Merge tag 'pm-merge' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm/arm-soc
[deliverable/linux.git] / net / mac80211 / wpa.c
1 /*
2 * Copyright 2002-2004, Instant802 Networks, Inc.
3 * Copyright 2008, Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
4 *
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
7 * published by the Free Software Foundation.
8 */
9
10 #include <linux/netdevice.h>
11 #include <linux/types.h>
12 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
13 #include <linux/compiler.h>
14 #include <linux/ieee80211.h>
15 #include <linux/gfp.h>
16 #include <asm/unaligned.h>
17 #include <net/mac80211.h>
18 #include <crypto/aes.h>
19
20 #include "ieee80211_i.h"
21 #include "michael.h"
22 #include "tkip.h"
23 #include "aes_ccm.h"
24 #include "aes_cmac.h"
25 #include "wpa.h"
26
27 ieee80211_tx_result
28 ieee80211_tx_h_michael_mic_add(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
29 {
30 u8 *data, *key, *mic;
31 size_t data_len;
32 unsigned int hdrlen;
33 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr;
34 struct sk_buff *skb = tx->skb;
35 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
36 int tail;
37
38 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
39 if (!tx->key || tx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
40 skb->len < 24 || !ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
41 return TX_CONTINUE;
42
43 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
44 if (skb->len < hdrlen)
45 return TX_DROP;
46
47 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
48 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen;
49
50 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE)) {
51 /* Need to use software crypto for the test */
52 info->control.hw_key = NULL;
53 }
54
55 if (info->control.hw_key &&
56 (info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_CTL_DONTFRAG ||
57 tx->local->ops->set_frag_threshold) &&
58 !(tx->key->conf.flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_MMIC)) {
59 /* hwaccel - with no need for SW-generated MMIC */
60 return TX_CONTINUE;
61 }
62
63 tail = MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
64 if (!info->control.hw_key)
65 tail += TKIP_ICV_LEN;
66
67 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
68 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
69 return TX_DROP;
70
71 key = &tx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_TX_MIC_KEY];
72 mic = skb_put(skb, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
73 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
74 if (unlikely(info->flags & IEEE80211_TX_INTFL_TKIP_MIC_FAILURE))
75 mic[0]++;
76
77 return TX_CONTINUE;
78 }
79
80
81 ieee80211_rx_result
82 ieee80211_rx_h_michael_mic_verify(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
83 {
84 u8 *data, *key = NULL;
85 size_t data_len;
86 unsigned int hdrlen;
87 u8 mic[MICHAEL_MIC_LEN];
88 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
89 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
90 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
91
92 /*
93 * it makes no sense to check for MIC errors on anything other
94 * than data frames.
95 */
96 if (!ieee80211_is_data_present(hdr->frame_control))
97 return RX_CONTINUE;
98
99 /*
100 * No way to verify the MIC if the hardware stripped it or
101 * the IV with the key index. In this case we have solely rely
102 * on the driver to set RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR in the event of a
103 * MIC failure report.
104 */
105 if (status->flag & (RX_FLAG_MMIC_STRIPPED | RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED)) {
106 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
107 goto mic_fail_no_key;
108
109 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_IV_STRIPPED) && rx->key &&
110 rx->key->conf.cipher == WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP)
111 goto update_iv;
112
113 return RX_CONTINUE;
114 }
115
116 /*
117 * Some hardware seems to generate Michael MIC failure reports; even
118 * though, the frame was not encrypted with TKIP and therefore has no
119 * MIC. Ignore the flag them to avoid triggering countermeasures.
120 */
121 if (!rx->key || rx->key->conf.cipher != WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP ||
122 !(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED))
123 return RX_CONTINUE;
124
125 if (rx->sdata->vif.type == NL80211_IFTYPE_AP && rx->key->conf.keyidx) {
126 /*
127 * APs with pairwise keys should never receive Michael MIC
128 * errors for non-zero keyidx because these are reserved for
129 * group keys and only the AP is sending real multicast
130 * frames in the BSS. (
131 */
132 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
133 }
134
135 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_MMIC_ERROR)
136 goto mic_fail;
137
138 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
139 if (skb->len < hdrlen + MICHAEL_MIC_LEN)
140 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
141
142 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
143 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
144 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
145
146 data = skb->data + hdrlen;
147 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN;
148 key = &rx->key->conf.key[NL80211_TKIP_DATA_OFFSET_RX_MIC_KEY];
149 michael_mic(key, hdr, data, data_len, mic);
150 if (memcmp(mic, data + data_len, MICHAEL_MIC_LEN) != 0)
151 goto mic_fail;
152
153 /* remove Michael MIC from payload */
154 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - MICHAEL_MIC_LEN);
155
156 update_iv:
157 /* update IV in key information to be able to detect replays */
158 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv32 = rx->tkip_iv32;
159 rx->key->u.tkip.rx[rx->security_idx].iv16 = rx->tkip_iv16;
160
161 return RX_CONTINUE;
162
163 mic_fail:
164 rx->key->u.tkip.mic_failures++;
165
166 mic_fail_no_key:
167 /*
168 * In some cases the key can be unset - e.g. a multicast packet, in
169 * a driver that supports HW encryption. Send up the key idx only if
170 * the key is set.
171 */
172 mac80211_ev_michael_mic_failure(rx->sdata,
173 rx->key ? rx->key->conf.keyidx : -1,
174 (void *) skb->data, NULL, GFP_ATOMIC);
175 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
176 }
177
178
179 static int tkip_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
180 {
181 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
182 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
183 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
184 unsigned long flags;
185 unsigned int hdrlen;
186 int len, tail;
187 u8 *pos;
188
189 if (info->control.hw_key &&
190 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
191 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
192 /* hwaccel - with no need for software-generated IV */
193 return 0;
194 }
195
196 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
197 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
198
199 if (info->control.hw_key)
200 tail = 0;
201 else
202 tail = TKIP_ICV_LEN;
203
204 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
205 skb_headroom(skb) < TKIP_IV_LEN))
206 return -1;
207
208 pos = skb_push(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
209 memmove(pos, pos + TKIP_IV_LEN, hdrlen);
210 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + TKIP_IV_LEN);
211 pos += hdrlen;
212
213 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
214 if (info->control.hw_key &&
215 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
216 return 0;
217
218 /* Increase IV for the frame */
219 spin_lock_irqsave(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
220 key->u.tkip.tx.iv16++;
221 if (key->u.tkip.tx.iv16 == 0)
222 key->u.tkip.tx.iv32++;
223 pos = ieee80211_tkip_add_iv(pos, key);
224 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&key->u.tkip.txlock, flags);
225
226 /* hwaccel - with software IV */
227 if (info->control.hw_key)
228 return 0;
229
230 /* Add room for ICV */
231 skb_put(skb, TKIP_ICV_LEN);
232
233 return ieee80211_tkip_encrypt_data(tx->local->wep_tx_tfm,
234 key, skb, pos, len);
235 }
236
237
238 ieee80211_tx_result
239 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
240 {
241 struct sk_buff *skb;
242
243 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
244
245 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
246 if (tkip_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
247 return TX_DROP;
248 }
249
250 return TX_CONTINUE;
251 }
252
253
254 ieee80211_rx_result
255 ieee80211_crypto_tkip_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
256 {
257 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) rx->skb->data;
258 int hdrlen, res, hwaccel = 0;
259 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
260 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
261 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
262
263 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
264
265 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control))
266 return RX_CONTINUE;
267
268 if (!rx->sta || skb->len - hdrlen < 12)
269 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
270
271 /* it may be possible to optimize this a bit more */
272 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
273 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
274 hdr = (void *)skb->data;
275
276 /*
277 * Let TKIP code verify IV, but skip decryption.
278 * In the case where hardware checks the IV as well,
279 * we don't even get here, see ieee80211_rx_h_decrypt()
280 */
281 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)
282 hwaccel = 1;
283
284 res = ieee80211_tkip_decrypt_data(rx->local->wep_rx_tfm,
285 key, skb->data + hdrlen,
286 skb->len - hdrlen, rx->sta->sta.addr,
287 hdr->addr1, hwaccel, rx->security_idx,
288 &rx->tkip_iv32,
289 &rx->tkip_iv16);
290 if (res != TKIP_DECRYPT_OK)
291 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
292
293 /* Trim ICV */
294 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - TKIP_ICV_LEN);
295
296 /* Remove IV */
297 memmove(skb->data + TKIP_IV_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
298 skb_pull(skb, TKIP_IV_LEN);
299
300 return RX_CONTINUE;
301 }
302
303
304 static void ccmp_special_blocks(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *pn, u8 *scratch,
305 int encrypted)
306 {
307 __le16 mask_fc;
308 int a4_included, mgmt;
309 u8 qos_tid;
310 u8 *b_0, *aad;
311 u16 data_len, len_a;
312 unsigned int hdrlen;
313 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)skb->data;
314
315 memset(scratch, 0, 6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
316
317 b_0 = scratch + 3 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
318 aad = scratch + 4 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
319
320 /*
321 * Mask FC: zero subtype b4 b5 b6 (if not mgmt)
322 * Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData; set Protected
323 */
324 mgmt = ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control);
325 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
326 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY |
327 IEEE80211_FCTL_PM | IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
328 if (!mgmt)
329 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(0x0070);
330 mask_fc |= cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_PROTECTED);
331
332 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
333 len_a = hdrlen - 2;
334 a4_included = ieee80211_has_a4(hdr->frame_control);
335
336 if (ieee80211_is_data_qos(hdr->frame_control))
337 qos_tid = *ieee80211_get_qos_ctl(hdr) & IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_TID_MASK;
338 else
339 qos_tid = 0;
340
341 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN;
342 if (encrypted)
343 data_len -= CCMP_MIC_LEN;
344
345 /* First block, b_0 */
346 b_0[0] = 0x59; /* flags: Adata: 1, M: 011, L: 001 */
347 /* Nonce: Nonce Flags | A2 | PN
348 * Nonce Flags: Priority (b0..b3) | Management (b4) | Reserved (b5..b7)
349 */
350 b_0[1] = qos_tid | (mgmt << 4);
351 memcpy(&b_0[2], hdr->addr2, ETH_ALEN);
352 memcpy(&b_0[8], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
353 /* l(m) */
354 put_unaligned_be16(data_len, &b_0[14]);
355
356 /* AAD (extra authenticate-only data) / masked 802.11 header
357 * FC | A1 | A2 | A3 | SC | [A4] | [QC] */
358 put_unaligned_be16(len_a, &aad[0]);
359 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *)&aad[2]);
360 memcpy(&aad[4], &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
361
362 /* Mask Seq#, leave Frag# */
363 aad[22] = *((u8 *) &hdr->seq_ctrl) & 0x0f;
364 aad[23] = 0;
365
366 if (a4_included) {
367 memcpy(&aad[24], hdr->addr4, ETH_ALEN);
368 aad[30] = qos_tid;
369 aad[31] = 0;
370 } else {
371 memset(&aad[24], 0, ETH_ALEN + IEEE80211_QOS_CTL_LEN);
372 aad[24] = qos_tid;
373 }
374 }
375
376
377 static inline void ccmp_pn2hdr(u8 *hdr, u8 *pn, int key_id)
378 {
379 hdr[0] = pn[5];
380 hdr[1] = pn[4];
381 hdr[2] = 0;
382 hdr[3] = 0x20 | (key_id << 6);
383 hdr[4] = pn[3];
384 hdr[5] = pn[2];
385 hdr[6] = pn[1];
386 hdr[7] = pn[0];
387 }
388
389
390 static inline void ccmp_hdr2pn(u8 *pn, u8 *hdr)
391 {
392 pn[0] = hdr[7];
393 pn[1] = hdr[6];
394 pn[2] = hdr[5];
395 pn[3] = hdr[4];
396 pn[4] = hdr[1];
397 pn[5] = hdr[0];
398 }
399
400
401 static int ccmp_encrypt_skb(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx, struct sk_buff *skb)
402 {
403 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
404 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
405 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
406 int hdrlen, len, tail;
407 u8 *pos;
408 u8 pn[6];
409 u64 pn64;
410 u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
411
412 if (info->control.hw_key &&
413 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_GENERATE_IV) &&
414 !(info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE)) {
415 /*
416 * hwaccel has no need for preallocated room for CCMP
417 * header or MIC fields
418 */
419 return 0;
420 }
421
422 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
423 len = skb->len - hdrlen;
424
425 if (info->control.hw_key)
426 tail = 0;
427 else
428 tail = CCMP_MIC_LEN;
429
430 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < tail ||
431 skb_headroom(skb) < CCMP_HDR_LEN))
432 return -1;
433
434 pos = skb_push(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
435 memmove(pos, pos + CCMP_HDR_LEN, hdrlen);
436 skb_set_network_header(skb, skb_network_offset(skb) + CCMP_HDR_LEN);
437
438 /* the HW only needs room for the IV, but not the actual IV */
439 if (info->control.hw_key &&
440 (info->control.hw_key->flags & IEEE80211_KEY_FLAG_PUT_IV_SPACE))
441 return 0;
442
443 hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) pos;
444 pos += hdrlen;
445
446 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.ccmp.tx_pn);
447
448 pn[5] = pn64;
449 pn[4] = pn64 >> 8;
450 pn[3] = pn64 >> 16;
451 pn[2] = pn64 >> 24;
452 pn[1] = pn64 >> 32;
453 pn[0] = pn64 >> 40;
454
455 ccmp_pn2hdr(pos, pn, key->conf.keyidx);
456
457 /* hwaccel - with software CCMP header */
458 if (info->control.hw_key)
459 return 0;
460
461 pos += CCMP_HDR_LEN;
462 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 0);
463 ieee80211_aes_ccm_encrypt(key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch, pos, len,
464 pos, skb_put(skb, CCMP_MIC_LEN));
465
466 return 0;
467 }
468
469
470 ieee80211_tx_result
471 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
472 {
473 struct sk_buff *skb;
474
475 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
476
477 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
478 if (ccmp_encrypt_skb(tx, skb) < 0)
479 return TX_DROP;
480 }
481
482 return TX_CONTINUE;
483 }
484
485
486 ieee80211_rx_result
487 ieee80211_crypto_ccmp_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
488 {
489 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *)rx->skb->data;
490 int hdrlen;
491 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
492 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
493 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
494 u8 pn[CCMP_PN_LEN];
495 int data_len;
496 int queue;
497
498 hdrlen = ieee80211_hdrlen(hdr->frame_control);
499
500 if (!ieee80211_is_data(hdr->frame_control) &&
501 !ieee80211_is_robust_mgmt_frame(hdr))
502 return RX_CONTINUE;
503
504 data_len = skb->len - hdrlen - CCMP_HDR_LEN - CCMP_MIC_LEN;
505 if (!rx->sta || data_len < 0)
506 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
507
508 if (status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED) {
509 if (!pskb_may_pull(rx->skb, hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
510 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
511 } else {
512 if (skb_linearize(rx->skb))
513 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
514 }
515
516 ccmp_hdr2pn(pn, skb->data + hdrlen);
517
518 queue = rx->security_idx;
519
520 if (memcmp(pn, key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], CCMP_PN_LEN) <= 0) {
521 key->u.ccmp.replays++;
522 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
523 }
524
525 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
526 u8 scratch[6 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
527 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
528 ccmp_special_blocks(skb, pn, scratch, 1);
529
530 if (ieee80211_aes_ccm_decrypt(
531 key->u.ccmp.tfm, scratch,
532 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN, data_len,
533 skb->data + skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN,
534 skb->data + hdrlen + CCMP_HDR_LEN))
535 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
536 }
537
538 memcpy(key->u.ccmp.rx_pn[queue], pn, CCMP_PN_LEN);
539
540 /* Remove CCMP header and MIC */
541 if (pskb_trim(skb, skb->len - CCMP_MIC_LEN))
542 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
543 memmove(skb->data + CCMP_HDR_LEN, skb->data, hdrlen);
544 skb_pull(skb, CCMP_HDR_LEN);
545
546 return RX_CONTINUE;
547 }
548
549
550 static void bip_aad(struct sk_buff *skb, u8 *aad)
551 {
552 __le16 mask_fc;
553 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
554
555 /* BIP AAD: FC(masked) || A1 || A2 || A3 */
556
557 /* FC type/subtype */
558 /* Mask FC Retry, PwrMgt, MoreData flags to zero */
559 mask_fc = hdr->frame_control;
560 mask_fc &= ~cpu_to_le16(IEEE80211_FCTL_RETRY | IEEE80211_FCTL_PM |
561 IEEE80211_FCTL_MOREDATA);
562 put_unaligned(mask_fc, (__le16 *) &aad[0]);
563 /* A1 || A2 || A3 */
564 memcpy(aad + 2, &hdr->addr1, 3 * ETH_ALEN);
565 }
566
567
568 static inline void bip_ipn_set64(u8 *d, u64 pn)
569 {
570 *d++ = pn;
571 *d++ = pn >> 8;
572 *d++ = pn >> 16;
573 *d++ = pn >> 24;
574 *d++ = pn >> 32;
575 *d = pn >> 40;
576 }
577
578 static inline void bip_ipn_swap(u8 *d, const u8 *s)
579 {
580 *d++ = s[5];
581 *d++ = s[4];
582 *d++ = s[3];
583 *d++ = s[2];
584 *d++ = s[1];
585 *d = s[0];
586 }
587
588
589 ieee80211_tx_result
590 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
591 {
592 struct sk_buff *skb;
593 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info;
594 struct ieee80211_key *key = tx->key;
595 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
596 u8 aad[20];
597 u64 pn64;
598
599 if (WARN_ON(skb_queue_len(&tx->skbs) != 1))
600 return TX_DROP;
601
602 skb = skb_peek(&tx->skbs);
603
604 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
605
606 if (info->control.hw_key)
607 return TX_CONTINUE;
608
609 if (WARN_ON(skb_tailroom(skb) < sizeof(*mmie)))
610 return TX_DROP;
611
612 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *) skb_put(skb, sizeof(*mmie));
613 mmie->element_id = WLAN_EID_MMIE;
614 mmie->length = sizeof(*mmie) - 2;
615 mmie->key_id = cpu_to_le16(key->conf.keyidx);
616
617 /* PN = PN + 1 */
618 pn64 = atomic64_inc_return(&key->u.aes_cmac.tx_pn);
619
620 bip_ipn_set64(mmie->sequence_number, pn64);
621
622 bip_aad(skb, aad);
623
624 /*
625 * MIC = AES-128-CMAC(IGTK, AAD || Management Frame Body || MMIE, 64)
626 */
627 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
628 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mmie->mic);
629
630 return TX_CONTINUE;
631 }
632
633
634 ieee80211_rx_result
635 ieee80211_crypto_aes_cmac_decrypt(struct ieee80211_rx_data *rx)
636 {
637 struct sk_buff *skb = rx->skb;
638 struct ieee80211_rx_status *status = IEEE80211_SKB_RXCB(skb);
639 struct ieee80211_key *key = rx->key;
640 struct ieee80211_mmie *mmie;
641 u8 aad[20], mic[8], ipn[6];
642 struct ieee80211_hdr *hdr = (struct ieee80211_hdr *) skb->data;
643
644 if (!ieee80211_is_mgmt(hdr->frame_control))
645 return RX_CONTINUE;
646
647 /* management frames are already linear */
648
649 if (skb->len < 24 + sizeof(*mmie))
650 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
651
652 mmie = (struct ieee80211_mmie *)
653 (skb->data + skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
654 if (mmie->element_id != WLAN_EID_MMIE ||
655 mmie->length != sizeof(*mmie) - 2)
656 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE; /* Invalid MMIE */
657
658 bip_ipn_swap(ipn, mmie->sequence_number);
659
660 if (memcmp(ipn, key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, 6) <= 0) {
661 key->u.aes_cmac.replays++;
662 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
663 }
664
665 if (!(status->flag & RX_FLAG_DECRYPTED)) {
666 /* hardware didn't decrypt/verify MIC */
667 bip_aad(skb, aad);
668 ieee80211_aes_cmac(key->u.aes_cmac.tfm, aad,
669 skb->data + 24, skb->len - 24, mic);
670 if (memcmp(mic, mmie->mic, sizeof(mmie->mic)) != 0) {
671 key->u.aes_cmac.icverrors++;
672 return RX_DROP_UNUSABLE;
673 }
674 }
675
676 memcpy(key->u.aes_cmac.rx_pn, ipn, 6);
677
678 /* Remove MMIE */
679 skb_trim(skb, skb->len - sizeof(*mmie));
680
681 return RX_CONTINUE;
682 }
683
684 ieee80211_tx_result
685 ieee80211_crypto_hw_encrypt(struct ieee80211_tx_data *tx)
686 {
687 struct sk_buff *skb;
688 struct ieee80211_tx_info *info = NULL;
689
690 skb_queue_walk(&tx->skbs, skb) {
691 info = IEEE80211_SKB_CB(skb);
692
693 /* handle hw-only algorithm */
694 if (!info->control.hw_key)
695 return TX_DROP;
696 }
697
698 ieee80211_tx_set_protected(tx);
699
700 return TX_CONTINUE;
701 }
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