Merge branches 'acpi-video', 'device-properties', 'pm-sleep' and 'pm-cpuidle'

[deliverable/linux.git] / crypto / jitterentropy.c

/*
 * Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter.
 *
 * Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2014
 *
 * Design
 * ======
 *
 * See http://www.chronox.de/jent.html
 *
 * License
 * =======
 *
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 * are met:
 * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
 *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
 * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
 *    products derived from this software without specific prior
 *    written permission.
 *
 * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
 * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are
 * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
 * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
 * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
 *
 * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
 * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
 * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
 * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
 * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
 * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
 * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
 * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
 * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
 * DAMAGE.
 */

/*
 * This Jitterentropy RNG is based on the jitterentropy library
 * version 1.1.0 provided at http://www.chronox.de/jent.html
 */

#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <crypto/internal/rng.h>

/* The entropy pool */
struct rand_data {
        /* all data values that are vital to maintain the security
         * of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not
         * access that information while the RNG executes its loops to
         * calculate the next random value. */
        __u64 data;             /* SENSITIVE Actual random number */
        __u64 old_data;         /* SENSITIVE Previous random number */
        __u64 prev_time;        /* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */
#define DATA_SIZE_BITS ((sizeof(__u64)) * 8)
        __u64 last_delta;       /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
        __s64 last_delta2;      /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
        unsigned int stuck:1;   /* Time measurement stuck */
        unsigned int osr;       /* Oversample rate */
        unsigned int stir:1;            /* Post-processing stirring */
        unsigned int disable_unbias:1;  /* Deactivate Von-Neuman unbias */
#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64
#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32
#define JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS 128
#define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE (JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS*JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE)
        unsigned char *mem;     /* Memory access location with size of
                                 * memblocks * memblocksize */
        unsigned int memlocation; /* Pointer to byte in *mem */
        unsigned int memblocks; /* Number of memory blocks in *mem */
        unsigned int memblocksize; /* Size of one memory block in bytes */
        unsigned int memaccessloops; /* Number of memory accesses per random
                                      * bit generation */
};

/* Flags that can be used to initialize the RNG */
#define JENT_DISABLE_STIR (1<<0) /* Disable stirring the entropy pool */
#define JENT_DISABLE_UNBIAS (1<<1) /* Disable the Von-Neuman Unbiaser */
#define JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS (1<<2) /* Disable memory access for more
                                           * entropy, saves MEMORY_SIZE RAM for
                                           * entropy collector */

#define DRIVER_NAME     "jitterentropy"

/* -- error codes for init function -- */
#define JENT_ENOTIME            1 /* Timer service not available */
#define JENT_ECOARSETIME        2 /* Timer too coarse for RNG */
#define JENT_ENOMONOTONIC       3 /* Timer is not monotonic increasing */
#define JENT_EMINVARIATION      4 /* Timer variations too small for RNG */
#define JENT_EVARVAR            5 /* Timer does not produce variations of
                                   * variations (2nd derivation of time is
                                   * zero). */
#define JENT_EMINVARVAR         6 /* Timer variations of variations is tooi
                                   * small. */

/***************************************************************************
 * Helper functions
 ***************************************************************************/

static inline void jent_get_nstime(__u64 *out)
{
        struct timespec ts;
        __u64 tmp = 0;

        tmp = random_get_entropy();

        /*
         * If random_get_entropy does not return a value (which is possible on,
         * for example, MIPS), invoke __getnstimeofday
         * hoping that there are timers we can work with.
         *
         * The list of available timers can be obtained from
         * /sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/available_clocksource
         * and are registered with clocksource_register()
         */
        if ((0 == tmp) &&
           (0 == __getnstimeofday(&ts))) {
                tmp = ts.tv_sec;
                tmp = tmp << 32;
                tmp = tmp | ts.tv_nsec;
        }

        *out = tmp;
}


/**
 * Update of the loop count used for the next round of
 * an entropy collection.
 *
 * Input:
 * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL
 * @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider
 * @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at
 *      the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value
 *
 * @return Newly calculated loop counter
 */
static __u64 jent_loop_shuffle(struct rand_data *ec,
                               unsigned int bits, unsigned int min)
{
        __u64 time = 0;
        __u64 shuffle = 0;
        unsigned int i = 0;
        unsigned int mask = (1<<bits) - 1;

        jent_get_nstime(&time);
        /*
         * mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle
         * calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more
         */
        if (ec)
                time ^= ec->data;
        /*
         * we fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many
         * bits of the time stamp are included as possible
         */
        for (i = 0; (DATA_SIZE_BITS / bits) > i; i++) {
                shuffle ^= time & mask;
                time = time >> bits;
        }

        /*
         * We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum
         * RNG loop count.
         */
        return (shuffle + (1<<min));
}

/***************************************************************************
 * Noise sources
 ***************************************************************************/

/*
 * The disabling of the optimizations is performed as documented and assessed
 * thoroughly in http://www.chronox.de/jent.html. However, instead of disabling
 * the optimization of the entire C file, only the main functions the jitter is
 * measured for are not optimized. These functions include the noise sources as
 * well as the main functions triggering the noise sources. As the time
 * measurement is done from one invocation of the jitter noise source to the
 * next, even the execution jitter of the code invoking the noise sources
 * contribute to the overall randomness as well. The behavior of the RNG and the
 * statistical characteristics when only the mentioned functions are not
 * optimized is almost equal to the a completely non-optimized RNG compilation
 * as tested with the test tools provided at the initially mentioned web site.
 */

/**
 * CPU Jitter noise source -- this is the noise source based on the CPU
 *                            execution time jitter
 *
 * This function folds the time into one bit units by iterating
 * through the DATA_SIZE_BITS bit time value as follows: assume our time value
 * is 0xabcd
 * 1st loop, 1st shift generates 0xd000
 * 1st loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000d
 * 2nd loop, 1st shift generates 0xcd00
 * 2nd loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000c
 * 3rd loop, 1st shift generates 0xbcd0
 * 3rd loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000b
 * 4th loop, 1st shift generates 0xabcd
 * 4th loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000a
 * Now, the values at the end of the 2nd shifts are XORed together.
 *
 * The code is deliberately inefficient and shall stay that way. This function
 * is the root cause why the code shall be compiled without optimization. This
 * function not only acts as folding operation, but this function's execution
 * is used to measure the CPU execution time jitter. Any change to the loop in
 * this function implies that careful retesting must be done.
 *
 * Input:
 * @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL
 * @time time stamp to be folded
 * @loop_cnt if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as number of
 *           loops to perform the folding
 *
 * Output:
 * @folded result of folding operation
 *
 * @return Number of loops the folding operation is performed
 */
#pragma GCC push_options
#pragma GCC optimize ("-O0")
static __u64 jent_fold_time(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 time,
                            __u64 *folded, __u64 loop_cnt)
{
        unsigned int i;
        __u64 j = 0;
        __u64 new = 0;
#define MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 4
#define MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 0
        __u64 fold_loop_cnt =
                jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT, MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT);

        /*
         * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
         * needed during runtime
         */
        if (loop_cnt)
                fold_loop_cnt = loop_cnt;
        for (j = 0; j < fold_loop_cnt; j++) {
                new = 0;
                for (i = 1; (DATA_SIZE_BITS) >= i; i++) {
                        __u64 tmp = time << (DATA_SIZE_BITS - i);

                        tmp = tmp >> (DATA_SIZE_BITS - 1);
                        new ^= tmp;
                }
        }
        *folded = new;
        return fold_loop_cnt;
}
#pragma GCC pop_options

/**
 * Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in
 *                               memory access times
 *
 * This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing
 * variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be
 * added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1
 * caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing.
 *
 * The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is  usually
 * slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal
 * variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant
 * variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more
 * and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses.
 * L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However,
 * to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite
 * large which is usually not desirable.
 *
 * Input:
 * @ec Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if
 *     the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise
 *     source is disabled
 * @loop_cnt if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as number of
 *           loops to perform the folding
 *
 * @return Number of memory access operations
 */
#pragma GCC push_options
#pragma GCC optimize ("-O0")
static unsigned int jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 loop_cnt)
{
        unsigned char *tmpval = NULL;
        unsigned int wrap = 0;
        __u64 i = 0;
#define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7
#define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0
        __u64 acc_loop_cnt =
                jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT);

        if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem)
                return 0;
        wrap = ec->memblocksize * ec->memblocks;

        /*
         * testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
         * needed during runtime
         */
        if (loop_cnt)
                acc_loop_cnt = loop_cnt;

        for (i = 0; i < (ec->memaccessloops + acc_loop_cnt); i++) {
                tmpval = ec->mem + ec->memlocation;
                /*
                 * memory access: just add 1 to one byte,
                 * wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read
                 * from and write to memory location
                 */
                *tmpval = (*tmpval + 1) & 0xff;
                /*
                 * Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer
                 * with wrap around logic to ensure that every
                 * memory location is hit evenly
                 */
                ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation + ec->memblocksize - 1;
                ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation % wrap;
        }
        return i;
}
#pragma GCC pop_options

/***************************************************************************
 * Start of entropy processing logic
 ***************************************************************************/

/**
 * Stuck test by checking the:
 *      1st derivation of the jitter measurement (time delta)
 *      2nd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas)
 *      3rd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas)
 *
 * All values must always be non-zero.
 *
 * Input:
 * @ec Reference to entropy collector
 * @current_delta Jitter time delta
 *
 * @return
 *      0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit)
 *      1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit)
 */
static void jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 current_delta)
{
        __s64 delta2 = ec->last_delta - current_delta;
        __s64 delta3 = delta2 - ec->last_delta2;

        ec->last_delta = current_delta;
        ec->last_delta2 = delta2;

        if (!current_delta || !delta2 || !delta3)
                ec->stuck = 1;
}

/**
 * This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and
 * use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is folded into one
 * bit. You can call this function the "random bit generator" as it
 * produces one random bit per invocation.
 *
 * WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output
 *          of this function! This can be done by calling this function
 *          and not using its result.
 *
 * Input:
 * @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector
 *
 * @return One random bit
 */
#pragma GCC push_options
#pragma GCC optimize ("-O0")
static __u64 jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec)
{
        __u64 time = 0;
        __u64 data = 0;
        __u64 current_delta = 0;

        /* Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations */
        jent_memaccess(ec, 0);

        /*
         * Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous
         * invocation to measure the timing variations
         */
        jent_get_nstime(&time);
        current_delta = time - ec->prev_time;
        ec->prev_time = time;

        /* Now call the next noise sources which also folds the data */
        jent_fold_time(ec, current_delta, &data, 0);

        /*
         * Check whether we have a stuck measurement. The enforcement
         * is performed after the stuck value has been mixed into the
         * entropy pool.
         */
        jent_stuck(ec, current_delta);

        return data;
}
#pragma GCC pop_options

/**
 * Von Neuman unbias as explained in RFC 4086 section 4.2. As shown in the
 * documentation of that RNG, the bits from jent_measure_jitter are considered
 * independent which implies that the Von Neuman unbias operation is applicable.
 * A proof of the Von-Neumann unbias operation to remove skews is given in the
 * document "A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number
 * generators", version 2.0 by Werner Schindler, section 5.4.1.
 *
 * Input:
 * @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector
 *
 * @return One random bit
 */
static __u64 jent_unbiased_bit(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
{
        do {
                __u64 a = jent_measure_jitter(entropy_collector);
                __u64 b = jent_measure_jitter(entropy_collector);

                if (a == b)
                        continue;
                if (1 == a)
                        return 1;
                else
                        return 0;
        } while (1);
}

/**
 * Shuffle the pool a bit by mixing some value with a bijective function (XOR)
 * into the pool.
 *
 * The function generates a mixer value that depends on the bits set and the
 * location of the set bits in the random number generated by the entropy
 * source. Therefore, based on the generated random number, this mixer value
 * can have 2**64 different values. That mixer value is initialized with the
 * first two SHA-1 constants. After obtaining the mixer value, it is XORed into
 * the random number.
 *
 * The mixer value is not assumed to contain any entropy. But due to the XOR
 * operation, it can also not destroy any entropy present in the entropy pool.
 *
 * Input:
 * @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector
 */
static void jent_stir_pool(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
{
        /*
         * to shut up GCC on 32 bit, we have to initialize the 64 variable
         * with two 32 bit variables
         */
        union c {
                __u64 u64;
                __u32 u32[2];
        };
        /*
         * This constant is derived from the first two 32 bit initialization
         * vectors of SHA-1 as defined in FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1
         */
        union c constant;
        /*
         * The start value of the mixer variable is derived from the third
         * and fourth 32 bit initialization vector of SHA-1 as defined in
         * FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1
         */
        union c mixer;
        unsigned int i = 0;

        /*
         * Store the SHA-1 constants in reverse order to make up the 64 bit
         * value -- this applies to a little endian system, on a big endian
         * system, it reverses as expected. But this really does not matter
         * as we do not rely on the specific numbers. We just pick the SHA-1
         * constants as they have a good mix of bit set and unset.
         */
        constant.u32[1] = 0x67452301;
        constant.u32[0] = 0xefcdab89;
        mixer.u32[1] = 0x98badcfe;
        mixer.u32[0] = 0x10325476;

        for (i = 0; i < DATA_SIZE_BITS; i++) {
                /*
                 * get the i-th bit of the input random number and only XOR
                 * the constant into the mixer value when that bit is set
                 */
                if ((entropy_collector->data >> i) & 1)
                        mixer.u64 ^= constant.u64;
                mixer.u64 = rol64(mixer.u64, 1);
        }
        entropy_collector->data ^= mixer.u64;
}

/**
 * Generator of one 64 bit random number
 * Function fills rand_data->data
 *
 * Input:
 * @ec Reference to entropy collector
 */
#pragma GCC push_options
#pragma GCC optimize ("-O0")
static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec)
{
        unsigned int k = 0;

        /* priming of the ->prev_time value */
        jent_measure_jitter(ec);

        while (1) {
                __u64 data = 0;

                if (ec->disable_unbias == 1)
                        data = jent_measure_jitter(ec);
                else
                        data = jent_unbiased_bit(ec);

                /* enforcement of the jent_stuck test */
                if (ec->stuck) {
                        /*
                         * We only mix in the bit considered not appropriate
                         * without the LSFR. The reason is that if we apply
                         * the LSFR and we do not rotate, the 2nd bit with LSFR
                         * will cancel out the first LSFR application on the
                         * bad bit.
                         *
                         * And we do not rotate as we apply the next bit to the
                         * current bit location again.
                         */
                        ec->data ^= data;
                        ec->stuck = 0;
                        continue;
                }

                /*
                 * Fibonacci LSFR with polynom of
                 *  x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is
                 *  primitive according to
                 *   http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf
                 * (the shift values are the polynom values minus one
                 * due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current
                 * position is always the LSB, the polynom only needs
                 * to shift data in from the left without wrap.
                 */
                ec->data ^= data;
                ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 63) & 1);
                ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 60) & 1);
                ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 55) & 1);
                ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 30) & 1);
                ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 27) & 1);
                ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 22) & 1);
                ec->data = rol64(ec->data, 1);

                /*
                 * We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the
                 * oversampling rate requested by the caller
                 */
                if (++k >= (DATA_SIZE_BITS * ec->osr))
                        break;
        }
        if (ec->stir)
                jent_stir_pool(ec);
}
#pragma GCC pop_options

/**
 * The continuous test required by FIPS 140-2 -- the function automatically
 * primes the test if needed.
 *
 * Return:
 * 0 if FIPS test passed
 * < 0 if FIPS test failed
 */
static void jent_fips_test(struct rand_data *ec)
{
        if (!fips_enabled)
                return;

        /* prime the FIPS test */
        if (!ec->old_data) {
                ec->old_data = ec->data;
                jent_gen_entropy(ec);
        }

        if (ec->data == ec->old_data)
                panic(DRIVER_NAME ": Duplicate output detected\n");

        ec->old_data = ec->data;
}


/**
 * Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller.
 *
 * This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate
 * as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic
 * creates 64 bit per invocation.
 *
 * This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact
 * size specified by the caller.
 *
 * Input:
 * @ec Reference to entropy collector
 * @data pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already
 *       exist
 * @len size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random
 *      in bytes
 *
 * @return 0 when request is fulfilled or an error
 *
 * The following error codes can occur:
 *      -1      entropy_collector is NULL
 */
static ssize_t jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, u8 *data, size_t len)
{
        u8 *p = data;

        if (!ec)
                return -EINVAL;

        while (0 < len) {
                size_t tocopy;

                jent_gen_entropy(ec);
                jent_fips_test(ec);
                if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8) < len)
                        tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8);
                else
                        tocopy = len;
                memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy);

                len -= tocopy;
                p += tocopy;
        }

        return 0;
}

/***************************************************************************
 * Initialization logic
 ***************************************************************************/

static struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr,
                                                      unsigned int flags)
{
        struct rand_data *entropy_collector;

        entropy_collector = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!entropy_collector)
                return NULL;

        if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) {
                /* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory
                 * access
                 */
                entropy_collector->mem = kzalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
                if (!entropy_collector->mem) {
                        kfree(entropy_collector);
                        return NULL;
                }
                entropy_collector->memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE;
                entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS;
                entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS;
        }

        /* verify and set the oversampling rate */
        if (0 == osr)
                osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */
        entropy_collector->osr = osr;

        entropy_collector->stir = 1;
        if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_STIR)
                entropy_collector->stir = 0;
        if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_UNBIAS)
                entropy_collector->disable_unbias = 1;

        /* fill the data pad with non-zero values */
        jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector);

        return entropy_collector;
}

static void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
{
        if (entropy_collector->mem)
                kzfree(entropy_collector->mem);
        entropy_collector->mem = NULL;
        if (entropy_collector)
                kzfree(entropy_collector);
        entropy_collector = NULL;
}

static int jent_entropy_init(void)
{
        int i;
        __u64 delta_sum = 0;
        __u64 old_delta = 0;
        int time_backwards = 0;
        int count_var = 0;
        int count_mod = 0;

        /* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is
         * that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These
         * loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce
         * false positives.
         *
         * Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic
         * jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But
         * the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely
         * used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus,
         * no statistical tests.
         */

        /*
         * We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or
         * check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the
         * following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution
         * timer.
         */
        /*
         * TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is
         * definitely too little.
         */
#define TESTLOOPCOUNT 300
#define CLEARCACHE 100
        for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) {
                __u64 time = 0;
                __u64 time2 = 0;
                __u64 folded = 0;
                __u64 delta = 0;
                unsigned int lowdelta = 0;

                jent_get_nstime(&time);
                jent_fold_time(NULL, time, &folded, 1<<MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT);
                jent_get_nstime(&time2);

                /* test whether timer works */
                if (!time || !time2)
                        return JENT_ENOTIME;
                delta = time2 - time;
                /*
                 * test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide
                 * delta even when called shortly after each other -- this
                 * implies that we also have a high resolution timer
                 */
                if (!delta)
                        return JENT_ECOARSETIME;

                /*
                 * up to here we did not modify any variable that will be
                 * evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we
                 * already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction,
                 * etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case
                 * measurements.
                 */
                if (CLEARCACHE > i)
                        continue;

                /* test whether we have an increasing timer */
                if (!(time2 > time))
                        time_backwards++;

                /*
                 * Avoid modulo of 64 bit integer to allow code to compile
                 * on 32 bit architectures.
                 */
                lowdelta = time2 - time;
                if (!(lowdelta % 100))
                        count_mod++;

                /*
                 * ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary
                 * for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check
                 * only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime
                 * the old_data value
                 */
                if (i) {
                        if (delta != old_delta)
                                count_var++;
                        if (delta > old_delta)
                                delta_sum += (delta - old_delta);
                        else
                                delta_sum += (old_delta - delta);
                }
                old_delta = delta;
        }

        /*
         * we allow up to three times the time running backwards.
         * CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus,
         * if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it
         * should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being
         * performed during our test run.
         */
        if (3 < time_backwards)
                return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC;
        /* Error if the time variances are always identical */
        if (!delta_sum)
                return JENT_EVARVAR;

        /*
         * Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger
         * than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation
         * implied with 1 is preserved
         */
        if (delta_sum <= 1)
                return JENT_EMINVARVAR;

        /*
         * Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at
         * least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter
         * increments in multiples of 100, but not always
         */
        if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod)
                return JENT_ECOARSETIME;

        return 0;
}

/***************************************************************************
 * Kernel crypto API interface
 ***************************************************************************/

struct jitterentropy {
        spinlock_t jent_lock;
        struct rand_data *entropy_collector;
};

static int jent_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
        struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
        int ret = 0;

        rng->entropy_collector = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(1, 0);
        if (!rng->entropy_collector)
                ret = -ENOMEM;

        spin_lock_init(&rng->jent_lock);
        return ret;
}

static void jent_kcapi_cleanup(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
        struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);

        spin_lock(&rng->jent_lock);
        if (rng->entropy_collector)
                jent_entropy_collector_free(rng->entropy_collector);
        rng->entropy_collector = NULL;
        spin_unlock(&rng->jent_lock);
}

static int jent_kcapi_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
                             const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
                             u8 *rdata, unsigned int dlen)
{
        struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
        int ret = 0;

        spin_lock(&rng->jent_lock);
        ret = jent_read_entropy(rng->entropy_collector, rdata, dlen);
        spin_unlock(&rng->jent_lock);

        return ret;
}

static int jent_kcapi_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
                            const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
        return 0;
}

static struct rng_alg jent_alg = {
        .generate               = jent_kcapi_random,
        .seed                   = jent_kcapi_reset,
        .seedsize               = 0,
        .base                   = {
                .cra_name               = "jitterentropy_rng",
                .cra_driver_name        = "jitterentropy_rng",
                .cra_priority           = 100,
                .cra_ctxsize            = sizeof(struct jitterentropy),
                .cra_module             = THIS_MODULE,
                .cra_init               = jent_kcapi_init,
                .cra_exit               = jent_kcapi_cleanup,

        }
};

static int __init jent_mod_init(void)
{
        int ret = 0;

        ret = jent_entropy_init();
        if (ret) {
                pr_info(DRIVER_NAME ": Initialization failed with host not compliant with requirements: %d\n", ret);
                return -EFAULT;
        }
        return crypto_register_rng(&jent_alg);
}

static void __exit jent_mod_exit(void)
{
        crypto_unregister_rng(&jent_alg);
}

module_init(jent_mod_init);
module_exit(jent_mod_exit);

MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Non-physical True Random Number Generator based on CPU Jitter");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("jitterentropy_rng");