES;
3909 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3910 if (unlikely(err))
3911 return -EACCES;
3912
3913 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3914 if (unlikely(err)) {
3915 printk(KERN_WARNING
3916 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3917 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3918 return -EACCES;
3919 }
3920
3921 return 0;
3922}
3923
3924/**
3925 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3926 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3927 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3928 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3929 *
3930 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3931 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3932 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3933 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3934 *
3935 */
3936static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
3937{
3938 int err = 0;
3939
3940 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
3941 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
3942 else
3943 *conn_sid = sk_sid;
3944
3945 return err;
3946}
3947
3948/* socket security operations */
3949
3950static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
3951 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
3952{
3953 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
3954 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3955 return 0;
3956 }
3957
3958 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
3959 socksid);
3960}
3961
3962static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
3963{
3964 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
3965 struct common_audit_data ad;
3966 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
3967 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
3968
3969 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3970 return 0;
3971
3972 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
3973 ad.u.net = &net;
3974 ad.u.net->sk = sk;
3975
3976 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3977}
3978
3979static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3980 int protocol, int kern)
3981{
3982 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
3983 u32 newsid;
3984 u16 secclass;
3985 int rc;
3986
3987 if (kern)
3988 return 0;
3989
3990 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3991 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
3992 if (rc)
3993 return rc;
3994
3995 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3996}
3997
3998static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3999 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4000{
4001 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4002 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4003 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4004 int err = 0;
4005
4006 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4007
4008 if (kern)
4009 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4010 else {
4011 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4012 if (err)
4013 return err;
4014 }
4015
4016 isec->initialized = 1;
4017
4018 if (sock->sk) {
4019 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4020 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4021 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4022 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4023 }
4024
4025 return err;
4026}
4027
4028/* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4029 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4030 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4031
4032static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4033{
4034 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4035 u16 family;
4036 int err;
4037
4038 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4039 if (err)
4040 goto out;
4041
4042 /*
4043 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4044 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4045 * check the first address now.
4046 */
4047 family = sk->sk_family;
4048 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4049 char *addrp;
4050 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4051 struct common_audit_data ad;
4052 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4053 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4054 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4055 unsigned short snum;
4056 u32 sid, node_perm;
4057
4058 if (family == PF_INET) {
4059 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4060 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4061 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4062 } else {
4063 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4064 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4065 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4066 }
4067
4068 if (snum) {
4069 int low, high;
4070
4071 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4072
4073 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4074 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4075 snum, &sid);
4076 if (err)
4077 goto out;
4078 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4079 ad.u.net = &net;
4080 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4081 ad.u.net->family = family;
4082 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4083 sksec->sclass,
4084 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4085 if (err)
4086 goto out;
4087 }
4088 }
4089
4090 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4091 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4092 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4093 break;
4094
4095 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4096 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4097 break;
4098
4099 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4100 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4101 break;
4102
4103 default:
4104 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4105 break;
4106 }
4107
4108 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4109 if (err)
4110 goto out;
4111
4112 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4113 ad.u.net = &net;
4114 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4115 ad.u.net->family = family;
4116
4117 if (family == PF_INET)
4118 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4119 else
4120 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4121
4122 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4123 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4124 if (err)
4125 goto out;
4126 }
4127out:
4128 return err;
4129}
4130
4131static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4132{
4133 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4134 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4135 int err;
4136
4137 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4138 if (err)
4139 return err;
4140
4141 /*
4142 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4143 */
4144 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4145 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4146 struct common_audit_data ad;
4147 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4148 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4149 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4150 unsigned short snum;
4151 u32 sid, perm;
4152
4153 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4154 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4155 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4156 return -EINVAL;
4157 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4158 } else {
4159 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4160 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4161 return -EINVAL;
4162 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4163 }
4164
4165 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4166 if (err)
4167 goto out;
4168
4169 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4170 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4171
4172 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4173 ad.u.net = &net;
4174 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4175 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4176 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4177 if (err)
4178 goto out;
4179 }
4180
4181 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4182
4183out:
4184 return err;
4185}
4186
4187static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4188{
4189 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4190}
4191
4192static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4193{
4194 int err;
4195 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4196 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4197
4198 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4199 if (err)
4200 return err;
4201
4202 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4203
4204 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4205 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4206 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4207 newisec->initialized = 1;
4208
4209 return 0;
4210}
4211
4212static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4213 int size)
4214{
4215 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4216}
4217
4218static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4219 int size, int flags)
4220{
4221 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4222}
4223
4224static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4225{
4226 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4227}
4228
4229static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4230{
4231 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4232}
4233
4234static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4235{
4236 int err;
4237
4238 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4239 if (err)
4240 return err;
4241
4242 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4243}
4244
4245static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4246 int optname)
4247{
4248 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4249}
4250
4251static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4252{
4253 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4254}
4255
4256static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4257 struct sock *other,
4258 struct sock *newsk)
4259{
4260 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4261 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4262 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4263 struct common_audit_data ad;
4264 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4265 int err;
4266
4267 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4268 ad.u.net = &net;
4269 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4270
4271 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4272 sksec_other->sclass,
4273 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4274 if (err)
4275 return err;
4276
4277 /* server child socket */
4278 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4279 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4280 &sksec_new->sid);
4281 if (err)
4282 return err;
4283
4284 /* connecting socket */
4285 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4286
4287 return 0;
4288}
4289
4290static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4291 struct socket *other)
4292{
4293 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4294 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4295 struct common_audit_data ad;
4296 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4297
4298 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4299 ad.u.net = &net;
4300 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4301
4302 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4303 &ad);
4304}
4305
4306static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4307 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4308 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4309{
4310 int err;
4311 u32 if_sid;
4312 u32 node_sid;
4313
4314 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4315 if (err)
4316 return err;
4317 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4318 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4319 if (err)
4320 return err;
4321
4322 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4323 if (err)
4324 return err;
4325 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4326 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4327}
4328
4329static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4330 u16 family)
4331{
4332 int err = 0;
4333 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4334 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4335 struct common_audit_data ad;
4336 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4337 char *addrp;
4338
4339 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4340 ad.u.net = &net;
4341 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4342 ad.u.net->family = family;
4343 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4344 if (err)
4345 return err;
4346
4347 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4348 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4349 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4350 if (err)
4351 return err;
4352 }
4353
4354 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4355 if (err)
4356 return err;
4357 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4358
4359 return err;
4360}
4361
4362static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4363{
4364 int err;
4365 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4366 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4367 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4368 struct common_audit_data ad;
4369 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4370 char *addrp;
4371 u8 secmark_active;
4372 u8 peerlbl_active;
4373
4374 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4375 return 0;
4376
4377 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4378 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4379 family = PF_INET;
4380
4381 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4382 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4383 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4384 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4385 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4386 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4387
4388 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4389 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4390 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4391 return 0;
4392
4393 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4394 ad.u.net = &net;
4395 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4396 ad.u.net->family = family;
4397 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4398 if (err)
4399 return err;
4400
4401 if (peerlbl_active) {
4402 u32 peer_sid;
4403
4404 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4405 if (err)
4406 return err;
4407 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4408 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4409 if (err) {
4410 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4411 return err;
4412 }
4413 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4414 PEER__RECV, &ad);
4415 if (err) {
4416 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4417 return err;
4418 }
4419 }
4420
4421 if (secmark_active) {
4422 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4423 PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4424 if (err)
4425 return err;
4426 }
4427
4428 return err;
4429}
4430
4431static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4432 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4433{
4434 int err = 0;
4435 char *scontext;
4436 u32 scontext_len;
4437 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4438 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4439
4440 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4441 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4442 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4443 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4444 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4445
4446 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4447 if (err)
4448 return err;
4449
4450 if (scontext_len > len) {
4451 err = -ERANGE;
4452 goto out_len;
4453 }
4454
4455 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4456 err = -EFAULT;
4457
4458out_len:
4459 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4460 err = -EFAULT;
4461 kfree(scontext);
4462 return err;
4463}
4464
4465static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4466{
4467 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4468 u16 family;
4469
4470 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4471 family = PF_INET;
4472 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4473 family = PF_INET6;
4474 else if (sock)
4475 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4476 else
4477 goto out;
4478
4479 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4480 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4481 else if (skb)
4482 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4483
4484out:
4485 *secid = peer_secid;
4486 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4487 return -EINVAL;
4488 return 0;
4489}
4490
4491static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4492{
4493 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4494
4495 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4496 if (!sksec)
4497 return -ENOMEM;
4498
4499 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4500 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4501 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4502 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4503
4504 return 0;
4505}
4506
4507static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4508{
4509 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4510
4511 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4512 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4513 kfree(sksec);
4514}
4515
4516static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4517{
4518 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4519 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4520
4521 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4522 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4523 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4524
4525 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4526}
4527
4528static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4529{
4530 if (!sk)
4531 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4532 else {
4533 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4534
4535 *secid = sksec->sid;
4536 }
4537}
4538
4539static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4540{
4541 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4542 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4543
4544 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4545 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4546 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4547 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4548}
4549
4550static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4551 struct request_sock *req)
4552{
4553 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4554 int err;
4555 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4556 u32 connsid;
4557 u32 peersid;
4558
4559 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4560 if (err)
4561 return err;
4562 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4563 if (err)
4564 return err;
4565 req->secid = connsid;
4566 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4567
4568 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4569}
4570
4571static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4572 const struct request_sock *req)
4573{
4574 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4575
4576 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4577 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4578 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4579 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4580 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4581 time it will have been created and available. */
4582
4583 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4584 * thread with access to newsksec */
4585 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4586}
4587
4588static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4589{
4590 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4591 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4592
4593 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4594 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4595 family = PF_INET;
4596
4597 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4598}
4599
4600static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
4601{
4602 skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
4603}
4604
4605static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4606{
4607 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4608 u32 tsid;
4609
4610 __tsec = current_security();
4611 tsid = __tsec->sid;
4612
4613 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4614}
4615
4616static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4617{
4618 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4619}
4620
4621static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4622{
4623 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4624}
4625
4626static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4627 struct flowi *fl)
4628{
4629 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4630}
4631
4632static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4633{
4634 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4635
4636 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4637 if (!tunsec)
4638 return -ENOMEM;
4639 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4640
4641 *security = tunsec;
4642 return 0;
4643}
4644
4645static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4646{
4647 kfree(security);
4648}
4649
4650static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4651{
4652 u32 sid = current_sid();
4653
4654 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4655 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4656 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4657 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4658 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4659 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4660
4661 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4662 NULL);
4663}
4664
4665static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4666{
4667 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4668
4669 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4670 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4671}
4672
4673static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4674{
4675 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4676 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4677
4678 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4679 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4680 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4681 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4682 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4683 * protocols were being used */
4684
4685 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4686 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4687
4688 return 0;
4689}
4690
4691static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4692{
4693 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4694 u32 sid = current_sid();
4695 int err;
4696
4697 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4698 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4699 if (err)
4700 return err;
4701 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4702 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4703 if (err)
4704 return err;
4705 tunsec->sid = sid;
4706
4707 return 0;
4708}
4709
4710static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4711{
4712 int err = 0;
4713 u32 perm;
4714 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4715 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4716
4717 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4718 err = -EINVAL;
4719 goto out;
4720 }
4721 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4722
4723 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4724 if (err) {
4725 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4726 printk(KERN_WARNING
4727 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4728 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
4729 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4730 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4731 err = 0;
4732 }
4733
4734 /* Ignore */
4735 if (err == -ENOENT)
4736 err = 0;
4737 goto out;
4738 }
4739
4740 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4741out:
4742 return err;
4743}
4744
4745#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4746
4747static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4748 const struct net_device *indev,
4749 u16 family)
4750{
4751 int err;
4752 char *addrp;
4753 u32 peer_sid;
4754 struct common_audit_data ad;
4755 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4756 u8 secmark_active;
4757 u8 netlbl_active;
4758 u8 peerlbl_active;
4759
4760 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4761 return NF_ACCEPT;
4762
4763 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4764 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4765 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4766 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4767 return NF_ACCEPT;
4768
4769 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4770 return NF_DROP;
4771
4772 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4773 ad.u.net = &net;
4774 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4775 ad.u.net->family = family;
4776 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4777 return NF_DROP;
4778
4779 if (peerlbl_active) {
4780 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4781 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4782 if (err) {
4783 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4784 return NF_DROP;
4785 }
4786 }
4787
4788 if (secmark_active)
4789 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4790 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4791 return NF_DROP;
4792
4793 if (netlbl_active)
4794 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4795 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4796 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4797 * protection */
4798 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4799 return NF_DROP;
4800
4801 return NF_ACCEPT;
4802}
4803
4804static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4805 struct sk_buff *skb,
4806 const struct net_device *in,
4807 const struct net_device *out,
4808 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4809{
4810 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in, PF_INET);
4811}
4812
4813#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4814static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4815 struct sk_buff *skb,
4816 const struct net_device *in,
4817 const struct net_device *out,
4818 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4819{
4820 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in, PF_INET6);
4821}
4822#endif /* IPV6 */
4823
4824static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4825 u16 family)
4826{
4827 struct sock *sk;
4828 u32 sid;
4829
4830 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4831 return NF_ACCEPT;
4832
4833 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4834 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4835 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4836 sk = skb->sk;
4837 if (sk) {
4838 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4839
4840 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4841 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4842 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4843 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4844 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4845 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4846 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4847 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4848 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4849 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4850 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4851 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4852 * best we can do. */
4853 return NF_ACCEPT;
4854
4855 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4856 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4857 sid = sksec->sid;
4858 } else
4859 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4860 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4861 return NF_DROP;
4862
4863 return NF_ACCEPT;
4864}
4865
4866static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4867 struct sk_buff *skb,
4868 const struct net_device *in,
4869 const struct net_device *out,
4870 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4871{
4872 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4873}
4874
4875static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4876 int ifindex,
4877 u16 family)
4878{
4879 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4880 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4881 struct common_audit_data ad;
4882 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4883 char *addrp;
4884 u8 proto;
4885
4886 if (sk == NULL)
4887 return NF_ACCEPT;
4888 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4889
4890 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4891 ad.u.net = &net;
4892 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4893 ad.u.net->family = family;
4894 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4895 return NF_DROP;
4896
4897 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4898 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4899 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4900 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4901
4902 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4903 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4904
4905 return NF_ACCEPT;
4906}
4907
4908static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
4909 const struct net_device *outdev,
4910 u16 family)
4911{
4912 u32 secmark_perm;
4913 u32 peer_sid;
4914 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
4915 struct sock *sk;
4916 struct common_audit_data ad;
4917 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4918 char *addrp;
4919 u8 secmark_active;
4920 u8 peerlbl_active;
4921
4922 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4923 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4924 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4925 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4926 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4927 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4928
4929 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4930 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4931 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4932 return NF_ACCEPT;
4933
4934 sk = skb->sk;
4935
4936#ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4937 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4938 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4939 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4940 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4941 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4942 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4943 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4944 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4945 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4946 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4947 * connection. */
4948 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
4949 !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
4950 return NF_ACCEPT;
4951#endif
4952
4953 if (sk == NULL) {
4954 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4955 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4956 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4957 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4958 if (skb->skb_iif) {
4959 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4960 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4961 return NF_DROP;
4962 } else {
4963 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4964 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4965 }
4966 } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
4967 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
4968 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
4969 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
4970 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
4971 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
4972 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
4973 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
4974 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
4975 * for similar problems. */
4976 u32 skb_sid;
4977 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4978 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
4979 return NF_DROP;
4980 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
4981 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
4982 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
4983 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
4984 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
4985 * pass the packet. */
4986 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4987 switch (family) {
4988 case PF_INET:
4989 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4990 return NF_ACCEPT;
4991 break;
4992 case PF_INET6:
4993 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
4994 return NF_ACCEPT;
4995 break;
4996 default:
4997 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4998 }
4999 }
5000 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5001 return NF_DROP;
5002 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5003 } else {
5004 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5005 * associated socket. */
5006 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5007 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5008 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5009 }
5010
5011 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5012 ad.u.net = &net;
5013 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5014 ad.u.net->family = family;
5015 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5016 return NF_DROP;
5017
5018 if (secmark_active)
5019 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5020 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5021 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5022
5023 if (peerlbl_active) {
5024 u32 if_sid;
5025 u32 node_sid;
5026
5027 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5028 return NF_DROP;
5029 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5030 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5031 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5032
5033 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5034 return NF_DROP;
5035 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5036 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5037 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5038 }
5039
5040 return NF_ACCEPT;
5041}
5042
5043static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5044 struct sk_buff *skb,
5045 const struct net_device *in,
5046 const struct net_device *out,
5047 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
5048{
5049 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out, PF_INET);
5050}
5051
5052#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5053static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5054 struct sk_buff *skb,
5055 const struct net_device *in,
5056 const struct net_device *out,
5057 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
5058{
5059 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out, PF_INET6);
5060}
5061#endif /* IPV6 */
5062
5063#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5064
5065static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5066{
5067 int err;
5068
5069 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
5070 if (err)
5071 return err;
5072
5073 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5074}
5075
5076static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5077 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5078 u16 sclass)
5079{
5080 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5081 u32 sid;
5082
5083 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5084 if (!isec)
5085 return -ENOMEM;
5086
5087 sid = task_sid(task);
5088 isec->sclass = sclass;
5089 isec->sid = sid;
5090 perm->security = isec;
5091
5092 return 0;
5093}
5094
5095static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5096{
5097 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5098 perm->security = NULL;
5099 kfree(isec);
5100}
5101
5102static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5103{
5104 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5105
5106 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5107 if (!msec)
5108 return -ENOMEM;
5109
5110 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5111 msg->security = msec;
5112
5113 return 0;
5114}
5115
5116static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5117{
5118 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5119
5120 msg->security = NULL;
5121 kfree(msec);
5122}
5123
5124static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5125 u32 perms)
5126{
5127 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5128 struct common_audit_data ad;
5129 u32 sid = current_sid();
5130
5131 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5132
5133 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5134 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5135
5136 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5137}
5138
5139static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5140{
5141 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5142}
5143
5144static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5145{
5146 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5147}
5148
5149/* message queue security operations */
5150static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5151{
5152 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5153 struct common_audit_data ad;
5154 u32 sid = current_sid();
5155 int rc;
5156
5157 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5158 if (rc)
5159 return rc;
5160
5161 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5162
5163 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5164 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5165
5166 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5167 MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
5168 if (rc) {
5169 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5170 return rc;
5171 }
5172 return 0;
5173}
5174
5175static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5176{
5177 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5178}
5179
5180static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5181{
5182 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5183 struct common_audit_data ad;
5184 u32 sid = current_sid();
5185
5186 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5187
5188 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5189 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5190
5191 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5192 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5193}
5194
5195static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5196{
5197 int err;
5198 int perms;
5199
5200 switch (cmd) {
5201 case IPC_INFO:
5202 case MSG_INFO:
5203 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5204 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5205 case IPC_STAT:
5206 case MSG_STAT:
5207 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5208 break;
5209 case IPC_SET:
5210 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5211 break;
5212 case IPC_RMID:
5213 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5214 break;
5215 default:
5216 return 0;
5217 }
5218
5219 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5220 return err;
5221}
5222
5223static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5224{
5225 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5226 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5227 struct common_audit_data ad;
5228 u32 sid = current_sid();
5229 int rc;
5230
5231 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5232 msec = msg->security;
5233
5234 /*
5235 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5236 */
5237 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5238 /*
5239 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5240 * message queue this message will be stored in
5241 */
5242 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5243 NULL, &msec->sid);
5244 if (rc)
5245 return rc;
5246 }
5247
5248 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5249 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5250
5251 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5252 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5253 MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
5254 if (!rc)
5255 /* Can this process send the message */
5256 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5257 MSG__SEND, &ad);
5258 if (!rc)
5259 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5260 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5261 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5262
5263 return rc;
5264}
5265
5266static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5267 struct task_struct *target,
5268 long type, int mode)
5269{
5270 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5271 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5272 struct common_audit_data ad;
5273 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5274 int rc;
5275
5276 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5277 msec = msg->security;
5278
5279 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5280 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5281
5282 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5283 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5284 if (!rc)
5285 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5286 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5287 return rc;
5288}
5289
5290/* Shared Memory security operations */
5291static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5292{
5293 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5294 struct common_audit_data ad;
5295 u32 sid = current_sid();
5296 int rc;
5297
5298 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5299 if (rc)
5300 return rc;
5301
5302 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5303
5304 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5305 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5306
5307 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5308 SHM__CREATE, &ad);
5309 if (rc) {
5310 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5311 return rc;
5312 }
5313 return 0;
5314}
5315
5316static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5317{
5318 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5319}
5320
5321static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5322{
5323 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5324 struct common_audit_data ad;
5325 u32 sid = current_sid();
5326
5327 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5328
5329 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5330 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5331
5332 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5333 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5334}
5335
5336/* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5337static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5338{
5339 int perms;
5340 int err;
5341
5342 switch (cmd) {
5343 case IPC_INFO:
5344 case SHM_INFO:
5345 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5346 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5347 case IPC_STAT:
5348 case SHM_STAT:
5349 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5350 break;
5351 case IPC_SET:
5352 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5353 break;
5354 case SHM_LOCK:
5355 case SHM_UNLOCK:
5356 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5357 break;
5358 case IPC_RMID:
5359 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5360 break;
5361 default:
5362 return 0;
5363 }
5364
5365 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5366 return err;
5367}
5368
5369static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5370 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5371{
5372 u32 perms;
5373
5374 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5375 perms = SHM__READ;
5376 else
5377 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5378
5379 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5380}
5381
5382/* Semaphore security operations */
5383static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5384{
5385 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5386 struct common_audit_data ad;
5387 u32 sid = current_sid();
5388 int rc;
5389
5390 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5391 if (rc)
5392 return rc;
5393
5394 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5395
5396 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5397 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5398
5399 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5400 SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5401 if (rc) {
5402 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5403 return rc;
5404 }
5405 return 0;
5406}
5407
5408static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5409{
5410 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5411}
5412
5413static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5414{
5415 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5416 struct common_audit_data ad;
5417 u32 sid = current_sid();
5418
5419 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5420
5421 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5422 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5423
5424 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5425 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5426}
5427
5428/* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5429static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5430{
5431 int err;
5432 u32 perms;
5433
5434 switch (cmd) {
5435 case IPC_INFO:
5436 case SEM_INFO:
5437 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5438 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5439 case GETPID:
5440 case GETNCNT:
5441 case GETZCNT:
5442 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5443 break;
5444 case GETVAL:
5445 case GETALL:
5446 perms = SEM__READ;
5447 break;
5448 case SETVAL:
5449 case SETALL:
5450 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5451 break;
5452 case IPC_RMID:
5453 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5454 break;
5455 case IPC_SET:
5456 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5457 break;
5458 case IPC_STAT:
5459 case SEM_STAT:
5460 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5461 break;
5462 default:
5463 return 0;
5464 }
5465
5466 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5467 return err;
5468}
5469
5470static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5471 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5472{
5473 u32 perms;
5474
5475 if (alter)
5476 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5477 else
5478 perms = SEM__READ;
5479
5480 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5481}
5482
5483static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5484{
5485 u32 av = 0;
5486
5487 av = 0;
5488 if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5489 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5490 if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5491 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5492
5493 if (av == 0)
5494 return 0;
5495
5496 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5497}
5498
5499static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5500{
5501 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5502 *secid = isec->sid;
5503}
5504
5505static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5506{
5507 if (inode)
5508 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5509}
5510
5511static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5512 char *name, char **value)
5513{
5514 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5515 u32 sid;
5516 int error;
5517 unsigned len;
5518
5519 if (current != p) {
5520 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5521 if (error)
5522 return error;
5523 }
5524
5525 rcu_read_lock();
5526 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5527
5528 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5529 sid = __tsec->sid;
5530 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5531 sid = __tsec->osid;
5532 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5533 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5534 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5535 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5536 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5537 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5538 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5539 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5540 else
5541 goto invalid;
5542 rcu_read_unlock();
5543
5544 if (!sid)
5545 return 0;
5546
5547 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5548 if (error)
5549 return error;
5550 return len;
5551
5552invalid:
5553 rcu_read_unlock();
5554 return -EINVAL;
5555}
5556
5557static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5558 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5559{
5560 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5561 struct task_struct *tracer;
5562 struct cred *new;
5563 u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5564 int error;
5565 char *str = value;
5566
5567 if (current != p) {
5568 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5569 security attributes. */
5570 return -EACCES;
5571 }
5572
5573 /*
5574 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5575 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5576 * above restriction is ever removed.
5577 */
5578 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5579 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5580 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5581 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5582 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5583 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5584 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5585 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5586 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5587 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5588 else
5589 error = -EINVAL;
5590 if (error)
5591 return error;
5592
5593 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5594 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5595 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5596 str[size-1] = 0;
5597 size--;
5598 }
5599 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5600 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5601 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5602 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5603 size_t audit_size;
5604
5605 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5606 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5607 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5608 audit_size = size - 1;
5609 else
5610 audit_size = size;
5611 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5612 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5613 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5614 audit_log_end(ab);
5615
5616 return error;
5617 }
5618 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5619 &sid);
5620 }
5621 if (error)
5622 return error;
5623 }
5624
5625 new = prepare_creds();
5626 if (!new)
5627 return -ENOMEM;
5628
5629 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5630 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5631 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5632 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5633 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5634 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5635 tsec = new->security;
5636 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5637 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5638 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5639 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5640 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5641 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5642 if (error)
5643 goto abort_change;
5644 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5645 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5646 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5647 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5648 error = -EINVAL;
5649 if (sid == 0)
5650 goto abort_change;
5651
5652 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5653 error = -EPERM;
5654 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5655 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5656 if (error)
5657 goto abort_change;
5658 }
5659
5660 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5661 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5662 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5663 if (error)
5664 goto abort_change;
5665
5666 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5667 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5668 ptsid = 0;
5669 rcu_read_lock();
5670 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5671 if (tracer)
5672 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5673 rcu_read_unlock();
5674
5675 if (tracer) {
5676 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5677 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5678 if (error)
5679 goto abort_change;
5680 }
5681
5682 tsec->sid = sid;
5683 } else {
5684 error = -EINVAL;
5685 goto abort_change;
5686 }
5687
5688 commit_creds(new);
5689 return size;
5690
5691abort_change:
5692 abort_creds(new);
5693 return error;
5694}
5695
5696static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5697{
5698 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5699}
5700
5701static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5702{
5703 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5704}
5705
5706static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5707{
5708 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5709}
5710
5711static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5712{
5713 kfree(secdata);
5714}
5715
5716/*
5717 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5718 */
5719static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5720{
5721 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5722}
5723
5724/*
5725 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5726 */
5727static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5728{
5729 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5730}
5731
5732static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5733{
5734 int len = 0;
5735 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5736 ctx, true);
5737 if (len < 0)
5738 return len;
5739 *ctxlen = len;
5740 return 0;
5741}
5742#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5743
5744static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5745 unsigned long flags)
5746{
5747 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5748 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5749
5750 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5751 if (!ksec)
5752 return -ENOMEM;
5753
5754 tsec = cred->security;
5755 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5756 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5757 else
5758 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5759
5760 k->security = ksec;
5761 return 0;
5762}
5763
5764static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5765{
5766 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5767
5768 k->security = NULL;
5769 kfree(ksec);
5770}
5771
5772static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5773 const struct cred *cred,
5774 unsigned perm)
5775{
5776 struct key *key;
5777 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5778 u32 sid;
5779
5780 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5781 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5782 appear to be created. */
5783 if (perm == 0)
5784 return 0;
5785
5786 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5787
5788 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5789 ksec = key->security;
5790
5791 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5792}
5793
5794static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5795{
5796 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5797 char *context = NULL;
5798 unsigned len;
5799 int rc;
5800
5801 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5802 if (!rc)
5803 rc = len;
5804 *_buffer = context;
5805 return rc;
5806}
5807
5808#endif
5809
5810static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5811 .name = "selinux",
5812
5813 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5814 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5815 .capget = selinux_capget,
5816 .capset = selinux_capset,
5817 .capable = selinux_capable,
5818 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5819 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5820 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5821 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5822
5823 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5824
5825 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5826 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5827 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5828 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5829
5830 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5831 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5832 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5833 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5834 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5835 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5836 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5837 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5838 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5839 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5840 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5841 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5842
5843 .dentry_init_security = selinux_dentry_init_security,
5844
5845 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5846 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5847 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5848 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5849 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5850 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5851 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5852 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5853 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5854 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5855 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5856 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5857 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5858 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5859 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5860 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5861 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5862 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5863 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5864 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5865 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5866 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5867 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5868 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5869 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5870
5871 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5872 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5873 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5874 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5875 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5876 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5877 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5878 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5879 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5880 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5881 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5882 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5883
5884 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5885
5886 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5887 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5888 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5889 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5890 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5891 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5892 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5893 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5894 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5895 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5896 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5897 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5898 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5899 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5900 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5901 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5902 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5903 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5904 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5905 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5906 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5907 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5908
5909 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5910 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5911
5912 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5913 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5914
5915 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5916 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5917 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5918 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5919 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5920 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5921
5922 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5923 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5924 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5925 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5926 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5927
5928 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5929 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5930 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5931 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5932 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5933
5934 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5935
5936 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5937 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5938
5939 .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel,
5940 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5941 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5942 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5943 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5944 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5945 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5946
5947 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5948 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5949
5950 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5951 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5952 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5953 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5954 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5955 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5956 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5957 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5958 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5959 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5960 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5961 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5962 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5963 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5964 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5965 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5966 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5967 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5968 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5969 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5970 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5971 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5972 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5973 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5974 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
5975 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
5976 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
5977 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5978 .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
5979 .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
5980 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
5981 .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
5982 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
5983 .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
5984 .skb_owned_by = selinux_skb_owned_by,
5985
5986#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5987 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5988 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5989 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5990 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5991 .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5992 .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
5993 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5994 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5995 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5996 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5997 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5998#endif
5999
6000#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
6001 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
6002 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
6003 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
6004 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
6005#endif
6006
6007#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
6008 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
6009 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
6010 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
6011 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
6012#endif
6013};
6014
6015static __init int selinux_init(void)
6016{
6017 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
6018 selinux_enabled = 0;
6019 return 0;
6020 }
6021
6022 if (!selinux_enabled) {
6023 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6024 return 0;
6025 }
6026
6027 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6028
6029 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6030 cred_init_security();
6031
6032 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6033
6034 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6035 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6036 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6037 avc_init();
6038
6039 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
6040 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
6041
6042 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6043 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6044
6045 if (selinux_enforcing)
6046 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6047 else
6048 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6049
6050 return 0;
6051}
6052
6053static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6054{
6055 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6056}
6057
6058void selinux_complete_init(void)
6059{
6060 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6061
6062 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6063 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6064 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6065}
6066
6067/* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6068 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6069security_initcall(selinux_init);
6070
6071#if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6072
6073static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6074 {
6075 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6076 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6077 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
6078 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6079 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6080 },
6081 {
6082 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6083 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6084 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
6085 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6086 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6087 },
6088 {
6089 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6090 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6091 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
6092 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6093 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6094 },
6095#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6096 {
6097 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6098 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6099 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
6100 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6101 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6102 },
6103 {
6104 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6105 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6106 .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
6107 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6108 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6109 },
6110#endif /* IPV6 */
6111};
6112
6113static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6114{
6115 int err;
6116
6117 if (!selinux_enabled)
6118 return 0;
6119
6120 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6121
6122 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6123 if (err)
6124 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6125
6126 return 0;
6127}
6128
6129__initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6130
6131#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6132static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6133{
6134 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6135
6136 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6137}
6138#endif
6139
6140#else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6141
6142#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6143#define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6144#endif
6145
6146#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6147
6148#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6149static int selinux_disabled;
6150
6151int selinux_disable(void)
6152{
6153 if (ss_initialized) {
6154 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6155 return -EINVAL;
6156 }
6157
6158 if (selinux_disabled) {
6159 /* Only do this once. */
6160 return -EINVAL;
6161 }
6162
6163 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6164
6165 selinux_disabled = 1;
6166 selinux_enabled = 0;
6167
6168 reset_security_ops();
6169
6170 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6171 avc_disable();
6172
6173 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6174 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6175
6176 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
6177 exit_sel_fs();
6178
6179 return 0;
6180}
6181#endif
Linux kernel - Deliverables
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