1 /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support
2 * Handles all system-call specific auditing features.
4 * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina.
5 * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
6 * Copyright (C) 2005, 2006 IBM Corporation
9 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
10 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
11 * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
12 * (at your option) any later version.
14 * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
15 * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
16 * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
17 * GNU General Public License for more details.
19 * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
20 * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
21 * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA
23 * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com>
25 * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie,
26 * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname.
28 * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in
29 * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by
30 * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG.
32 * POSIX message queue support added by George Wilson <ltcgcw@us.ibm.com>,
35 * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was
36 * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005.
38 * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional
39 * filesystem information.
41 * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com>
42 * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance.
45 #include <linux/init.h>
46 #include <asm/types.h>
47 #include <linux/atomic.h>
49 #include <linux/namei.h>
51 #include <linux/export.h>
52 #include <linux/slab.h>
53 #include <linux/mount.h>
54 #include <linux/socket.h>
55 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
56 #include <linux/audit.h>
57 #include <linux/personality.h>
58 #include <linux/time.h>
59 #include <linux/netlink.h>
60 #include <linux/compiler.h>
61 #include <asm/unistd.h>
62 #include <linux/security.h>
63 #include <linux/list.h>
64 #include <linux/tty.h>
65 #include <linux/binfmts.h>
66 #include <linux/highmem.h>
67 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
68 #include <linux/capability.h>
69 #include <linux/fs_struct.h>
73 /* flags stating the success for a syscall */
74 #define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
75 #define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
76 #define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
78 /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context
79 * for saving names from getname(). If we get more names we will allocate
80 * a name dynamically and also add those to the list anchored by names_list. */
83 /* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
84 #define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
86 /* no execve audit message should be longer than this (userspace limits) */
87 #define MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN 7500
89 /* number of audit rules */
92 /* determines whether we collect data for signals sent */
95 struct audit_cap_data
{
96 kernel_cap_t permitted
;
97 kernel_cap_t inheritable
;
99 unsigned int fE
; /* effective bit of a file capability */
100 kernel_cap_t effective
; /* effective set of a process */
104 /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and
105 * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved
106 * pointers at syscall exit time).
108 * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */
110 struct list_head list
; /* audit_context->names_list */
119 struct audit_cap_data fcap
;
120 unsigned int fcap_ver
;
121 int name_len
; /* number of name's characters to log */
122 bool name_put
; /* call __putname() for this name */
124 * This was an allocated audit_names and not from the array of
125 * names allocated in the task audit context. Thus this name
126 * should be freed on syscall exit
131 struct audit_aux_data
{
132 struct audit_aux_data
*next
;
136 #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0
138 /* Number of target pids per aux struct. */
139 #define AUDIT_AUX_PIDS 16
141 struct audit_aux_data_execve
{
142 struct audit_aux_data d
;
145 struct mm_struct
*mm
;
148 struct audit_aux_data_pids
{
149 struct audit_aux_data d
;
150 pid_t target_pid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
151 uid_t target_auid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
152 uid_t target_uid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
153 unsigned int target_sessionid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
154 u32 target_sid
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
];
155 char target_comm
[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
][TASK_COMM_LEN
];
159 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
{
160 struct audit_aux_data d
;
161 struct audit_cap_data fcap
;
162 unsigned int fcap_ver
;
163 struct audit_cap_data old_pcap
;
164 struct audit_cap_data new_pcap
;
167 struct audit_aux_data_capset
{
168 struct audit_aux_data d
;
170 struct audit_cap_data cap
;
173 struct audit_tree_refs
{
174 struct audit_tree_refs
*next
;
175 struct audit_chunk
*c
[31];
178 /* The per-task audit context. */
179 struct audit_context
{
180 int dummy
; /* must be the first element */
181 int in_syscall
; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */
182 enum audit_state state
, current_state
;
183 unsigned int serial
; /* serial number for record */
184 int major
; /* syscall number */
185 struct timespec ctime
; /* time of syscall entry */
186 unsigned long argv
[4]; /* syscall arguments */
187 long return_code
;/* syscall return code */
189 int return_valid
; /* return code is valid */
191 * The names_list is the list of all audit_names collected during this
192 * syscall. The first AUDIT_NAMES entries in the names_list will
193 * actually be from the preallocated_names array for performance
194 * reasons. Except during allocation they should never be referenced
195 * through the preallocated_names array and should only be found/used
196 * by running the names_list.
198 struct audit_names preallocated_names
[AUDIT_NAMES
];
199 int name_count
; /* total records in names_list */
200 struct list_head names_list
; /* anchor for struct audit_names->list */
201 char * filterkey
; /* key for rule that triggered record */
203 struct audit_context
*previous
; /* For nested syscalls */
204 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
205 struct audit_aux_data
*aux_pids
;
206 struct sockaddr_storage
*sockaddr
;
208 /* Save things to print about task_struct */
210 uid_t uid
, euid
, suid
, fsuid
;
211 gid_t gid
, egid
, sgid
, fsgid
;
212 unsigned long personality
;
218 unsigned int target_sessionid
;
220 char target_comm
[TASK_COMM_LEN
];
222 struct audit_tree_refs
*trees
, *first_trees
;
223 struct list_head killed_trees
;
241 unsigned long qbytes
;
245 struct mq_attr mqstat
;
254 unsigned int msg_prio
;
255 struct timespec abs_timeout
;
264 struct audit_cap_data cap
;
279 static inline int open_arg(int flags
, int mask
)
281 int n
= ACC_MODE(flags
);
282 if (flags
& (O_TRUNC
| O_CREAT
))
283 n
|= AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
;
287 static int audit_match_perm(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int mask
)
294 switch (audit_classify_syscall(ctx
->arch
, n
)) {
296 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
297 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE
, n
))
299 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
300 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ
, n
))
302 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
303 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR
, n
))
306 case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */
307 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) &&
308 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_WRITE_32
, n
))
310 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_READ
) &&
311 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_READ_32
, n
))
313 if ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_ATTR
) &&
314 audit_match_class(AUDIT_CLASS_CHATTR_32
, n
))
318 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[1]);
320 return mask
& ACC_MODE(ctx
->argv
[2]);
321 case 4: /* socketcall */
322 return ((mask
& AUDIT_PERM_WRITE
) && ctx
->argv
[0] == SYS_BIND
);
324 return mask
& AUDIT_PERM_EXEC
;
330 static int audit_match_filetype(struct audit_context
*ctx
, int val
)
332 struct audit_names
*n
;
333 umode_t mode
= (umode_t
)val
;
338 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
339 if ((n
->ino
!= -1) &&
340 ((n
->mode
& S_IFMT
) == mode
))
348 * We keep a linked list of fixed-sized (31 pointer) arrays of audit_chunk *;
349 * ->first_trees points to its beginning, ->trees - to the current end of data.
350 * ->tree_count is the number of free entries in array pointed to by ->trees.
351 * Original condition is (NULL, NULL, 0); as soon as it grows we never revert to NULL,
352 * "empty" becomes (p, p, 31) afterwards. We don't shrink the list (and seriously,
353 * it's going to remain 1-element for almost any setup) until we free context itself.
354 * References in it _are_ dropped - at the same time we free/drop aux stuff.
357 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
358 static void audit_set_auditable(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
362 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
366 static int put_tree_ref(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_chunk
*chunk
)
368 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
369 int left
= ctx
->tree_count
;
371 p
->c
[--left
] = chunk
;
372 ctx
->tree_count
= left
;
381 ctx
->tree_count
= 30;
387 static int grow_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
389 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
= ctx
->trees
;
390 ctx
->trees
= kzalloc(sizeof(struct audit_tree_refs
), GFP_KERNEL
);
396 p
->next
= ctx
->trees
;
398 ctx
->first_trees
= ctx
->trees
;
399 ctx
->tree_count
= 31;
404 static void unroll_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
405 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, int count
)
407 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
408 struct audit_tree_refs
*q
;
411 /* we started with empty chain */
412 p
= ctx
->first_trees
;
414 /* if the very first allocation has failed, nothing to do */
419 for (q
= p
; q
!= ctx
->trees
; q
= q
->next
, n
= 31) {
421 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
425 while (n
-- > ctx
->tree_count
) {
426 audit_put_chunk(q
->c
[n
]);
430 ctx
->tree_count
= count
;
434 static void free_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
)
436 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
, *q
;
437 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
; p
= q
) {
443 static int match_tree_refs(struct audit_context
*ctx
, struct audit_tree
*tree
)
445 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
446 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
451 for (p
= ctx
->first_trees
; p
!= ctx
->trees
; p
= p
->next
) {
452 for (n
= 0; n
< 31; n
++)
453 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
458 for (n
= ctx
->tree_count
; n
< 31; n
++)
459 if (audit_tree_match(p
->c
[n
], tree
))
466 /* Determine if any context name data matches a rule's watch data */
467 /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0
470 * If task_creation is true, this is an explicit indication that we are
471 * filtering a task rule at task creation time. This and tsk == current are
472 * the only situations where tsk->cred may be accessed without an rcu read lock.
474 static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
475 struct audit_krule
*rule
,
476 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
477 struct audit_names
*name
,
478 enum audit_state
*state
,
481 const struct cred
*cred
;
485 cred
= rcu_dereference_check(tsk
->cred
, tsk
== current
|| task_creation
);
487 for (i
= 0; i
< rule
->field_count
; i
++) {
488 struct audit_field
*f
= &rule
->fields
[i
];
489 struct audit_names
*n
;
494 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->pid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
499 ctx
->ppid
= sys_getppid();
500 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->ppid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
504 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
507 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->euid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
510 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->suid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
513 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->fsuid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
516 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->gid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
519 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->egid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
522 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->sgid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
525 result
= audit_comparator(cred
->fsgid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
528 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->personality
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
532 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->arch
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
536 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
)
537 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_code
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
540 if (ctx
&& ctx
->return_valid
) {
542 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_SUCCESS
);
544 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->return_valid
, f
->op
, AUDITSC_FAILURE
);
549 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
550 audit_comparator(MAJOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
553 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
554 if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
555 audit_comparator(MAJOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
564 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
565 audit_comparator(MINOR(name
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
))
568 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
569 if (audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->dev
), f
->op
, f
->val
) ||
570 audit_comparator(MINOR(n
->rdev
), f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
579 result
= (name
->ino
== f
->val
);
581 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
582 if (audit_comparator(n
->ino
, f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
591 result
= audit_comparator(name
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
593 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
594 if (audit_comparator(n
->uid
, f
->op
, f
->val
)) {
603 result
= audit_watch_compare(rule
->watch
, name
->ino
, name
->dev
);
607 result
= match_tree_refs(ctx
, rule
->tree
);
612 result
= audit_comparator(tsk
->loginuid
, f
->op
, f
->val
);
614 case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER
:
615 case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE
:
616 case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE
:
619 /* NOTE: this may return negative values indicating
620 a temporary error. We simply treat this as a
621 match for now to avoid losing information that
622 may be wanted. An error message will also be
626 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &sid
);
629 result
= security_audit_rule_match(sid
, f
->type
,
638 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW
:
639 case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH
:
640 /* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
643 /* Find files that match */
645 result
= security_audit_rule_match(
646 name
->osid
, f
->type
, f
->op
,
649 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
650 if (security_audit_rule_match(n
->osid
, f
->type
,
658 /* Find ipc objects that match */
659 if (!ctx
|| ctx
->type
!= AUDIT_IPC
)
661 if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx
->ipc
.osid
,
672 result
= audit_comparator(ctx
->argv
[f
->type
-AUDIT_ARG0
], f
->op
, f
->val
);
674 case AUDIT_FILTERKEY
:
675 /* ignore this field for filtering */
679 result
= audit_match_perm(ctx
, f
->val
);
682 result
= audit_match_filetype(ctx
, f
->val
);
691 if (rule
->prio
<= ctx
->prio
)
693 if (rule
->filterkey
) {
694 kfree(ctx
->filterkey
);
695 ctx
->filterkey
= kstrdup(rule
->filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
697 ctx
->prio
= rule
->prio
;
699 switch (rule
->action
) {
700 case AUDIT_NEVER
: *state
= AUDIT_DISABLED
; break;
701 case AUDIT_ALWAYS
: *state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
; break;
706 /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is
707 * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task
708 * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid.
710 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_task(struct task_struct
*tsk
, char **key
)
712 struct audit_entry
*e
;
713 enum audit_state state
;
716 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK
], list
) {
717 if (audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, NULL
, NULL
,
719 if (state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
720 *key
= kstrdup(e
->rule
.filterkey
, GFP_ATOMIC
);
726 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
729 /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the
730 * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is
731 * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit
732 * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT).
734 static enum audit_state
audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
735 struct audit_context
*ctx
,
736 struct list_head
*list
)
738 struct audit_entry
*e
;
739 enum audit_state state
;
741 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
742 return AUDIT_DISABLED
;
745 if (!list_empty(list
)) {
746 int word
= AUDIT_WORD(ctx
->major
);
747 int bit
= AUDIT_BIT(ctx
->major
);
749 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
750 if ((e
->rule
.mask
[word
] & bit
) == bit
&&
751 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, NULL
,
754 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
760 return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
;
764 * Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
765 * Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
767 static int audit_filter_inode_name(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
768 struct audit_names
*n
,
769 struct audit_context
*ctx
) {
771 int h
= audit_hash_ino((u32
)n
->ino
);
772 struct list_head
*list
= &audit_inode_hash
[h
];
773 struct audit_entry
*e
;
774 enum audit_state state
;
776 word
= AUDIT_WORD(ctx
->major
);
777 bit
= AUDIT_BIT(ctx
->major
);
779 if (list_empty(list
))
782 list_for_each_entry_rcu(e
, list
, list
) {
783 if ((e
->rule
.mask
[word
] & bit
) == bit
&&
784 audit_filter_rules(tsk
, &e
->rule
, ctx
, n
, &state
, false)) {
785 ctx
->current_state
= state
;
793 /* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if any audit_names have been
794 * collected during syscall processing. We only check rules in sublists at hash
795 * buckets applicable to the inode numbers in audit_names.
796 * Regarding audit_state, same rules apply as for audit_filter_syscall().
798 void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct
*tsk
, struct audit_context
*ctx
)
800 struct audit_names
*n
;
802 if (audit_pid
&& tsk
->tgid
== audit_pid
)
807 list_for_each_entry(n
, &ctx
->names_list
, list
) {
808 if (audit_filter_inode_name(tsk
, n
, ctx
))
814 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_get_context(struct task_struct
*tsk
,
818 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
822 context
->return_valid
= return_valid
;
825 * we need to fix up the return code in the audit logs if the actual
826 * return codes are later going to be fixed up by the arch specific
829 * This is actually a test for:
830 * (rc == ERESTARTSYS ) || (rc == ERESTARTNOINTR) ||
831 * (rc == ERESTARTNOHAND) || (rc == ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK)
833 * but is faster than a bunch of ||
835 if (unlikely(return_code
<= -ERESTARTSYS
) &&
836 (return_code
>= -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK
) &&
837 (return_code
!= -ENOIOCTLCMD
))
838 context
->return_code
= -EINTR
;
840 context
->return_code
= return_code
;
842 if (context
->in_syscall
&& !context
->dummy
) {
843 audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT
]);
844 audit_filter_inodes(tsk
, context
);
847 tsk
->audit_context
= NULL
;
851 static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context
*context
)
853 struct audit_names
*n
, *next
;
856 if (context
->put_count
+ context
->ino_count
!= context
->name_count
) {
857 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d"
858 " name_count=%d put_count=%d"
859 " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n",
861 context
->serial
, context
->major
, context
->in_syscall
,
862 context
->name_count
, context
->put_count
,
864 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
865 printk(KERN_ERR
"names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i
,
866 n
->name
, n
->name
?: "(null)");
873 context
->put_count
= 0;
874 context
->ino_count
= 0;
877 list_for_each_entry_safe(n
, next
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
879 if (n
->name
&& n
->name_put
)
884 context
->name_count
= 0;
885 path_put(&context
->pwd
);
886 context
->pwd
.dentry
= NULL
;
887 context
->pwd
.mnt
= NULL
;
890 static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context
*context
)
892 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
894 while ((aux
= context
->aux
)) {
895 context
->aux
= aux
->next
;
898 while ((aux
= context
->aux_pids
)) {
899 context
->aux_pids
= aux
->next
;
904 static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context
*context
,
905 enum audit_state state
)
907 memset(context
, 0, sizeof(*context
));
908 context
->state
= state
;
909 context
->prio
= state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
912 static inline struct audit_context
*audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state
)
914 struct audit_context
*context
;
916 if (!(context
= kmalloc(sizeof(*context
), GFP_KERNEL
)))
918 audit_zero_context(context
, state
);
919 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->killed_trees
);
920 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context
->names_list
);
925 * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task
928 * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context
929 * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the
930 * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is
933 int audit_alloc(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
935 struct audit_context
*context
;
936 enum audit_state state
;
939 if (likely(!audit_ever_enabled
))
940 return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */
942 state
= audit_filter_task(tsk
, &key
);
943 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
)
946 if (!(context
= audit_alloc_context(state
))) {
948 audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc");
951 context
->filterkey
= key
;
953 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
954 set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk
, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT
);
958 static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context
*context
)
960 struct audit_context
*previous
;
964 previous
= context
->previous
;
965 if (previous
|| (count
&& count
< 10)) {
967 printk(KERN_ERR
"audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:"
968 " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n",
969 context
->serial
, context
->major
,
970 context
->name_count
, count
);
972 audit_free_names(context
);
973 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
974 free_tree_refs(context
);
975 audit_free_aux(context
);
976 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
977 kfree(context
->sockaddr
);
982 printk(KERN_ERR
"audit: freed %d contexts\n", count
);
985 void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer
*ab
)
992 security_task_getsecid(current
, &sid
);
996 error
= security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
);
998 if (error
!= -EINVAL
)
1003 audit_log_format(ab
, " subj=%s", ctx
);
1004 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1008 audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context");
1012 EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_task_context
);
1014 static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1016 char name
[sizeof(tsk
->comm
)];
1017 struct mm_struct
*mm
= tsk
->mm
;
1018 struct vm_area_struct
*vma
;
1020 /* tsk == current */
1022 get_task_comm(name
, tsk
);
1023 audit_log_format(ab
, " comm=");
1024 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, name
);
1027 down_read(&mm
->mmap_sem
);
1030 if ((vma
->vm_flags
& VM_EXECUTABLE
) &&
1032 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "exe=",
1033 &vma
->vm_file
->f_path
);
1038 up_read(&mm
->mmap_sem
);
1040 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
1043 static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context
*context
, pid_t pid
,
1044 uid_t auid
, uid_t uid
, unsigned int sessionid
,
1045 u32 sid
, char *comm
)
1047 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1052 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_OBJ_PID
);
1056 audit_log_format(ab
, "opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d", pid
, auid
,
1058 if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1059 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=(none)");
1062 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1063 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1065 audit_log_format(ab
, " ocomm=");
1066 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, comm
);
1073 * to_send and len_sent accounting are very loose estimates. We aren't
1074 * really worried about a hard cap to MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN so much as being
1075 * within about 500 bytes (next page boundary)
1077 * why snprintf? an int is up to 12 digits long. if we just assumed when
1078 * logging that a[%d]= was going to be 16 characters long we would be wasting
1079 * space in every audit message. In one 7500 byte message we can log up to
1080 * about 1000 min size arguments. That comes down to about 50% waste of space
1081 * if we didn't do the snprintf to find out how long arg_num_len was.
1083 static int audit_log_single_execve_arg(struct audit_context
*context
,
1084 struct audit_buffer
**ab
,
1087 const char __user
*p
,
1090 char arg_num_len_buf
[12];
1091 const char __user
*tmp_p
= p
;
1092 /* how many digits are in arg_num? 5 is the length of ' a=""' */
1093 size_t arg_num_len
= snprintf(arg_num_len_buf
, 12, "%d", arg_num
) + 5;
1094 size_t len
, len_left
, to_send
;
1095 size_t max_execve_audit_len
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1096 unsigned int i
, has_cntl
= 0, too_long
= 0;
1099 /* strnlen_user includes the null we don't want to send */
1100 len_left
= len
= strnlen_user(p
, MAX_ARG_STRLEN
) - 1;
1103 * We just created this mm, if we can't find the strings
1104 * we just copied into it something is _very_ wrong. Similar
1105 * for strings that are too long, we should not have created
1108 if (unlikely((len
== -1) || len
> MAX_ARG_STRLEN
- 1)) {
1110 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1114 /* walk the whole argument looking for non-ascii chars */
1116 if (len_left
> MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
)
1117 to_send
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
;
1120 ret
= copy_from_user(buf
, tmp_p
, to_send
);
1122 * There is no reason for this copy to be short. We just
1123 * copied them here, and the mm hasn't been exposed to user-
1128 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1131 buf
[to_send
] = '\0';
1132 has_cntl
= audit_string_contains_control(buf
, to_send
);
1135 * hex messages get logged as 2 bytes, so we can only
1136 * send half as much in each message
1138 max_execve_audit_len
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
/ 2;
1141 len_left
-= to_send
;
1143 } while (len_left
> 0);
1147 if (len
> max_execve_audit_len
)
1150 /* rewalk the argument actually logging the message */
1151 for (i
= 0; len_left
> 0; i
++) {
1154 if (len_left
> max_execve_audit_len
)
1155 to_send
= max_execve_audit_len
;
1159 /* do we have space left to send this argument in this ab? */
1160 room_left
= MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
- arg_num_len
- *len_sent
;
1162 room_left
-= (to_send
* 2);
1164 room_left
-= to_send
;
1165 if (room_left
< 0) {
1168 *ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EXECVE
);
1174 * first record needs to say how long the original string was
1175 * so we can be sure nothing was lost.
1177 if ((i
== 0) && (too_long
))
1178 audit_log_format(*ab
, " a%d_len=%zu", arg_num
,
1179 has_cntl
? 2*len
: len
);
1182 * normally arguments are small enough to fit and we already
1183 * filled buf above when we checked for control characters
1184 * so don't bother with another copy_from_user
1186 if (len
>= max_execve_audit_len
)
1187 ret
= copy_from_user(buf
, p
, to_send
);
1192 send_sig(SIGKILL
, current
, 0);
1195 buf
[to_send
] = '\0';
1197 /* actually log it */
1198 audit_log_format(*ab
, " a%d", arg_num
);
1200 audit_log_format(*ab
, "[%d]", i
);
1201 audit_log_format(*ab
, "=");
1203 audit_log_n_hex(*ab
, buf
, to_send
);
1205 audit_log_string(*ab
, buf
);
1208 len_left
-= to_send
;
1209 *len_sent
+= arg_num_len
;
1211 *len_sent
+= to_send
* 2;
1213 *len_sent
+= to_send
;
1215 /* include the null we didn't log */
1219 static void audit_log_execve_info(struct audit_context
*context
,
1220 struct audit_buffer
**ab
,
1221 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*axi
)
1224 size_t len
, len_sent
= 0;
1225 const char __user
*p
;
1228 if (axi
->mm
!= current
->mm
)
1229 return; /* execve failed, no additional info */
1231 p
= (const char __user
*)axi
->mm
->arg_start
;
1233 audit_log_format(*ab
, "argc=%d", axi
->argc
);
1236 * we need some kernel buffer to hold the userspace args. Just
1237 * allocate one big one rather than allocating one of the right size
1238 * for every single argument inside audit_log_single_execve_arg()
1239 * should be <8k allocation so should be pretty safe.
1241 buf
= kmalloc(MAX_EXECVE_AUDIT_LEN
+ 1, GFP_KERNEL
);
1243 audit_panic("out of memory for argv string\n");
1247 for (i
= 0; i
< axi
->argc
; i
++) {
1248 len
= audit_log_single_execve_arg(context
, ab
, i
,
1257 static void audit_log_cap(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *prefix
, kernel_cap_t
*cap
)
1261 audit_log_format(ab
, " %s=", prefix
);
1262 CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i
) {
1263 audit_log_format(ab
, "%08x", cap
->cap
[(_KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S
-1) - i
]);
1267 static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, struct audit_names
*name
)
1269 kernel_cap_t
*perm
= &name
->fcap
.permitted
;
1270 kernel_cap_t
*inh
= &name
->fcap
.inheritable
;
1273 if (!cap_isclear(*perm
)) {
1274 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_fp", perm
);
1277 if (!cap_isclear(*inh
)) {
1278 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_fi", inh
);
1283 audit_log_format(ab
, " cap_fe=%d cap_fver=%x", name
->fcap
.fE
, name
->fcap_ver
);
1286 static void show_special(struct audit_context
*context
, int *call_panic
)
1288 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1291 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, context
->type
);
1295 switch (context
->type
) {
1296 case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
: {
1297 int nargs
= context
->socketcall
.nargs
;
1298 audit_log_format(ab
, "nargs=%d", nargs
);
1299 for (i
= 0; i
< nargs
; i
++)
1300 audit_log_format(ab
, " a%d=%lx", i
,
1301 context
->socketcall
.args
[i
]);
1304 u32 osid
= context
->ipc
.osid
;
1306 audit_log_format(ab
, "ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1307 context
->ipc
.uid
, context
->ipc
.gid
, context
->ipc
.mode
);
1311 if (security_secid_to_secctx(osid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1312 audit_log_format(ab
, " osid=%u", osid
);
1315 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1316 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1319 if (context
->ipc
.has_perm
) {
1321 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
,
1322 AUDIT_IPC_SET_PERM
);
1323 audit_log_format(ab
,
1324 "qbytes=%lx ouid=%u ogid=%u mode=%#ho",
1325 context
->ipc
.qbytes
,
1326 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
,
1327 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
,
1328 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
);
1333 case AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
: {
1334 audit_log_format(ab
,
1335 "oflag=0x%x mode=%#ho mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld "
1336 "mq_msgsize=%ld mq_curmsgs=%ld",
1337 context
->mq_open
.oflag
, context
->mq_open
.mode
,
1338 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_flags
,
1339 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_maxmsg
,
1340 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_msgsize
,
1341 context
->mq_open
.attr
.mq_curmsgs
);
1343 case AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
: {
1344 audit_log_format(ab
,
1345 "mqdes=%d msg_len=%zd msg_prio=%u "
1346 "abs_timeout_sec=%ld abs_timeout_nsec=%ld",
1347 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
,
1348 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
,
1349 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
,
1350 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_sec
,
1351 context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
.tv_nsec
);
1353 case AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
: {
1354 audit_log_format(ab
, "mqdes=%d sigev_signo=%d",
1355 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
,
1356 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
);
1358 case AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
: {
1359 struct mq_attr
*attr
= &context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
;
1360 audit_log_format(ab
,
1361 "mqdes=%d mq_flags=0x%lx mq_maxmsg=%ld mq_msgsize=%ld "
1363 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
,
1364 attr
->mq_flags
, attr
->mq_maxmsg
,
1365 attr
->mq_msgsize
, attr
->mq_curmsgs
);
1367 case AUDIT_CAPSET
: {
1368 audit_log_format(ab
, "pid=%d", context
->capset
.pid
);
1369 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pi", &context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
);
1370 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pp", &context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
);
1371 audit_log_cap(ab
, "cap_pe", &context
->capset
.cap
.effective
);
1374 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd=%d flags=0x%x", context
->mmap
.fd
,
1375 context
->mmap
.flags
);
1381 static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context
*context
, struct audit_names
*n
,
1382 int record_num
, int *call_panic
)
1384 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1385 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_PATH
);
1387 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1389 audit_log_format(ab
, "item=%d", record_num
);
1392 switch (n
->name_len
) {
1393 case AUDIT_NAME_FULL
:
1394 /* log the full path */
1395 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1396 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
);
1399 /* name was specified as a relative path and the
1400 * directory component is the cwd */
1401 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "name=", &context
->pwd
);
1404 /* log the name's directory component */
1405 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=");
1406 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab
, n
->name
,
1410 audit_log_format(ab
, " name=(null)");
1412 if (n
->ino
!= (unsigned long)-1) {
1413 audit_log_format(ab
, " inode=%lu"
1414 " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#ho"
1415 " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x",
1428 if (security_secid_to_secctx(
1429 n
->osid
, &ctx
, &len
)) {
1430 audit_log_format(ab
, " osid=%u", n
->osid
);
1433 audit_log_format(ab
, " obj=%s", ctx
);
1434 security_release_secctx(ctx
, len
);
1438 audit_log_fcaps(ab
, n
);
1443 static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context
*context
, struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1445 const struct cred
*cred
;
1446 int i
, call_panic
= 0;
1447 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
1448 struct audit_aux_data
*aux
;
1450 struct audit_names
*n
;
1452 /* tsk == current */
1453 context
->pid
= tsk
->pid
;
1455 context
->ppid
= sys_getppid();
1456 cred
= current_cred();
1457 context
->uid
= cred
->uid
;
1458 context
->gid
= cred
->gid
;
1459 context
->euid
= cred
->euid
;
1460 context
->suid
= cred
->suid
;
1461 context
->fsuid
= cred
->fsuid
;
1462 context
->egid
= cred
->egid
;
1463 context
->sgid
= cred
->sgid
;
1464 context
->fsgid
= cred
->fsgid
;
1465 context
->personality
= tsk
->personality
;
1467 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SYSCALL
);
1469 return; /* audit_panic has been called */
1470 audit_log_format(ab
, "arch=%x syscall=%d",
1471 context
->arch
, context
->major
);
1472 if (context
->personality
!= PER_LINUX
)
1473 audit_log_format(ab
, " per=%lx", context
->personality
);
1474 if (context
->return_valid
)
1475 audit_log_format(ab
, " success=%s exit=%ld",
1476 (context
->return_valid
==AUDITSC_SUCCESS
)?"yes":"no",
1477 context
->return_code
);
1479 spin_lock_irq(&tsk
->sighand
->siglock
);
1480 if (tsk
->signal
&& tsk
->signal
->tty
&& tsk
->signal
->tty
->name
)
1481 tty
= tsk
->signal
->tty
->name
;
1484 spin_unlock_irq(&tsk
->sighand
->siglock
);
1486 audit_log_format(ab
,
1487 " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d"
1488 " ppid=%d pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u"
1489 " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u"
1490 " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s ses=%u",
1495 context
->name_count
,
1501 context
->euid
, context
->suid
, context
->fsuid
,
1502 context
->egid
, context
->sgid
, context
->fsgid
, tty
,
1506 audit_log_task_info(ab
, tsk
);
1507 audit_log_key(ab
, context
->filterkey
);
1510 for (aux
= context
->aux
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1512 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, aux
->type
);
1514 continue; /* audit_panic has been called */
1516 switch (aux
->type
) {
1518 case AUDIT_EXECVE
: {
1519 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*axi
= (void *)aux
;
1520 audit_log_execve_info(context
, &ab
, axi
);
1523 case AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
: {
1524 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1525 audit_log_format(ab
, "fver=%x", axs
->fcap_ver
);
1526 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fp", &axs
->fcap
.permitted
);
1527 audit_log_cap(ab
, "fi", &axs
->fcap
.inheritable
);
1528 audit_log_format(ab
, " fe=%d", axs
->fcap
.fE
);
1529 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pp", &axs
->old_pcap
.permitted
);
1530 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pi", &axs
->old_pcap
.inheritable
);
1531 audit_log_cap(ab
, "old_pe", &axs
->old_pcap
.effective
);
1532 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pp", &axs
->new_pcap
.permitted
);
1533 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pi", &axs
->new_pcap
.inheritable
);
1534 audit_log_cap(ab
, "new_pe", &axs
->new_pcap
.effective
);
1542 show_special(context
, &call_panic
);
1544 if (context
->fds
[0] >= 0) {
1545 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_FD_PAIR
);
1547 audit_log_format(ab
, "fd0=%d fd1=%d",
1548 context
->fds
[0], context
->fds
[1]);
1553 if (context
->sockaddr_len
) {
1554 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_SOCKADDR
);
1556 audit_log_format(ab
, "saddr=");
1557 audit_log_n_hex(ab
, (void *)context
->sockaddr
,
1558 context
->sockaddr_len
);
1563 for (aux
= context
->aux_pids
; aux
; aux
= aux
->next
) {
1564 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axs
= (void *)aux
;
1566 for (i
= 0; i
< axs
->pid_count
; i
++)
1567 if (audit_log_pid_context(context
, axs
->target_pid
[i
],
1568 axs
->target_auid
[i
],
1570 axs
->target_sessionid
[i
],
1572 axs
->target_comm
[i
]))
1576 if (context
->target_pid
&&
1577 audit_log_pid_context(context
, context
->target_pid
,
1578 context
->target_auid
, context
->target_uid
,
1579 context
->target_sessionid
,
1580 context
->target_sid
, context
->target_comm
))
1583 if (context
->pwd
.dentry
&& context
->pwd
.mnt
) {
1584 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_CWD
);
1586 audit_log_d_path(ab
, "cwd=", &context
->pwd
);
1592 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
)
1593 audit_log_name(context
, n
, i
++, &call_panic
);
1595 /* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */
1596 ab
= audit_log_start(context
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_EOE
);
1600 audit_panic("error converting sid to string");
1604 * audit_free - free a per-task audit context
1605 * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free
1607 * Called from copy_process and do_exit
1609 void __audit_free(struct task_struct
*tsk
)
1611 struct audit_context
*context
;
1613 context
= audit_get_context(tsk
, 0, 0);
1617 /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit
1618 * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block.
1619 * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this
1620 * in the context of the idle thread */
1621 /* that can happen only if we are called from do_exit() */
1622 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1623 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1624 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1625 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1627 audit_free_context(context
);
1631 * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry
1632 * @arch: architecture type
1633 * @major: major syscall type (function)
1634 * @a1: additional syscall register 1
1635 * @a2: additional syscall register 2
1636 * @a3: additional syscall register 3
1637 * @a4: additional syscall register 4
1639 * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the
1640 * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or
1641 * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the
1642 * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT,
1643 * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it
1644 * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it
1647 void __audit_syscall_entry(int arch
, int major
,
1648 unsigned long a1
, unsigned long a2
,
1649 unsigned long a3
, unsigned long a4
)
1651 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1652 struct audit_context
*context
= tsk
->audit_context
;
1653 enum audit_state state
;
1659 * This happens only on certain architectures that make system
1660 * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of
1661 * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new
1662 * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you
1663 * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.)
1667 * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S)
1669 * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner
1670 * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught.
1672 if (context
->in_syscall
) {
1673 struct audit_context
*newctx
;
1677 "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;"
1678 " entering syscall=%d\n",
1679 context
->serial
, tsk
->pid
, context
->major
, major
);
1681 newctx
= audit_alloc_context(context
->state
);
1683 newctx
->previous
= context
;
1685 tsk
->audit_context
= newctx
;
1687 /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we
1688 * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname
1689 * will be lost). The only other alternative is
1690 * to abandon auditing. */
1691 audit_zero_context(context
, context
->state
);
1694 BUG_ON(context
->in_syscall
|| context
->name_count
);
1699 context
->arch
= arch
;
1700 context
->major
= major
;
1701 context
->argv
[0] = a1
;
1702 context
->argv
[1] = a2
;
1703 context
->argv
[2] = a3
;
1704 context
->argv
[3] = a4
;
1706 state
= context
->state
;
1707 context
->dummy
= !audit_n_rules
;
1708 if (!context
->dummy
&& state
== AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT
) {
1710 state
= audit_filter_syscall(tsk
, context
, &audit_filter_list
[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY
]);
1712 if (state
== AUDIT_DISABLED
)
1715 context
->serial
= 0;
1716 context
->ctime
= CURRENT_TIME
;
1717 context
->in_syscall
= 1;
1718 context
->current_state
= state
;
1723 * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call
1724 * @pt_regs: syscall registers
1726 * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as
1727 * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from
1728 * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit
1729 * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases,
1730 * free the names stored from getname().
1732 void __audit_syscall_exit(int success
, long return_code
)
1734 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
1735 struct audit_context
*context
;
1738 success
= AUDITSC_SUCCESS
;
1740 success
= AUDITSC_FAILURE
;
1742 context
= audit_get_context(tsk
, success
, return_code
);
1746 if (context
->in_syscall
&& context
->current_state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
)
1747 audit_log_exit(context
, tsk
);
1749 context
->in_syscall
= 0;
1750 context
->prio
= context
->state
== AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
? ~0ULL : 0;
1752 if (!list_empty(&context
->killed_trees
))
1753 audit_kill_trees(&context
->killed_trees
);
1755 if (context
->previous
) {
1756 struct audit_context
*new_context
= context
->previous
;
1757 context
->previous
= NULL
;
1758 audit_free_context(context
);
1759 tsk
->audit_context
= new_context
;
1761 audit_free_names(context
);
1762 unroll_tree_refs(context
, NULL
, 0);
1763 audit_free_aux(context
);
1764 context
->aux
= NULL
;
1765 context
->aux_pids
= NULL
;
1766 context
->target_pid
= 0;
1767 context
->target_sid
= 0;
1768 context
->sockaddr_len
= 0;
1770 context
->fds
[0] = -1;
1771 if (context
->state
!= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
) {
1772 kfree(context
->filterkey
);
1773 context
->filterkey
= NULL
;
1775 tsk
->audit_context
= context
;
1779 static inline void handle_one(const struct inode
*inode
)
1781 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1782 struct audit_context
*context
;
1783 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1784 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1786 if (likely(hlist_empty(&inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
)))
1788 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1790 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1792 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1796 if (likely(put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
)))
1798 if (unlikely(!grow_tree_refs(context
))) {
1799 printk(KERN_WARNING
"out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1800 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1801 audit_put_chunk(chunk
);
1802 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1805 put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
);
1809 static void handle_path(const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1811 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE
1812 struct audit_context
*context
;
1813 struct audit_tree_refs
*p
;
1814 const struct dentry
*d
, *parent
;
1815 struct audit_chunk
*drop
;
1819 context
= current
->audit_context
;
1821 count
= context
->tree_count
;
1826 seq
= read_seqbegin(&rename_lock
);
1828 struct inode
*inode
= d
->d_inode
;
1829 if (inode
&& unlikely(!hlist_empty(&inode
->i_fsnotify_marks
))) {
1830 struct audit_chunk
*chunk
;
1831 chunk
= audit_tree_lookup(inode
);
1833 if (unlikely(!put_tree_ref(context
, chunk
))) {
1839 parent
= d
->d_parent
;
1844 if (unlikely(read_seqretry(&rename_lock
, seq
) || drop
)) { /* in this order */
1847 /* just a race with rename */
1848 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1851 audit_put_chunk(drop
);
1852 if (grow_tree_refs(context
)) {
1853 /* OK, got more space */
1854 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1859 "out of memory, audit has lost a tree reference\n");
1860 unroll_tree_refs(context
, p
, count
);
1861 audit_set_auditable(context
);
1868 static struct audit_names
*audit_alloc_name(struct audit_context
*context
)
1870 struct audit_names
*aname
;
1872 if (context
->name_count
< AUDIT_NAMES
) {
1873 aname
= &context
->preallocated_names
[context
->name_count
];
1874 memset(aname
, 0, sizeof(*aname
));
1876 aname
= kzalloc(sizeof(*aname
), GFP_NOFS
);
1879 aname
->should_free
= true;
1882 aname
->ino
= (unsigned long)-1;
1883 list_add_tail(&aname
->list
, &context
->names_list
);
1885 context
->name_count
++;
1887 context
->ino_count
++;
1893 * audit_getname - add a name to the list
1894 * @name: name to add
1896 * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context.
1897 * Called from fs/namei.c:getname().
1899 void __audit_getname(const char *name
)
1901 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1902 struct audit_names
*n
;
1904 if (IS_ERR(name
) || !name
)
1907 if (!context
->in_syscall
) {
1908 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1909 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n",
1910 __FILE__
, __LINE__
, context
->serial
, name
);
1916 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
1921 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
1924 if (!context
->pwd
.dentry
)
1925 get_fs_pwd(current
->fs
, &context
->pwd
);
1928 /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request
1929 * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname
1931 * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context,
1932 * then we delay the putname until syscall exit.
1933 * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname().
1935 void audit_putname(const char *name
)
1937 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
1940 if (!context
->in_syscall
) {
1941 #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2
1942 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n",
1943 __FILE__
, __LINE__
, context
->serial
, name
);
1944 if (context
->name_count
) {
1945 struct audit_names
*n
;
1948 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
)
1949 printk(KERN_ERR
"name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i
,
1950 n
->name
, n
->name
?: "(null)");
1957 ++context
->put_count
;
1958 if (context
->put_count
> context
->name_count
) {
1959 printk(KERN_ERR
"%s:%d(:%d): major=%d"
1960 " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d"
1963 context
->serial
, context
->major
,
1964 context
->in_syscall
, name
, context
->name_count
,
1965 context
->put_count
);
1972 static inline int audit_copy_fcaps(struct audit_names
*name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
)
1974 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data caps
;
1980 rc
= get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry
, &caps
);
1984 name
->fcap
.permitted
= caps
.permitted
;
1985 name
->fcap
.inheritable
= caps
.inheritable
;
1986 name
->fcap
.fE
= !!(caps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
1987 name
->fcap_ver
= (caps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
1993 /* Copy inode data into an audit_names. */
1994 static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names
*name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
,
1995 const struct inode
*inode
)
1997 name
->ino
= inode
->i_ino
;
1998 name
->dev
= inode
->i_sb
->s_dev
;
1999 name
->mode
= inode
->i_mode
;
2000 name
->uid
= inode
->i_uid
;
2001 name
->gid
= inode
->i_gid
;
2002 name
->rdev
= inode
->i_rdev
;
2003 security_inode_getsecid(inode
, &name
->osid
);
2004 audit_copy_fcaps(name
, dentry
);
2008 * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup
2009 * @name: name being audited
2010 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2012 * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup().
2014 void __audit_inode(const char *name
, const struct dentry
*dentry
)
2016 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2017 const struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2018 struct audit_names
*n
;
2020 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
2023 list_for_each_entry_reverse(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2024 if (n
->name
&& (n
->name
== name
))
2028 /* unable to find the name from a previous getname() */
2029 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
2033 handle_path(dentry
);
2034 audit_copy_inode(n
, dentry
, inode
);
2038 * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects
2039 * @dentry: dentry being audited
2040 * @parent: inode of dentry parent
2042 * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode
2043 * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent.
2044 * This call updates the audit context with the child's information.
2045 * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after
2046 * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object
2047 * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during
2048 * unsuccessful attempts.
2050 void __audit_inode_child(const struct dentry
*dentry
,
2051 const struct inode
*parent
)
2053 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2054 const char *found_parent
= NULL
, *found_child
= NULL
;
2055 const struct inode
*inode
= dentry
->d_inode
;
2056 const char *dname
= dentry
->d_name
.name
;
2057 struct audit_names
*n
;
2060 if (!context
->in_syscall
)
2066 /* parent is more likely, look for it first */
2067 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2071 if (n
->ino
== parent
->i_ino
&&
2072 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
, &dirlen
)) {
2073 n
->name_len
= dirlen
; /* update parent data in place */
2074 found_parent
= n
->name
;
2079 /* no matching parent, look for matching child */
2080 list_for_each_entry(n
, &context
->names_list
, list
) {
2084 /* strcmp() is the more likely scenario */
2085 if (!strcmp(dname
, n
->name
) ||
2086 !audit_compare_dname_path(dname
, n
->name
, &dirlen
)) {
2088 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, inode
);
2090 n
->ino
= (unsigned long)-1;
2091 found_child
= n
->name
;
2097 if (!found_parent
) {
2098 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
2101 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, parent
);
2105 n
= audit_alloc_name(context
);
2109 /* Re-use the name belonging to the slot for a matching parent
2110 * directory. All names for this context are relinquished in
2111 * audit_free_names() */
2113 n
->name
= found_parent
;
2114 n
->name_len
= AUDIT_NAME_FULL
;
2115 /* don't call __putname() */
2116 n
->name_put
= false;
2120 audit_copy_inode(n
, NULL
, inode
);
2123 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child
);
2126 * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values
2127 * @ctx: audit_context for the task
2128 * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context
2129 * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context
2131 * Also sets the context as auditable.
2133 int auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context
*ctx
,
2134 struct timespec
*t
, unsigned int *serial
)
2136 if (!ctx
->in_syscall
)
2139 ctx
->serial
= audit_serial();
2140 t
->tv_sec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_sec
;
2141 t
->tv_nsec
= ctx
->ctime
.tv_nsec
;
2142 *serial
= ctx
->serial
;
2145 ctx
->current_state
= AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT
;
2150 /* global counter which is incremented every time something logs in */
2151 static atomic_t session_id
= ATOMIC_INIT(0);
2154 * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid
2155 * @task: task whose audit context is being modified
2156 * @loginuid: loginuid value
2160 * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write().
2162 int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct
*task
, uid_t loginuid
)
2164 unsigned int sessionid
= atomic_inc_return(&session_id
);
2165 struct audit_context
*context
= task
->audit_context
;
2167 if (context
&& context
->in_syscall
) {
2168 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2170 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_LOGIN
);
2172 audit_log_format(ab
, "login pid=%d uid=%u "
2173 "old auid=%u new auid=%u"
2174 " old ses=%u new ses=%u",
2175 task
->pid
, task_uid(task
),
2176 task
->loginuid
, loginuid
,
2177 task
->sessionid
, sessionid
);
2181 task
->sessionid
= sessionid
;
2182 task
->loginuid
= loginuid
;
2187 * __audit_mq_open - record audit data for a POSIX MQ open
2190 * @attr: queue attributes
2193 void __audit_mq_open(int oflag
, umode_t mode
, struct mq_attr
*attr
)
2195 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2198 memcpy(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, attr
, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2200 memset(&context
->mq_open
.attr
, 0, sizeof(struct mq_attr
));
2202 context
->mq_open
.oflag
= oflag
;
2203 context
->mq_open
.mode
= mode
;
2205 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_OPEN
;
2209 * __audit_mq_sendrecv - record audit data for a POSIX MQ timed send/receive
2210 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2211 * @msg_len: Message length
2212 * @msg_prio: Message priority
2213 * @abs_timeout: Message timeout in absolute time
2216 void __audit_mq_sendrecv(mqd_t mqdes
, size_t msg_len
, unsigned int msg_prio
,
2217 const struct timespec
*abs_timeout
)
2219 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2220 struct timespec
*p
= &context
->mq_sendrecv
.abs_timeout
;
2223 memcpy(p
, abs_timeout
, sizeof(struct timespec
));
2225 memset(p
, 0, sizeof(struct timespec
));
2227 context
->mq_sendrecv
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2228 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_len
= msg_len
;
2229 context
->mq_sendrecv
.msg_prio
= msg_prio
;
2231 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_SENDRECV
;
2235 * __audit_mq_notify - record audit data for a POSIX MQ notify
2236 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2237 * @notification: Notification event
2241 void __audit_mq_notify(mqd_t mqdes
, const struct sigevent
*notification
)
2243 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2246 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= notification
->sigev_signo
;
2248 context
->mq_notify
.sigev_signo
= 0;
2250 context
->mq_notify
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2251 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_NOTIFY
;
2255 * __audit_mq_getsetattr - record audit data for a POSIX MQ get/set attribute
2256 * @mqdes: MQ descriptor
2260 void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes
, struct mq_attr
*mqstat
)
2262 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2263 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqdes
= mqdes
;
2264 context
->mq_getsetattr
.mqstat
= *mqstat
;
2265 context
->type
= AUDIT_MQ_GETSETATTR
;
2269 * audit_ipc_obj - record audit data for ipc object
2270 * @ipcp: ipc permissions
2273 void __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm
*ipcp
)
2275 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2276 context
->ipc
.uid
= ipcp
->uid
;
2277 context
->ipc
.gid
= ipcp
->gid
;
2278 context
->ipc
.mode
= ipcp
->mode
;
2279 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 0;
2280 security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp
, &context
->ipc
.osid
);
2281 context
->type
= AUDIT_IPC
;
2285 * audit_ipc_set_perm - record audit data for new ipc permissions
2286 * @qbytes: msgq bytes
2287 * @uid: msgq user id
2288 * @gid: msgq group id
2289 * @mode: msgq mode (permissions)
2291 * Called only after audit_ipc_obj().
2293 void __audit_ipc_set_perm(unsigned long qbytes
, uid_t uid
, gid_t gid
, umode_t mode
)
2295 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2297 context
->ipc
.qbytes
= qbytes
;
2298 context
->ipc
.perm_uid
= uid
;
2299 context
->ipc
.perm_gid
= gid
;
2300 context
->ipc
.perm_mode
= mode
;
2301 context
->ipc
.has_perm
= 1;
2304 int __audit_bprm(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
)
2306 struct audit_aux_data_execve
*ax
;
2307 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2309 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2313 ax
->argc
= bprm
->argc
;
2314 ax
->envc
= bprm
->envc
;
2316 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_EXECVE
;
2317 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2318 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2324 * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall
2325 * @nargs: number of args
2329 void __audit_socketcall(int nargs
, unsigned long *args
)
2331 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2333 context
->type
= AUDIT_SOCKETCALL
;
2334 context
->socketcall
.nargs
= nargs
;
2335 memcpy(context
->socketcall
.args
, args
, nargs
* sizeof(unsigned long));
2339 * __audit_fd_pair - record audit data for pipe and socketpair
2340 * @fd1: the first file descriptor
2341 * @fd2: the second file descriptor
2344 void __audit_fd_pair(int fd1
, int fd2
)
2346 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2347 context
->fds
[0] = fd1
;
2348 context
->fds
[1] = fd2
;
2352 * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto
2353 * @len: data length in user space
2354 * @a: data address in kernel space
2356 * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error.
2358 int __audit_sockaddr(int len
, void *a
)
2360 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2362 if (!context
->sockaddr
) {
2363 void *p
= kmalloc(sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2366 context
->sockaddr
= p
;
2369 context
->sockaddr_len
= len
;
2370 memcpy(context
->sockaddr
, a
, len
);
2374 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct
*t
)
2376 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2378 context
->target_pid
= t
->pid
;
2379 context
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2380 context
->target_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2381 context
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2382 security_task_getsecid(t
, &context
->target_sid
);
2383 memcpy(context
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2387 * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem
2388 * @sig: signal value
2389 * @t: task being signaled
2391 * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid)
2392 * and uid that is doing that.
2394 int __audit_signal_info(int sig
, struct task_struct
*t
)
2396 struct audit_aux_data_pids
*axp
;
2397 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
2398 struct audit_context
*ctx
= tsk
->audit_context
;
2399 uid_t uid
= current_uid(), t_uid
= task_uid(t
);
2401 if (audit_pid
&& t
->tgid
== audit_pid
) {
2402 if (sig
== SIGTERM
|| sig
== SIGHUP
|| sig
== SIGUSR1
|| sig
== SIGUSR2
) {
2403 audit_sig_pid
= tsk
->pid
;
2404 if (tsk
->loginuid
!= -1)
2405 audit_sig_uid
= tsk
->loginuid
;
2407 audit_sig_uid
= uid
;
2408 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &audit_sig_sid
);
2410 if (!audit_signals
|| audit_dummy_context())
2414 /* optimize the common case by putting first signal recipient directly
2415 * in audit_context */
2416 if (!ctx
->target_pid
) {
2417 ctx
->target_pid
= t
->tgid
;
2418 ctx
->target_auid
= audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2419 ctx
->target_uid
= t_uid
;
2420 ctx
->target_sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2421 security_task_getsecid(t
, &ctx
->target_sid
);
2422 memcpy(ctx
->target_comm
, t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2426 axp
= (void *)ctx
->aux_pids
;
2427 if (!axp
|| axp
->pid_count
== AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
) {
2428 axp
= kzalloc(sizeof(*axp
), GFP_ATOMIC
);
2432 axp
->d
.type
= AUDIT_OBJ_PID
;
2433 axp
->d
.next
= ctx
->aux_pids
;
2434 ctx
->aux_pids
= (void *)axp
;
2436 BUG_ON(axp
->pid_count
>= AUDIT_AUX_PIDS
);
2438 axp
->target_pid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t
->tgid
;
2439 axp
->target_auid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_loginuid(t
);
2440 axp
->target_uid
[axp
->pid_count
] = t_uid
;
2441 axp
->target_sessionid
[axp
->pid_count
] = audit_get_sessionid(t
);
2442 security_task_getsecid(t
, &axp
->target_sid
[axp
->pid_count
]);
2443 memcpy(axp
->target_comm
[axp
->pid_count
], t
->comm
, TASK_COMM_LEN
);
2450 * __audit_log_bprm_fcaps - store information about a loading bprm and relevant fcaps
2451 * @bprm: pointer to the bprm being processed
2452 * @new: the proposed new credentials
2453 * @old: the old credentials
2455 * Simply check if the proc already has the caps given by the file and if not
2456 * store the priv escalation info for later auditing at the end of the syscall
2460 int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm
*bprm
,
2461 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2463 struct audit_aux_data_bprm_fcaps
*ax
;
2464 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2465 struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps
;
2466 struct dentry
*dentry
;
2468 ax
= kmalloc(sizeof(*ax
), GFP_KERNEL
);
2472 ax
->d
.type
= AUDIT_BPRM_FCAPS
;
2473 ax
->d
.next
= context
->aux
;
2474 context
->aux
= (void *)ax
;
2476 dentry
= dget(bprm
->file
->f_dentry
);
2477 get_vfs_caps_from_disk(dentry
, &vcaps
);
2480 ax
->fcap
.permitted
= vcaps
.permitted
;
2481 ax
->fcap
.inheritable
= vcaps
.inheritable
;
2482 ax
->fcap
.fE
= !!(vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE
);
2483 ax
->fcap_ver
= (vcaps
.magic_etc
& VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK
) >> VFS_CAP_REVISION_SHIFT
;
2485 ax
->old_pcap
.permitted
= old
->cap_permitted
;
2486 ax
->old_pcap
.inheritable
= old
->cap_inheritable
;
2487 ax
->old_pcap
.effective
= old
->cap_effective
;
2489 ax
->new_pcap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2490 ax
->new_pcap
.inheritable
= new->cap_inheritable
;
2491 ax
->new_pcap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2496 * __audit_log_capset - store information about the arguments to the capset syscall
2497 * @pid: target pid of the capset call
2498 * @new: the new credentials
2499 * @old: the old (current) credentials
2501 * Record the aguments userspace sent to sys_capset for later printing by the
2502 * audit system if applicable
2504 void __audit_log_capset(pid_t pid
,
2505 const struct cred
*new, const struct cred
*old
)
2507 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2508 context
->capset
.pid
= pid
;
2509 context
->capset
.cap
.effective
= new->cap_effective
;
2510 context
->capset
.cap
.inheritable
= new->cap_effective
;
2511 context
->capset
.cap
.permitted
= new->cap_permitted
;
2512 context
->type
= AUDIT_CAPSET
;
2515 void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd
, int flags
)
2517 struct audit_context
*context
= current
->audit_context
;
2518 context
->mmap
.fd
= fd
;
2519 context
->mmap
.flags
= flags
;
2520 context
->type
= AUDIT_MMAP
;
2523 static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *reason
, long signr
)
2527 unsigned int sessionid
;
2529 auid
= audit_get_loginuid(current
);
2530 sessionid
= audit_get_sessionid(current
);
2531 current_uid_gid(&uid
, &gid
);
2533 audit_log_format(ab
, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u ses=%u",
2534 auid
, uid
, gid
, sessionid
);
2535 audit_log_task_context(ab
);
2536 audit_log_format(ab
, " pid=%d comm=", current
->pid
);
2537 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, current
->comm
);
2538 audit_log_format(ab
, " reason=");
2539 audit_log_string(ab
, reason
);
2540 audit_log_format(ab
, " sig=%ld", signr
);
2543 * audit_core_dumps - record information about processes that end abnormally
2544 * @signr: signal value
2546 * If a process ends with a core dump, something fishy is going on and we
2547 * should record the event for investigation.
2549 void audit_core_dumps(long signr
)
2551 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2556 if (signr
== SIGQUIT
) /* don't care for those */
2559 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2560 audit_log_abend(ab
, "memory violation", signr
);
2564 void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall
)
2566 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
2568 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND
);
2569 audit_log_abend(ab
, "seccomp", SIGKILL
);
2570 audit_log_format(ab
, " syscall=%ld", syscall
);
2574 struct list_head
*audit_killed_trees(void)
2576 struct audit_context
*ctx
= current
->audit_context
;
2577 if (likely(!ctx
|| !ctx
->in_syscall
))
2579 return &ctx
->killed_trees
;