Merge branch 'slab/next' into slab/for-linus
[deliverable/linux.git] / net / mac80211 / wpa.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 */
9
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
18 #include <crypto/aes.h>
19
20 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
21 #include "michael.h"
22 #include "tkip.h"
23 #include "aes_ccm.h"
24 #include "aes_cmac.h"
25 #include "wpa.h"
26
27 ieee80211_tx_result
28 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
29 {
30 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
31 size_t data_len;
32 unsigned int hdrlen;
33 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
34 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
35 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
36 int tail;
37
38 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
39 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
40 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
41 return TX_CONTINUE;
42
43 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
44 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
45 return TX_DROP;
46
47 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
48 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
49
50 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
51 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
52 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
53 }
54
55 if (info->control.hw_key &&
56 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
57 tx->local->ops->set_frag_threshold) &&
58 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
59 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
60 return TX_CONTINUE;
61 }
62
63 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
64 if (!info->control.hw_key)
65 tail += TKIP_ICV_LEN;
66
67 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
68 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
69 return TX_DROP;
70
71 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
72 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
73 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
74 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
75 mic[0]++;
76
77 return TX_CONTINUE;
78 }
79
80
81 ieee80211_rx_result
82 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
83 {
84 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
85 size_t data_len;
86 unsigned int hdrlen;
87 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
88 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
89 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
90 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
91
92 /*
93 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
94 * than data frames.
95 */
96 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
97 return RX_CONTINUE;
98
99 /*
100 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
101 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
102 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
103 * MIC failure report.
104 */
105 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
106 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
107 goto mic_fail;
108
109 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
110 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
111 goto update_iv;
112
113 return RX_CONTINUE;
114 }
115
116 /*
117 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
118 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
119 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
120 */
121 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
122 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
123 return RX_CONTINUE;
124
125 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
126 /*
127 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
128 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
129 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
130 * frames in the BSS. (
131 */
132 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
133 }
134
135 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
136 goto mic_fail;
137
138 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
139 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
140 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
141
142 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
143 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
144 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
145
146 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
147 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
148 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
149 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
150 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
151 goto mic_fail;
152
153 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
154 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
155
156 update_iv:
157 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
158 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
159 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
160
161 return RX_CONTINUE;
162
163 mic_fail:
164 /*
165 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
166 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
167 * the key is set.
168 */
169 mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
170 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
171 (void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
172 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
173 }
174
175
176 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
177 {
178 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
179 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
180 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
181 unsigned long flags;
182 unsigned int hdrlen;
183 int len, tail;
184 u8 *pos;
185
186 if (info->control.hw_key &&
187 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
188 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
189 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
190 return 0;
191 }
192
193 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
194 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
195
196 if (info->control.hw_key)
197 tail = 0;
198 else
199 tail = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
200
201 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
202 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
203 return -1;
204
205 pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
206 memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
207 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + TKIP_IV_LEN);
208 pos += hdrlen;
209
210 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
211 if (info->control.hw_key &&
212 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
213 return 0;
214
215 /* Increase IV for the frame */
216 spin_lock_irqsave(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
217 key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
218 if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
219 key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
220 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
221 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
222
223 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
224 if (info->control.hw_key)
225 return 0;
226
227 /* Add room for ICV */
228 skb_put(skb, TKIP_ICV_LEN);
229
230 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
231 key, skb, pos, len);
232 }
233
234
235 ieee80211_tx_result
236 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
237 {
238 struct sk_buff *skb;
239
240 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
241
242 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
243 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
244 return TX_DROP;
245 }
246
247 return TX_CONTINUE;
248 }
249
250
251 ieee80211_rx_result
252 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
253 {
254 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
255 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
256 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
257 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
258 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
259
260 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
261
262 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
263 return RX_CONTINUE;
264
265 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
266 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
267
268 /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
269 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
270 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
271 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
272
273 /*
274 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
275 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
276 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
277 */
278 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
279 hwaccel = 1;
280
281 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
282 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
283 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
284 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
285 &rx->tkip_iv32,
286 &rx->tkip_iv16);
287 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
288 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
289
290 /* Trim ICV */
291 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - TKIP_ICV_LEN);
292
293 /* Remove IV */
294 memmove(skb->data + TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
295 skb_pull(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
296
297 return RX_CONTINUE;
298 }
299
300
301 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
302 int encrypted)
303 {
304 __le16 mask_fc;
305 int a4_included, mgmt;
306 u8 qos_tid;
307 u8 *b_0, *aad;
308 u16 data_len, len_a;
309 unsigned int hdrlen;
310 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
311
312 memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
313
314 b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
315 aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
316
317 /*
318 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
319 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
320 */
321 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
322 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
323 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
324 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
325 if (!mgmt)
326 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
327 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
328
329 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
330 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
331 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
332
333 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
334 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
335 else
336 qos_tid = 0;
337
338 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN;
339 if (encrypted)
340 data_len -= CCMP_MIC_LEN;
341
342 /* First block, b_0 */
343 b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
344 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
345 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
346 */
347 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
348 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
349 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
350 /* l(m) */
351 put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
352
353 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
354 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
355 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
356 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
357 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
358
359 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
360 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
361 aad[23] = 0;
362
363 if (a4_included) {
364 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
365 aad[30] = qos_tid;
366 aad[31] = 0;
367 } else {
368 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
369 aad[24] = qos_tid;
370 }
371 }
372
373
374 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
375 {
376 hdr[0] = pn[5];
377 hdr[1] = pn[4];
378 hdr[2] = 0;
379 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
380 hdr[4] = pn[3];
381 hdr[5] = pn[2];
382 hdr[6] = pn[1];
383 hdr[7] = pn[0];
384 }
385
386
387 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
388 {
389 pn[0] = hdr[7];
390 pn[1] = hdr[6];
391 pn[2] = hdr[5];
392 pn[3] = hdr[4];
393 pn[4] = hdr[1];
394 pn[5] = hdr[0];
395 }
396
397
398 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
399 {
400 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
401 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
402 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
403 int hdrlen, len, tail;
404 u8 *pos;
405 u8 pn[6];
406 u64 pn64;
407 u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
408
409 if (info->control.hw_key &&
410 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
411 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
412 /*
413 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
414 * header or MIC fields
415 */
416 return 0;
417 }
418
419 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
420 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
421
422 if (info->control.hw_key)
423 tail = 0;
424 else
425 tail = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
426
427 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
428 skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN))
429 return -1;
430
431 pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
432 memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
433 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + CCMP_HDR_LEN);
434
435 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
436 if (info->control.hw_key &&
437 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
438 return 0;
439
440 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
441 pos += hdrlen;
442
443 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
444
445 pn[5] = pn64;
446 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
447 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
448 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
449 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
450 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
451
452 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
453
454 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
455 if (info->control.hw_key)
456 return 0;
457
458 pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN;
459 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
460 ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
461 pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN));
462
463 return 0;
464 }
465
466
467 ieee80211_tx_result
468 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
469 {
470 struct sk_buff *skb;
471
472 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
473
474 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
475 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
476 return TX_DROP;
477 }
478
479 return TX_CONTINUE;
480 }
481
482
483 ieee80211_rx_result
484 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
485 {
486 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
487 int hdrlen;
488 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
489 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
490 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
491 u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN];
492 int data_len;
493 int queue;
494
495 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
496
497 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
498 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr))
499 return RX_CONTINUE;
500
501 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN;
502 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
503 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
504
505 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
506 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
507 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
508 } else {
509 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
510 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
511 }
512
513 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
514
515 queue = rx->security_idx;
516
517 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
518 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
519 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
520 }
521
522 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
523 u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
524 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
525 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
526
527 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
528 key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
529 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
530 skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
531 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
532 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
533 }
534
535 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
536
537 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
538 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN))
539 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
540 memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
541 skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
542
543 return RX_CONTINUE;
544 }
545
546
547 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
548 {
549 __le16 mask_fc;
550 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
551
552 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
553
554 /* FC type/subtype */
555 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
556 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
557 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
558 IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
559 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
560 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
561 memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
562 }
563
564
565 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
566 {
567 *d++ = pn;
568 *d++ = pn >> 8;
569 *d++ = pn >> 16;
570 *d++ = pn >> 24;
571 *d++ = pn >> 32;
572 *d = pn >> 40;
573 }
574
575 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
576 {
577 *d++ = s[5];
578 *d++ = s[4];
579 *d++ = s[3];
580 *d++ = s[2];
581 *d++ = s[1];
582 *d = s[0];
583 }
584
585
586 ieee80211_tx_result
587 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
588 {
589 struct sk_buff *skb;
590 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
591 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
592 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
593 u8 aad[20];
594 u64 pn64;
595
596 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
597 return TX_DROP;
598
599 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
600
601 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
602
603 if (info->control.hw_key)
604 return TX_CONTINUE;
605
606 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
607 return TX_DROP;
608
609 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
610 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
611 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
612 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
613
614 /* PN = PN + 1 */
615 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
616
617 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
618
619 bip_aad(skb, aad);
620
621 /*
622 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
623 */
624 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
625 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
626
627 return TX_CONTINUE;
628 }
629
630
631 ieee80211_rx_result
632 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
633 {
634 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
635 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
636 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
637 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
638 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
639 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
640
641 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
642 return RX_CONTINUE;
643
644 /* management frames are already linear */
645
646 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
647 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
648
649 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
650 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
651 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
652 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
653 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
654
655 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
656
657 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
658 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
659 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
660 }
661
662 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
663 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
664 bip_aad(skb, aad);
665 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
666 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
667 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
668 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
669 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
670 }
671 }
672
673 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
674
675 /* Remove MMIE */
676 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
677
678 return RX_CONTINUE;
679 }
680
681 ieee80211_tx_result
682 ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
683 {
684 struct sk_buff *skb;
685 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
686
687 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
688 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
689
690 /* handle hw-only algorithm */
691 if (!info->control.hw_key)
692 return TX_DROP;
693 }
694
695 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
696
697 return TX_CONTINUE;
698 }
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