12398fde02e87e7c7eb0eba1430e72287c6bb6f8
[deliverable/linux.git] / net / mac80211 / wpa.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 */
9
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
18 #include <crypto/aes.h>
19
20 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
21 #include "michael.h"
22 #include "tkip.h"
23 #include "aes_ccm.h"
24 #include "aes_cmac.h"
25 #include "wpa.h"
26
27 ieee80211_tx_result
28 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
29 {
30 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
31 size_t data_len;
32 unsigned int hdrlen;
33 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
34 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
35 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
36 int tail;
37
38 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
39 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
40 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
41 return TX_CONTINUE;
42
43 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
44 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
45 return TX_DROP;
46
47 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
48 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
49
50 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
51 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
52 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
53 }
54
55 if (info->control.hw_key &&
56 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
57 tx->local->ops->set_frag_threshold) &&
58 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
59 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
60 return TX_CONTINUE;
61 }
62
63 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
64 if (!info->control.hw_key)
65 tail += IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
66
67 if (WARN(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
68 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
69 "mmic: not enough head/tail (%d/%d,%d/%d)\n",
70 skb_headroom(skb), IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN,
71 skb_tailroom(skb), tail))
72 return TX_DROP;
73
74 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
75 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
76 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
77 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
78 mic[0]++;
79
80 return TX_CONTINUE;
81 }
82
83
84 ieee80211_rx_result
85 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
86 {
87 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
88 size_t data_len;
89 unsigned int hdrlen;
90 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
91 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
92 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
93 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
94
95 /*
96 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
97 * than data frames.
98 */
99 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
100 return RX_CONTINUE;
101
102 /*
103 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
104 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
105 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
106 * MIC failure report.
107 */
108 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
109 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
110 goto mic_fail_no_key;
111
112 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
113 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
114 goto update_iv;
115
116 return RX_CONTINUE;
117 }
118
119 /*
120 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
121 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
122 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
123 */
124 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
125 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
126 return RX_CONTINUE;
127
128 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
129 /*
130 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
131 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
132 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
133 * frames in the BSS.
134 */
135 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
136 }
137
138 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
139 goto mic_fail;
140
141 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
142 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
143 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
144
145 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
146 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
147 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
148
149 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
150 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
151 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
152 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
153 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
154 goto mic_fail;
155
156 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
157 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
158
159 update_iv:
160 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
161 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
162 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
163
164 return RX_CONTINUE;
165
166 mic_fail:
167 rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
168
169 mic_fail_no_key:
170 /*
171 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
172 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
173 * the key is set.
174 */
175 mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
176 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
177 (void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
178 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
179 }
180
181
182 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
183 {
184 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
185 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
186 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
187 unsigned int hdrlen;
188 int len, tail;
189 u8 *pos;
190
191 if (info->control.hw_key &&
192 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
193 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
194 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
195 return 0;
196 }
197
198 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
199 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
200
201 if (info->control.hw_key)
202 tail = 0;
203 else
204 tail = IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN;
205
206 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
207 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN))
208 return -1;
209
210 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
211 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
212 pos += hdrlen;
213
214 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
215 if (info->control.hw_key &&
216 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
217 return 0;
218
219 /* Increase IV for the frame */
220 spin_lock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
221 key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
222 if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
223 key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
224 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
225 spin_unlock(&key->u.tkip.txlock);
226
227 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
228 if (info->control.hw_key)
229 return 0;
230
231 /* Add room for ICV */
232 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
233
234 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
235 key, skb, pos, len);
236 }
237
238
239 ieee80211_tx_result
240 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
241 {
242 struct sk_buff *skb;
243
244 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
245
246 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
247 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
248 return TX_DROP;
249 }
250
251 return TX_CONTINUE;
252 }
253
254
255 ieee80211_rx_result
256 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
257 {
258 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
259 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
260 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
261 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
262 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
263
264 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
265
266 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
267 return RX_CONTINUE;
268
269 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
270 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
271
272 /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
273 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
274 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
275 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
276
277 /*
278 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
279 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
280 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
281 */
282 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
283 hwaccel = 1;
284
285 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
286 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
287 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
288 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
289 &rx->tkip_iv32,
290 &rx->tkip_iv16);
291 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
292 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
293
294 /* Trim ICV */
295 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_TKIP_ICV_LEN);
296
297 /* Remove IV */
298 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
299 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_TKIP_IV_LEN);
300
301 return RX_CONTINUE;
302 }
303
304
305 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *b_0, u8 *aad)
306 {
307 __le16 mask_fc;
308 int a4_included, mgmt;
309 u8 qos_tid;
310 u16 len_a;
311 unsigned int hdrlen;
312 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
313
314 /*
315 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
316 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
317 */
318 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
319 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
320 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
321 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
322 if (!mgmt)
323 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
324 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
325
326 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
327 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
328 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
329
330 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
331 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
332 else
333 qos_tid = 0;
334
335 /* In CCM, the initial vectors (IV) used for CTR mode encryption and CBC
336 * mode authentication are not allowed to collide, yet both are derived
337 * from this vector b_0. We only set L := 1 here to indicate that the
338 * data size can be represented in (L+1) bytes. The CCM layer will take
339 * care of storing the data length in the top (L+1) bytes and setting
340 * and clearing the other bits as is required to derive the two IVs.
341 */
342 b_0[0] = 0x1;
343
344 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
345 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
346 */
347 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
348 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
349 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
350
351 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
352 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
353 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
354 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
355 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
356
357 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
358 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
359 aad[23] = 0;
360
361 if (a4_included) {
362 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
363 aad[30] = qos_tid;
364 aad[31] = 0;
365 } else {
366 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
367 aad[24] = qos_tid;
368 }
369 }
370
371
372 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
373 {
374 hdr[0] = pn[5];
375 hdr[1] = pn[4];
376 hdr[2] = 0;
377 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
378 hdr[4] = pn[3];
379 hdr[5] = pn[2];
380 hdr[6] = pn[1];
381 hdr[7] = pn[0];
382 }
383
384
385 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
386 {
387 pn[0] = hdr[7];
388 pn[1] = hdr[6];
389 pn[2] = hdr[5];
390 pn[3] = hdr[4];
391 pn[4] = hdr[1];
392 pn[5] = hdr[0];
393 }
394
395
396 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
397 {
398 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
399 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
400 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
401 int hdrlen, len, tail;
402 u8 *pos;
403 u8 pn[6];
404 u64 pn64;
405 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
406 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
407
408 if (info->control.hw_key &&
409 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
410 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE) &&
411 !((info->control.hw_key->flags &
412 IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV_MGMT) &&
413 ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))) {
414 /*
415 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
416 * header or MIC fields
417 */
418 return 0;
419 }
420
421 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
422 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
423
424 if (info->control.hw_key)
425 tail = 0;
426 else
427 tail = IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
428
429 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
430 skb_headroom(skb) < IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
431 return -1;
432
433 pos = skb_push(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
434 memmove(pos, pos + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
435
436 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
437 if (info->control.hw_key &&
438 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
439 return 0;
440
441 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
442 pos += hdrlen;
443
444 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
445
446 pn[5] = pn64;
447 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
448 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
449 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
450 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
451 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
452
453 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
454
455 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
456 if (info->control.hw_key)
457 return 0;
458
459 pos += IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN;
460 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
461 ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad, pos, len,
462 skb_put(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN));
463
464 return 0;
465 }
466
467
468 ieee80211_tx_result
469 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
470 {
471 struct sk_buff *skb;
472
473 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
474
475 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
476 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
477 return TX_DROP;
478 }
479
480 return TX_CONTINUE;
481 }
482
483
484 ieee80211_rx_result
485 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
486 {
487 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
488 int hdrlen;
489 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
490 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
491 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
492 u8 pn[IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN];
493 int data_len;
494 int queue;
495
496 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
497
498 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
499 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(skb))
500 return RX_CONTINUE;
501
502 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN -
503 IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN;
504 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
505 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
506
507 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
508 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN))
509 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
510 } else {
511 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
512 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
513 }
514
515 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
516
517 queue = rx->security_idx;
518
519 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
520 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
521 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
522 }
523
524 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
525 u8 aad[2 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
526 u8 b_0[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
527 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
528 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, b_0, aad);
529
530 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
531 key->u.ccmp.tfm, b_0, aad,
532 skb->data + hdrlen + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN,
533 data_len,
534 skb->data + skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
535 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
536 }
537
538 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, IEEE80211_CCMP_PN_LEN);
539
540 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
541 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - IEEE80211_CCMP_MIC_LEN))
542 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
543 memmove(skb->data + IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
544 skb_pull(skb, IEEE80211_CCMP_HDR_LEN);
545
546 return RX_CONTINUE;
547 }
548
549 static ieee80211_tx_result
550 ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx,
551 struct sk_buff *skb)
552 {
553 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
554 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
555 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
556 const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = key->sta->cipher_scheme;
557 int hdrlen;
558 u8 *pos;
559
560 if (info->control.hw_key &&
561 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
562 /* hwaccel has no need for preallocated head room */
563 return TX_CONTINUE;
564 }
565
566 if (unlikely(skb_headroom(skb) < cs->hdr_len &&
567 pskb_expand_head(skb, cs->hdr_len, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)))
568 return TX_DROP;
569
570 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
571
572 pos = skb_push(skb, cs->hdr_len);
573 memmove(pos, pos + cs->hdr_len, hdrlen);
574
575 return TX_CONTINUE;
576 }
577
578 static inline int ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(u8 *pn1, u8 *pn2, int len)
579 {
580 int i;
581
582 /* pn is little endian */
583 for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
584 if (pn1[i] < pn2[i])
585 return -1;
586 else if (pn1[i] > pn2[i])
587 return 1;
588 }
589
590 return 0;
591 }
592
593 static ieee80211_rx_result
594 ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
595 {
596 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
597 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
598 const struct ieee80211_cipher_scheme *cs = NULL;
599 int hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
600 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(rx->skb);
601 int data_len;
602 u8 *rx_pn;
603 u8 *skb_pn;
604 u8 qos_tid;
605
606 if (!rx->sta || !rx->sta->cipher_scheme ||
607 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
608 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
609
610 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
611 return RX_CONTINUE;
612
613 cs = rx->sta->cipher_scheme;
614
615 data_len = rx->skb->len - hdrlen - cs->hdr_len;
616
617 if (data_len < 0)
618 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
619
620 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
621 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) &
622 IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
623 else
624 qos_tid = 0;
625
626 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
627 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
628
629 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
630
631 rx_pn = key->u.gen.rx_pn[qos_tid];
632 skb_pn = rx->skb->data + hdrlen + cs->pn_off;
633
634 if (ieee80211_crypto_cs_pn_compare(skb_pn, rx_pn, cs->pn_len) <= 0)
635 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
636
637 memcpy(rx_pn, skb_pn, cs->pn_len);
638
639 /* remove security header and MIC */
640 if (pskb_trim(rx->skb, rx->skb->len - cs->mic_len))
641 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
642
643 memmove(rx->skb->data + cs->hdr_len, rx->skb->data, hdrlen);
644 skb_pull(rx->skb, cs->hdr_len);
645
646 return RX_CONTINUE;
647 }
648
649 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
650 {
651 __le16 mask_fc;
652 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
653
654 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
655
656 /* FC type/subtype */
657 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
658 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
659 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
660 IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
661 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
662 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
663 memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
664 }
665
666
667 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
668 {
669 *d++ = pn;
670 *d++ = pn >> 8;
671 *d++ = pn >> 16;
672 *d++ = pn >> 24;
673 *d++ = pn >> 32;
674 *d = pn >> 40;
675 }
676
677 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
678 {
679 *d++ = s[5];
680 *d++ = s[4];
681 *d++ = s[3];
682 *d++ = s[2];
683 *d++ = s[1];
684 *d = s[0];
685 }
686
687
688 ieee80211_tx_result
689 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
690 {
691 struct sk_buff *skb;
692 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
693 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
694 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
695 u8 aad[20];
696 u64 pn64;
697
698 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
699 return TX_DROP;
700
701 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
702
703 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
704
705 if (info->control.hw_key)
706 return TX_CONTINUE;
707
708 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
709 return TX_DROP;
710
711 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
712 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
713 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
714 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
715
716 /* PN = PN + 1 */
717 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
718
719 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
720
721 bip_aad(skb, aad);
722
723 /*
724 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
725 */
726 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
727 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
728
729 return TX_CONTINUE;
730 }
731
732
733 ieee80211_rx_result
734 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
735 {
736 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
737 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
738 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
739 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
740 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
741 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
742
743 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
744 return RX_CONTINUE;
745
746 /* management frames are already linear */
747
748 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
749 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
750
751 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
752 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
753 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
754 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
755 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
756
757 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
758
759 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
760 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
761 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
762 }
763
764 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
765 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
766 bip_aad(skb, aad);
767 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
768 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
769 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
770 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
771 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
772 }
773 }
774
775 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
776
777 /* Remove MMIE */
778 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
779
780 return RX_CONTINUE;
781 }
782
783 ieee80211_tx_result
784 ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
785 {
786 struct sk_buff *skb;
787 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
788 ieee80211_tx_result res;
789
790 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
791 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
792
793 /* handle hw-only algorithm */
794 if (!info->control.hw_key)
795 return TX_DROP;
796
797 if (tx->key->sta->cipher_scheme) {
798 res = ieee80211_crypto_cs_encrypt(tx, skb);
799 if (res != TX_CONTINUE)
800 return res;
801 }
802 }
803
804 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
805
806 return TX_CONTINUE;
807 }
808
809 ieee80211_rx_result
810 ieee80211_crypto_hw_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
811 {
812 if (rx->sta && rx->sta->cipher_scheme)
813 return ieee80211_crypto_cs_decrypt(rx);
814
815 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
816 }
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