| 1 | /* |
| 2 | * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations. |
| 5 | * |
| 6 | * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> |
| 7 | * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com> |
| 8 | * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com> |
| 9 | * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> |
| 10 | * |
| 11 | * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. |
| 12 | * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> |
| 13 | * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> |
| 14 | * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc. |
| 15 | * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> |
| 16 | * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
| 17 | * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
| 18 | * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd. |
| 19 | * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> |
| 20 | * |
| 21 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
| 22 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2, |
| 23 | * as published by the Free Software Foundation. |
| 24 | */ |
| 25 | |
| 26 | #include <linux/init.h> |
| 27 | #include <linux/kd.h> |
| 28 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
| 29 | #include <linux/tracehook.h> |
| 30 | #include <linux/errno.h> |
| 31 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
| 32 | #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> |
| 33 | #include <linux/xattr.h> |
| 34 | #include <linux/capability.h> |
| 35 | #include <linux/unistd.h> |
| 36 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
| 37 | #include <linux/mman.h> |
| 38 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
| 39 | #include <linux/pagemap.h> |
| 40 | #include <linux/proc_fs.h> |
| 41 | #include <linux/swap.h> |
| 42 | #include <linux/spinlock.h> |
| 43 | #include <linux/syscalls.h> |
| 44 | #include <linux/dcache.h> |
| 45 | #include <linux/file.h> |
| 46 | #include <linux/fdtable.h> |
| 47 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
| 48 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
| 49 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h> |
| 50 | #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h> |
| 51 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
| 52 | #include <net/icmp.h> |
| 53 | #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */ |
| 54 | #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */ |
| 55 | #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h> |
| 56 | #include <net/net_namespace.h> |
| 57 | #include <net/netlabel.h> |
| 58 | #include <linux/uaccess.h> |
| 59 | #include <asm/ioctls.h> |
| 60 | #include <linux/atomic.h> |
| 61 | #include <linux/bitops.h> |
| 62 | #include <linux/interrupt.h> |
| 63 | #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */ |
| 64 | #include <net/netlink.h> |
| 65 | #include <linux/tcp.h> |
| 66 | #include <linux/udp.h> |
| 67 | #include <linux/dccp.h> |
| 68 | #include <linux/quota.h> |
| 69 | #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */ |
| 70 | #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */ |
| 71 | #include <linux/parser.h> |
| 72 | #include <linux/nfs_mount.h> |
| 73 | #include <net/ipv6.h> |
| 74 | #include <linux/hugetlb.h> |
| 75 | #include <linux/personality.h> |
| 76 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
| 77 | #include <linux/string.h> |
| 78 | #include <linux/selinux.h> |
| 79 | #include <linux/mutex.h> |
| 80 | #include <linux/posix-timers.h> |
| 81 | #include <linux/syslog.h> |
| 82 | #include <linux/user_namespace.h> |
| 83 | #include <linux/export.h> |
| 84 | #include <linux/msg.h> |
| 85 | #include <linux/shm.h> |
| 86 | |
| 87 | #include "avc.h" |
| 88 | #include "objsec.h" |
| 89 | #include "netif.h" |
| 90 | #include "netnode.h" |
| 91 | #include "netport.h" |
| 92 | #include "xfrm.h" |
| 93 | #include "netlabel.h" |
| 94 | #include "audit.h" |
| 95 | #include "avc_ss.h" |
| 96 | |
| 97 | /* SECMARK reference count */ |
| 98 | static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0); |
| 99 | |
| 100 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP |
| 101 | int selinux_enforcing; |
| 102 | |
| 103 | static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str) |
| 104 | { |
| 105 | unsigned long enforcing; |
| 106 | if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing)) |
| 107 | selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0; |
| 108 | return 1; |
| 109 | } |
| 110 | __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup); |
| 111 | #endif |
| 112 | |
| 113 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM |
| 114 | int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE; |
| 115 | |
| 116 | static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str) |
| 117 | { |
| 118 | unsigned long enabled; |
| 119 | if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled)) |
| 120 | selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0; |
| 121 | return 1; |
| 122 | } |
| 123 | __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup); |
| 124 | #else |
| 125 | int selinux_enabled = 1; |
| 126 | #endif |
| 127 | |
| 128 | static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache; |
| 129 | |
| 130 | /** |
| 131 | * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled |
| 132 | * |
| 133 | * Description: |
| 134 | * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK |
| 135 | * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than |
| 136 | * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is |
| 137 | * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network |
| 138 | * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled. |
| 139 | * |
| 140 | */ |
| 141 | static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void) |
| 142 | { |
| 143 | return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount)); |
| 144 | } |
| 145 | |
| 146 | /** |
| 147 | * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled |
| 148 | * |
| 149 | * Description: |
| 150 | * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true |
| 151 | * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the |
| 152 | * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling |
| 153 | * is always considered enabled. |
| 154 | * |
| 155 | */ |
| 156 | static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void) |
| 157 | { |
| 158 | return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()); |
| 159 | } |
| 160 | |
| 161 | static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event) |
| 162 | { |
| 163 | if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) { |
| 164 | sel_netif_flush(); |
| 165 | sel_netnode_flush(); |
| 166 | sel_netport_flush(); |
| 167 | synchronize_net(); |
| 168 | } |
| 169 | return 0; |
| 170 | } |
| 171 | |
| 172 | /* |
| 173 | * initialise the security for the init task |
| 174 | */ |
| 175 | static void cred_init_security(void) |
| 176 | { |
| 177 | struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred; |
| 178 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
| 179 | |
| 180 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
| 181 | if (!tsec) |
| 182 | panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n"); |
| 183 | |
| 184 | tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
| 185 | cred->security = tsec; |
| 186 | } |
| 187 | |
| 188 | /* |
| 189 | * get the security ID of a set of credentials |
| 190 | */ |
| 191 | static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred) |
| 192 | { |
| 193 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
| 194 | |
| 195 | tsec = cred->security; |
| 196 | return tsec->sid; |
| 197 | } |
| 198 | |
| 199 | /* |
| 200 | * get the objective security ID of a task |
| 201 | */ |
| 202 | static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task) |
| 203 | { |
| 204 | u32 sid; |
| 205 | |
| 206 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 207 | sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task)); |
| 208 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 209 | return sid; |
| 210 | } |
| 211 | |
| 212 | /* |
| 213 | * get the subjective security ID of the current task |
| 214 | */ |
| 215 | static inline u32 current_sid(void) |
| 216 | { |
| 217 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
| 218 | |
| 219 | return tsec->sid; |
| 220 | } |
| 221 | |
| 222 | /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */ |
| 223 | |
| 224 | static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) |
| 225 | { |
| 226 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
| 227 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 228 | |
| 229 | isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS); |
| 230 | if (!isec) |
| 231 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 232 | |
| 233 | mutex_init(&isec->lock); |
| 234 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list); |
| 235 | isec->inode = inode; |
| 236 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
| 237 | isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE; |
| 238 | isec->task_sid = sid; |
| 239 | inode->i_security = isec; |
| 240 | |
| 241 | return 0; |
| 242 | } |
| 243 | |
| 244 | static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) |
| 245 | { |
| 246 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
| 247 | |
| 248 | isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu); |
| 249 | kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec); |
| 250 | } |
| 251 | |
| 252 | static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) |
| 253 | { |
| 254 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 255 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
| 256 | |
| 257 | /* |
| 258 | * As not all inode security structures are in a list, we check for |
| 259 | * empty list outside of the lock to make sure that we won't waste |
| 260 | * time taking a lock doing nothing. |
| 261 | * |
| 262 | * The list_del_init() function can be safely called more than once. |
| 263 | * It should not be possible for this function to be called with |
| 264 | * concurrent list_add(), but for better safety against future changes |
| 265 | * in the code, we use list_empty_careful() here. |
| 266 | */ |
| 267 | if (!list_empty_careful(&isec->list)) { |
| 268 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
| 269 | list_del_init(&isec->list); |
| 270 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
| 271 | } |
| 272 | |
| 273 | /* |
| 274 | * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and |
| 275 | * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made |
| 276 | * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS |
| 277 | * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder |
| 278 | * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and |
| 279 | * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact. |
| 280 | * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too. |
| 281 | */ |
| 282 | call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu); |
| 283 | } |
| 284 | |
| 285 | static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
| 286 | { |
| 287 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
| 288 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 289 | |
| 290 | fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
| 291 | if (!fsec) |
| 292 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 293 | |
| 294 | fsec->sid = sid; |
| 295 | fsec->fown_sid = sid; |
| 296 | file->f_security = fsec; |
| 297 | |
| 298 | return 0; |
| 299 | } |
| 300 | |
| 301 | static void file_free_security(struct file *file) |
| 302 | { |
| 303 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
| 304 | file->f_security = NULL; |
| 305 | kfree(fsec); |
| 306 | } |
| 307 | |
| 308 | static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) |
| 309 | { |
| 310 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
| 311 | |
| 312 | sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
| 313 | if (!sbsec) |
| 314 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 315 | |
| 316 | mutex_init(&sbsec->lock); |
| 317 | INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head); |
| 318 | spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
| 319 | sbsec->sb = sb; |
| 320 | sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
| 321 | sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE; |
| 322 | sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
| 323 | sb->s_security = sbsec; |
| 324 | |
| 325 | return 0; |
| 326 | } |
| 327 | |
| 328 | static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb) |
| 329 | { |
| 330 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
| 331 | sb->s_security = NULL; |
| 332 | kfree(sbsec); |
| 333 | } |
| 334 | |
| 335 | /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */ |
| 336 | |
| 337 | static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = { |
| 338 | "uses xattr", |
| 339 | "uses transition SIDs", |
| 340 | "uses task SIDs", |
| 341 | "uses genfs_contexts", |
| 342 | "not configured for labeling", |
| 343 | "uses mountpoint labeling", |
| 344 | "uses native labeling", |
| 345 | }; |
| 346 | |
| 347 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry); |
| 348 | |
| 349 | static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode) |
| 350 | { |
| 351 | return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL); |
| 352 | } |
| 353 | |
| 354 | enum { |
| 355 | Opt_error = -1, |
| 356 | Opt_context = 1, |
| 357 | Opt_fscontext = 2, |
| 358 | Opt_defcontext = 3, |
| 359 | Opt_rootcontext = 4, |
| 360 | Opt_labelsupport = 5, |
| 361 | Opt_nextmntopt = 6, |
| 362 | }; |
| 363 | |
| 364 | #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1) |
| 365 | |
| 366 | static const match_table_t tokens = { |
| 367 | {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
| 368 | {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
| 369 | {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
| 370 | {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"}, |
| 371 | {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR}, |
| 372 | {Opt_error, NULL}, |
| 373 | }; |
| 374 | |
| 375 | #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n" |
| 376 | |
| 377 | static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid, |
| 378 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, |
| 379 | const struct cred *cred) |
| 380 | { |
| 381 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
| 382 | int rc; |
| 383 | |
| 384 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
| 385 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
| 386 | if (rc) |
| 387 | return rc; |
| 388 | |
| 389 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
| 390 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL); |
| 391 | return rc; |
| 392 | } |
| 393 | |
| 394 | static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid, |
| 395 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, |
| 396 | const struct cred *cred) |
| 397 | { |
| 398 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
| 399 | int rc; |
| 400 | rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
| 401 | FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
| 402 | if (rc) |
| 403 | return rc; |
| 404 | |
| 405 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
| 406 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL); |
| 407 | return rc; |
| 408 | } |
| 409 | |
| 410 | static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb) |
| 411 | { |
| 412 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
| 413 | |
| 414 | return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR || |
| 415 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS || |
| 416 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK || |
| 417 | sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE || |
| 418 | /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */ |
| 419 | !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || |
| 420 | !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") || |
| 421 | !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || |
| 422 | !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs"); |
| 423 | } |
| 424 | |
| 425 | static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb) |
| 426 | { |
| 427 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
| 428 | struct dentry *root = sb->s_root; |
| 429 | struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root); |
| 430 | int rc = 0; |
| 431 | |
| 432 | if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) { |
| 433 | /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no |
| 434 | error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on |
| 435 | the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be |
| 436 | the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have |
| 437 | assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */ |
| 438 | if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) { |
| 439 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no " |
| 440 | "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
| 441 | rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 442 | goto out; |
| 443 | } |
| 444 | rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0); |
| 445 | if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) { |
| 446 | if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP) |
| 447 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " |
| 448 | "%s) has no security xattr handler\n", |
| 449 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
| 450 | else |
| 451 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type " |
| 452 | "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id, |
| 453 | sb->s_type->name, -rc); |
| 454 | goto out; |
| 455 | } |
| 456 | } |
| 457 | |
| 458 | if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors)) |
| 459 | printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n", |
| 460 | sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name); |
| 461 | |
| 462 | sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED; |
| 463 | if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb)) |
| 464 | sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT; |
| 465 | |
| 466 | /* Initialize the root inode. */ |
| 467 | rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root); |
| 468 | |
| 469 | /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g. |
| 470 | inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created |
| 471 | during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly |
| 472 | populates itself. */ |
| 473 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
| 474 | next_inode: |
| 475 | if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) { |
| 476 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = |
| 477 | list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next, |
| 478 | struct inode_security_struct, list); |
| 479 | struct inode *inode = isec->inode; |
| 480 | list_del_init(&isec->list); |
| 481 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
| 482 | inode = igrab(inode); |
| 483 | if (inode) { |
| 484 | if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode)) |
| 485 | inode_doinit(inode); |
| 486 | iput(inode); |
| 487 | } |
| 488 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
| 489 | goto next_inode; |
| 490 | } |
| 491 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
| 492 | out: |
| 493 | return rc; |
| 494 | } |
| 495 | |
| 496 | /* |
| 497 | * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security |
| 498 | * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying |
| 499 | * mount options, or whatever. |
| 500 | */ |
| 501 | static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb, |
| 502 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
| 503 | { |
| 504 | int rc = 0, i; |
| 505 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
| 506 | char *context = NULL; |
| 507 | u32 len; |
| 508 | char tmp; |
| 509 | |
| 510 | security_init_mnt_opts(opts); |
| 511 | |
| 512 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) |
| 513 | return -EINVAL; |
| 514 | |
| 515 | if (!ss_initialized) |
| 516 | return -EINVAL; |
| 517 | |
| 518 | /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */ |
| 519 | BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS)); |
| 520 | |
| 521 | tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
| 522 | /* count the number of mount options for this sb */ |
| 523 | for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) { |
| 524 | if (tmp & 0x01) |
| 525 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; |
| 526 | tmp >>= 1; |
| 527 | } |
| 528 | /* Check if the Label support flag is set */ |
| 529 | if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) |
| 530 | opts->num_mnt_opts++; |
| 531 | |
| 532 | opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); |
| 533 | if (!opts->mnt_opts) { |
| 534 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
| 535 | goto out_free; |
| 536 | } |
| 537 | |
| 538 | opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); |
| 539 | if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) { |
| 540 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
| 541 | goto out_free; |
| 542 | } |
| 543 | |
| 544 | i = 0; |
| 545 | if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) { |
| 546 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len); |
| 547 | if (rc) |
| 548 | goto out_free; |
| 549 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
| 550 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
| 551 | } |
| 552 | if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) { |
| 553 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len); |
| 554 | if (rc) |
| 555 | goto out_free; |
| 556 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
| 557 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT; |
| 558 | } |
| 559 | if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) { |
| 560 | rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len); |
| 561 | if (rc) |
| 562 | goto out_free; |
| 563 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
| 564 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
| 565 | } |
| 566 | if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { |
| 567 | struct inode *root = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root); |
| 568 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security; |
| 569 | |
| 570 | rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len); |
| 571 | if (rc) |
| 572 | goto out_free; |
| 573 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = context; |
| 574 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
| 575 | } |
| 576 | if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) { |
| 577 | opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL; |
| 578 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT; |
| 579 | } |
| 580 | |
| 581 | BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts); |
| 582 | |
| 583 | return 0; |
| 584 | |
| 585 | out_free: |
| 586 | security_free_mnt_opts(opts); |
| 587 | return rc; |
| 588 | } |
| 589 | |
| 590 | static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag, |
| 591 | u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid) |
| 592 | { |
| 593 | char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
| 594 | |
| 595 | /* check if the old mount command had the same options */ |
| 596 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) |
| 597 | if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) || |
| 598 | (old_sid != new_sid)) |
| 599 | return 1; |
| 600 | |
| 601 | /* check if we were passed the same options twice, |
| 602 | * aka someone passed context=a,context=b |
| 603 | */ |
| 604 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) |
| 605 | if (mnt_flags & flag) |
| 606 | return 1; |
| 607 | return 0; |
| 608 | } |
| 609 | |
| 610 | /* |
| 611 | * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point |
| 612 | * labeling information. |
| 613 | */ |
| 614 | static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, |
| 615 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts, |
| 616 | unsigned long kern_flags, |
| 617 | unsigned long *set_kern_flags) |
| 618 | { |
| 619 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 620 | int rc = 0, i; |
| 621 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
| 622 | const char *name = sb->s_type->name; |
| 623 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root); |
| 624 | struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security; |
| 625 | u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0; |
| 626 | u32 defcontext_sid = 0; |
| 627 | char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts; |
| 628 | int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags; |
| 629 | int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts; |
| 630 | |
| 631 | mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock); |
| 632 | |
| 633 | if (!ss_initialized) { |
| 634 | if (!num_opts) { |
| 635 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, |
| 636 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security |
| 637 | server is ready to handle calls. */ |
| 638 | goto out; |
| 639 | } |
| 640 | rc = -EINVAL; |
| 641 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options " |
| 642 | "before the security server is initialized\n"); |
| 643 | goto out; |
| 644 | } |
| 645 | if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) { |
| 646 | /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to |
| 647 | * place the results is not allowed */ |
| 648 | rc = -EINVAL; |
| 649 | goto out; |
| 650 | } |
| 651 | |
| 652 | /* |
| 653 | * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once |
| 654 | * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs. |
| 655 | * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data |
| 656 | * we need to skip the double mount verification. |
| 657 | * |
| 658 | * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first |
| 659 | * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using |
| 660 | * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options |
| 661 | * will be used for both mounts) |
| 662 | */ |
| 663 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) |
| 664 | && (num_opts == 0)) |
| 665 | goto out; |
| 666 | |
| 667 | /* |
| 668 | * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids. |
| 669 | * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more |
| 670 | * than once with different security options. |
| 671 | */ |
| 672 | for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) { |
| 673 | u32 sid; |
| 674 | |
| 675 | if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) |
| 676 | continue; |
| 677 | rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], |
| 678 | strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL); |
| 679 | if (rc) { |
| 680 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" |
| 681 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", |
| 682 | mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc); |
| 683 | goto out; |
| 684 | } |
| 685 | switch (flags[i]) { |
| 686 | case FSCONTEXT_MNT: |
| 687 | fscontext_sid = sid; |
| 688 | |
| 689 | if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, |
| 690 | fscontext_sid)) |
| 691 | goto out_double_mount; |
| 692 | |
| 693 | sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
| 694 | break; |
| 695 | case CONTEXT_MNT: |
| 696 | context_sid = sid; |
| 697 | |
| 698 | if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, |
| 699 | context_sid)) |
| 700 | goto out_double_mount; |
| 701 | |
| 702 | sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT; |
| 703 | break; |
| 704 | case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: |
| 705 | rootcontext_sid = sid; |
| 706 | |
| 707 | if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, |
| 708 | rootcontext_sid)) |
| 709 | goto out_double_mount; |
| 710 | |
| 711 | sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
| 712 | |
| 713 | break; |
| 714 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: |
| 715 | defcontext_sid = sid; |
| 716 | |
| 717 | if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, |
| 718 | defcontext_sid)) |
| 719 | goto out_double_mount; |
| 720 | |
| 721 | sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
| 722 | |
| 723 | break; |
| 724 | default: |
| 725 | rc = -EINVAL; |
| 726 | goto out; |
| 727 | } |
| 728 | } |
| 729 | |
| 730 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { |
| 731 | /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */ |
| 732 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts) |
| 733 | goto out_double_mount; |
| 734 | rc = 0; |
| 735 | goto out; |
| 736 | } |
| 737 | |
| 738 | if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) |
| 739 | sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS; |
| 740 | |
| 741 | if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") || |
| 742 | !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") || |
| 743 | !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore")) |
| 744 | sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS; |
| 745 | |
| 746 | if (!sbsec->behavior) { |
| 747 | /* |
| 748 | * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this |
| 749 | * filesystem type. |
| 750 | */ |
| 751 | rc = security_fs_use(sb); |
| 752 | if (rc) { |
| 753 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
| 754 | "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n", |
| 755 | __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc); |
| 756 | goto out; |
| 757 | } |
| 758 | } |
| 759 | /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */ |
| 760 | if (fscontext_sid) { |
| 761 | rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred); |
| 762 | if (rc) |
| 763 | goto out; |
| 764 | |
| 765 | sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid; |
| 766 | } |
| 767 | |
| 768 | /* |
| 769 | * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior. |
| 770 | * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set |
| 771 | * the superblock context if not already set. |
| 772 | */ |
| 773 | if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) { |
| 774 | sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE; |
| 775 | *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS; |
| 776 | } |
| 777 | |
| 778 | if (context_sid) { |
| 779 | if (!fscontext_sid) { |
| 780 | rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, |
| 781 | cred); |
| 782 | if (rc) |
| 783 | goto out; |
| 784 | sbsec->sid = context_sid; |
| 785 | } else { |
| 786 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, |
| 787 | cred); |
| 788 | if (rc) |
| 789 | goto out; |
| 790 | } |
| 791 | if (!rootcontext_sid) |
| 792 | rootcontext_sid = context_sid; |
| 793 | |
| 794 | sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid; |
| 795 | sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT; |
| 796 | } |
| 797 | |
| 798 | if (rootcontext_sid) { |
| 799 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, |
| 800 | cred); |
| 801 | if (rc) |
| 802 | goto out; |
| 803 | |
| 804 | root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid; |
| 805 | root_isec->initialized = 1; |
| 806 | } |
| 807 | |
| 808 | if (defcontext_sid) { |
| 809 | if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR && |
| 810 | sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) { |
| 811 | rc = -EINVAL; |
| 812 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is " |
| 813 | "invalid for this filesystem type\n"); |
| 814 | goto out; |
| 815 | } |
| 816 | |
| 817 | if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) { |
| 818 | rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid, |
| 819 | sbsec, cred); |
| 820 | if (rc) |
| 821 | goto out; |
| 822 | } |
| 823 | |
| 824 | sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid; |
| 825 | } |
| 826 | |
| 827 | rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb); |
| 828 | out: |
| 829 | mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock); |
| 830 | return rc; |
| 831 | out_double_mount: |
| 832 | rc = -EINVAL; |
| 833 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different " |
| 834 | "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name); |
| 835 | goto out; |
| 836 | } |
| 837 | |
| 838 | static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb, |
| 839 | const struct super_block *newsb) |
| 840 | { |
| 841 | struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security; |
| 842 | struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security; |
| 843 | char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
| 844 | char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK; |
| 845 | |
| 846 | if (oldflags != newflags) |
| 847 | goto mismatch; |
| 848 | if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid) |
| 849 | goto mismatch; |
| 850 | if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid) |
| 851 | goto mismatch; |
| 852 | if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid) |
| 853 | goto mismatch; |
| 854 | if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) { |
| 855 | struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root)->i_security; |
| 856 | struct inode_security_struct *newroot = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root)->i_security; |
| 857 | if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid) |
| 858 | goto mismatch; |
| 859 | } |
| 860 | return 0; |
| 861 | mismatch: |
| 862 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, " |
| 863 | "different security settings for (dev %s, " |
| 864 | "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name); |
| 865 | return -EBUSY; |
| 866 | } |
| 867 | |
| 868 | static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb, |
| 869 | struct super_block *newsb) |
| 870 | { |
| 871 | const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security; |
| 872 | struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security; |
| 873 | |
| 874 | int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT); |
| 875 | int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT); |
| 876 | int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT); |
| 877 | |
| 878 | /* |
| 879 | * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm |
| 880 | * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later |
| 881 | */ |
| 882 | if (!ss_initialized) |
| 883 | return 0; |
| 884 | |
| 885 | /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */ |
| 886 | BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)); |
| 887 | |
| 888 | /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */ |
| 889 | if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) |
| 890 | return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb); |
| 891 | |
| 892 | mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock); |
| 893 | |
| 894 | newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags; |
| 895 | |
| 896 | newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid; |
| 897 | newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid; |
| 898 | newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior; |
| 899 | |
| 900 | if (set_context) { |
| 901 | u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid; |
| 902 | |
| 903 | if (!set_fscontext) |
| 904 | newsbsec->sid = sid; |
| 905 | if (!set_rootcontext) { |
| 906 | struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root); |
| 907 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; |
| 908 | newisec->sid = sid; |
| 909 | } |
| 910 | newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid; |
| 911 | } |
| 912 | if (set_rootcontext) { |
| 913 | const struct inode *oldinode = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root); |
| 914 | const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security; |
| 915 | struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root); |
| 916 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security; |
| 917 | |
| 918 | newisec->sid = oldisec->sid; |
| 919 | } |
| 920 | |
| 921 | sb_finish_set_opts(newsb); |
| 922 | mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock); |
| 923 | return 0; |
| 924 | } |
| 925 | |
| 926 | static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options, |
| 927 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
| 928 | { |
| 929 | char *p; |
| 930 | char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL; |
| 931 | char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL; |
| 932 | int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0; |
| 933 | |
| 934 | opts->num_mnt_opts = 0; |
| 935 | |
| 936 | /* Standard string-based options. */ |
| 937 | while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) { |
| 938 | int token; |
| 939 | substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; |
| 940 | |
| 941 | if (!*p) |
| 942 | continue; |
| 943 | |
| 944 | token = match_token(p, tokens, args); |
| 945 | |
| 946 | switch (token) { |
| 947 | case Opt_context: |
| 948 | if (context || defcontext) { |
| 949 | rc = -EINVAL; |
| 950 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
| 951 | goto out_err; |
| 952 | } |
| 953 | context = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
| 954 | if (!context) { |
| 955 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
| 956 | goto out_err; |
| 957 | } |
| 958 | break; |
| 959 | |
| 960 | case Opt_fscontext: |
| 961 | if (fscontext) { |
| 962 | rc = -EINVAL; |
| 963 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
| 964 | goto out_err; |
| 965 | } |
| 966 | fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
| 967 | if (!fscontext) { |
| 968 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
| 969 | goto out_err; |
| 970 | } |
| 971 | break; |
| 972 | |
| 973 | case Opt_rootcontext: |
| 974 | if (rootcontext) { |
| 975 | rc = -EINVAL; |
| 976 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
| 977 | goto out_err; |
| 978 | } |
| 979 | rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
| 980 | if (!rootcontext) { |
| 981 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
| 982 | goto out_err; |
| 983 | } |
| 984 | break; |
| 985 | |
| 986 | case Opt_defcontext: |
| 987 | if (context || defcontext) { |
| 988 | rc = -EINVAL; |
| 989 | printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG); |
| 990 | goto out_err; |
| 991 | } |
| 992 | defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]); |
| 993 | if (!defcontext) { |
| 994 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
| 995 | goto out_err; |
| 996 | } |
| 997 | break; |
| 998 | case Opt_labelsupport: |
| 999 | break; |
| 1000 | default: |
| 1001 | rc = -EINVAL; |
| 1002 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n"); |
| 1003 | goto out_err; |
| 1004 | |
| 1005 | } |
| 1006 | } |
| 1007 | |
| 1008 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
| 1009 | opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC); |
| 1010 | if (!opts->mnt_opts) |
| 1011 | goto out_err; |
| 1012 | |
| 1013 | opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC); |
| 1014 | if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) { |
| 1015 | kfree(opts->mnt_opts); |
| 1016 | goto out_err; |
| 1017 | } |
| 1018 | |
| 1019 | if (fscontext) { |
| 1020 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext; |
| 1021 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT; |
| 1022 | } |
| 1023 | if (context) { |
| 1024 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context; |
| 1025 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT; |
| 1026 | } |
| 1027 | if (rootcontext) { |
| 1028 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext; |
| 1029 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT; |
| 1030 | } |
| 1031 | if (defcontext) { |
| 1032 | opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext; |
| 1033 | opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT; |
| 1034 | } |
| 1035 | |
| 1036 | opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts; |
| 1037 | return 0; |
| 1038 | |
| 1039 | out_err: |
| 1040 | kfree(context); |
| 1041 | kfree(defcontext); |
| 1042 | kfree(fscontext); |
| 1043 | kfree(rootcontext); |
| 1044 | return rc; |
| 1045 | } |
| 1046 | /* |
| 1047 | * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec |
| 1048 | */ |
| 1049 | static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data) |
| 1050 | { |
| 1051 | int rc = 0; |
| 1052 | char *options = data; |
| 1053 | struct security_mnt_opts opts; |
| 1054 | |
| 1055 | security_init_mnt_opts(&opts); |
| 1056 | |
| 1057 | if (!data) |
| 1058 | goto out; |
| 1059 | |
| 1060 | BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA); |
| 1061 | |
| 1062 | rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts); |
| 1063 | if (rc) |
| 1064 | goto out_err; |
| 1065 | |
| 1066 | out: |
| 1067 | rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL); |
| 1068 | |
| 1069 | out_err: |
| 1070 | security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); |
| 1071 | return rc; |
| 1072 | } |
| 1073 | |
| 1074 | static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m, |
| 1075 | struct security_mnt_opts *opts) |
| 1076 | { |
| 1077 | int i; |
| 1078 | char *prefix; |
| 1079 | |
| 1080 | for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) { |
| 1081 | char *has_comma; |
| 1082 | |
| 1083 | if (opts->mnt_opts[i]) |
| 1084 | has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ','); |
| 1085 | else |
| 1086 | has_comma = NULL; |
| 1087 | |
| 1088 | switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) { |
| 1089 | case CONTEXT_MNT: |
| 1090 | prefix = CONTEXT_STR; |
| 1091 | break; |
| 1092 | case FSCONTEXT_MNT: |
| 1093 | prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR; |
| 1094 | break; |
| 1095 | case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: |
| 1096 | prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR; |
| 1097 | break; |
| 1098 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: |
| 1099 | prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR; |
| 1100 | break; |
| 1101 | case SBLABEL_MNT: |
| 1102 | seq_putc(m, ','); |
| 1103 | seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR); |
| 1104 | continue; |
| 1105 | default: |
| 1106 | BUG(); |
| 1107 | return; |
| 1108 | }; |
| 1109 | /* we need a comma before each option */ |
| 1110 | seq_putc(m, ','); |
| 1111 | seq_puts(m, prefix); |
| 1112 | if (has_comma) |
| 1113 | seq_putc(m, '\"'); |
| 1114 | seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]); |
| 1115 | if (has_comma) |
| 1116 | seq_putc(m, '\"'); |
| 1117 | } |
| 1118 | } |
| 1119 | |
| 1120 | static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb) |
| 1121 | { |
| 1122 | struct security_mnt_opts opts; |
| 1123 | int rc; |
| 1124 | |
| 1125 | rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts); |
| 1126 | if (rc) { |
| 1127 | /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */ |
| 1128 | if (rc == -EINVAL) |
| 1129 | rc = 0; |
| 1130 | return rc; |
| 1131 | } |
| 1132 | |
| 1133 | selinux_write_opts(m, &opts); |
| 1134 | |
| 1135 | security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); |
| 1136 | |
| 1137 | return rc; |
| 1138 | } |
| 1139 | |
| 1140 | static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode) |
| 1141 | { |
| 1142 | switch (mode & S_IFMT) { |
| 1143 | case S_IFSOCK: |
| 1144 | return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE; |
| 1145 | case S_IFLNK: |
| 1146 | return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE; |
| 1147 | case S_IFREG: |
| 1148 | return SECCLASS_FILE; |
| 1149 | case S_IFBLK: |
| 1150 | return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE; |
| 1151 | case S_IFDIR: |
| 1152 | return SECCLASS_DIR; |
| 1153 | case S_IFCHR: |
| 1154 | return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE; |
| 1155 | case S_IFIFO: |
| 1156 | return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE; |
| 1157 | |
| 1158 | } |
| 1159 | |
| 1160 | return SECCLASS_FILE; |
| 1161 | } |
| 1162 | |
| 1163 | static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol) |
| 1164 | { |
| 1165 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP); |
| 1166 | } |
| 1167 | |
| 1168 | static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol) |
| 1169 | { |
| 1170 | return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP); |
| 1171 | } |
| 1172 | |
| 1173 | static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol) |
| 1174 | { |
| 1175 | switch (family) { |
| 1176 | case PF_UNIX: |
| 1177 | switch (type) { |
| 1178 | case SOCK_STREAM: |
| 1179 | case SOCK_SEQPACKET: |
| 1180 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET; |
| 1181 | case SOCK_DGRAM: |
| 1182 | return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET; |
| 1183 | } |
| 1184 | break; |
| 1185 | case PF_INET: |
| 1186 | case PF_INET6: |
| 1187 | switch (type) { |
| 1188 | case SOCK_STREAM: |
| 1189 | if (default_protocol_stream(protocol)) |
| 1190 | return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET; |
| 1191 | else |
| 1192 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
| 1193 | case SOCK_DGRAM: |
| 1194 | if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol)) |
| 1195 | return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET; |
| 1196 | else |
| 1197 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
| 1198 | case SOCK_DCCP: |
| 1199 | return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET; |
| 1200 | default: |
| 1201 | return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET; |
| 1202 | } |
| 1203 | break; |
| 1204 | case PF_NETLINK: |
| 1205 | switch (protocol) { |
| 1206 | case NETLINK_ROUTE: |
| 1207 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET; |
| 1208 | case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG: |
| 1209 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET; |
| 1210 | case NETLINK_NFLOG: |
| 1211 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET; |
| 1212 | case NETLINK_XFRM: |
| 1213 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET; |
| 1214 | case NETLINK_SELINUX: |
| 1215 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET; |
| 1216 | case NETLINK_ISCSI: |
| 1217 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ISCSI_SOCKET; |
| 1218 | case NETLINK_AUDIT: |
| 1219 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET; |
| 1220 | case NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP: |
| 1221 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP_SOCKET; |
| 1222 | case NETLINK_CONNECTOR: |
| 1223 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CONNECTOR_SOCKET; |
| 1224 | case NETLINK_NETFILTER: |
| 1225 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NETFILTER_SOCKET; |
| 1226 | case NETLINK_DNRTMSG: |
| 1227 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET; |
| 1228 | case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT: |
| 1229 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET; |
| 1230 | case NETLINK_GENERIC: |
| 1231 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_GENERIC_SOCKET; |
| 1232 | case NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT: |
| 1233 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT_SOCKET; |
| 1234 | case NETLINK_RDMA: |
| 1235 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_RDMA_SOCKET; |
| 1236 | case NETLINK_CRYPTO: |
| 1237 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_CRYPTO_SOCKET; |
| 1238 | default: |
| 1239 | return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET; |
| 1240 | } |
| 1241 | case PF_PACKET: |
| 1242 | return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET; |
| 1243 | case PF_KEY: |
| 1244 | return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET; |
| 1245 | case PF_APPLETALK: |
| 1246 | return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET; |
| 1247 | } |
| 1248 | |
| 1249 | return SECCLASS_SOCKET; |
| 1250 | } |
| 1251 | |
| 1252 | static int selinux_genfs_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry, |
| 1253 | u16 tclass, |
| 1254 | u16 flags, |
| 1255 | u32 *sid) |
| 1256 | { |
| 1257 | int rc; |
| 1258 | struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_inode->i_sb; |
| 1259 | char *buffer, *path; |
| 1260 | |
| 1261 | buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL); |
| 1262 | if (!buffer) |
| 1263 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 1264 | |
| 1265 | path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE); |
| 1266 | if (IS_ERR(path)) |
| 1267 | rc = PTR_ERR(path); |
| 1268 | else { |
| 1269 | if (flags & SE_SBPROC) { |
| 1270 | /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the |
| 1271 | * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling. |
| 1272 | * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */ |
| 1273 | while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') { |
| 1274 | path[1] = '/'; |
| 1275 | path++; |
| 1276 | } |
| 1277 | } |
| 1278 | rc = security_genfs_sid(sb->s_type->name, path, tclass, sid); |
| 1279 | } |
| 1280 | free_page((unsigned long)buffer); |
| 1281 | return rc; |
| 1282 | } |
| 1283 | |
| 1284 | /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */ |
| 1285 | static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry) |
| 1286 | { |
| 1287 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL; |
| 1288 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 1289 | u32 sid; |
| 1290 | struct dentry *dentry; |
| 1291 | #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255 |
| 1292 | char *context = NULL; |
| 1293 | unsigned len = 0; |
| 1294 | int rc = 0; |
| 1295 | |
| 1296 | if (isec->initialized) |
| 1297 | goto out; |
| 1298 | |
| 1299 | mutex_lock(&isec->lock); |
| 1300 | if (isec->initialized) |
| 1301 | goto out_unlock; |
| 1302 | |
| 1303 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
| 1304 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) { |
| 1305 | /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init, |
| 1306 | after the initial policy is loaded and the security |
| 1307 | server is ready to handle calls. */ |
| 1308 | spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
| 1309 | if (list_empty(&isec->list)) |
| 1310 | list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head); |
| 1311 | spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock); |
| 1312 | goto out_unlock; |
| 1313 | } |
| 1314 | |
| 1315 | switch (sbsec->behavior) { |
| 1316 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE: |
| 1317 | break; |
| 1318 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR: |
| 1319 | if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) { |
| 1320 | isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid; |
| 1321 | break; |
| 1322 | } |
| 1323 | |
| 1324 | /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one. |
| 1325 | Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */ |
| 1326 | if (opt_dentry) { |
| 1327 | /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */ |
| 1328 | dentry = dget(opt_dentry); |
| 1329 | } else { |
| 1330 | /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */ |
| 1331 | dentry = d_find_alias(inode); |
| 1332 | } |
| 1333 | if (!dentry) { |
| 1334 | /* |
| 1335 | * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed |
| 1336 | * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we |
| 1337 | * may find inodes that have no dentry on the |
| 1338 | * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these |
| 1339 | * will get fixed up the next time we go through |
| 1340 | * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could |
| 1341 | * be used again by userspace. |
| 1342 | */ |
| 1343 | goto out_unlock; |
| 1344 | } |
| 1345 | |
| 1346 | len = INITCONTEXTLEN; |
| 1347 | context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); |
| 1348 | if (!context) { |
| 1349 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
| 1350 | dput(dentry); |
| 1351 | goto out_unlock; |
| 1352 | } |
| 1353 | context[len] = '\0'; |
| 1354 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
| 1355 | context, len); |
| 1356 | if (rc == -ERANGE) { |
| 1357 | kfree(context); |
| 1358 | |
| 1359 | /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */ |
| 1360 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
| 1361 | NULL, 0); |
| 1362 | if (rc < 0) { |
| 1363 | dput(dentry); |
| 1364 | goto out_unlock; |
| 1365 | } |
| 1366 | len = rc; |
| 1367 | context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS); |
| 1368 | if (!context) { |
| 1369 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
| 1370 | dput(dentry); |
| 1371 | goto out_unlock; |
| 1372 | } |
| 1373 | context[len] = '\0'; |
| 1374 | rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, |
| 1375 | XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, |
| 1376 | context, len); |
| 1377 | } |
| 1378 | dput(dentry); |
| 1379 | if (rc < 0) { |
| 1380 | if (rc != -ENODATA) { |
| 1381 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned " |
| 1382 | "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__, |
| 1383 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); |
| 1384 | kfree(context); |
| 1385 | goto out_unlock; |
| 1386 | } |
| 1387 | /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */ |
| 1388 | sid = sbsec->def_sid; |
| 1389 | rc = 0; |
| 1390 | } else { |
| 1391 | rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid, |
| 1392 | sbsec->def_sid, |
| 1393 | GFP_NOFS); |
| 1394 | if (rc) { |
| 1395 | char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id; |
| 1396 | unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino; |
| 1397 | |
| 1398 | if (rc == -EINVAL) { |
| 1399 | if (printk_ratelimit()) |
| 1400 | printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid " |
| 1401 | "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the " |
| 1402 | "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context); |
| 1403 | } else { |
| 1404 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) " |
| 1405 | "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", |
| 1406 | __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino); |
| 1407 | } |
| 1408 | kfree(context); |
| 1409 | /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */ |
| 1410 | rc = 0; |
| 1411 | break; |
| 1412 | } |
| 1413 | } |
| 1414 | kfree(context); |
| 1415 | isec->sid = sid; |
| 1416 | break; |
| 1417 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK: |
| 1418 | isec->sid = isec->task_sid; |
| 1419 | break; |
| 1420 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS: |
| 1421 | /* Default to the fs SID. */ |
| 1422 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; |
| 1423 | |
| 1424 | /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */ |
| 1425 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
| 1426 | rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid, |
| 1427 | isec->sclass, NULL, &sid); |
| 1428 | if (rc) |
| 1429 | goto out_unlock; |
| 1430 | isec->sid = sid; |
| 1431 | break; |
| 1432 | case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT: |
| 1433 | isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; |
| 1434 | break; |
| 1435 | default: |
| 1436 | /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */ |
| 1437 | isec->sid = sbsec->sid; |
| 1438 | |
| 1439 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) { |
| 1440 | /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on |
| 1441 | * procfs inodes */ |
| 1442 | if (opt_dentry) |
| 1443 | /* Called from d_instantiate or |
| 1444 | * d_splice_alias. */ |
| 1445 | dentry = dget(opt_dentry); |
| 1446 | else |
| 1447 | /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to |
| 1448 | * find a dentry. */ |
| 1449 | dentry = d_find_alias(inode); |
| 1450 | /* |
| 1451 | * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed |
| 1452 | * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we |
| 1453 | * may find inodes that have no dentry on the |
| 1454 | * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as |
| 1455 | * these will get fixed up the next time we go through |
| 1456 | * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes |
| 1457 | * could be used again by userspace. |
| 1458 | */ |
| 1459 | if (!dentry) |
| 1460 | goto out_unlock; |
| 1461 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
| 1462 | rc = selinux_genfs_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, |
| 1463 | sbsec->flags, &sid); |
| 1464 | dput(dentry); |
| 1465 | if (rc) |
| 1466 | goto out_unlock; |
| 1467 | isec->sid = sid; |
| 1468 | } |
| 1469 | break; |
| 1470 | } |
| 1471 | |
| 1472 | isec->initialized = 1; |
| 1473 | |
| 1474 | out_unlock: |
| 1475 | mutex_unlock(&isec->lock); |
| 1476 | out: |
| 1477 | if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE) |
| 1478 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
| 1479 | return rc; |
| 1480 | } |
| 1481 | |
| 1482 | /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */ |
| 1483 | static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig) |
| 1484 | { |
| 1485 | u32 perm = 0; |
| 1486 | |
| 1487 | switch (sig) { |
| 1488 | case SIGCHLD: |
| 1489 | /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */ |
| 1490 | perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD; |
| 1491 | break; |
| 1492 | case SIGKILL: |
| 1493 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ |
| 1494 | perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL; |
| 1495 | break; |
| 1496 | case SIGSTOP: |
| 1497 | /* Cannot be caught or ignored */ |
| 1498 | perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP; |
| 1499 | break; |
| 1500 | default: |
| 1501 | /* All other signals. */ |
| 1502 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL; |
| 1503 | break; |
| 1504 | } |
| 1505 | |
| 1506 | return perm; |
| 1507 | } |
| 1508 | |
| 1509 | /* |
| 1510 | * Check permission between a pair of credentials |
| 1511 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
| 1512 | */ |
| 1513 | static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor, |
| 1514 | const struct cred *target, |
| 1515 | u32 perms) |
| 1516 | { |
| 1517 | u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target); |
| 1518 | |
| 1519 | return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
| 1520 | } |
| 1521 | |
| 1522 | /* |
| 1523 | * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks, |
| 1524 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
| 1525 | * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target |
| 1526 | * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1 |
| 1527 | */ |
| 1528 | static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1, |
| 1529 | const struct task_struct *tsk2, |
| 1530 | u32 perms) |
| 1531 | { |
| 1532 | const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2; |
| 1533 | u32 sid1, sid2; |
| 1534 | |
| 1535 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 1536 | __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid; |
| 1537 | __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid; |
| 1538 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 1539 | return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
| 1540 | } |
| 1541 | |
| 1542 | /* |
| 1543 | * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks, |
| 1544 | * fork check, ptrace check, etc. |
| 1545 | * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target |
| 1546 | * - this uses current's subjective creds |
| 1547 | */ |
| 1548 | static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk, |
| 1549 | u32 perms) |
| 1550 | { |
| 1551 | u32 sid, tsid; |
| 1552 | |
| 1553 | sid = current_sid(); |
| 1554 | tsid = task_sid(tsk); |
| 1555 | return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL); |
| 1556 | } |
| 1557 | |
| 1558 | #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63 |
| 1559 | #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63. |
| 1560 | #endif |
| 1561 | |
| 1562 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */ |
| 1563 | static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred, |
| 1564 | int cap, int audit) |
| 1565 | { |
| 1566 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 1567 | struct av_decision avd; |
| 1568 | u16 sclass; |
| 1569 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
| 1570 | u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap); |
| 1571 | int rc; |
| 1572 | |
| 1573 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP; |
| 1574 | ad.u.cap = cap; |
| 1575 | |
| 1576 | switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) { |
| 1577 | case 0: |
| 1578 | sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY; |
| 1579 | break; |
| 1580 | case 1: |
| 1581 | sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2; |
| 1582 | break; |
| 1583 | default: |
| 1584 | printk(KERN_ERR |
| 1585 | "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap); |
| 1586 | BUG(); |
| 1587 | return -EINVAL; |
| 1588 | } |
| 1589 | |
| 1590 | rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd); |
| 1591 | if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) { |
| 1592 | int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad); |
| 1593 | if (rc2) |
| 1594 | return rc2; |
| 1595 | } |
| 1596 | return rc; |
| 1597 | } |
| 1598 | |
| 1599 | /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */ |
| 1600 | static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk, |
| 1601 | u32 perms) |
| 1602 | { |
| 1603 | u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); |
| 1604 | |
| 1605 | return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, |
| 1606 | SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL); |
| 1607 | } |
| 1608 | |
| 1609 | /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode. |
| 1610 | The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit |
| 1611 | data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */ |
| 1612 | static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
| 1613 | struct inode *inode, |
| 1614 | u32 perms, |
| 1615 | struct common_audit_data *adp) |
| 1616 | { |
| 1617 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
| 1618 | u32 sid; |
| 1619 | |
| 1620 | validate_creds(cred); |
| 1621 | |
| 1622 | if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) |
| 1623 | return 0; |
| 1624 | |
| 1625 | sid = cred_sid(cred); |
| 1626 | isec = inode->i_security; |
| 1627 | |
| 1628 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp); |
| 1629 | } |
| 1630 | |
| 1631 | /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing |
| 1632 | the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the |
| 1633 | pathname if needed. */ |
| 1634 | static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
| 1635 | struct dentry *dentry, |
| 1636 | u32 av) |
| 1637 | { |
| 1638 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
| 1639 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 1640 | |
| 1641 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
| 1642 | ad.u.dentry = dentry; |
| 1643 | return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); |
| 1644 | } |
| 1645 | |
| 1646 | /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing |
| 1647 | the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the |
| 1648 | pathname if needed. */ |
| 1649 | static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
| 1650 | const struct path *path, |
| 1651 | u32 av) |
| 1652 | { |
| 1653 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry); |
| 1654 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 1655 | |
| 1656 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; |
| 1657 | ad.u.path = *path; |
| 1658 | return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); |
| 1659 | } |
| 1660 | |
| 1661 | /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */ |
| 1662 | static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
| 1663 | struct file *file, |
| 1664 | u32 av) |
| 1665 | { |
| 1666 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 1667 | |
| 1668 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; |
| 1669 | ad.u.path = file->f_path; |
| 1670 | return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad); |
| 1671 | } |
| 1672 | |
| 1673 | /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to |
| 1674 | access an inode in a given way. Check access to the |
| 1675 | descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to |
| 1676 | check a particular permission to the file. |
| 1677 | Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it |
| 1678 | has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then |
| 1679 | access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases |
| 1680 | where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */ |
| 1681 | static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
| 1682 | struct file *file, |
| 1683 | u32 av) |
| 1684 | { |
| 1685 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
| 1686 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); |
| 1687 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 1688 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
| 1689 | int rc; |
| 1690 | |
| 1691 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; |
| 1692 | ad.u.path = file->f_path; |
| 1693 | |
| 1694 | if (sid != fsec->sid) { |
| 1695 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, |
| 1696 | SECCLASS_FD, |
| 1697 | FD__USE, |
| 1698 | &ad); |
| 1699 | if (rc) |
| 1700 | goto out; |
| 1701 | } |
| 1702 | |
| 1703 | /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ |
| 1704 | rc = 0; |
| 1705 | if (av) |
| 1706 | rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad); |
| 1707 | |
| 1708 | out: |
| 1709 | return rc; |
| 1710 | } |
| 1711 | |
| 1712 | /* Check whether a task can create a file. */ |
| 1713 | static int may_create(struct inode *dir, |
| 1714 | struct dentry *dentry, |
| 1715 | u16 tclass) |
| 1716 | { |
| 1717 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
| 1718 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; |
| 1719 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
| 1720 | u32 sid, newsid; |
| 1721 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 1722 | int rc; |
| 1723 | |
| 1724 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
| 1725 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; |
| 1726 | |
| 1727 | sid = tsec->sid; |
| 1728 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; |
| 1729 | |
| 1730 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
| 1731 | ad.u.dentry = dentry; |
| 1732 | |
| 1733 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, |
| 1734 | DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, |
| 1735 | &ad); |
| 1736 | if (rc) |
| 1737 | return rc; |
| 1738 | |
| 1739 | if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) { |
| 1740 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, |
| 1741 | &dentry->d_name, &newsid); |
| 1742 | if (rc) |
| 1743 | return rc; |
| 1744 | } |
| 1745 | |
| 1746 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad); |
| 1747 | if (rc) |
| 1748 | return rc; |
| 1749 | |
| 1750 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid, |
| 1751 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
| 1752 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
| 1753 | } |
| 1754 | |
| 1755 | /* Check whether a task can create a key. */ |
| 1756 | static int may_create_key(u32 ksid, |
| 1757 | struct task_struct *ctx) |
| 1758 | { |
| 1759 | u32 sid = task_sid(ctx); |
| 1760 | |
| 1761 | return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL); |
| 1762 | } |
| 1763 | |
| 1764 | #define MAY_LINK 0 |
| 1765 | #define MAY_UNLINK 1 |
| 1766 | #define MAY_RMDIR 2 |
| 1767 | |
| 1768 | /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */ |
| 1769 | static int may_link(struct inode *dir, |
| 1770 | struct dentry *dentry, |
| 1771 | int kind) |
| 1772 | |
| 1773 | { |
| 1774 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec; |
| 1775 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 1776 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 1777 | u32 av; |
| 1778 | int rc; |
| 1779 | |
| 1780 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
| 1781 | isec = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security; |
| 1782 | |
| 1783 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
| 1784 | ad.u.dentry = dentry; |
| 1785 | |
| 1786 | av = DIR__SEARCH; |
| 1787 | av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME); |
| 1788 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); |
| 1789 | if (rc) |
| 1790 | return rc; |
| 1791 | |
| 1792 | switch (kind) { |
| 1793 | case MAY_LINK: |
| 1794 | av = FILE__LINK; |
| 1795 | break; |
| 1796 | case MAY_UNLINK: |
| 1797 | av = FILE__UNLINK; |
| 1798 | break; |
| 1799 | case MAY_RMDIR: |
| 1800 | av = DIR__RMDIR; |
| 1801 | break; |
| 1802 | default: |
| 1803 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n", |
| 1804 | __func__, kind); |
| 1805 | return 0; |
| 1806 | } |
| 1807 | |
| 1808 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad); |
| 1809 | return rc; |
| 1810 | } |
| 1811 | |
| 1812 | static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir, |
| 1813 | struct dentry *old_dentry, |
| 1814 | struct inode *new_dir, |
| 1815 | struct dentry *new_dentry) |
| 1816 | { |
| 1817 | struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec; |
| 1818 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 1819 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 1820 | u32 av; |
| 1821 | int old_is_dir, new_is_dir; |
| 1822 | int rc; |
| 1823 | |
| 1824 | old_dsec = old_dir->i_security; |
| 1825 | old_isec = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_security; |
| 1826 | old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry); |
| 1827 | new_dsec = new_dir->i_security; |
| 1828 | |
| 1829 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
| 1830 | |
| 1831 | ad.u.dentry = old_dentry; |
| 1832 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, |
| 1833 | DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad); |
| 1834 | if (rc) |
| 1835 | return rc; |
| 1836 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid, |
| 1837 | old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad); |
| 1838 | if (rc) |
| 1839 | return rc; |
| 1840 | if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) { |
| 1841 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid, |
| 1842 | old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad); |
| 1843 | if (rc) |
| 1844 | return rc; |
| 1845 | } |
| 1846 | |
| 1847 | ad.u.dentry = new_dentry; |
| 1848 | av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH; |
| 1849 | if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) |
| 1850 | av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME; |
| 1851 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad); |
| 1852 | if (rc) |
| 1853 | return rc; |
| 1854 | if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) { |
| 1855 | new_isec = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_security; |
| 1856 | new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry); |
| 1857 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid, |
| 1858 | new_isec->sclass, |
| 1859 | (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad); |
| 1860 | if (rc) |
| 1861 | return rc; |
| 1862 | } |
| 1863 | |
| 1864 | return 0; |
| 1865 | } |
| 1866 | |
| 1867 | /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */ |
| 1868 | static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, |
| 1869 | struct super_block *sb, |
| 1870 | u32 perms, |
| 1871 | struct common_audit_data *ad) |
| 1872 | { |
| 1873 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
| 1874 | u32 sid = cred_sid(cred); |
| 1875 | |
| 1876 | sbsec = sb->s_security; |
| 1877 | return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad); |
| 1878 | } |
| 1879 | |
| 1880 | /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */ |
| 1881 | static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask) |
| 1882 | { |
| 1883 | u32 av = 0; |
| 1884 | |
| 1885 | if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) { |
| 1886 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) |
| 1887 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; |
| 1888 | if (mask & MAY_READ) |
| 1889 | av |= FILE__READ; |
| 1890 | |
| 1891 | if (mask & MAY_APPEND) |
| 1892 | av |= FILE__APPEND; |
| 1893 | else if (mask & MAY_WRITE) |
| 1894 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
| 1895 | |
| 1896 | } else { |
| 1897 | if (mask & MAY_EXEC) |
| 1898 | av |= DIR__SEARCH; |
| 1899 | if (mask & MAY_WRITE) |
| 1900 | av |= DIR__WRITE; |
| 1901 | if (mask & MAY_READ) |
| 1902 | av |= DIR__READ; |
| 1903 | } |
| 1904 | |
| 1905 | return av; |
| 1906 | } |
| 1907 | |
| 1908 | /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */ |
| 1909 | static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file) |
| 1910 | { |
| 1911 | u32 av = 0; |
| 1912 | |
| 1913 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) |
| 1914 | av |= FILE__READ; |
| 1915 | if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) { |
| 1916 | if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND) |
| 1917 | av |= FILE__APPEND; |
| 1918 | else |
| 1919 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
| 1920 | } |
| 1921 | if (!av) { |
| 1922 | /* |
| 1923 | * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use. |
| 1924 | */ |
| 1925 | av = FILE__IOCTL; |
| 1926 | } |
| 1927 | |
| 1928 | return av; |
| 1929 | } |
| 1930 | |
| 1931 | /* |
| 1932 | * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open |
| 1933 | * open permission. |
| 1934 | */ |
| 1935 | static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file) |
| 1936 | { |
| 1937 | u32 av = file_to_av(file); |
| 1938 | |
| 1939 | if (selinux_policycap_openperm) |
| 1940 | av |= FILE__OPEN; |
| 1941 | |
| 1942 | return av; |
| 1943 | } |
| 1944 | |
| 1945 | /* Hook functions begin here. */ |
| 1946 | |
| 1947 | static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr) |
| 1948 | { |
| 1949 | u32 mysid = current_sid(); |
| 1950 | u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr); |
| 1951 | |
| 1952 | return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, |
| 1953 | BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL); |
| 1954 | } |
| 1955 | |
| 1956 | static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from, |
| 1957 | struct task_struct *to) |
| 1958 | { |
| 1959 | u32 mysid = current_sid(); |
| 1960 | u32 fromsid = task_sid(from); |
| 1961 | u32 tosid = task_sid(to); |
| 1962 | int rc; |
| 1963 | |
| 1964 | if (mysid != fromsid) { |
| 1965 | rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER, |
| 1966 | BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL); |
| 1967 | if (rc) |
| 1968 | return rc; |
| 1969 | } |
| 1970 | |
| 1971 | return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, |
| 1972 | NULL); |
| 1973 | } |
| 1974 | |
| 1975 | static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from, |
| 1976 | struct task_struct *to) |
| 1977 | { |
| 1978 | u32 fromsid = task_sid(from); |
| 1979 | u32 tosid = task_sid(to); |
| 1980 | |
| 1981 | return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER, |
| 1982 | NULL); |
| 1983 | } |
| 1984 | |
| 1985 | static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, |
| 1986 | struct task_struct *to, |
| 1987 | struct file *file) |
| 1988 | { |
| 1989 | u32 sid = task_sid(to); |
| 1990 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
| 1991 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry); |
| 1992 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 1993 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 1994 | int rc; |
| 1995 | |
| 1996 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; |
| 1997 | ad.u.path = file->f_path; |
| 1998 | |
| 1999 | if (sid != fsec->sid) { |
| 2000 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid, |
| 2001 | SECCLASS_FD, |
| 2002 | FD__USE, |
| 2003 | &ad); |
| 2004 | if (rc) |
| 2005 | return rc; |
| 2006 | } |
| 2007 | |
| 2008 | if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) |
| 2009 | return 0; |
| 2010 | |
| 2011 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file), |
| 2012 | &ad); |
| 2013 | } |
| 2014 | |
| 2015 | static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, |
| 2016 | unsigned int mode) |
| 2017 | { |
| 2018 | if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) { |
| 2019 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 2020 | u32 csid = task_sid(child); |
| 2021 | return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL); |
| 2022 | } |
| 2023 | |
| 2024 | return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE); |
| 2025 | } |
| 2026 | |
| 2027 | static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) |
| 2028 | { |
| 2029 | return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE); |
| 2030 | } |
| 2031 | |
| 2032 | static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, |
| 2033 | kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
| 2034 | { |
| 2035 | return current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP); |
| 2036 | } |
| 2037 | |
| 2038 | static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
| 2039 | const kernel_cap_t *effective, |
| 2040 | const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, |
| 2041 | const kernel_cap_t *permitted) |
| 2042 | { |
| 2043 | return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP); |
| 2044 | } |
| 2045 | |
| 2046 | /* |
| 2047 | * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook, |
| 2048 | * which was removed). |
| 2049 | * |
| 2050 | * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux |
| 2051 | * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not |
| 2052 | * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of |
| 2053 | * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook. |
| 2054 | */ |
| 2055 | |
| 2056 | static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns, |
| 2057 | int cap, int audit) |
| 2058 | { |
| 2059 | return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit); |
| 2060 | } |
| 2061 | |
| 2062 | static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb) |
| 2063 | { |
| 2064 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2065 | int rc = 0; |
| 2066 | |
| 2067 | if (!sb) |
| 2068 | return 0; |
| 2069 | |
| 2070 | switch (cmds) { |
| 2071 | case Q_SYNC: |
| 2072 | case Q_QUOTAON: |
| 2073 | case Q_QUOTAOFF: |
| 2074 | case Q_SETINFO: |
| 2075 | case Q_SETQUOTA: |
| 2076 | rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL); |
| 2077 | break; |
| 2078 | case Q_GETFMT: |
| 2079 | case Q_GETINFO: |
| 2080 | case Q_GETQUOTA: |
| 2081 | rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL); |
| 2082 | break; |
| 2083 | default: |
| 2084 | rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */ |
| 2085 | break; |
| 2086 | } |
| 2087 | return rc; |
| 2088 | } |
| 2089 | |
| 2090 | static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry) |
| 2091 | { |
| 2092 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2093 | |
| 2094 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON); |
| 2095 | } |
| 2096 | |
| 2097 | static int selinux_syslog(int type) |
| 2098 | { |
| 2099 | int rc; |
| 2100 | |
| 2101 | switch (type) { |
| 2102 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */ |
| 2103 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */ |
| 2104 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ); |
| 2105 | break; |
| 2106 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */ |
| 2107 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */ |
| 2108 | /* Set level of messages printed to console */ |
| 2109 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL: |
| 2110 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE); |
| 2111 | break; |
| 2112 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */ |
| 2113 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */ |
| 2114 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */ |
| 2115 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */ |
| 2116 | case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */ |
| 2117 | default: |
| 2118 | rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD); |
| 2119 | break; |
| 2120 | } |
| 2121 | return rc; |
| 2122 | } |
| 2123 | |
| 2124 | /* |
| 2125 | * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual |
| 2126 | * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to |
| 2127 | * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. |
| 2128 | * |
| 2129 | * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all |
| 2130 | * processes that allocate mappings. |
| 2131 | */ |
| 2132 | static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) |
| 2133 | { |
| 2134 | int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; |
| 2135 | |
| 2136 | rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, |
| 2137 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); |
| 2138 | if (rc == 0) |
| 2139 | cap_sys_admin = 1; |
| 2140 | |
| 2141 | return cap_sys_admin; |
| 2142 | } |
| 2143 | |
| 2144 | /* binprm security operations */ |
| 2145 | |
| 2146 | static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm, |
| 2147 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec, |
| 2148 | const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec) |
| 2149 | { |
| 2150 | int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS); |
| 2151 | int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID); |
| 2152 | int rc; |
| 2153 | |
| 2154 | if (!nnp && !nosuid) |
| 2155 | return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */ |
| 2156 | |
| 2157 | if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) |
| 2158 | return 0; /* No change in credentials */ |
| 2159 | |
| 2160 | /* |
| 2161 | * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid |
| 2162 | * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are |
| 2163 | * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions |
| 2164 | * of the current SID. |
| 2165 | */ |
| 2166 | rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid); |
| 2167 | if (rc) { |
| 2168 | /* |
| 2169 | * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid. |
| 2170 | * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller. |
| 2171 | * nosuid: Permission denied to file. |
| 2172 | */ |
| 2173 | if (nnp) |
| 2174 | return -EPERM; |
| 2175 | else |
| 2176 | return -EACCES; |
| 2177 | } |
| 2178 | return 0; |
| 2179 | } |
| 2180 | |
| 2181 | static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
| 2182 | { |
| 2183 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; |
| 2184 | struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; |
| 2185 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
| 2186 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 2187 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); |
| 2188 | int rc; |
| 2189 | |
| 2190 | /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not |
| 2191 | * the script interpreter */ |
| 2192 | if (bprm->cred_prepared) |
| 2193 | return 0; |
| 2194 | |
| 2195 | old_tsec = current_security(); |
| 2196 | new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; |
| 2197 | isec = inode->i_security; |
| 2198 | |
| 2199 | /* Default to the current task SID. */ |
| 2200 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; |
| 2201 | new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid; |
| 2202 | |
| 2203 | /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */ |
| 2204 | new_tsec->create_sid = 0; |
| 2205 | new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; |
| 2206 | new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; |
| 2207 | |
| 2208 | if (old_tsec->exec_sid) { |
| 2209 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid; |
| 2210 | /* Reset exec SID on execve. */ |
| 2211 | new_tsec->exec_sid = 0; |
| 2212 | |
| 2213 | /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */ |
| 2214 | rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); |
| 2215 | if (rc) |
| 2216 | return rc; |
| 2217 | } else { |
| 2218 | /* Check for a default transition on this program. */ |
| 2219 | rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
| 2220 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL, |
| 2221 | &new_tsec->sid); |
| 2222 | if (rc) |
| 2223 | return rc; |
| 2224 | |
| 2225 | /* |
| 2226 | * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed |
| 2227 | * transition. |
| 2228 | */ |
| 2229 | rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec); |
| 2230 | if (rc) |
| 2231 | new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid; |
| 2232 | } |
| 2233 | |
| 2234 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH; |
| 2235 | ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path; |
| 2236 | |
| 2237 | if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) { |
| 2238 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
| 2239 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad); |
| 2240 | if (rc) |
| 2241 | return rc; |
| 2242 | } else { |
| 2243 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ |
| 2244 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, |
| 2245 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad); |
| 2246 | if (rc) |
| 2247 | return rc; |
| 2248 | |
| 2249 | rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid, |
| 2250 | SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad); |
| 2251 | if (rc) |
| 2252 | return rc; |
| 2253 | |
| 2254 | /* Check for shared state */ |
| 2255 | if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) { |
| 2256 | rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid, |
| 2257 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE, |
| 2258 | NULL); |
| 2259 | if (rc) |
| 2260 | return -EPERM; |
| 2261 | } |
| 2262 | |
| 2263 | /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that |
| 2264 | * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */ |
| 2265 | if (bprm->unsafe & |
| 2266 | (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) { |
| 2267 | struct task_struct *tracer; |
| 2268 | struct task_security_struct *sec; |
| 2269 | u32 ptsid = 0; |
| 2270 | |
| 2271 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 2272 | tracer = ptrace_parent(current); |
| 2273 | if (likely(tracer != NULL)) { |
| 2274 | sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security; |
| 2275 | ptsid = sec->sid; |
| 2276 | } |
| 2277 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 2278 | |
| 2279 | if (ptsid != 0) { |
| 2280 | rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid, |
| 2281 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
| 2282 | PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); |
| 2283 | if (rc) |
| 2284 | return -EPERM; |
| 2285 | } |
| 2286 | } |
| 2287 | |
| 2288 | /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */ |
| 2289 | bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; |
| 2290 | } |
| 2291 | |
| 2292 | return 0; |
| 2293 | } |
| 2294 | |
| 2295 | static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
| 2296 | { |
| 2297 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
| 2298 | u32 sid, osid; |
| 2299 | int atsecure = 0; |
| 2300 | |
| 2301 | sid = tsec->sid; |
| 2302 | osid = tsec->osid; |
| 2303 | |
| 2304 | if (osid != sid) { |
| 2305 | /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless |
| 2306 | the noatsecure permission is granted between |
| 2307 | the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */ |
| 2308 | atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, |
| 2309 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
| 2310 | PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL); |
| 2311 | } |
| 2312 | |
| 2313 | return !!atsecure; |
| 2314 | } |
| 2315 | |
| 2316 | static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd) |
| 2317 | { |
| 2318 | return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0; |
| 2319 | } |
| 2320 | |
| 2321 | /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */ |
| 2322 | static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred, |
| 2323 | struct files_struct *files) |
| 2324 | { |
| 2325 | struct file *file, *devnull = NULL; |
| 2326 | struct tty_struct *tty; |
| 2327 | int drop_tty = 0; |
| 2328 | unsigned n; |
| 2329 | |
| 2330 | tty = get_current_tty(); |
| 2331 | if (tty) { |
| 2332 | spin_lock(&tty_files_lock); |
| 2333 | if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) { |
| 2334 | struct tty_file_private *file_priv; |
| 2335 | |
| 2336 | /* Revalidate access to controlling tty. |
| 2337 | Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly |
| 2338 | rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular |
| 2339 | open file may belong to another process and we are |
| 2340 | only interested in the inode-based check here. */ |
| 2341 | file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, |
| 2342 | struct tty_file_private, list); |
| 2343 | file = file_priv->file; |
| 2344 | if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE)) |
| 2345 | drop_tty = 1; |
| 2346 | } |
| 2347 | spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock); |
| 2348 | tty_kref_put(tty); |
| 2349 | } |
| 2350 | /* Reset controlling tty. */ |
| 2351 | if (drop_tty) |
| 2352 | no_tty(); |
| 2353 | |
| 2354 | /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */ |
| 2355 | n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred); |
| 2356 | if (!n) /* none found? */ |
| 2357 | return; |
| 2358 | |
| 2359 | devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred); |
| 2360 | if (IS_ERR(devnull)) |
| 2361 | devnull = NULL; |
| 2362 | /* replace all the matching ones with this */ |
| 2363 | do { |
| 2364 | replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0); |
| 2365 | } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0); |
| 2366 | if (devnull) |
| 2367 | fput(devnull); |
| 2368 | } |
| 2369 | |
| 2370 | /* |
| 2371 | * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec |
| 2372 | */ |
| 2373 | static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
| 2374 | { |
| 2375 | struct task_security_struct *new_tsec; |
| 2376 | struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim; |
| 2377 | int rc, i; |
| 2378 | |
| 2379 | new_tsec = bprm->cred->security; |
| 2380 | if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid) |
| 2381 | return; |
| 2382 | |
| 2383 | /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */ |
| 2384 | flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files); |
| 2385 | |
| 2386 | /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */ |
| 2387 | current->pdeath_signal = 0; |
| 2388 | |
| 2389 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old |
| 2390 | * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current |
| 2391 | * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit. |
| 2392 | * |
| 2393 | * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be |
| 2394 | * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's |
| 2395 | * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits |
| 2396 | * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is |
| 2397 | * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK. |
| 2398 | */ |
| 2399 | rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
| 2400 | PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL); |
| 2401 | if (rc) { |
| 2402 | /* protect against do_prlimit() */ |
| 2403 | task_lock(current); |
| 2404 | for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) { |
| 2405 | rlim = current->signal->rlim + i; |
| 2406 | initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i; |
| 2407 | rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur); |
| 2408 | } |
| 2409 | task_unlock(current); |
| 2410 | update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU)); |
| 2411 | } |
| 2412 | } |
| 2413 | |
| 2414 | /* |
| 2415 | * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials |
| 2416 | * due to exec |
| 2417 | */ |
| 2418 | static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) |
| 2419 | { |
| 2420 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
| 2421 | struct itimerval itimer; |
| 2422 | u32 osid, sid; |
| 2423 | int rc, i; |
| 2424 | |
| 2425 | osid = tsec->osid; |
| 2426 | sid = tsec->sid; |
| 2427 | |
| 2428 | if (sid == osid) |
| 2429 | return; |
| 2430 | |
| 2431 | /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID. |
| 2432 | * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and |
| 2433 | * flush and unblock signals. |
| 2434 | * |
| 2435 | * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any |
| 2436 | * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID. |
| 2437 | */ |
| 2438 | rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL); |
| 2439 | if (rc) { |
| 2440 | memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer); |
| 2441 | for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) |
| 2442 | do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL); |
| 2443 | spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| 2444 | if (!fatal_signal_pending(current)) { |
| 2445 | flush_sigqueue(¤t->pending); |
| 2446 | flush_sigqueue(¤t->signal->shared_pending); |
| 2447 | flush_signal_handlers(current, 1); |
| 2448 | sigemptyset(¤t->blocked); |
| 2449 | recalc_sigpending(); |
| 2450 | } |
| 2451 | spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); |
| 2452 | } |
| 2453 | |
| 2454 | /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck |
| 2455 | * wait permission to the new task SID. */ |
| 2456 | read_lock(&tasklist_lock); |
| 2457 | __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent); |
| 2458 | read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); |
| 2459 | } |
| 2460 | |
| 2461 | /* superblock security operations */ |
| 2462 | |
| 2463 | static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb) |
| 2464 | { |
| 2465 | return superblock_alloc_security(sb); |
| 2466 | } |
| 2467 | |
| 2468 | static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb) |
| 2469 | { |
| 2470 | superblock_free_security(sb); |
| 2471 | } |
| 2472 | |
| 2473 | static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen) |
| 2474 | { |
| 2475 | if (plen > olen) |
| 2476 | return 0; |
| 2477 | |
| 2478 | return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen); |
| 2479 | } |
| 2480 | |
| 2481 | static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len) |
| 2482 | { |
| 2483 | return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
| 2484 | match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
| 2485 | match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
| 2486 | match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) || |
| 2487 | match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len)); |
| 2488 | } |
| 2489 | |
| 2490 | static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len) |
| 2491 | { |
| 2492 | if (!*first) { |
| 2493 | **to = ','; |
| 2494 | *to += 1; |
| 2495 | } else |
| 2496 | *first = 0; |
| 2497 | memcpy(*to, from, len); |
| 2498 | *to += len; |
| 2499 | } |
| 2500 | |
| 2501 | static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, |
| 2502 | int len) |
| 2503 | { |
| 2504 | int current_size = 0; |
| 2505 | |
| 2506 | if (!*first) { |
| 2507 | **to = '|'; |
| 2508 | *to += 1; |
| 2509 | } else |
| 2510 | *first = 0; |
| 2511 | |
| 2512 | while (current_size < len) { |
| 2513 | if (*from != '"') { |
| 2514 | **to = *from; |
| 2515 | *to += 1; |
| 2516 | } |
| 2517 | from += 1; |
| 2518 | current_size += 1; |
| 2519 | } |
| 2520 | } |
| 2521 | |
| 2522 | static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy) |
| 2523 | { |
| 2524 | int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0; |
| 2525 | char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end; |
| 2526 | char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec; |
| 2527 | int open_quote = 0; |
| 2528 | |
| 2529 | in_curr = orig; |
| 2530 | sec_curr = copy; |
| 2531 | |
| 2532 | nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL); |
| 2533 | if (!nosec) { |
| 2534 | rc = -ENOMEM; |
| 2535 | goto out; |
| 2536 | } |
| 2537 | |
| 2538 | nosec_save = nosec; |
| 2539 | fnosec = fsec = 1; |
| 2540 | in_save = in_end = orig; |
| 2541 | |
| 2542 | do { |
| 2543 | if (*in_end == '"') |
| 2544 | open_quote = !open_quote; |
| 2545 | if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) || |
| 2546 | *in_end == '\0') { |
| 2547 | int len = in_end - in_curr; |
| 2548 | |
| 2549 | if (selinux_option(in_curr, len)) |
| 2550 | take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len); |
| 2551 | else |
| 2552 | take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len); |
| 2553 | |
| 2554 | in_curr = in_end + 1; |
| 2555 | } |
| 2556 | } while (*in_end++); |
| 2557 | |
| 2558 | strcpy(in_save, nosec_save); |
| 2559 | free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save); |
| 2560 | out: |
| 2561 | return rc; |
| 2562 | } |
| 2563 | |
| 2564 | static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data) |
| 2565 | { |
| 2566 | int rc, i, *flags; |
| 2567 | struct security_mnt_opts opts; |
| 2568 | char *secdata, **mount_options; |
| 2569 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security; |
| 2570 | |
| 2571 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) |
| 2572 | return 0; |
| 2573 | |
| 2574 | if (!data) |
| 2575 | return 0; |
| 2576 | |
| 2577 | if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA) |
| 2578 | return 0; |
| 2579 | |
| 2580 | security_init_mnt_opts(&opts); |
| 2581 | secdata = alloc_secdata(); |
| 2582 | if (!secdata) |
| 2583 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 2584 | rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata); |
| 2585 | if (rc) |
| 2586 | goto out_free_secdata; |
| 2587 | |
| 2588 | rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts); |
| 2589 | if (rc) |
| 2590 | goto out_free_secdata; |
| 2591 | |
| 2592 | mount_options = opts.mnt_opts; |
| 2593 | flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags; |
| 2594 | |
| 2595 | for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) { |
| 2596 | u32 sid; |
| 2597 | size_t len; |
| 2598 | |
| 2599 | if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT) |
| 2600 | continue; |
| 2601 | len = strlen(mount_options[i]); |
| 2602 | rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid, |
| 2603 | GFP_KERNEL); |
| 2604 | if (rc) { |
| 2605 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid" |
| 2606 | "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n", |
| 2607 | mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc); |
| 2608 | goto out_free_opts; |
| 2609 | } |
| 2610 | rc = -EINVAL; |
| 2611 | switch (flags[i]) { |
| 2612 | case FSCONTEXT_MNT: |
| 2613 | if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid)) |
| 2614 | goto out_bad_option; |
| 2615 | break; |
| 2616 | case CONTEXT_MNT: |
| 2617 | if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid)) |
| 2618 | goto out_bad_option; |
| 2619 | break; |
| 2620 | case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: { |
| 2621 | struct inode_security_struct *root_isec; |
| 2622 | root_isec = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root)->i_security; |
| 2623 | |
| 2624 | if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid)) |
| 2625 | goto out_bad_option; |
| 2626 | break; |
| 2627 | } |
| 2628 | case DEFCONTEXT_MNT: |
| 2629 | if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid)) |
| 2630 | goto out_bad_option; |
| 2631 | break; |
| 2632 | default: |
| 2633 | goto out_free_opts; |
| 2634 | } |
| 2635 | } |
| 2636 | |
| 2637 | rc = 0; |
| 2638 | out_free_opts: |
| 2639 | security_free_mnt_opts(&opts); |
| 2640 | out_free_secdata: |
| 2641 | free_secdata(secdata); |
| 2642 | return rc; |
| 2643 | out_bad_option: |
| 2644 | printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options " |
| 2645 | "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id, |
| 2646 | sb->s_type->name); |
| 2647 | goto out_free_opts; |
| 2648 | } |
| 2649 | |
| 2650 | static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data) |
| 2651 | { |
| 2652 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2653 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 2654 | int rc; |
| 2655 | |
| 2656 | rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data); |
| 2657 | if (rc) |
| 2658 | return rc; |
| 2659 | |
| 2660 | /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */ |
| 2661 | if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT) |
| 2662 | return 0; |
| 2663 | |
| 2664 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
| 2665 | ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root; |
| 2666 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad); |
| 2667 | } |
| 2668 | |
| 2669 | static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry) |
| 2670 | { |
| 2671 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2672 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 2673 | |
| 2674 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
| 2675 | ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root; |
| 2676 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad); |
| 2677 | } |
| 2678 | |
| 2679 | static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name, |
| 2680 | struct path *path, |
| 2681 | const char *type, |
| 2682 | unsigned long flags, |
| 2683 | void *data) |
| 2684 | { |
| 2685 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2686 | |
| 2687 | if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) |
| 2688 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb, |
| 2689 | FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL); |
| 2690 | else |
| 2691 | return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON); |
| 2692 | } |
| 2693 | |
| 2694 | static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) |
| 2695 | { |
| 2696 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2697 | |
| 2698 | return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb, |
| 2699 | FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL); |
| 2700 | } |
| 2701 | |
| 2702 | /* inode security operations */ |
| 2703 | |
| 2704 | static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode) |
| 2705 | { |
| 2706 | return inode_alloc_security(inode); |
| 2707 | } |
| 2708 | |
| 2709 | static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode) |
| 2710 | { |
| 2711 | inode_free_security(inode); |
| 2712 | } |
| 2713 | |
| 2714 | static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, |
| 2715 | struct qstr *name, void **ctx, |
| 2716 | u32 *ctxlen) |
| 2717 | { |
| 2718 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2719 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
| 2720 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; |
| 2721 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
| 2722 | struct inode *dir = d_backing_inode(dentry->d_parent); |
| 2723 | u32 newsid; |
| 2724 | int rc; |
| 2725 | |
| 2726 | tsec = cred->security; |
| 2727 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
| 2728 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; |
| 2729 | |
| 2730 | if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) { |
| 2731 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; |
| 2732 | } else { |
| 2733 | rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, |
| 2734 | inode_mode_to_security_class(mode), |
| 2735 | name, |
| 2736 | &newsid); |
| 2737 | if (rc) { |
| 2738 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
| 2739 | "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n", |
| 2740 | __func__, -rc); |
| 2741 | return rc; |
| 2742 | } |
| 2743 | } |
| 2744 | |
| 2745 | return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen); |
| 2746 | } |
| 2747 | |
| 2748 | static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, |
| 2749 | const struct qstr *qstr, |
| 2750 | const char **name, |
| 2751 | void **value, size_t *len) |
| 2752 | { |
| 2753 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
| 2754 | struct inode_security_struct *dsec; |
| 2755 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
| 2756 | u32 sid, newsid, clen; |
| 2757 | int rc; |
| 2758 | char *context; |
| 2759 | |
| 2760 | dsec = dir->i_security; |
| 2761 | sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security; |
| 2762 | |
| 2763 | sid = tsec->sid; |
| 2764 | newsid = tsec->create_sid; |
| 2765 | |
| 2766 | if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && |
| 2767 | (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)) |
| 2768 | newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid; |
| 2769 | else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) { |
| 2770 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, |
| 2771 | inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode), |
| 2772 | qstr, &newsid); |
| 2773 | if (rc) { |
| 2774 | printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: " |
| 2775 | "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s " |
| 2776 | "ino=%ld)\n", |
| 2777 | __func__, |
| 2778 | -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); |
| 2779 | return rc; |
| 2780 | } |
| 2781 | } |
| 2782 | |
| 2783 | /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */ |
| 2784 | if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) { |
| 2785 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 2786 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
| 2787 | isec->sid = newsid; |
| 2788 | isec->initialized = 1; |
| 2789 | } |
| 2790 | |
| 2791 | if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) |
| 2792 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 2793 | |
| 2794 | if (name) |
| 2795 | *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX; |
| 2796 | |
| 2797 | if (value && len) { |
| 2798 | rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen); |
| 2799 | if (rc) |
| 2800 | return rc; |
| 2801 | *value = context; |
| 2802 | *len = clen; |
| 2803 | } |
| 2804 | |
| 2805 | return 0; |
| 2806 | } |
| 2807 | |
| 2808 | static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) |
| 2809 | { |
| 2810 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE); |
| 2811 | } |
| 2812 | |
| 2813 | static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
| 2814 | { |
| 2815 | return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK); |
| 2816 | } |
| 2817 | |
| 2818 | static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
| 2819 | { |
| 2820 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK); |
| 2821 | } |
| 2822 | |
| 2823 | static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
| 2824 | { |
| 2825 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE); |
| 2826 | } |
| 2827 | |
| 2828 | static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask) |
| 2829 | { |
| 2830 | return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR); |
| 2831 | } |
| 2832 | |
| 2833 | static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
| 2834 | { |
| 2835 | return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR); |
| 2836 | } |
| 2837 | |
| 2838 | static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev) |
| 2839 | { |
| 2840 | return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode)); |
| 2841 | } |
| 2842 | |
| 2843 | static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
| 2844 | struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry) |
| 2845 | { |
| 2846 | return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry); |
| 2847 | } |
| 2848 | |
| 2849 | static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry) |
| 2850 | { |
| 2851 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2852 | |
| 2853 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ); |
| 2854 | } |
| 2855 | |
| 2856 | static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata) |
| 2857 | { |
| 2858 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2859 | |
| 2860 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ); |
| 2861 | } |
| 2862 | |
| 2863 | static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, |
| 2864 | u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied, |
| 2865 | int result, |
| 2866 | unsigned flags) |
| 2867 | { |
| 2868 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 2869 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 2870 | int rc; |
| 2871 | |
| 2872 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE; |
| 2873 | ad.u.inode = inode; |
| 2874 | |
| 2875 | rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, |
| 2876 | audited, denied, result, &ad, flags); |
| 2877 | if (rc) |
| 2878 | return rc; |
| 2879 | return 0; |
| 2880 | } |
| 2881 | |
| 2882 | static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) |
| 2883 | { |
| 2884 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2885 | u32 perms; |
| 2886 | bool from_access; |
| 2887 | unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK; |
| 2888 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
| 2889 | u32 sid; |
| 2890 | struct av_decision avd; |
| 2891 | int rc, rc2; |
| 2892 | u32 audited, denied; |
| 2893 | |
| 2894 | from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS; |
| 2895 | mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND); |
| 2896 | |
| 2897 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ |
| 2898 | if (!mask) |
| 2899 | return 0; |
| 2900 | |
| 2901 | validate_creds(cred); |
| 2902 | |
| 2903 | if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) |
| 2904 | return 0; |
| 2905 | |
| 2906 | perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask); |
| 2907 | |
| 2908 | sid = cred_sid(cred); |
| 2909 | isec = inode->i_security; |
| 2910 | |
| 2911 | rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd); |
| 2912 | audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc, |
| 2913 | from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0, |
| 2914 | &denied); |
| 2915 | if (likely(!audited)) |
| 2916 | return rc; |
| 2917 | |
| 2918 | rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags); |
| 2919 | if (rc2) |
| 2920 | return rc2; |
| 2921 | return rc; |
| 2922 | } |
| 2923 | |
| 2924 | static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr) |
| 2925 | { |
| 2926 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2927 | unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid; |
| 2928 | __u32 av = FILE__WRITE; |
| 2929 | |
| 2930 | /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */ |
| 2931 | if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) { |
| 2932 | ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE | |
| 2933 | ATTR_FORCE); |
| 2934 | if (!ia_valid) |
| 2935 | return 0; |
| 2936 | } |
| 2937 | |
| 2938 | if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID | |
| 2939 | ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET)) |
| 2940 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); |
| 2941 | |
| 2942 | if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE)) |
| 2943 | av |= FILE__OPEN; |
| 2944 | |
| 2945 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av); |
| 2946 | } |
| 2947 | |
| 2948 | static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) |
| 2949 | { |
| 2950 | return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR); |
| 2951 | } |
| 2952 | |
| 2953 | static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
| 2954 | { |
| 2955 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 2956 | |
| 2957 | if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX, |
| 2958 | sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) { |
| 2959 | if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) { |
| 2960 | if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP)) |
| 2961 | return -EPERM; |
| 2962 | } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { |
| 2963 | /* A different attribute in the security namespace. |
| 2964 | Restrict to administrator. */ |
| 2965 | return -EPERM; |
| 2966 | } |
| 2967 | } |
| 2968 | |
| 2969 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the |
| 2970 | ordinary setattr permission. */ |
| 2971 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR); |
| 2972 | } |
| 2973 | |
| 2974 | static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, |
| 2975 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) |
| 2976 | { |
| 2977 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
| 2978 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 2979 | struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; |
| 2980 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 2981 | u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); |
| 2982 | int rc = 0; |
| 2983 | |
| 2984 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) |
| 2985 | return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); |
| 2986 | |
| 2987 | sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security; |
| 2988 | if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) |
| 2989 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 2990 | |
| 2991 | if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode)) |
| 2992 | return -EPERM; |
| 2993 | |
| 2994 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY; |
| 2995 | ad.u.dentry = dentry; |
| 2996 | |
| 2997 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, |
| 2998 | FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad); |
| 2999 | if (rc) |
| 3000 | return rc; |
| 3001 | |
| 3002 | rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); |
| 3003 | if (rc == -EINVAL) { |
| 3004 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { |
| 3005 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
| 3006 | size_t audit_size; |
| 3007 | const char *str; |
| 3008 | |
| 3009 | /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the |
| 3010 | * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ |
| 3011 | if (value) { |
| 3012 | str = value; |
| 3013 | if (str[size - 1] == '\0') |
| 3014 | audit_size = size - 1; |
| 3015 | else |
| 3016 | audit_size = size; |
| 3017 | } else { |
| 3018 | str = ""; |
| 3019 | audit_size = 0; |
| 3020 | } |
| 3021 | ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); |
| 3022 | audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context="); |
| 3023 | audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); |
| 3024 | audit_log_end(ab); |
| 3025 | |
| 3026 | return rc; |
| 3027 | } |
| 3028 | rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); |
| 3029 | } |
| 3030 | if (rc) |
| 3031 | return rc; |
| 3032 | |
| 3033 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass, |
| 3034 | FILE__RELABELTO, &ad); |
| 3035 | if (rc) |
| 3036 | return rc; |
| 3037 | |
| 3038 | rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid, |
| 3039 | isec->sclass); |
| 3040 | if (rc) |
| 3041 | return rc; |
| 3042 | |
| 3043 | return avc_has_perm(newsid, |
| 3044 | sbsec->sid, |
| 3045 | SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, |
| 3046 | FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, |
| 3047 | &ad); |
| 3048 | } |
| 3049 | |
| 3050 | static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, |
| 3051 | const void *value, size_t size, |
| 3052 | int flags) |
| 3053 | { |
| 3054 | struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); |
| 3055 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 3056 | u32 newsid; |
| 3057 | int rc; |
| 3058 | |
| 3059 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { |
| 3060 | /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */ |
| 3061 | return; |
| 3062 | } |
| 3063 | |
| 3064 | rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid); |
| 3065 | if (rc) { |
| 3066 | printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID" |
| 3067 | "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", |
| 3068 | inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc); |
| 3069 | return; |
| 3070 | } |
| 3071 | |
| 3072 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
| 3073 | isec->sid = newsid; |
| 3074 | isec->initialized = 1; |
| 3075 | |
| 3076 | return; |
| 3077 | } |
| 3078 | |
| 3079 | static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
| 3080 | { |
| 3081 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 3082 | |
| 3083 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); |
| 3084 | } |
| 3085 | |
| 3086 | static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) |
| 3087 | { |
| 3088 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 3089 | |
| 3090 | return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR); |
| 3091 | } |
| 3092 | |
| 3093 | static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) |
| 3094 | { |
| 3095 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) |
| 3096 | return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name); |
| 3097 | |
| 3098 | /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label. |
| 3099 | You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */ |
| 3100 | return -EACCES; |
| 3101 | } |
| 3102 | |
| 3103 | /* |
| 3104 | * Copy the inode security context value to the user. |
| 3105 | * |
| 3106 | * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook. |
| 3107 | */ |
| 3108 | static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc) |
| 3109 | { |
| 3110 | u32 size; |
| 3111 | int error; |
| 3112 | char *context = NULL; |
| 3113 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 3114 | |
| 3115 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) |
| 3116 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 3117 | |
| 3118 | /* |
| 3119 | * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context |
| 3120 | * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise, |
| 3121 | * use the in-core value under current policy. |
| 3122 | * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since |
| 3123 | * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly |
| 3124 | * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the |
| 3125 | * in-core context value, not a denial. |
| 3126 | */ |
| 3127 | error = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN, |
| 3128 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); |
| 3129 | if (!error) |
| 3130 | error = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN, |
| 3131 | SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT); |
| 3132 | if (!error) |
| 3133 | error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context, |
| 3134 | &size); |
| 3135 | else |
| 3136 | error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size); |
| 3137 | if (error) |
| 3138 | return error; |
| 3139 | error = size; |
| 3140 | if (alloc) { |
| 3141 | *buffer = context; |
| 3142 | goto out_nofree; |
| 3143 | } |
| 3144 | kfree(context); |
| 3145 | out_nofree: |
| 3146 | return error; |
| 3147 | } |
| 3148 | |
| 3149 | static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, |
| 3150 | const void *value, size_t size, int flags) |
| 3151 | { |
| 3152 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 3153 | u32 newsid; |
| 3154 | int rc; |
| 3155 | |
| 3156 | if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX)) |
| 3157 | return -EOPNOTSUPP; |
| 3158 | |
| 3159 | if (!value || !size) |
| 3160 | return -EACCES; |
| 3161 | |
| 3162 | rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL); |
| 3163 | if (rc) |
| 3164 | return rc; |
| 3165 | |
| 3166 | isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode); |
| 3167 | isec->sid = newsid; |
| 3168 | isec->initialized = 1; |
| 3169 | return 0; |
| 3170 | } |
| 3171 | |
| 3172 | static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size) |
| 3173 | { |
| 3174 | const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); |
| 3175 | if (buffer && len <= buffer_size) |
| 3176 | memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len); |
| 3177 | return len; |
| 3178 | } |
| 3179 | |
| 3180 | static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid) |
| 3181 | { |
| 3182 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 3183 | *secid = isec->sid; |
| 3184 | } |
| 3185 | |
| 3186 | /* file security operations */ |
| 3187 | |
| 3188 | static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
| 3189 | { |
| 3190 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 3191 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); |
| 3192 | |
| 3193 | /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */ |
| 3194 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE)) |
| 3195 | mask |= MAY_APPEND; |
| 3196 | |
| 3197 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, |
| 3198 | file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask)); |
| 3199 | } |
| 3200 | |
| 3201 | static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask) |
| 3202 | { |
| 3203 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); |
| 3204 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
| 3205 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 3206 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 3207 | |
| 3208 | if (!mask) |
| 3209 | /* No permission to check. Existence test. */ |
| 3210 | return 0; |
| 3211 | |
| 3212 | if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid && |
| 3213 | fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno()) |
| 3214 | /* No change since file_open check. */ |
| 3215 | return 0; |
| 3216 | |
| 3217 | return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask); |
| 3218 | } |
| 3219 | |
| 3220 | static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) |
| 3221 | { |
| 3222 | return file_alloc_security(file); |
| 3223 | } |
| 3224 | |
| 3225 | static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file) |
| 3226 | { |
| 3227 | file_free_security(file); |
| 3228 | } |
| 3229 | |
| 3230 | /* |
| 3231 | * Check whether a task has the ioctl permission and cmd |
| 3232 | * operation to an inode. |
| 3233 | */ |
| 3234 | int ioctl_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, |
| 3235 | u32 requested, u16 cmd) |
| 3236 | { |
| 3237 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 3238 | struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security; |
| 3239 | struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); |
| 3240 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 3241 | struct lsm_ioctlop_audit ioctl; |
| 3242 | u32 ssid = cred_sid(cred); |
| 3243 | int rc; |
| 3244 | u8 driver = cmd >> 8; |
| 3245 | u8 xperm = cmd & 0xff; |
| 3246 | |
| 3247 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IOCTL_OP; |
| 3248 | ad.u.op = &ioctl; |
| 3249 | ad.u.op->cmd = cmd; |
| 3250 | ad.u.op->path = file->f_path; |
| 3251 | |
| 3252 | if (ssid != fsec->sid) { |
| 3253 | rc = avc_has_perm(ssid, fsec->sid, |
| 3254 | SECCLASS_FD, |
| 3255 | FD__USE, |
| 3256 | &ad); |
| 3257 | if (rc) |
| 3258 | goto out; |
| 3259 | } |
| 3260 | |
| 3261 | if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode))) |
| 3262 | return 0; |
| 3263 | |
| 3264 | rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, |
| 3265 | requested, driver, xperm, &ad); |
| 3266 | out: |
| 3267 | return rc; |
| 3268 | } |
| 3269 | |
| 3270 | static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, |
| 3271 | unsigned long arg) |
| 3272 | { |
| 3273 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 3274 | int error = 0; |
| 3275 | |
| 3276 | switch (cmd) { |
| 3277 | case FIONREAD: |
| 3278 | /* fall through */ |
| 3279 | case FIBMAP: |
| 3280 | /* fall through */ |
| 3281 | case FIGETBSZ: |
| 3282 | /* fall through */ |
| 3283 | case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS: |
| 3284 | /* fall through */ |
| 3285 | case FS_IOC_GETVERSION: |
| 3286 | error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR); |
| 3287 | break; |
| 3288 | |
| 3289 | case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS: |
| 3290 | /* fall through */ |
| 3291 | case FS_IOC_SETVERSION: |
| 3292 | error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR); |
| 3293 | break; |
| 3294 | |
| 3295 | /* sys_ioctl() checks */ |
| 3296 | case FIONBIO: |
| 3297 | /* fall through */ |
| 3298 | case FIOASYNC: |
| 3299 | error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); |
| 3300 | break; |
| 3301 | |
| 3302 | case KDSKBENT: |
| 3303 | case KDSKBSENT: |
| 3304 | error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, |
| 3305 | SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); |
| 3306 | break; |
| 3307 | |
| 3308 | /* default case assumes that the command will go |
| 3309 | * to the file's ioctl() function. |
| 3310 | */ |
| 3311 | default: |
| 3312 | error = ioctl_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL, (u16) cmd); |
| 3313 | } |
| 3314 | return error; |
| 3315 | } |
| 3316 | |
| 3317 | static int default_noexec; |
| 3318 | |
| 3319 | static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared) |
| 3320 | { |
| 3321 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 3322 | int rc = 0; |
| 3323 | |
| 3324 | if (default_noexec && |
| 3325 | (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) || |
| 3326 | (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) { |
| 3327 | /* |
| 3328 | * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a |
| 3329 | * private file mapping that will also be writable. |
| 3330 | * This has an additional check. |
| 3331 | */ |
| 3332 | rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM); |
| 3333 | if (rc) |
| 3334 | goto error; |
| 3335 | } |
| 3336 | |
| 3337 | if (file) { |
| 3338 | /* read access is always possible with a mapping */ |
| 3339 | u32 av = FILE__READ; |
| 3340 | |
| 3341 | /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */ |
| 3342 | if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)) |
| 3343 | av |= FILE__WRITE; |
| 3344 | |
| 3345 | if (prot & PROT_EXEC) |
| 3346 | av |= FILE__EXECUTE; |
| 3347 | |
| 3348 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, av); |
| 3349 | } |
| 3350 | |
| 3351 | error: |
| 3352 | return rc; |
| 3353 | } |
| 3354 | |
| 3355 | static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) |
| 3356 | { |
| 3357 | int rc = 0; |
| 3358 | |
| 3359 | if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { |
| 3360 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 3361 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, |
| 3362 | MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); |
| 3363 | } |
| 3364 | |
| 3365 | return rc; |
| 3366 | } |
| 3367 | |
| 3368 | static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, |
| 3369 | unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags) |
| 3370 | { |
| 3371 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) |
| 3372 | prot = reqprot; |
| 3373 | |
| 3374 | return file_map_prot_check(file, prot, |
| 3375 | (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED); |
| 3376 | } |
| 3377 | |
| 3378 | static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, |
| 3379 | unsigned long reqprot, |
| 3380 | unsigned long prot) |
| 3381 | { |
| 3382 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 3383 | |
| 3384 | if (selinux_checkreqprot) |
| 3385 | prot = reqprot; |
| 3386 | |
| 3387 | if (default_noexec && |
| 3388 | (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) { |
| 3389 | int rc = 0; |
| 3390 | if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk && |
| 3391 | vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) { |
| 3392 | rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP); |
| 3393 | } else if (!vma->vm_file && |
| 3394 | vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack && |
| 3395 | vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) { |
| 3396 | rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK); |
| 3397 | } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) { |
| 3398 | /* |
| 3399 | * We are making executable a file mapping that has |
| 3400 | * had some COW done. Since pages might have been |
| 3401 | * written, check ability to execute the possibly |
| 3402 | * modified content. This typically should only |
| 3403 | * occur for text relocations. |
| 3404 | */ |
| 3405 | rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD); |
| 3406 | } |
| 3407 | if (rc) |
| 3408 | return rc; |
| 3409 | } |
| 3410 | |
| 3411 | return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED); |
| 3412 | } |
| 3413 | |
| 3414 | static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd) |
| 3415 | { |
| 3416 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 3417 | |
| 3418 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); |
| 3419 | } |
| 3420 | |
| 3421 | static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, |
| 3422 | unsigned long arg) |
| 3423 | { |
| 3424 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 3425 | int err = 0; |
| 3426 | |
| 3427 | switch (cmd) { |
| 3428 | case F_SETFL: |
| 3429 | if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) { |
| 3430 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE); |
| 3431 | break; |
| 3432 | } |
| 3433 | /* fall through */ |
| 3434 | case F_SETOWN: |
| 3435 | case F_SETSIG: |
| 3436 | case F_GETFL: |
| 3437 | case F_GETOWN: |
| 3438 | case F_GETSIG: |
| 3439 | case F_GETOWNER_UIDS: |
| 3440 | /* Just check FD__USE permission */ |
| 3441 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0); |
| 3442 | break; |
| 3443 | case F_GETLK: |
| 3444 | case F_SETLK: |
| 3445 | case F_SETLKW: |
| 3446 | case F_OFD_GETLK: |
| 3447 | case F_OFD_SETLK: |
| 3448 | case F_OFD_SETLKW: |
| 3449 | #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 |
| 3450 | case F_GETLK64: |
| 3451 | case F_SETLK64: |
| 3452 | case F_SETLKW64: |
| 3453 | #endif |
| 3454 | err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK); |
| 3455 | break; |
| 3456 | } |
| 3457 | |
| 3458 | return err; |
| 3459 | } |
| 3460 | |
| 3461 | static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file) |
| 3462 | { |
| 3463 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
| 3464 | |
| 3465 | fsec = file->f_security; |
| 3466 | fsec->fown_sid = current_sid(); |
| 3467 | } |
| 3468 | |
| 3469 | static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, |
| 3470 | struct fown_struct *fown, int signum) |
| 3471 | { |
| 3472 | struct file *file; |
| 3473 | u32 sid = task_sid(tsk); |
| 3474 | u32 perm; |
| 3475 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
| 3476 | |
| 3477 | /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ |
| 3478 | file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); |
| 3479 | |
| 3480 | fsec = file->f_security; |
| 3481 | |
| 3482 | if (!signum) |
| 3483 | perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */ |
| 3484 | else |
| 3485 | perm = signal_to_av(signum); |
| 3486 | |
| 3487 | return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid, |
| 3488 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); |
| 3489 | } |
| 3490 | |
| 3491 | static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file) |
| 3492 | { |
| 3493 | const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); |
| 3494 | |
| 3495 | return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file)); |
| 3496 | } |
| 3497 | |
| 3498 | static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred) |
| 3499 | { |
| 3500 | struct file_security_struct *fsec; |
| 3501 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
| 3502 | |
| 3503 | fsec = file->f_security; |
| 3504 | isec = file_inode(file)->i_security; |
| 3505 | /* |
| 3506 | * Save inode label and policy sequence number |
| 3507 | * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission |
| 3508 | * can determine whether revalidation is necessary. |
| 3509 | * Task label is already saved in the file security |
| 3510 | * struct as its SID. |
| 3511 | */ |
| 3512 | fsec->isid = isec->sid; |
| 3513 | fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno(); |
| 3514 | /* |
| 3515 | * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed |
| 3516 | * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving |
| 3517 | * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted. |
| 3518 | * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the |
| 3519 | * new inode label or new policy. |
| 3520 | * This check is not redundant - do not remove. |
| 3521 | */ |
| 3522 | return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file)); |
| 3523 | } |
| 3524 | |
| 3525 | /* task security operations */ |
| 3526 | |
| 3527 | static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags) |
| 3528 | { |
| 3529 | return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK); |
| 3530 | } |
| 3531 | |
| 3532 | /* |
| 3533 | * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials |
| 3534 | */ |
| 3535 | static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp) |
| 3536 | { |
| 3537 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
| 3538 | |
| 3539 | tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp); |
| 3540 | if (!tsec) |
| 3541 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 3542 | |
| 3543 | cred->security = tsec; |
| 3544 | return 0; |
| 3545 | } |
| 3546 | |
| 3547 | /* |
| 3548 | * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials |
| 3549 | */ |
| 3550 | static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred) |
| 3551 | { |
| 3552 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security; |
| 3553 | |
| 3554 | /* |
| 3555 | * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or |
| 3556 | * security_prepare_creds() returned an error. |
| 3557 | */ |
| 3558 | BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE); |
| 3559 | cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL; |
| 3560 | kfree(tsec); |
| 3561 | } |
| 3562 | |
| 3563 | /* |
| 3564 | * prepare a new set of credentials for modification |
| 3565 | */ |
| 3566 | static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, |
| 3567 | gfp_t gfp) |
| 3568 | { |
| 3569 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec; |
| 3570 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
| 3571 | |
| 3572 | old_tsec = old->security; |
| 3573 | |
| 3574 | tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp); |
| 3575 | if (!tsec) |
| 3576 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 3577 | |
| 3578 | new->security = tsec; |
| 3579 | return 0; |
| 3580 | } |
| 3581 | |
| 3582 | /* |
| 3583 | * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds |
| 3584 | */ |
| 3585 | static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) |
| 3586 | { |
| 3587 | const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security; |
| 3588 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
| 3589 | |
| 3590 | *tsec = *old_tsec; |
| 3591 | } |
| 3592 | |
| 3593 | /* |
| 3594 | * set the security data for a kernel service |
| 3595 | * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled |
| 3596 | */ |
| 3597 | static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid) |
| 3598 | { |
| 3599 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
| 3600 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 3601 | int ret; |
| 3602 | |
| 3603 | ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid, |
| 3604 | SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, |
| 3605 | KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE, |
| 3606 | NULL); |
| 3607 | if (ret == 0) { |
| 3608 | tsec->sid = secid; |
| 3609 | tsec->create_sid = 0; |
| 3610 | tsec->keycreate_sid = 0; |
| 3611 | tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0; |
| 3612 | } |
| 3613 | return ret; |
| 3614 | } |
| 3615 | |
| 3616 | /* |
| 3617 | * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the |
| 3618 | * objective context of the specified inode |
| 3619 | */ |
| 3620 | static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode) |
| 3621 | { |
| 3622 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 3623 | struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security; |
| 3624 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 3625 | int ret; |
| 3626 | |
| 3627 | ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, |
| 3628 | SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE, |
| 3629 | KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS, |
| 3630 | NULL); |
| 3631 | |
| 3632 | if (ret == 0) |
| 3633 | tsec->create_sid = isec->sid; |
| 3634 | return ret; |
| 3635 | } |
| 3636 | |
| 3637 | static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name) |
| 3638 | { |
| 3639 | u32 sid; |
| 3640 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 3641 | |
| 3642 | sid = task_sid(current); |
| 3643 | |
| 3644 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD; |
| 3645 | ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name; |
| 3646 | |
| 3647 | return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM, |
| 3648 | SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad); |
| 3649 | } |
| 3650 | |
| 3651 | static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid) |
| 3652 | { |
| 3653 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID); |
| 3654 | } |
| 3655 | |
| 3656 | static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p) |
| 3657 | { |
| 3658 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID); |
| 3659 | } |
| 3660 | |
| 3661 | static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p) |
| 3662 | { |
| 3663 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION); |
| 3664 | } |
| 3665 | |
| 3666 | static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid) |
| 3667 | { |
| 3668 | *secid = task_sid(p); |
| 3669 | } |
| 3670 | |
| 3671 | static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice) |
| 3672 | { |
| 3673 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
| 3674 | } |
| 3675 | |
| 3676 | static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio) |
| 3677 | { |
| 3678 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
| 3679 | } |
| 3680 | |
| 3681 | static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p) |
| 3682 | { |
| 3683 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); |
| 3684 | } |
| 3685 | |
| 3686 | static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource, |
| 3687 | struct rlimit *new_rlim) |
| 3688 | { |
| 3689 | struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource; |
| 3690 | |
| 3691 | /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether |
| 3692 | lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can |
| 3693 | later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit |
| 3694 | upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */ |
| 3695 | if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max) |
| 3696 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT); |
| 3697 | |
| 3698 | return 0; |
| 3699 | } |
| 3700 | |
| 3701 | static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p) |
| 3702 | { |
| 3703 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
| 3704 | } |
| 3705 | |
| 3706 | static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p) |
| 3707 | { |
| 3708 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED); |
| 3709 | } |
| 3710 | |
| 3711 | static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p) |
| 3712 | { |
| 3713 | return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED); |
| 3714 | } |
| 3715 | |
| 3716 | static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info, |
| 3717 | int sig, u32 secid) |
| 3718 | { |
| 3719 | u32 perm; |
| 3720 | int rc; |
| 3721 | |
| 3722 | if (!sig) |
| 3723 | perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */ |
| 3724 | else |
| 3725 | perm = signal_to_av(sig); |
| 3726 | if (secid) |
| 3727 | rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p), |
| 3728 | SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL); |
| 3729 | else |
| 3730 | rc = current_has_perm(p, perm); |
| 3731 | return rc; |
| 3732 | } |
| 3733 | |
| 3734 | static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p) |
| 3735 | { |
| 3736 | return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD); |
| 3737 | } |
| 3738 | |
| 3739 | static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, |
| 3740 | struct inode *inode) |
| 3741 | { |
| 3742 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security; |
| 3743 | u32 sid = task_sid(p); |
| 3744 | |
| 3745 | isec->sid = sid; |
| 3746 | isec->initialized = 1; |
| 3747 | } |
| 3748 | |
| 3749 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ |
| 3750 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 3751 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) |
| 3752 | { |
| 3753 | int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL; |
| 3754 | struct iphdr _iph, *ih; |
| 3755 | |
| 3756 | offset = skb_network_offset(skb); |
| 3757 | ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph); |
| 3758 | if (ih == NULL) |
| 3759 | goto out; |
| 3760 | |
| 3761 | ihlen = ih->ihl * 4; |
| 3762 | if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph)) |
| 3763 | goto out; |
| 3764 | |
| 3765 | ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr; |
| 3766 | ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr; |
| 3767 | ret = 0; |
| 3768 | |
| 3769 | if (proto) |
| 3770 | *proto = ih->protocol; |
| 3771 | |
| 3772 | switch (ih->protocol) { |
| 3773 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { |
| 3774 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; |
| 3775 | |
| 3776 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
| 3777 | break; |
| 3778 | |
| 3779 | offset += ihlen; |
| 3780 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); |
| 3781 | if (th == NULL) |
| 3782 | break; |
| 3783 | |
| 3784 | ad->u.net->sport = th->source; |
| 3785 | ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; |
| 3786 | break; |
| 3787 | } |
| 3788 | |
| 3789 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { |
| 3790 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; |
| 3791 | |
| 3792 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
| 3793 | break; |
| 3794 | |
| 3795 | offset += ihlen; |
| 3796 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); |
| 3797 | if (uh == NULL) |
| 3798 | break; |
| 3799 | |
| 3800 | ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; |
| 3801 | ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; |
| 3802 | break; |
| 3803 | } |
| 3804 | |
| 3805 | case IPPROTO_DCCP: { |
| 3806 | struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; |
| 3807 | |
| 3808 | if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET) |
| 3809 | break; |
| 3810 | |
| 3811 | offset += ihlen; |
| 3812 | dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); |
| 3813 | if (dh == NULL) |
| 3814 | break; |
| 3815 | |
| 3816 | ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; |
| 3817 | ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; |
| 3818 | break; |
| 3819 | } |
| 3820 | |
| 3821 | default: |
| 3822 | break; |
| 3823 | } |
| 3824 | out: |
| 3825 | return ret; |
| 3826 | } |
| 3827 | |
| 3828 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
| 3829 | |
| 3830 | /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ |
| 3831 | static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 3832 | struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto) |
| 3833 | { |
| 3834 | u8 nexthdr; |
| 3835 | int ret = -EINVAL, offset; |
| 3836 | struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6; |
| 3837 | __be16 frag_off; |
| 3838 | |
| 3839 | offset = skb_network_offset(skb); |
| 3840 | ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h); |
| 3841 | if (ip6 == NULL) |
| 3842 | goto out; |
| 3843 | |
| 3844 | ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr; |
| 3845 | ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr; |
| 3846 | ret = 0; |
| 3847 | |
| 3848 | nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr; |
| 3849 | offset += sizeof(_ipv6h); |
| 3850 | offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off); |
| 3851 | if (offset < 0) |
| 3852 | goto out; |
| 3853 | |
| 3854 | if (proto) |
| 3855 | *proto = nexthdr; |
| 3856 | |
| 3857 | switch (nexthdr) { |
| 3858 | case IPPROTO_TCP: { |
| 3859 | struct tcphdr _tcph, *th; |
| 3860 | |
| 3861 | th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph); |
| 3862 | if (th == NULL) |
| 3863 | break; |
| 3864 | |
| 3865 | ad->u.net->sport = th->source; |
| 3866 | ad->u.net->dport = th->dest; |
| 3867 | break; |
| 3868 | } |
| 3869 | |
| 3870 | case IPPROTO_UDP: { |
| 3871 | struct udphdr _udph, *uh; |
| 3872 | |
| 3873 | uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph); |
| 3874 | if (uh == NULL) |
| 3875 | break; |
| 3876 | |
| 3877 | ad->u.net->sport = uh->source; |
| 3878 | ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest; |
| 3879 | break; |
| 3880 | } |
| 3881 | |
| 3882 | case IPPROTO_DCCP: { |
| 3883 | struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh; |
| 3884 | |
| 3885 | dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph); |
| 3886 | if (dh == NULL) |
| 3887 | break; |
| 3888 | |
| 3889 | ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport; |
| 3890 | ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport; |
| 3891 | break; |
| 3892 | } |
| 3893 | |
| 3894 | /* includes fragments */ |
| 3895 | default: |
| 3896 | break; |
| 3897 | } |
| 3898 | out: |
| 3899 | return ret; |
| 3900 | } |
| 3901 | |
| 3902 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
| 3903 | |
| 3904 | static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, |
| 3905 | char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto) |
| 3906 | { |
| 3907 | char *addrp; |
| 3908 | int ret; |
| 3909 | |
| 3910 | switch (ad->u.net->family) { |
| 3911 | case PF_INET: |
| 3912 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto); |
| 3913 | if (ret) |
| 3914 | goto parse_error; |
| 3915 | addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr : |
| 3916 | &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr); |
| 3917 | goto okay; |
| 3918 | |
| 3919 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
| 3920 | case PF_INET6: |
| 3921 | ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto); |
| 3922 | if (ret) |
| 3923 | goto parse_error; |
| 3924 | addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr : |
| 3925 | &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr); |
| 3926 | goto okay; |
| 3927 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
| 3928 | default: |
| 3929 | addrp = NULL; |
| 3930 | goto okay; |
| 3931 | } |
| 3932 | |
| 3933 | parse_error: |
| 3934 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
| 3935 | "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb()," |
| 3936 | " unable to parse packet\n"); |
| 3937 | return ret; |
| 3938 | |
| 3939 | okay: |
| 3940 | if (_addrp) |
| 3941 | *_addrp = addrp; |
| 3942 | return 0; |
| 3943 | } |
| 3944 | |
| 3945 | /** |
| 3946 | * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet |
| 3947 | * @skb: the packet |
| 3948 | * @family: protocol family |
| 3949 | * @sid: the packet's peer label SID |
| 3950 | * |
| 3951 | * Description: |
| 3952 | * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine |
| 3953 | * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in |
| 3954 | * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function |
| 3955 | * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL) |
| 3956 | * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different |
| 3957 | * peer labels. |
| 3958 | * |
| 3959 | */ |
| 3960 | static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid) |
| 3961 | { |
| 3962 | int err; |
| 3963 | u32 xfrm_sid; |
| 3964 | u32 nlbl_sid; |
| 3965 | u32 nlbl_type; |
| 3966 | |
| 3967 | err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid); |
| 3968 | if (unlikely(err)) |
| 3969 | return -EACCES; |
| 3970 | err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid); |
| 3971 | if (unlikely(err)) |
| 3972 | return -EACCES; |
| 3973 | |
| 3974 | err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid); |
| 3975 | if (unlikely(err)) { |
| 3976 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
| 3977 | "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid()," |
| 3978 | " unable to determine packet's peer label\n"); |
| 3979 | return -EACCES; |
| 3980 | } |
| 3981 | |
| 3982 | return 0; |
| 3983 | } |
| 3984 | |
| 3985 | /** |
| 3986 | * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection |
| 3987 | * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID |
| 3988 | * @skb_sid: the packet's SID |
| 3989 | * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID |
| 3990 | * |
| 3991 | * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is |
| 3992 | * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create |
| 3993 | * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy |
| 3994 | * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure. |
| 3995 | * |
| 3996 | */ |
| 3997 | static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid) |
| 3998 | { |
| 3999 | int err = 0; |
| 4000 | |
| 4001 | if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL) |
| 4002 | err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid); |
| 4003 | else |
| 4004 | *conn_sid = sk_sid; |
| 4005 | |
| 4006 | return err; |
| 4007 | } |
| 4008 | |
| 4009 | /* socket security operations */ |
| 4010 | |
| 4011 | static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, |
| 4012 | u16 secclass, u32 *socksid) |
| 4013 | { |
| 4014 | if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) { |
| 4015 | *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid; |
| 4016 | return 0; |
| 4017 | } |
| 4018 | |
| 4019 | return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL, |
| 4020 | socksid); |
| 4021 | } |
| 4022 | |
| 4023 | static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms) |
| 4024 | { |
| 4025 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4026 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 4027 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
| 4028 | u32 tsid = task_sid(task); |
| 4029 | |
| 4030 | if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL) |
| 4031 | return 0; |
| 4032 | |
| 4033 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
| 4034 | ad.u.net = &net; |
| 4035 | ad.u.net->sk = sk; |
| 4036 | |
| 4037 | return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad); |
| 4038 | } |
| 4039 | |
| 4040 | static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type, |
| 4041 | int protocol, int kern) |
| 4042 | { |
| 4043 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
| 4044 | u32 newsid; |
| 4045 | u16 secclass; |
| 4046 | int rc; |
| 4047 | |
| 4048 | if (kern) |
| 4049 | return 0; |
| 4050 | |
| 4051 | secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); |
| 4052 | rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid); |
| 4053 | if (rc) |
| 4054 | return rc; |
| 4055 | |
| 4056 | return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL); |
| 4057 | } |
| 4058 | |
| 4059 | static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, |
| 4060 | int type, int protocol, int kern) |
| 4061 | { |
| 4062 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security(); |
| 4063 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
| 4064 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
| 4065 | int err = 0; |
| 4066 | |
| 4067 | isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol); |
| 4068 | |
| 4069 | if (kern) |
| 4070 | isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
| 4071 | else { |
| 4072 | err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid)); |
| 4073 | if (err) |
| 4074 | return err; |
| 4075 | } |
| 4076 | |
| 4077 | isec->initialized = 1; |
| 4078 | |
| 4079 | if (sock->sk) { |
| 4080 | sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
| 4081 | sksec->sid = isec->sid; |
| 4082 | sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
| 4083 | err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family); |
| 4084 | } |
| 4085 | |
| 4086 | return err; |
| 4087 | } |
| 4088 | |
| 4089 | /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind. |
| 4090 | Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind |
| 4091 | permission check between the socket and the port number. */ |
| 4092 | |
| 4093 | static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
| 4094 | { |
| 4095 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; |
| 4096 | u16 family; |
| 4097 | int err; |
| 4098 | |
| 4099 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND); |
| 4100 | if (err) |
| 4101 | goto out; |
| 4102 | |
| 4103 | /* |
| 4104 | * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port. |
| 4105 | * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just |
| 4106 | * check the first address now. |
| 4107 | */ |
| 4108 | family = sk->sk_family; |
| 4109 | if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) { |
| 4110 | char *addrp; |
| 4111 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4112 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 4113 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
| 4114 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; |
| 4115 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; |
| 4116 | unsigned short snum; |
| 4117 | u32 sid, node_perm; |
| 4118 | |
| 4119 | if (family == PF_INET) { |
| 4120 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; |
| 4121 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); |
| 4122 | addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; |
| 4123 | } else { |
| 4124 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; |
| 4125 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); |
| 4126 | addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr; |
| 4127 | } |
| 4128 | |
| 4129 | if (snum) { |
| 4130 | int low, high; |
| 4131 | |
| 4132 | inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high); |
| 4133 | |
| 4134 | if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) { |
| 4135 | err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, |
| 4136 | snum, &sid); |
| 4137 | if (err) |
| 4138 | goto out; |
| 4139 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
| 4140 | ad.u.net = &net; |
| 4141 | ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); |
| 4142 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
| 4143 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, |
| 4144 | sksec->sclass, |
| 4145 | SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad); |
| 4146 | if (err) |
| 4147 | goto out; |
| 4148 | } |
| 4149 | } |
| 4150 | |
| 4151 | switch (sksec->sclass) { |
| 4152 | case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET: |
| 4153 | node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
| 4154 | break; |
| 4155 | |
| 4156 | case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET: |
| 4157 | node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
| 4158 | break; |
| 4159 | |
| 4160 | case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET: |
| 4161 | node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
| 4162 | break; |
| 4163 | |
| 4164 | default: |
| 4165 | node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND; |
| 4166 | break; |
| 4167 | } |
| 4168 | |
| 4169 | err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid); |
| 4170 | if (err) |
| 4171 | goto out; |
| 4172 | |
| 4173 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
| 4174 | ad.u.net = &net; |
| 4175 | ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum); |
| 4176 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
| 4177 | |
| 4178 | if (family == PF_INET) |
| 4179 | ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr; |
| 4180 | else |
| 4181 | ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr; |
| 4182 | |
| 4183 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, |
| 4184 | sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad); |
| 4185 | if (err) |
| 4186 | goto out; |
| 4187 | } |
| 4188 | out: |
| 4189 | return err; |
| 4190 | } |
| 4191 | |
| 4192 | static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) |
| 4193 | { |
| 4194 | struct sock *sk = sock->sk; |
| 4195 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4196 | int err; |
| 4197 | |
| 4198 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); |
| 4199 | if (err) |
| 4200 | return err; |
| 4201 | |
| 4202 | /* |
| 4203 | * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port. |
| 4204 | */ |
| 4205 | if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET || |
| 4206 | sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) { |
| 4207 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 4208 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
| 4209 | struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL; |
| 4210 | struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL; |
| 4211 | unsigned short snum; |
| 4212 | u32 sid, perm; |
| 4213 | |
| 4214 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) { |
| 4215 | addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address; |
| 4216 | if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) |
| 4217 | return -EINVAL; |
| 4218 | snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port); |
| 4219 | } else { |
| 4220 | addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address; |
| 4221 | if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133) |
| 4222 | return -EINVAL; |
| 4223 | snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port); |
| 4224 | } |
| 4225 | |
| 4226 | err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid); |
| 4227 | if (err) |
| 4228 | goto out; |
| 4229 | |
| 4230 | perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ? |
| 4231 | TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT; |
| 4232 | |
| 4233 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
| 4234 | ad.u.net = &net; |
| 4235 | ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum); |
| 4236 | ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family; |
| 4237 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad); |
| 4238 | if (err) |
| 4239 | goto out; |
| 4240 | } |
| 4241 | |
| 4242 | err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address); |
| 4243 | |
| 4244 | out: |
| 4245 | return err; |
| 4246 | } |
| 4247 | |
| 4248 | static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog) |
| 4249 | { |
| 4250 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN); |
| 4251 | } |
| 4252 | |
| 4253 | static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock) |
| 4254 | { |
| 4255 | int err; |
| 4256 | struct inode_security_struct *isec; |
| 4257 | struct inode_security_struct *newisec; |
| 4258 | |
| 4259 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT); |
| 4260 | if (err) |
| 4261 | return err; |
| 4262 | |
| 4263 | newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security; |
| 4264 | |
| 4265 | isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security; |
| 4266 | newisec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
| 4267 | newisec->sid = isec->sid; |
| 4268 | newisec->initialized = 1; |
| 4269 | |
| 4270 | return 0; |
| 4271 | } |
| 4272 | |
| 4273 | static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, |
| 4274 | int size) |
| 4275 | { |
| 4276 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE); |
| 4277 | } |
| 4278 | |
| 4279 | static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, |
| 4280 | int size, int flags) |
| 4281 | { |
| 4282 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ); |
| 4283 | } |
| 4284 | |
| 4285 | static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock) |
| 4286 | { |
| 4287 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); |
| 4288 | } |
| 4289 | |
| 4290 | static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock) |
| 4291 | { |
| 4292 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR); |
| 4293 | } |
| 4294 | |
| 4295 | static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname) |
| 4296 | { |
| 4297 | int err; |
| 4298 | |
| 4299 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT); |
| 4300 | if (err) |
| 4301 | return err; |
| 4302 | |
| 4303 | return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname); |
| 4304 | } |
| 4305 | |
| 4306 | static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, |
| 4307 | int optname) |
| 4308 | { |
| 4309 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT); |
| 4310 | } |
| 4311 | |
| 4312 | static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how) |
| 4313 | { |
| 4314 | return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN); |
| 4315 | } |
| 4316 | |
| 4317 | static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, |
| 4318 | struct sock *other, |
| 4319 | struct sock *newsk) |
| 4320 | { |
| 4321 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security; |
| 4322 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; |
| 4323 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; |
| 4324 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 4325 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
| 4326 | int err; |
| 4327 | |
| 4328 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
| 4329 | ad.u.net = &net; |
| 4330 | ad.u.net->sk = other; |
| 4331 | |
| 4332 | err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid, |
| 4333 | sksec_other->sclass, |
| 4334 | UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad); |
| 4335 | if (err) |
| 4336 | return err; |
| 4337 | |
| 4338 | /* server child socket */ |
| 4339 | sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid; |
| 4340 | err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid, |
| 4341 | &sksec_new->sid); |
| 4342 | if (err) |
| 4343 | return err; |
| 4344 | |
| 4345 | /* connecting socket */ |
| 4346 | sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid; |
| 4347 | |
| 4348 | return 0; |
| 4349 | } |
| 4350 | |
| 4351 | static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, |
| 4352 | struct socket *other) |
| 4353 | { |
| 4354 | struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
| 4355 | struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; |
| 4356 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 4357 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
| 4358 | |
| 4359 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
| 4360 | ad.u.net = &net; |
| 4361 | ad.u.net->sk = other->sk; |
| 4362 | |
| 4363 | return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, |
| 4364 | &ad); |
| 4365 | } |
| 4366 | |
| 4367 | static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex, |
| 4368 | char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid, |
| 4369 | struct common_audit_data *ad) |
| 4370 | { |
| 4371 | int err; |
| 4372 | u32 if_sid; |
| 4373 | u32 node_sid; |
| 4374 | |
| 4375 | err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid); |
| 4376 | if (err) |
| 4377 | return err; |
| 4378 | err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, |
| 4379 | SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad); |
| 4380 | if (err) |
| 4381 | return err; |
| 4382 | |
| 4383 | err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid); |
| 4384 | if (err) |
| 4385 | return err; |
| 4386 | return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, |
| 4387 | SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad); |
| 4388 | } |
| 4389 | |
| 4390 | static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 4391 | u16 family) |
| 4392 | { |
| 4393 | int err = 0; |
| 4394 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4395 | u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; |
| 4396 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 4397 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
| 4398 | char *addrp; |
| 4399 | |
| 4400 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
| 4401 | ad.u.net = &net; |
| 4402 | ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; |
| 4403 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
| 4404 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); |
| 4405 | if (err) |
| 4406 | return err; |
| 4407 | |
| 4408 | if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) { |
| 4409 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, |
| 4410 | PACKET__RECV, &ad); |
| 4411 | if (err) |
| 4412 | return err; |
| 4413 | } |
| 4414 | |
| 4415 | err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad); |
| 4416 | if (err) |
| 4417 | return err; |
| 4418 | err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad); |
| 4419 | |
| 4420 | return err; |
| 4421 | } |
| 4422 | |
| 4423 | static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
| 4424 | { |
| 4425 | int err; |
| 4426 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4427 | u16 family = sk->sk_family; |
| 4428 | u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; |
| 4429 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 4430 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
| 4431 | char *addrp; |
| 4432 | u8 secmark_active; |
| 4433 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
| 4434 | |
| 4435 | if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) |
| 4436 | return 0; |
| 4437 | |
| 4438 | /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ |
| 4439 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
| 4440 | family = PF_INET; |
| 4441 | |
| 4442 | /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing |
| 4443 | * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the |
| 4444 | * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function |
| 4445 | * as fast and as clean as possible. */ |
| 4446 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
| 4447 | return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family); |
| 4448 | |
| 4449 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
| 4450 | peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); |
| 4451 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
| 4452 | return 0; |
| 4453 | |
| 4454 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
| 4455 | ad.u.net = &net; |
| 4456 | ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif; |
| 4457 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
| 4458 | err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL); |
| 4459 | if (err) |
| 4460 | return err; |
| 4461 | |
| 4462 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
| 4463 | u32 peer_sid; |
| 4464 | |
| 4465 | err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid); |
| 4466 | if (err) |
| 4467 | return err; |
| 4468 | err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif, |
| 4469 | addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); |
| 4470 | if (err) { |
| 4471 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); |
| 4472 | return err; |
| 4473 | } |
| 4474 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER, |
| 4475 | PEER__RECV, &ad); |
| 4476 | if (err) { |
| 4477 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0); |
| 4478 | return err; |
| 4479 | } |
| 4480 | } |
| 4481 | |
| 4482 | if (secmark_active) { |
| 4483 | err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET, |
| 4484 | PACKET__RECV, &ad); |
| 4485 | if (err) |
| 4486 | return err; |
| 4487 | } |
| 4488 | |
| 4489 | return err; |
| 4490 | } |
| 4491 | |
| 4492 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, |
| 4493 | int __user *optlen, unsigned len) |
| 4494 | { |
| 4495 | int err = 0; |
| 4496 | char *scontext; |
| 4497 | u32 scontext_len; |
| 4498 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; |
| 4499 | u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; |
| 4500 | |
| 4501 | if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || |
| 4502 | sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) |
| 4503 | peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; |
| 4504 | if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) |
| 4505 | return -ENOPROTOOPT; |
| 4506 | |
| 4507 | err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len); |
| 4508 | if (err) |
| 4509 | return err; |
| 4510 | |
| 4511 | if (scontext_len > len) { |
| 4512 | err = -ERANGE; |
| 4513 | goto out_len; |
| 4514 | } |
| 4515 | |
| 4516 | if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len)) |
| 4517 | err = -EFAULT; |
| 4518 | |
| 4519 | out_len: |
| 4520 | if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen)) |
| 4521 | err = -EFAULT; |
| 4522 | kfree(scontext); |
| 4523 | return err; |
| 4524 | } |
| 4525 | |
| 4526 | static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid) |
| 4527 | { |
| 4528 | u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL; |
| 4529 | u16 family; |
| 4530 | |
| 4531 | if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
| 4532 | family = PF_INET; |
| 4533 | else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) |
| 4534 | family = PF_INET6; |
| 4535 | else if (sock) |
| 4536 | family = sock->sk->sk_family; |
| 4537 | else |
| 4538 | goto out; |
| 4539 | |
| 4540 | if (sock && family == PF_UNIX) |
| 4541 | selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid); |
| 4542 | else if (skb) |
| 4543 | selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid); |
| 4544 | |
| 4545 | out: |
| 4546 | *secid = peer_secid; |
| 4547 | if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) |
| 4548 | return -EINVAL; |
| 4549 | return 0; |
| 4550 | } |
| 4551 | |
| 4552 | static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) |
| 4553 | { |
| 4554 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
| 4555 | |
| 4556 | sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority); |
| 4557 | if (!sksec) |
| 4558 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 4559 | |
| 4560 | sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
| 4561 | sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
| 4562 | sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET; |
| 4563 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec); |
| 4564 | sk->sk_security = sksec; |
| 4565 | |
| 4566 | return 0; |
| 4567 | } |
| 4568 | |
| 4569 | static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) |
| 4570 | { |
| 4571 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4572 | |
| 4573 | sk->sk_security = NULL; |
| 4574 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec); |
| 4575 | kfree(sksec); |
| 4576 | } |
| 4577 | |
| 4578 | static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) |
| 4579 | { |
| 4580 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4581 | struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; |
| 4582 | |
| 4583 | newsksec->sid = sksec->sid; |
| 4584 | newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; |
| 4585 | newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; |
| 4586 | |
| 4587 | selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec); |
| 4588 | } |
| 4589 | |
| 4590 | static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) |
| 4591 | { |
| 4592 | if (!sk) |
| 4593 | *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; |
| 4594 | else { |
| 4595 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4596 | |
| 4597 | *secid = sksec->sid; |
| 4598 | } |
| 4599 | } |
| 4600 | |
| 4601 | static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) |
| 4602 | { |
| 4603 | struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security; |
| 4604 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4605 | |
| 4606 | if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || |
| 4607 | sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) |
| 4608 | isec->sid = sksec->sid; |
| 4609 | sksec->sclass = isec->sclass; |
| 4610 | } |
| 4611 | |
| 4612 | static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 4613 | struct request_sock *req) |
| 4614 | { |
| 4615 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4616 | int err; |
| 4617 | u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family; |
| 4618 | u32 connsid; |
| 4619 | u32 peersid; |
| 4620 | |
| 4621 | err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid); |
| 4622 | if (err) |
| 4623 | return err; |
| 4624 | err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid); |
| 4625 | if (err) |
| 4626 | return err; |
| 4627 | req->secid = connsid; |
| 4628 | req->peer_secid = peersid; |
| 4629 | |
| 4630 | return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family); |
| 4631 | } |
| 4632 | |
| 4633 | static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, |
| 4634 | const struct request_sock *req) |
| 4635 | { |
| 4636 | struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; |
| 4637 | |
| 4638 | newsksec->sid = req->secid; |
| 4639 | newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid; |
| 4640 | /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the |
| 4641 | new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet. |
| 4642 | So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which |
| 4643 | time it will have been created and available. */ |
| 4644 | |
| 4645 | /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only |
| 4646 | * thread with access to newsksec */ |
| 4647 | selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family); |
| 4648 | } |
| 4649 | |
| 4650 | static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
| 4651 | { |
| 4652 | u16 family = sk->sk_family; |
| 4653 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4654 | |
| 4655 | /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ |
| 4656 | if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) |
| 4657 | family = PF_INET; |
| 4658 | |
| 4659 | selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid); |
| 4660 | } |
| 4661 | |
| 4662 | static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid) |
| 4663 | { |
| 4664 | const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; |
| 4665 | u32 tsid; |
| 4666 | |
| 4667 | __tsec = current_security(); |
| 4668 | tsid = __tsec->sid; |
| 4669 | |
| 4670 | return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL); |
| 4671 | } |
| 4672 | |
| 4673 | static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void) |
| 4674 | { |
| 4675 | atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount); |
| 4676 | } |
| 4677 | |
| 4678 | static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void) |
| 4679 | { |
| 4680 | atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount); |
| 4681 | } |
| 4682 | |
| 4683 | static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, |
| 4684 | struct flowi *fl) |
| 4685 | { |
| 4686 | fl->flowi_secid = req->secid; |
| 4687 | } |
| 4688 | |
| 4689 | static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) |
| 4690 | { |
| 4691 | struct tun_security_struct *tunsec; |
| 4692 | |
| 4693 | tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL); |
| 4694 | if (!tunsec) |
| 4695 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 4696 | tunsec->sid = current_sid(); |
| 4697 | |
| 4698 | *security = tunsec; |
| 4699 | return 0; |
| 4700 | } |
| 4701 | |
| 4702 | static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) |
| 4703 | { |
| 4704 | kfree(security); |
| 4705 | } |
| 4706 | |
| 4707 | static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) |
| 4708 | { |
| 4709 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 4710 | |
| 4711 | /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket |
| 4712 | * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense, |
| 4713 | * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and |
| 4714 | * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple |
| 4715 | * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to |
| 4716 | * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */ |
| 4717 | |
| 4718 | return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE, |
| 4719 | NULL); |
| 4720 | } |
| 4721 | |
| 4722 | static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) |
| 4723 | { |
| 4724 | struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; |
| 4725 | |
| 4726 | return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, |
| 4727 | TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL); |
| 4728 | } |
| 4729 | |
| 4730 | static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) |
| 4731 | { |
| 4732 | struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; |
| 4733 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4734 | |
| 4735 | /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it |
| 4736 | * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply |
| 4737 | * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled |
| 4738 | * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly |
| 4739 | * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling |
| 4740 | * protocols were being used */ |
| 4741 | |
| 4742 | sksec->sid = tunsec->sid; |
| 4743 | sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET; |
| 4744 | |
| 4745 | return 0; |
| 4746 | } |
| 4747 | |
| 4748 | static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security) |
| 4749 | { |
| 4750 | struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; |
| 4751 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 4752 | int err; |
| 4753 | |
| 4754 | err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, |
| 4755 | TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL); |
| 4756 | if (err) |
| 4757 | return err; |
| 4758 | err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, |
| 4759 | TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL); |
| 4760 | if (err) |
| 4761 | return err; |
| 4762 | tunsec->sid = sid; |
| 4763 | |
| 4764 | return 0; |
| 4765 | } |
| 4766 | |
| 4767 | static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
| 4768 | { |
| 4769 | int err = 0; |
| 4770 | u32 perm; |
| 4771 | struct nlmsghdr *nlh; |
| 4772 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4773 | |
| 4774 | if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) { |
| 4775 | err = -EINVAL; |
| 4776 | goto out; |
| 4777 | } |
| 4778 | nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb); |
| 4779 | |
| 4780 | err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm); |
| 4781 | if (err) { |
| 4782 | if (err == -EINVAL) { |
| 4783 | printk(KERN_WARNING |
| 4784 | "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:" |
| 4785 | " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%s\n", |
| 4786 | sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, |
| 4787 | secclass_map[sksec->sclass - 1].name); |
| 4788 | if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown()) |
| 4789 | err = 0; |
| 4790 | } |
| 4791 | |
| 4792 | /* Ignore */ |
| 4793 | if (err == -ENOENT) |
| 4794 | err = 0; |
| 4795 | goto out; |
| 4796 | } |
| 4797 | |
| 4798 | err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm); |
| 4799 | out: |
| 4800 | return err; |
| 4801 | } |
| 4802 | |
| 4803 | #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER |
| 4804 | |
| 4805 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 4806 | const struct net_device *indev, |
| 4807 | u16 family) |
| 4808 | { |
| 4809 | int err; |
| 4810 | char *addrp; |
| 4811 | u32 peer_sid; |
| 4812 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 4813 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
| 4814 | u8 secmark_active; |
| 4815 | u8 netlbl_active; |
| 4816 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
| 4817 | |
| 4818 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
| 4819 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 4820 | |
| 4821 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
| 4822 | netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled(); |
| 4823 | peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); |
| 4824 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
| 4825 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 4826 | |
| 4827 | if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0) |
| 4828 | return NF_DROP; |
| 4829 | |
| 4830 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
| 4831 | ad.u.net = &net; |
| 4832 | ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex; |
| 4833 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
| 4834 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0) |
| 4835 | return NF_DROP; |
| 4836 | |
| 4837 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
| 4838 | err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex, |
| 4839 | addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad); |
| 4840 | if (err) { |
| 4841 | selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1); |
| 4842 | return NF_DROP; |
| 4843 | } |
| 4844 | } |
| 4845 | |
| 4846 | if (secmark_active) |
| 4847 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, |
| 4848 | SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad)) |
| 4849 | return NF_DROP; |
| 4850 | |
| 4851 | if (netlbl_active) |
| 4852 | /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING |
| 4853 | * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary |
| 4854 | * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH |
| 4855 | * protection */ |
| 4856 | if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0) |
| 4857 | return NF_DROP; |
| 4858 | |
| 4859 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 4860 | } |
| 4861 | |
| 4862 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, |
| 4863 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 4864 | const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
| 4865 | { |
| 4866 | return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET); |
| 4867 | } |
| 4868 | |
| 4869 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
| 4870 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, |
| 4871 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 4872 | const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
| 4873 | { |
| 4874 | return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6); |
| 4875 | } |
| 4876 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
| 4877 | |
| 4878 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 4879 | u16 family) |
| 4880 | { |
| 4881 | struct sock *sk; |
| 4882 | u32 sid; |
| 4883 | |
| 4884 | if (!netlbl_enabled()) |
| 4885 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 4886 | |
| 4887 | /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path |
| 4888 | * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling |
| 4889 | * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */ |
| 4890 | sk = skb->sk; |
| 4891 | if (sk) { |
| 4892 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
| 4893 | |
| 4894 | if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) |
| 4895 | /* if the socket is the listening state then this |
| 4896 | * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to |
| 4897 | * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and |
| 4898 | * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't |
| 4899 | * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on |
| 4900 | * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent. |
| 4901 | * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is |
| 4902 | * as any IP option based labeling should be copied |
| 4903 | * from the initial connection request (in the IP |
| 4904 | * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a |
| 4905 | * security label in the packet itself this is the |
| 4906 | * best we can do. */ |
| 4907 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 4908 | |
| 4909 | /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ |
| 4910 | sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4911 | sid = sksec->sid; |
| 4912 | } else |
| 4913 | sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
| 4914 | if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0) |
| 4915 | return NF_DROP; |
| 4916 | |
| 4917 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 4918 | } |
| 4919 | |
| 4920 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, |
| 4921 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 4922 | const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
| 4923 | { |
| 4924 | return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET); |
| 4925 | } |
| 4926 | |
| 4927 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 4928 | int ifindex, |
| 4929 | u16 family) |
| 4930 | { |
| 4931 | struct sock *sk = skb->sk; |
| 4932 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec; |
| 4933 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 4934 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
| 4935 | char *addrp; |
| 4936 | u8 proto; |
| 4937 | |
| 4938 | if (sk == NULL) |
| 4939 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 4940 | sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 4941 | |
| 4942 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
| 4943 | ad.u.net = &net; |
| 4944 | ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; |
| 4945 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
| 4946 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto)) |
| 4947 | return NF_DROP; |
| 4948 | |
| 4949 | if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) |
| 4950 | if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, |
| 4951 | SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad)) |
| 4952 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
| 4953 | |
| 4954 | if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto)) |
| 4955 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
| 4956 | |
| 4957 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 4958 | } |
| 4959 | |
| 4960 | static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 4961 | const struct net_device *outdev, |
| 4962 | u16 family) |
| 4963 | { |
| 4964 | u32 secmark_perm; |
| 4965 | u32 peer_sid; |
| 4966 | int ifindex = outdev->ifindex; |
| 4967 | struct sock *sk; |
| 4968 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 4969 | struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,}; |
| 4970 | char *addrp; |
| 4971 | u8 secmark_active; |
| 4972 | u8 peerlbl_active; |
| 4973 | |
| 4974 | /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing |
| 4975 | * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the |
| 4976 | * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function |
| 4977 | * as fast and as clean as possible. */ |
| 4978 | if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer) |
| 4979 | return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family); |
| 4980 | |
| 4981 | secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled(); |
| 4982 | peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled(); |
| 4983 | if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active) |
| 4984 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 4985 | |
| 4986 | sk = skb->sk; |
| 4987 | |
| 4988 | #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM |
| 4989 | /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec |
| 4990 | * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks |
| 4991 | * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks |
| 4992 | * when the packet is on it's final way out. |
| 4993 | * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst |
| 4994 | * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. |
| 4995 | * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the |
| 4996 | * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing |
| 4997 | * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do; |
| 4998 | * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per |
| 4999 | * connection. */ |
| 5000 | if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL && |
| 5001 | !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)) |
| 5002 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 5003 | #endif |
| 5004 | |
| 5005 | if (sk == NULL) { |
| 5006 | /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming |
| 5007 | * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet |
| 5008 | * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded |
| 5009 | * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */ |
| 5010 | if (skb->skb_iif) { |
| 5011 | secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT; |
| 5012 | if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid)) |
| 5013 | return NF_DROP; |
| 5014 | } else { |
| 5015 | secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; |
| 5016 | peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; |
| 5017 | } |
| 5018 | } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) { |
| 5019 | /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the |
| 5020 | * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In |
| 5021 | * this particular case the correct security label is assigned |
| 5022 | * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't |
| 5023 | * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent |
| 5024 | * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only |
| 5025 | * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in |
| 5026 | * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output() |
| 5027 | * for similar problems. */ |
| 5028 | u32 skb_sid; |
| 5029 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 5030 | if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid)) |
| 5031 | return NF_DROP; |
| 5032 | /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL |
| 5033 | * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM |
| 5034 | * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final" |
| 5035 | * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied |
| 5036 | * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely |
| 5037 | * pass the packet. */ |
| 5038 | if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) { |
| 5039 | switch (family) { |
| 5040 | case PF_INET: |
| 5041 | if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) |
| 5042 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 5043 | break; |
| 5044 | case PF_INET6: |
| 5045 | if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED) |
| 5046 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 5047 | break; |
| 5048 | default: |
| 5049 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
| 5050 | } |
| 5051 | } |
| 5052 | if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid)) |
| 5053 | return NF_DROP; |
| 5054 | secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; |
| 5055 | } else { |
| 5056 | /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the |
| 5057 | * associated socket. */ |
| 5058 | struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; |
| 5059 | peer_sid = sksec->sid; |
| 5060 | secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; |
| 5061 | } |
| 5062 | |
| 5063 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET; |
| 5064 | ad.u.net = &net; |
| 5065 | ad.u.net->netif = ifindex; |
| 5066 | ad.u.net->family = family; |
| 5067 | if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL)) |
| 5068 | return NF_DROP; |
| 5069 | |
| 5070 | if (secmark_active) |
| 5071 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark, |
| 5072 | SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad)) |
| 5073 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
| 5074 | |
| 5075 | if (peerlbl_active) { |
| 5076 | u32 if_sid; |
| 5077 | u32 node_sid; |
| 5078 | |
| 5079 | if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid)) |
| 5080 | return NF_DROP; |
| 5081 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid, |
| 5082 | SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad)) |
| 5083 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
| 5084 | |
| 5085 | if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid)) |
| 5086 | return NF_DROP; |
| 5087 | if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid, |
| 5088 | SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad)) |
| 5089 | return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED); |
| 5090 | } |
| 5091 | |
| 5092 | return NF_ACCEPT; |
| 5093 | } |
| 5094 | |
| 5095 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, |
| 5096 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 5097 | const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
| 5098 | { |
| 5099 | return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET); |
| 5100 | } |
| 5101 | |
| 5102 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
| 5103 | static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops, |
| 5104 | struct sk_buff *skb, |
| 5105 | const struct nf_hook_state *state) |
| 5106 | { |
| 5107 | return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6); |
| 5108 | } |
| 5109 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
| 5110 | |
| 5111 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
| 5112 | |
| 5113 | static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) |
| 5114 | { |
| 5115 | return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb); |
| 5116 | } |
| 5117 | |
| 5118 | static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task, |
| 5119 | struct kern_ipc_perm *perm, |
| 5120 | u16 sclass) |
| 5121 | { |
| 5122 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
| 5123 | u32 sid; |
| 5124 | |
| 5125 | isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
| 5126 | if (!isec) |
| 5127 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 5128 | |
| 5129 | sid = task_sid(task); |
| 5130 | isec->sclass = sclass; |
| 5131 | isec->sid = sid; |
| 5132 | perm->security = isec; |
| 5133 | |
| 5134 | return 0; |
| 5135 | } |
| 5136 | |
| 5137 | static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm) |
| 5138 | { |
| 5139 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security; |
| 5140 | perm->security = NULL; |
| 5141 | kfree(isec); |
| 5142 | } |
| 5143 | |
| 5144 | static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
| 5145 | { |
| 5146 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
| 5147 | |
| 5148 | msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
| 5149 | if (!msec) |
| 5150 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 5151 | |
| 5152 | msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; |
| 5153 | msg->security = msec; |
| 5154 | |
| 5155 | return 0; |
| 5156 | } |
| 5157 | |
| 5158 | static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
| 5159 | { |
| 5160 | struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security; |
| 5161 | |
| 5162 | msg->security = NULL; |
| 5163 | kfree(msec); |
| 5164 | } |
| 5165 | |
| 5166 | static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms, |
| 5167 | u32 perms) |
| 5168 | { |
| 5169 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
| 5170 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 5171 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 5172 | |
| 5173 | isec = ipc_perms->security; |
| 5174 | |
| 5175 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
| 5176 | ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key; |
| 5177 | |
| 5178 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad); |
| 5179 | } |
| 5180 | |
| 5181 | static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
| 5182 | { |
| 5183 | return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg); |
| 5184 | } |
| 5185 | |
| 5186 | static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg) |
| 5187 | { |
| 5188 | msg_msg_free_security(msg); |
| 5189 | } |
| 5190 | |
| 5191 | /* message queue security operations */ |
| 5192 | static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq) |
| 5193 | { |
| 5194 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
| 5195 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 5196 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 5197 | int rc; |
| 5198 | |
| 5199 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ); |
| 5200 | if (rc) |
| 5201 | return rc; |
| 5202 | |
| 5203 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
| 5204 | |
| 5205 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
| 5206 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
| 5207 | |
| 5208 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
| 5209 | MSGQ__CREATE, &ad); |
| 5210 | if (rc) { |
| 5211 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); |
| 5212 | return rc; |
| 5213 | } |
| 5214 | return 0; |
| 5215 | } |
| 5216 | |
| 5217 | static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq) |
| 5218 | { |
| 5219 | ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm); |
| 5220 | } |
| 5221 | |
| 5222 | static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg) |
| 5223 | { |
| 5224 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
| 5225 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 5226 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 5227 | |
| 5228 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
| 5229 | |
| 5230 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
| 5231 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
| 5232 | |
| 5233 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
| 5234 | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
| 5235 | } |
| 5236 | |
| 5237 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd) |
| 5238 | { |
| 5239 | int err; |
| 5240 | int perms; |
| 5241 | |
| 5242 | switch (cmd) { |
| 5243 | case IPC_INFO: |
| 5244 | case MSG_INFO: |
| 5245 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
| 5246 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
| 5247 | case IPC_STAT: |
| 5248 | case MSG_STAT: |
| 5249 | perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE; |
| 5250 | break; |
| 5251 | case IPC_SET: |
| 5252 | perms = MSGQ__SETATTR; |
| 5253 | break; |
| 5254 | case IPC_RMID: |
| 5255 | perms = MSGQ__DESTROY; |
| 5256 | break; |
| 5257 | default: |
| 5258 | return 0; |
| 5259 | } |
| 5260 | |
| 5261 | err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms); |
| 5262 | return err; |
| 5263 | } |
| 5264 | |
| 5265 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg) |
| 5266 | { |
| 5267 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
| 5268 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
| 5269 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 5270 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 5271 | int rc; |
| 5272 | |
| 5273 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
| 5274 | msec = msg->security; |
| 5275 | |
| 5276 | /* |
| 5277 | * First time through, need to assign label to the message |
| 5278 | */ |
| 5279 | if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) { |
| 5280 | /* |
| 5281 | * Compute new sid based on current process and |
| 5282 | * message queue this message will be stored in |
| 5283 | */ |
| 5284 | rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, |
| 5285 | NULL, &msec->sid); |
| 5286 | if (rc) |
| 5287 | return rc; |
| 5288 | } |
| 5289 | |
| 5290 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
| 5291 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
| 5292 | |
| 5293 | /* Can this process write to the queue? */ |
| 5294 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
| 5295 | MSGQ__WRITE, &ad); |
| 5296 | if (!rc) |
| 5297 | /* Can this process send the message */ |
| 5298 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG, |
| 5299 | MSG__SEND, &ad); |
| 5300 | if (!rc) |
| 5301 | /* Can the message be put in the queue? */ |
| 5302 | rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ, |
| 5303 | MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad); |
| 5304 | |
| 5305 | return rc; |
| 5306 | } |
| 5307 | |
| 5308 | static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, |
| 5309 | struct task_struct *target, |
| 5310 | long type, int mode) |
| 5311 | { |
| 5312 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
| 5313 | struct msg_security_struct *msec; |
| 5314 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 5315 | u32 sid = task_sid(target); |
| 5316 | int rc; |
| 5317 | |
| 5318 | isec = msq->q_perm.security; |
| 5319 | msec = msg->security; |
| 5320 | |
| 5321 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
| 5322 | ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key; |
| 5323 | |
| 5324 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, |
| 5325 | SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad); |
| 5326 | if (!rc) |
| 5327 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, |
| 5328 | SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad); |
| 5329 | return rc; |
| 5330 | } |
| 5331 | |
| 5332 | /* Shared Memory security operations */ |
| 5333 | static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) |
| 5334 | { |
| 5335 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
| 5336 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 5337 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 5338 | int rc; |
| 5339 | |
| 5340 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM); |
| 5341 | if (rc) |
| 5342 | return rc; |
| 5343 | |
| 5344 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; |
| 5345 | |
| 5346 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
| 5347 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; |
| 5348 | |
| 5349 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, |
| 5350 | SHM__CREATE, &ad); |
| 5351 | if (rc) { |
| 5352 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); |
| 5353 | return rc; |
| 5354 | } |
| 5355 | return 0; |
| 5356 | } |
| 5357 | |
| 5358 | static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp) |
| 5359 | { |
| 5360 | ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm); |
| 5361 | } |
| 5362 | |
| 5363 | static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg) |
| 5364 | { |
| 5365 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
| 5366 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 5367 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 5368 | |
| 5369 | isec = shp->shm_perm.security; |
| 5370 | |
| 5371 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
| 5372 | ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key; |
| 5373 | |
| 5374 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM, |
| 5375 | SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
| 5376 | } |
| 5377 | |
| 5378 | /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */ |
| 5379 | static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd) |
| 5380 | { |
| 5381 | int perms; |
| 5382 | int err; |
| 5383 | |
| 5384 | switch (cmd) { |
| 5385 | case IPC_INFO: |
| 5386 | case SHM_INFO: |
| 5387 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
| 5388 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
| 5389 | case IPC_STAT: |
| 5390 | case SHM_STAT: |
| 5391 | perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE; |
| 5392 | break; |
| 5393 | case IPC_SET: |
| 5394 | perms = SHM__SETATTR; |
| 5395 | break; |
| 5396 | case SHM_LOCK: |
| 5397 | case SHM_UNLOCK: |
| 5398 | perms = SHM__LOCK; |
| 5399 | break; |
| 5400 | case IPC_RMID: |
| 5401 | perms = SHM__DESTROY; |
| 5402 | break; |
| 5403 | default: |
| 5404 | return 0; |
| 5405 | } |
| 5406 | |
| 5407 | err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); |
| 5408 | return err; |
| 5409 | } |
| 5410 | |
| 5411 | static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, |
| 5412 | char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg) |
| 5413 | { |
| 5414 | u32 perms; |
| 5415 | |
| 5416 | if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY) |
| 5417 | perms = SHM__READ; |
| 5418 | else |
| 5419 | perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE; |
| 5420 | |
| 5421 | return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms); |
| 5422 | } |
| 5423 | |
| 5424 | /* Semaphore security operations */ |
| 5425 | static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma) |
| 5426 | { |
| 5427 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
| 5428 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 5429 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 5430 | int rc; |
| 5431 | |
| 5432 | rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM); |
| 5433 | if (rc) |
| 5434 | return rc; |
| 5435 | |
| 5436 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; |
| 5437 | |
| 5438 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
| 5439 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; |
| 5440 | |
| 5441 | rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, |
| 5442 | SEM__CREATE, &ad); |
| 5443 | if (rc) { |
| 5444 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); |
| 5445 | return rc; |
| 5446 | } |
| 5447 | return 0; |
| 5448 | } |
| 5449 | |
| 5450 | static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma) |
| 5451 | { |
| 5452 | ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm); |
| 5453 | } |
| 5454 | |
| 5455 | static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg) |
| 5456 | { |
| 5457 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec; |
| 5458 | struct common_audit_data ad; |
| 5459 | u32 sid = current_sid(); |
| 5460 | |
| 5461 | isec = sma->sem_perm.security; |
| 5462 | |
| 5463 | ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC; |
| 5464 | ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key; |
| 5465 | |
| 5466 | return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM, |
| 5467 | SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad); |
| 5468 | } |
| 5469 | |
| 5470 | /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */ |
| 5471 | static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd) |
| 5472 | { |
| 5473 | int err; |
| 5474 | u32 perms; |
| 5475 | |
| 5476 | switch (cmd) { |
| 5477 | case IPC_INFO: |
| 5478 | case SEM_INFO: |
| 5479 | /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */ |
| 5480 | return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO); |
| 5481 | case GETPID: |
| 5482 | case GETNCNT: |
| 5483 | case GETZCNT: |
| 5484 | perms = SEM__GETATTR; |
| 5485 | break; |
| 5486 | case GETVAL: |
| 5487 | case GETALL: |
| 5488 | perms = SEM__READ; |
| 5489 | break; |
| 5490 | case SETVAL: |
| 5491 | case SETALL: |
| 5492 | perms = SEM__WRITE; |
| 5493 | break; |
| 5494 | case IPC_RMID: |
| 5495 | perms = SEM__DESTROY; |
| 5496 | break; |
| 5497 | case IPC_SET: |
| 5498 | perms = SEM__SETATTR; |
| 5499 | break; |
| 5500 | case IPC_STAT: |
| 5501 | case SEM_STAT: |
| 5502 | perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE; |
| 5503 | break; |
| 5504 | default: |
| 5505 | return 0; |
| 5506 | } |
| 5507 | |
| 5508 | err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); |
| 5509 | return err; |
| 5510 | } |
| 5511 | |
| 5512 | static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, |
| 5513 | struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter) |
| 5514 | { |
| 5515 | u32 perms; |
| 5516 | |
| 5517 | if (alter) |
| 5518 | perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE; |
| 5519 | else |
| 5520 | perms = SEM__READ; |
| 5521 | |
| 5522 | return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms); |
| 5523 | } |
| 5524 | |
| 5525 | static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag) |
| 5526 | { |
| 5527 | u32 av = 0; |
| 5528 | |
| 5529 | av = 0; |
| 5530 | if (flag & S_IRUGO) |
| 5531 | av |= IPC__UNIX_READ; |
| 5532 | if (flag & S_IWUGO) |
| 5533 | av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE; |
| 5534 | |
| 5535 | if (av == 0) |
| 5536 | return 0; |
| 5537 | |
| 5538 | return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av); |
| 5539 | } |
| 5540 | |
| 5541 | static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid) |
| 5542 | { |
| 5543 | struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security; |
| 5544 | *secid = isec->sid; |
| 5545 | } |
| 5546 | |
| 5547 | static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) |
| 5548 | { |
| 5549 | if (inode) |
| 5550 | inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry); |
| 5551 | } |
| 5552 | |
| 5553 | static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, |
| 5554 | char *name, char **value) |
| 5555 | { |
| 5556 | const struct task_security_struct *__tsec; |
| 5557 | u32 sid; |
| 5558 | int error; |
| 5559 | unsigned len; |
| 5560 | |
| 5561 | if (current != p) { |
| 5562 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR); |
| 5563 | if (error) |
| 5564 | return error; |
| 5565 | } |
| 5566 | |
| 5567 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 5568 | __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security; |
| 5569 | |
| 5570 | if (!strcmp(name, "current")) |
| 5571 | sid = __tsec->sid; |
| 5572 | else if (!strcmp(name, "prev")) |
| 5573 | sid = __tsec->osid; |
| 5574 | else if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) |
| 5575 | sid = __tsec->exec_sid; |
| 5576 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) |
| 5577 | sid = __tsec->create_sid; |
| 5578 | else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) |
| 5579 | sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid; |
| 5580 | else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) |
| 5581 | sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid; |
| 5582 | else |
| 5583 | goto invalid; |
| 5584 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 5585 | |
| 5586 | if (!sid) |
| 5587 | return 0; |
| 5588 | |
| 5589 | error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len); |
| 5590 | if (error) |
| 5591 | return error; |
| 5592 | return len; |
| 5593 | |
| 5594 | invalid: |
| 5595 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 5596 | return -EINVAL; |
| 5597 | } |
| 5598 | |
| 5599 | static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, |
| 5600 | char *name, void *value, size_t size) |
| 5601 | { |
| 5602 | struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
| 5603 | struct task_struct *tracer; |
| 5604 | struct cred *new; |
| 5605 | u32 sid = 0, ptsid; |
| 5606 | int error; |
| 5607 | char *str = value; |
| 5608 | |
| 5609 | if (current != p) { |
| 5610 | /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own |
| 5611 | security attributes. */ |
| 5612 | return -EACCES; |
| 5613 | } |
| 5614 | |
| 5615 | /* |
| 5616 | * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. |
| 5617 | * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the |
| 5618 | * above restriction is ever removed. |
| 5619 | */ |
| 5620 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) |
| 5621 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC); |
| 5622 | else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) |
| 5623 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE); |
| 5624 | else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) |
| 5625 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE); |
| 5626 | else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) |
| 5627 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE); |
| 5628 | else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) |
| 5629 | error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT); |
| 5630 | else |
| 5631 | error = -EINVAL; |
| 5632 | if (error) |
| 5633 | return error; |
| 5634 | |
| 5635 | /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */ |
| 5636 | if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') { |
| 5637 | if (str[size-1] == '\n') { |
| 5638 | str[size-1] = 0; |
| 5639 | size--; |
| 5640 | } |
| 5641 | error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL); |
| 5642 | if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { |
| 5643 | if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) { |
| 5644 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
| 5645 | size_t audit_size; |
| 5646 | |
| 5647 | /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the |
| 5648 | * context contains a nul and we should audit that */ |
| 5649 | if (str[size - 1] == '\0') |
| 5650 | audit_size = size - 1; |
| 5651 | else |
| 5652 | audit_size = size; |
| 5653 | ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR); |
| 5654 | audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context="); |
| 5655 | audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size); |
| 5656 | audit_log_end(ab); |
| 5657 | |
| 5658 | return error; |
| 5659 | } |
| 5660 | error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, |
| 5661 | &sid); |
| 5662 | } |
| 5663 | if (error) |
| 5664 | return error; |
| 5665 | } |
| 5666 | |
| 5667 | new = prepare_creds(); |
| 5668 | if (!new) |
| 5669 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 5670 | |
| 5671 | /* Permission checking based on the specified context is |
| 5672 | performed during the actual operation (execve, |
| 5673 | open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the |
| 5674 | operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve |
| 5675 | checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The |
| 5676 | operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */ |
| 5677 | tsec = new->security; |
| 5678 | if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) { |
| 5679 | tsec->exec_sid = sid; |
| 5680 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) { |
| 5681 | tsec->create_sid = sid; |
| 5682 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) { |
| 5683 | error = may_create_key(sid, p); |
| 5684 | if (error) |
| 5685 | goto abort_change; |
| 5686 | tsec->keycreate_sid = sid; |
| 5687 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) { |
| 5688 | tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid; |
| 5689 | } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) { |
| 5690 | error = -EINVAL; |
| 5691 | if (sid == 0) |
| 5692 | goto abort_change; |
| 5693 | |
| 5694 | /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */ |
| 5695 | error = -EPERM; |
| 5696 | if (!current_is_single_threaded()) { |
| 5697 | error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid); |
| 5698 | if (error) |
| 5699 | goto abort_change; |
| 5700 | } |
| 5701 | |
| 5702 | /* Check permissions for the transition. */ |
| 5703 | error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
| 5704 | PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL); |
| 5705 | if (error) |
| 5706 | goto abort_change; |
| 5707 | |
| 5708 | /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok. |
| 5709 | Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */ |
| 5710 | ptsid = 0; |
| 5711 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 5712 | tracer = ptrace_parent(p); |
| 5713 | if (tracer) |
| 5714 | ptsid = task_sid(tracer); |
| 5715 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 5716 | |
| 5717 | if (tracer) { |
| 5718 | error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, |
| 5719 | PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL); |
| 5720 | if (error) |
| 5721 | goto abort_change; |
| 5722 | } |
| 5723 | |
| 5724 | tsec->sid = sid; |
| 5725 | } else { |
| 5726 | error = -EINVAL; |
| 5727 | goto abort_change; |
| 5728 | } |
| 5729 | |
| 5730 | commit_creds(new); |
| 5731 | return size; |
| 5732 | |
| 5733 | abort_change: |
| 5734 | abort_creds(new); |
| 5735 | return error; |
| 5736 | } |
| 5737 | |
| 5738 | static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name) |
| 5739 | { |
| 5740 | return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0); |
| 5741 | } |
| 5742 | |
| 5743 | static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) |
| 5744 | { |
| 5745 | return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen); |
| 5746 | } |
| 5747 | |
| 5748 | static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid) |
| 5749 | { |
| 5750 | return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL); |
| 5751 | } |
| 5752 | |
| 5753 | static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen) |
| 5754 | { |
| 5755 | kfree(secdata); |
| 5756 | } |
| 5757 | |
| 5758 | /* |
| 5759 | * called with inode->i_mutex locked |
| 5760 | */ |
| 5761 | static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) |
| 5762 | { |
| 5763 | return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); |
| 5764 | } |
| 5765 | |
| 5766 | /* |
| 5767 | * called with inode->i_mutex locked |
| 5768 | */ |
| 5769 | static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) |
| 5770 | { |
| 5771 | return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0); |
| 5772 | } |
| 5773 | |
| 5774 | static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) |
| 5775 | { |
| 5776 | int len = 0; |
| 5777 | len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, |
| 5778 | ctx, true); |
| 5779 | if (len < 0) |
| 5780 | return len; |
| 5781 | *ctxlen = len; |
| 5782 | return 0; |
| 5783 | } |
| 5784 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
| 5785 | |
| 5786 | static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, |
| 5787 | unsigned long flags) |
| 5788 | { |
| 5789 | const struct task_security_struct *tsec; |
| 5790 | struct key_security_struct *ksec; |
| 5791 | |
| 5792 | ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); |
| 5793 | if (!ksec) |
| 5794 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 5795 | |
| 5796 | tsec = cred->security; |
| 5797 | if (tsec->keycreate_sid) |
| 5798 | ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid; |
| 5799 | else |
| 5800 | ksec->sid = tsec->sid; |
| 5801 | |
| 5802 | k->security = ksec; |
| 5803 | return 0; |
| 5804 | } |
| 5805 | |
| 5806 | static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) |
| 5807 | { |
| 5808 | struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; |
| 5809 | |
| 5810 | k->security = NULL; |
| 5811 | kfree(ksec); |
| 5812 | } |
| 5813 | |
| 5814 | static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, |
| 5815 | const struct cred *cred, |
| 5816 | unsigned perm) |
| 5817 | { |
| 5818 | struct key *key; |
| 5819 | struct key_security_struct *ksec; |
| 5820 | u32 sid; |
| 5821 | |
| 5822 | /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the |
| 5823 | permission check. No serious, additional covert channels |
| 5824 | appear to be created. */ |
| 5825 | if (perm == 0) |
| 5826 | return 0; |
| 5827 | |
| 5828 | sid = cred_sid(cred); |
| 5829 | |
| 5830 | key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); |
| 5831 | ksec = key->security; |
| 5832 | |
| 5833 | return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); |
| 5834 | } |
| 5835 | |
| 5836 | static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) |
| 5837 | { |
| 5838 | struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; |
| 5839 | char *context = NULL; |
| 5840 | unsigned len; |
| 5841 | int rc; |
| 5842 | |
| 5843 | rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len); |
| 5844 | if (!rc) |
| 5845 | rc = len; |
| 5846 | *_buffer = context; |
| 5847 | return rc; |
| 5848 | } |
| 5849 | |
| 5850 | #endif |
| 5851 | |
| 5852 | static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] = { |
| 5853 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), |
| 5854 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), |
| 5855 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_binder, selinux_binder_transfer_binder), |
| 5856 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transfer_file, selinux_binder_transfer_file), |
| 5857 | |
| 5858 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check), |
| 5859 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme), |
| 5860 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget), |
| 5861 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset), |
| 5862 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable), |
| 5863 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(quotactl, selinux_quotactl), |
| 5864 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(quota_on, selinux_quota_on), |
| 5865 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, selinux_syslog), |
| 5866 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, selinux_vm_enough_memory), |
| 5867 | |
| 5868 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(netlink_send, selinux_netlink_send), |
| 5869 | |
| 5870 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, selinux_bprm_set_creds), |
| 5871 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, selinux_bprm_committing_creds), |
| 5872 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, selinux_bprm_committed_creds), |
| 5873 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, selinux_bprm_secureexec), |
| 5874 | |
| 5875 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, selinux_sb_alloc_security), |
| 5876 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, selinux_sb_free_security), |
| 5877 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, selinux_sb_copy_data), |
| 5878 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_remount, selinux_sb_remount), |
| 5879 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount), |
| 5880 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options), |
| 5881 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs), |
| 5882 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount), |
| 5883 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount), |
| 5884 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts), |
| 5885 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts), |
| 5886 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, selinux_parse_opts_str), |
| 5887 | |
| 5888 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_init_security, selinux_dentry_init_security), |
| 5889 | |
| 5890 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, selinux_inode_alloc_security), |
| 5891 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, selinux_inode_free_security), |
| 5892 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, selinux_inode_init_security), |
| 5893 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_create, selinux_inode_create), |
| 5894 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, selinux_inode_link), |
| 5895 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, selinux_inode_unlink), |
| 5896 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_symlink, selinux_inode_symlink), |
| 5897 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mkdir, selinux_inode_mkdir), |
| 5898 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, selinux_inode_rmdir), |
| 5899 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_mknod, selinux_inode_mknod), |
| 5900 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, selinux_inode_rename), |
| 5901 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_readlink, selinux_inode_readlink), |
| 5902 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_follow_link, selinux_inode_follow_link), |
| 5903 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission), |
| 5904 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr), |
| 5905 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr), |
| 5906 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr), |
| 5907 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr), |
| 5908 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr), |
| 5909 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listxattr, selinux_inode_listxattr), |
| 5910 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, selinux_inode_removexattr), |
| 5911 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, selinux_inode_getsecurity), |
| 5912 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, selinux_inode_setsecurity), |
| 5913 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, selinux_inode_listsecurity), |
| 5914 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, selinux_inode_getsecid), |
| 5915 | |
| 5916 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission), |
| 5917 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security), |
| 5918 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security), |
| 5919 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl), |
| 5920 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file), |
| 5921 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr), |
| 5922 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect), |
| 5923 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, selinux_file_lock), |
| 5924 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, selinux_file_fcntl), |
| 5925 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, selinux_file_set_fowner), |
| 5926 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, selinux_file_send_sigiotask), |
| 5927 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, selinux_file_receive), |
| 5928 | |
| 5929 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, selinux_file_open), |
| 5930 | |
| 5931 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_create, selinux_task_create), |
| 5932 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, selinux_cred_alloc_blank), |
| 5933 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, selinux_cred_free), |
| 5934 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, selinux_cred_prepare), |
| 5935 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, selinux_cred_transfer), |
| 5936 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, selinux_kernel_act_as), |
| 5937 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, selinux_kernel_create_files_as), |
| 5938 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_module_request, selinux_kernel_module_request), |
| 5939 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid), |
| 5940 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid), |
| 5941 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid), |
| 5942 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, selinux_task_getsecid), |
| 5943 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice), |
| 5944 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio), |
| 5945 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio), |
| 5946 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, selinux_task_setrlimit), |
| 5947 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, selinux_task_setscheduler), |
| 5948 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, selinux_task_getscheduler), |
| 5949 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), |
| 5950 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), |
| 5951 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, selinux_task_wait), |
| 5952 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), |
| 5953 | |
| 5954 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), |
| 5955 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid), |
| 5956 | |
| 5957 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security), |
| 5958 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, selinux_msg_msg_free_security), |
| 5959 | |
| 5960 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, |
| 5961 | selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security), |
| 5962 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, selinux_msg_queue_free_security), |
| 5963 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, selinux_msg_queue_associate), |
| 5964 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, selinux_msg_queue_msgctl), |
| 5965 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd), |
| 5966 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv), |
| 5967 | |
| 5968 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, selinux_shm_alloc_security), |
| 5969 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, selinux_shm_free_security), |
| 5970 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, selinux_shm_associate), |
| 5971 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, selinux_shm_shmctl), |
| 5972 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, selinux_shm_shmat), |
| 5973 | |
| 5974 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, selinux_sem_alloc_security), |
| 5975 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, selinux_sem_free_security), |
| 5976 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, selinux_sem_associate), |
| 5977 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, selinux_sem_semctl), |
| 5978 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, selinux_sem_semop), |
| 5979 | |
| 5980 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate), |
| 5981 | |
| 5982 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr), |
| 5983 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr), |
| 5984 | |
| 5985 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, selinux_ismaclabel), |
| 5986 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, selinux_secid_to_secctx), |
| 5987 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, selinux_secctx_to_secid), |
| 5988 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, selinux_release_secctx), |
| 5989 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, selinux_inode_notifysecctx), |
| 5990 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, selinux_inode_setsecctx), |
| 5991 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, selinux_inode_getsecctx), |
| 5992 | |
| 5993 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect), |
| 5994 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, selinux_socket_unix_may_send), |
| 5995 | |
| 5996 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_create, selinux_socket_create), |
| 5997 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, selinux_socket_post_create), |
| 5998 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, selinux_socket_bind), |
| 5999 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, selinux_socket_connect), |
| 6000 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_listen, selinux_socket_listen), |
| 6001 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_accept, selinux_socket_accept), |
| 6002 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, selinux_socket_sendmsg), |
| 6003 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_recvmsg, selinux_socket_recvmsg), |
| 6004 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockname, selinux_socket_getsockname), |
| 6005 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeername, selinux_socket_getpeername), |
| 6006 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getsockopt, selinux_socket_getsockopt), |
| 6007 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_setsockopt, selinux_socket_setsockopt), |
| 6008 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_shutdown, selinux_socket_shutdown), |
| 6009 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb), |
| 6010 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, |
| 6011 | selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream), |
| 6012 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram), |
| 6013 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, selinux_sk_alloc_security), |
| 6014 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, selinux_sk_free_security), |
| 6015 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, selinux_sk_clone_security), |
| 6016 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_getsecid, selinux_sk_getsecid), |
| 6017 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, selinux_sock_graft), |
| 6018 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, selinux_inet_conn_request), |
| 6019 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, selinux_inet_csk_clone), |
| 6020 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_established, selinux_inet_conn_established), |
| 6021 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_relabel_packet, selinux_secmark_relabel_packet), |
| 6022 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc), |
| 6023 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec), |
| 6024 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow), |
| 6025 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_alloc_security, selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security), |
| 6026 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security), |
| 6027 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create), |
| 6028 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue), |
| 6029 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach), |
| 6030 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_open, selinux_tun_dev_open), |
| 6031 | |
| 6032 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM |
| 6033 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_alloc_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc), |
| 6034 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_clone_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_clone), |
| 6035 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free), |
| 6036 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_delete), |
| 6037 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc, selinux_xfrm_state_alloc), |
| 6038 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_alloc_acquire, |
| 6039 | selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire), |
| 6040 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_free_security, selinux_xfrm_state_free), |
| 6041 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_delete_security, selinux_xfrm_state_delete), |
| 6042 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_lookup, selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup), |
| 6043 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_state_pol_flow_match, |
| 6044 | selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match), |
| 6045 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_decode_session, selinux_xfrm_decode_session), |
| 6046 | #endif |
| 6047 | |
| 6048 | #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS |
| 6049 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, selinux_key_alloc), |
| 6050 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free), |
| 6051 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission), |
| 6052 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity), |
| 6053 | #endif |
| 6054 | |
| 6055 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT |
| 6056 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, selinux_audit_rule_init), |
| 6057 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, selinux_audit_rule_known), |
| 6058 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match), |
| 6059 | LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free), |
| 6060 | #endif |
| 6061 | }; |
| 6062 | |
| 6063 | static __init int selinux_init(void) |
| 6064 | { |
| 6065 | if (!security_module_enable("selinux")) { |
| 6066 | selinux_enabled = 0; |
| 6067 | return 0; |
| 6068 | } |
| 6069 | |
| 6070 | if (!selinux_enabled) { |
| 6071 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n"); |
| 6072 | return 0; |
| 6073 | } |
| 6074 | |
| 6075 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n"); |
| 6076 | |
| 6077 | /* Set the security state for the initial task. */ |
| 6078 | cred_init_security(); |
| 6079 | |
| 6080 | default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC); |
| 6081 | |
| 6082 | sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security", |
| 6083 | sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), |
| 6084 | 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); |
| 6085 | avc_init(); |
| 6086 | |
| 6087 | security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); |
| 6088 | |
| 6089 | if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET)) |
| 6090 | panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n"); |
| 6091 | |
| 6092 | if (selinux_enforcing) |
| 6093 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n"); |
| 6094 | else |
| 6095 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n"); |
| 6096 | |
| 6097 | return 0; |
| 6098 | } |
| 6099 | |
| 6100 | static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused) |
| 6101 | { |
| 6102 | superblock_doinit(sb, NULL); |
| 6103 | } |
| 6104 | |
| 6105 | void selinux_complete_init(void) |
| 6106 | { |
| 6107 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n"); |
| 6108 | |
| 6109 | /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */ |
| 6110 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n"); |
| 6111 | iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL); |
| 6112 | } |
| 6113 | |
| 6114 | /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label |
| 6115 | all processes and objects when they are created. */ |
| 6116 | security_initcall(selinux_init); |
| 6117 | |
| 6118 | #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER) |
| 6119 | |
| 6120 | static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = { |
| 6121 | { |
| 6122 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute, |
| 6123 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
| 6124 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, |
| 6125 | .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
| 6126 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, |
| 6127 | }, |
| 6128 | { |
| 6129 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward, |
| 6130 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
| 6131 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, |
| 6132 | .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, |
| 6133 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
| 6134 | }, |
| 6135 | { |
| 6136 | .hook = selinux_ipv4_output, |
| 6137 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
| 6138 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4, |
| 6139 | .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT, |
| 6140 | .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
| 6141 | }, |
| 6142 | #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE) |
| 6143 | { |
| 6144 | .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute, |
| 6145 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
| 6146 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, |
| 6147 | .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, |
| 6148 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST, |
| 6149 | }, |
| 6150 | { |
| 6151 | .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward, |
| 6152 | .owner = THIS_MODULE, |
| 6153 | .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6, |
| 6154 | .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD, |
| 6155 | .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST, |
| 6156 | }, |
| 6157 | #endif /* IPV6 */ |
| 6158 | }; |
| 6159 | |
| 6160 | static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void) |
| 6161 | { |
| 6162 | int err; |
| 6163 | |
| 6164 | if (!selinux_enabled) |
| 6165 | return 0; |
| 6166 | |
| 6167 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n"); |
| 6168 | |
| 6169 | err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops)); |
| 6170 | if (err) |
| 6171 | panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err); |
| 6172 | |
| 6173 | return 0; |
| 6174 | } |
| 6175 | |
| 6176 | __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init); |
| 6177 | |
| 6178 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
| 6179 | static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void) |
| 6180 | { |
| 6181 | printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n"); |
| 6182 | |
| 6183 | nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops)); |
| 6184 | } |
| 6185 | #endif |
| 6186 | |
| 6187 | #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
| 6188 | |
| 6189 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
| 6190 | #define selinux_nf_ip_exit() |
| 6191 | #endif |
| 6192 | |
| 6193 | #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */ |
| 6194 | |
| 6195 | #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE |
| 6196 | static int selinux_disabled; |
| 6197 | |
| 6198 | int selinux_disable(void) |
| 6199 | { |
| 6200 | if (ss_initialized) { |
| 6201 | /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */ |
| 6202 | return -EINVAL; |
| 6203 | } |
| 6204 | |
| 6205 | if (selinux_disabled) { |
| 6206 | /* Only do this once. */ |
| 6207 | return -EINVAL; |
| 6208 | } |
| 6209 | |
| 6210 | printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n"); |
| 6211 | |
| 6212 | selinux_disabled = 1; |
| 6213 | selinux_enabled = 0; |
| 6214 | |
| 6215 | security_delete_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks)); |
| 6216 | |
| 6217 | /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */ |
| 6218 | avc_disable(); |
| 6219 | |
| 6220 | /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */ |
| 6221 | selinux_nf_ip_exit(); |
| 6222 | |
| 6223 | /* Unregister selinuxfs. */ |
| 6224 | exit_sel_fs(); |
| 6225 | |
| 6226 | return 0; |
| 6227 | } |
| 6228 | #endif |