2 * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
3 * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
5 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
6 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
7 * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
10 * - initialize default measure policy rules
13 #include <linux/module.h>
14 #include <linux/list.h>
16 #include <linux/security.h>
17 #include <linux/magic.h>
18 #include <linux/parser.h>
19 #include <linux/slab.h>
20 #include <linux/rculist.h>
21 #include <linux/genhd.h>
22 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
26 /* flags definitions */
27 #define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
28 #define IMA_MASK 0x0002
29 #define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
30 #define IMA_UID 0x0008
31 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010
32 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020
33 #define IMA_INMASK 0x0040
34 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080
35 #define IMA_PCR 0x0100
38 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */
39 #define DONT_MEASURE 0x0002
40 #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */
41 #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008
44 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \
45 (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8))
48 static int temp_ima_appraise
;
50 #define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
51 enum lsm_rule_types
{ LSM_OBJ_USER
, LSM_OBJ_ROLE
, LSM_OBJ_TYPE
,
52 LSM_SUBJ_USER
, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE
, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
55 enum policy_types
{ ORIGINAL_TCB
= 1, DEFAULT_TCB
};
57 struct ima_rule_entry
{
58 struct list_head list
;
63 unsigned long fsmagic
;
69 void *rule
; /* LSM file metadata specific */
70 void *args_p
; /* audit value */
71 int type
; /* audit type */
76 * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
77 * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
81 * The minimum rule set to allow for full TCB coverage. Measures all files
82 * opened or mmap for exec and everything read by root. Dangerous because
83 * normal users can easily run the machine out of memory simply building
84 * and running executables.
86 static struct ima_rule_entry dont_measure_rules
[] = {
87 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
88 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= SYSFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
89 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= DEBUGFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
90 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= TMPFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
91 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
92 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= BINFMTFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
93 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= SECURITYFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
94 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= SELINUX_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
95 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
,
96 .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
97 {.action
= DONT_MEASURE
, .fsmagic
= NSFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
}
100 static struct ima_rule_entry original_measurement_rules
[] = {
101 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= MMAP_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_EXEC
,
102 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
},
103 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= BPRM_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_EXEC
,
104 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
},
105 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= FILE_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_READ
,
106 .uid
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
| IMA_UID
},
107 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= MODULE_CHECK
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
108 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= FIRMWARE_CHECK
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
111 static struct ima_rule_entry default_measurement_rules
[] = {
112 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= MMAP_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_EXEC
,
113 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
},
114 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= BPRM_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_EXEC
,
115 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_MASK
},
116 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= FILE_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_READ
,
117 .uid
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_INMASK
| IMA_EUID
},
118 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= FILE_CHECK
, .mask
= MAY_READ
,
119 .uid
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_INMASK
| IMA_UID
},
120 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= MODULE_CHECK
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
121 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= FIRMWARE_CHECK
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
122 {.action
= MEASURE
, .func
= POLICY_CHECK
, .flags
= IMA_FUNC
},
125 static struct ima_rule_entry default_appraise_rules
[] = {
126 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
127 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= SYSFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
128 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= DEBUGFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
129 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= TMPFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
130 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= RAMFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
131 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
132 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= BINFMTFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
133 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= SECURITYFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
134 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= SELINUX_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
135 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= NSFS_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
136 {.action
= DONT_APPRAISE
, .fsmagic
= CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC
, .flags
= IMA_FSMAGIC
},
137 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY
138 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .func
= POLICY_CHECK
,
139 .flags
= IMA_FUNC
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
141 #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_SIGNED_INIT
142 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .fowner
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
, .flags
= IMA_FOWNER
},
144 /* force signature */
145 {.action
= APPRAISE
, .fowner
= GLOBAL_ROOT_UID
,
146 .flags
= IMA_FOWNER
| IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
},
150 static LIST_HEAD(ima_default_rules
);
151 static LIST_HEAD(ima_policy_rules
);
152 static LIST_HEAD(ima_temp_rules
);
153 static struct list_head
*ima_rules
;
155 static int ima_policy __initdata
;
157 static int __init
default_measure_policy_setup(char *str
)
162 ima_policy
= ORIGINAL_TCB
;
165 __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup
);
167 static int __init
policy_setup(char *str
)
172 if (strcmp(str
, "tcb") == 0)
173 ima_policy
= DEFAULT_TCB
;
177 __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup
);
179 static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb __initdata
;
180 static int __init
default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str
)
182 ima_use_appraise_tcb
= 1;
185 __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup
);
188 * The LSM policy can be reloaded, leaving the IMA LSM based rules referring
189 * to the old, stale LSM policy. Update the IMA LSM based rules to reflect
190 * the reloaded LSM policy. We assume the rules still exist; and BUG_ON() if
193 static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
195 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
199 list_for_each_entry(entry
, &ima_policy_rules
, list
) {
200 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++) {
201 if (!entry
->lsm
[i
].rule
)
203 result
= security_filter_rule_init(entry
->lsm
[i
].type
,
205 entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
,
206 &entry
->lsm
[i
].rule
);
207 BUG_ON(!entry
->lsm
[i
].rule
);
213 * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
214 * @rule: a pointer to a rule
215 * @inode: a pointer to an inode
216 * @func: LIM hook identifier
217 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
219 * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
221 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry
*rule
, struct inode
*inode
,
222 enum ima_hooks func
, int mask
)
224 struct task_struct
*tsk
= current
;
225 const struct cred
*cred
= current_cred();
228 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FUNC
) &&
229 (rule
->func
!= func
&& func
!= POST_SETATTR
))
231 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_MASK
) &&
232 (rule
->mask
!= mask
&& func
!= POST_SETATTR
))
234 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_INMASK
) &&
235 (!(rule
->mask
& mask
) && func
!= POST_SETATTR
))
237 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FSMAGIC
)
238 && rule
->fsmagic
!= inode
->i_sb
->s_magic
)
240 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FSUUID
) &&
241 memcmp(rule
->fsuuid
, inode
->i_sb
->s_uuid
, sizeof(rule
->fsuuid
)))
243 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_UID
) && !uid_eq(rule
->uid
, cred
->uid
))
245 if (rule
->flags
& IMA_EUID
) {
246 if (has_capability_noaudit(current
, CAP_SETUID
)) {
247 if (!uid_eq(rule
->uid
, cred
->euid
)
248 && !uid_eq(rule
->uid
, cred
->suid
)
249 && !uid_eq(rule
->uid
, cred
->uid
))
251 } else if (!uid_eq(rule
->uid
, cred
->euid
))
255 if ((rule
->flags
& IMA_FOWNER
) && !uid_eq(rule
->fowner
, inode
->i_uid
))
257 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++) {
262 if (!rule
->lsm
[i
].rule
)
269 security_inode_getsecid(inode
, &osid
);
270 rc
= security_filter_rule_match(osid
,
279 security_task_getsecid(tsk
, &sid
);
280 rc
= security_filter_rule_match(sid
,
288 if ((rc
< 0) && (!retried
)) {
290 ima_lsm_update_rules();
300 * In addition to knowing that we need to appraise the file in general,
301 * we need to differentiate between calling hooks, for hook specific rules.
303 static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry
*rule
, enum ima_hooks func
)
305 if (!(rule
->flags
& IMA_FUNC
))
306 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE
;
310 return IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE
;
312 return IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE
;
315 return IMA_FILE_APPRAISE
;
316 case MODULE_CHECK
... MAX_CHECK
- 1:
318 return IMA_READ_APPRAISE
;
323 * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
324 * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
325 * @func: IMA hook identifier
326 * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
327 * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
329 * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
332 * Since the IMA policy may be updated multiple times we need to lock the
333 * list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous
334 * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
336 int ima_match_policy(struct inode
*inode
, enum ima_hooks func
, int mask
,
339 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
340 int action
= 0, actmask
= flags
| (flags
<< 1);
343 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry
, ima_rules
, list
) {
345 if (!(entry
->action
& actmask
))
348 if (!ima_match_rules(entry
, inode
, func
, mask
))
351 action
|= entry
->flags
& IMA_ACTION_FLAGS
;
353 action
|= entry
->action
& IMA_DO_MASK
;
354 if (entry
->action
& IMA_APPRAISE
)
355 action
|= get_subaction(entry
, func
);
357 if (entry
->action
& IMA_DO_MASK
)
358 actmask
&= ~(entry
->action
| entry
->action
<< 1);
360 actmask
&= ~(entry
->action
| entry
->action
>> 1);
362 if ((pcr
) && (entry
->flags
& IMA_PCR
))
374 * Initialize the ima_policy_flag variable based on the currently
375 * loaded policy. Based on this flag, the decision to short circuit
376 * out of a function or not call the function in the first place
377 * can be made earlier.
379 void ima_update_policy_flag(void)
381 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
383 list_for_each_entry(entry
, ima_rules
, list
) {
384 if (entry
->action
& IMA_DO_MASK
)
385 ima_policy_flag
|= entry
->action
;
388 ima_appraise
|= temp_ima_appraise
;
390 ima_policy_flag
&= ~IMA_APPRAISE
;
394 * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
396 * ima_rules points to either the ima_default_rules or the
397 * the new ima_policy_rules.
399 void __init
ima_init_policy(void)
401 int i
, measure_entries
, appraise_entries
;
403 /* if !ima_policy set entries = 0 so we load NO default rules */
404 measure_entries
= ima_policy
? ARRAY_SIZE(dont_measure_rules
) : 0;
405 appraise_entries
= ima_use_appraise_tcb
?
406 ARRAY_SIZE(default_appraise_rules
) : 0;
408 for (i
= 0; i
< measure_entries
; i
++)
409 list_add_tail(&dont_measure_rules
[i
].list
, &ima_default_rules
);
411 switch (ima_policy
) {
413 for (i
= 0; i
< ARRAY_SIZE(original_measurement_rules
); i
++)
414 list_add_tail(&original_measurement_rules
[i
].list
,
418 for (i
= 0; i
< ARRAY_SIZE(default_measurement_rules
); i
++)
419 list_add_tail(&default_measurement_rules
[i
].list
,
425 for (i
= 0; i
< appraise_entries
; i
++) {
426 list_add_tail(&default_appraise_rules
[i
].list
,
428 if (default_appraise_rules
[i
].func
== POLICY_CHECK
)
429 temp_ima_appraise
|= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY
;
432 ima_rules
= &ima_default_rules
;
433 ima_update_policy_flag();
436 /* Make sure we have a valid policy, at least containing some rules. */
437 int ima_check_policy(void)
439 if (list_empty(&ima_temp_rules
))
445 * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
447 * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
448 * policy. What we do here is to splice ima_policy_rules and ima_temp_rules so
449 * they make a queue. The policy may be updated multiple times and this is the
452 * Policy rules are never deleted so ima_policy_flag gets zeroed only once when
453 * we switch from the default policy to user defined.
455 void ima_update_policy(void)
457 struct list_head
*first
, *last
, *policy
;
459 /* append current policy with the new rules */
460 first
= (&ima_temp_rules
)->next
;
461 last
= (&ima_temp_rules
)->prev
;
462 policy
= &ima_policy_rules
;
467 rcu_assign_pointer(list_next_rcu(policy
->prev
), first
);
468 first
->prev
= policy
->prev
;
471 /* prepare for the next policy rules addition */
472 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ima_temp_rules
);
474 if (ima_rules
!= policy
) {
478 ima_update_policy_flag();
483 Opt_measure
= 1, Opt_dont_measure
,
484 Opt_appraise
, Opt_dont_appraise
,
486 Opt_obj_user
, Opt_obj_role
, Opt_obj_type
,
487 Opt_subj_user
, Opt_subj_role
, Opt_subj_type
,
488 Opt_func
, Opt_mask
, Opt_fsmagic
,
489 Opt_fsuuid
, Opt_uid
, Opt_euid
, Opt_fowner
,
490 Opt_appraise_type
, Opt_permit_directio
,
494 static match_table_t policy_tokens
= {
495 {Opt_measure
, "measure"},
496 {Opt_dont_measure
, "dont_measure"},
497 {Opt_appraise
, "appraise"},
498 {Opt_dont_appraise
, "dont_appraise"},
499 {Opt_audit
, "audit"},
500 {Opt_obj_user
, "obj_user=%s"},
501 {Opt_obj_role
, "obj_role=%s"},
502 {Opt_obj_type
, "obj_type=%s"},
503 {Opt_subj_user
, "subj_user=%s"},
504 {Opt_subj_role
, "subj_role=%s"},
505 {Opt_subj_type
, "subj_type=%s"},
506 {Opt_func
, "func=%s"},
507 {Opt_mask
, "mask=%s"},
508 {Opt_fsmagic
, "fsmagic=%s"},
509 {Opt_fsuuid
, "fsuuid=%s"},
511 {Opt_euid
, "euid=%s"},
512 {Opt_fowner
, "fowner=%s"},
513 {Opt_appraise_type
, "appraise_type=%s"},
514 {Opt_permit_directio
, "permit_directio"},
519 static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
,
520 substring_t
*args
, int lsm_rule
, int audit_type
)
524 if (entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].rule
)
527 entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
= match_strdup(args
);
528 if (!entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
)
531 entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].type
= audit_type
;
532 result
= security_filter_rule_init(entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].type
,
534 entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
,
535 &entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].rule
);
536 if (!entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].rule
) {
537 kfree(entry
->lsm
[lsm_rule
].args_p
);
544 static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer
*ab
, char *key
, char *value
)
546 audit_log_format(ab
, "%s=", key
);
547 audit_log_untrustedstring(ab
, value
);
548 audit_log_format(ab
, " ");
551 static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule
, struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
)
553 struct audit_buffer
*ab
;
558 ab
= audit_log_start(NULL
, GFP_KERNEL
, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE
);
560 entry
->uid
= INVALID_UID
;
561 entry
->fowner
= INVALID_UID
;
562 entry
->action
= UNKNOWN
;
563 while ((p
= strsep(&rule
, " \t")) != NULL
) {
564 substring_t args
[MAX_OPT_ARGS
];
570 if ((*p
== '\0') || (*p
== ' ') || (*p
== '\t'))
572 token
= match_token(p
, policy_tokens
, args
);
575 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "measure");
577 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
580 entry
->action
= MEASURE
;
582 case Opt_dont_measure
:
583 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "dont_measure");
585 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
588 entry
->action
= DONT_MEASURE
;
591 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "appraise");
593 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
596 entry
->action
= APPRAISE
;
598 case Opt_dont_appraise
:
599 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "dont_appraise");
601 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
604 entry
->action
= DONT_APPRAISE
;
607 ima_log_string(ab
, "action", "audit");
609 if (entry
->action
!= UNKNOWN
)
612 entry
->action
= AUDIT
;
615 ima_log_string(ab
, "func", args
[0].from
);
620 if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
621 entry
->func
= FILE_CHECK
;
622 /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
623 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
624 entry
->func
= FILE_CHECK
;
625 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "MODULE_CHECK") == 0)
626 entry
->func
= MODULE_CHECK
;
627 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "FIRMWARE_CHECK") == 0)
628 entry
->func
= FIRMWARE_CHECK
;
629 else if ((strcmp(args
[0].from
, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
630 || (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "MMAP_CHECK") == 0))
631 entry
->func
= MMAP_CHECK
;
632 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
633 entry
->func
= BPRM_CHECK
;
634 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK") ==
636 entry
->func
= KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
;
637 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK")
639 entry
->func
= KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
;
640 else if (strcmp(args
[0].from
, "POLICY_CHECK") == 0)
641 entry
->func
= POLICY_CHECK
;
645 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FUNC
;
648 ima_log_string(ab
, "mask", args
[0].from
);
657 if ((strcmp(from
, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
658 entry
->mask
= MAY_EXEC
;
659 else if (strcmp(from
, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
660 entry
->mask
= MAY_WRITE
;
661 else if (strcmp(from
, "MAY_READ") == 0)
662 entry
->mask
= MAY_READ
;
663 else if (strcmp(from
, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
664 entry
->mask
= MAY_APPEND
;
668 entry
->flags
|= (*args
[0].from
== '^')
669 ? IMA_INMASK
: IMA_MASK
;
672 ima_log_string(ab
, "fsmagic", args
[0].from
);
674 if (entry
->fsmagic
) {
679 result
= kstrtoul(args
[0].from
, 16, &entry
->fsmagic
);
681 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FSMAGIC
;
684 ima_log_string(ab
, "fsuuid", args
[0].from
);
686 if (memchr_inv(entry
->fsuuid
, 0x00,
687 sizeof(entry
->fsuuid
))) {
692 result
= blk_part_pack_uuid(args
[0].from
,
695 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FSUUID
;
698 ima_log_string(ab
, "uid", args
[0].from
);
700 if (token
== Opt_euid
)
701 ima_log_string(ab
, "euid", args
[0].from
);
703 if (uid_valid(entry
->uid
)) {
708 result
= kstrtoul(args
[0].from
, 10, &lnum
);
710 entry
->uid
= make_kuid(current_user_ns(),
712 if (!uid_valid(entry
->uid
) ||
716 entry
->flags
|= (token
== Opt_uid
)
717 ? IMA_UID
: IMA_EUID
;
721 ima_log_string(ab
, "fowner", args
[0].from
);
723 if (uid_valid(entry
->fowner
)) {
728 result
= kstrtoul(args
[0].from
, 10, &lnum
);
730 entry
->fowner
= make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t
)lnum
);
731 if (!uid_valid(entry
->fowner
) || (((uid_t
)lnum
) != lnum
))
734 entry
->flags
|= IMA_FOWNER
;
738 ima_log_string(ab
, "obj_user", args
[0].from
);
739 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
744 ima_log_string(ab
, "obj_role", args
[0].from
);
745 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
750 ima_log_string(ab
, "obj_type", args
[0].from
);
751 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
756 ima_log_string(ab
, "subj_user", args
[0].from
);
757 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
762 ima_log_string(ab
, "subj_role", args
[0].from
);
763 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
768 ima_log_string(ab
, "subj_type", args
[0].from
);
769 result
= ima_lsm_rule_init(entry
, args
,
773 case Opt_appraise_type
:
774 if (entry
->action
!= APPRAISE
) {
779 ima_log_string(ab
, "appraise_type", args
[0].from
);
780 if ((strcmp(args
[0].from
, "imasig")) == 0)
781 entry
->flags
|= IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
;
785 case Opt_permit_directio
:
786 entry
->flags
|= IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO
;
789 if (entry
->action
!= MEASURE
) {
793 ima_log_string(ab
, "pcr", args
[0].from
);
795 result
= kstrtoint(args
[0].from
, 10, &entry
->pcr
);
796 if (result
|| INVALID_PCR(entry
->pcr
))
799 entry
->flags
|= IMA_PCR
;
803 ima_log_string(ab
, "UNKNOWN", p
);
808 if (!result
&& (entry
->action
== UNKNOWN
))
810 else if (entry
->func
== MODULE_CHECK
)
811 temp_ima_appraise
|= IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES
;
812 else if (entry
->func
== FIRMWARE_CHECK
)
813 temp_ima_appraise
|= IMA_APPRAISE_FIRMWARE
;
814 else if (entry
->func
== POLICY_CHECK
)
815 temp_ima_appraise
|= IMA_APPRAISE_POLICY
;
816 audit_log_format(ab
, "res=%d", !result
);
822 * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to ima_policy_rules
823 * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
825 * Avoid locking by allowing just one writer at a time in ima_write_policy()
826 * Returns the length of the rule parsed, an error code on failure
828 ssize_t
ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule
)
830 static const char op
[] = "update_policy";
832 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
836 p
= strsep(&rule
, "\n");
838 p
+= strspn(p
, " \t");
840 if (*p
== '#' || *p
== '\0')
843 entry
= kzalloc(sizeof(*entry
), GFP_KERNEL
);
845 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS
, NULL
,
846 NULL
, op
, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM
, audit_info
);
850 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry
->list
);
852 result
= ima_parse_rule(p
, entry
);
855 integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS
, NULL
,
856 NULL
, op
, "invalid-policy", result
,
861 list_add_tail(&entry
->list
, &ima_temp_rules
);
867 * ima_delete_rules() called to cleanup invalid in-flight policy.
868 * We don't need locking as we operate on the temp list, which is
869 * different from the active one. There is also only one user of
870 * ima_delete_rules() at a time.
872 void ima_delete_rules(void)
874 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
, *tmp
;
877 temp_ima_appraise
= 0;
878 list_for_each_entry_safe(entry
, tmp
, &ima_temp_rules
, list
) {
879 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++)
880 kfree(entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
882 list_del(&entry
->list
);
887 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
889 mask_exec
= 0, mask_write
, mask_read
, mask_append
892 static char *mask_tokens
[] = {
900 func_file
= 0, func_mmap
, func_bprm
,
901 func_module
, func_firmware
, func_post
,
902 func_kexec_kernel
, func_kexec_initramfs
,
906 static char *func_tokens
[] = {
913 "KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
914 "KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK",
918 void *ima_policy_start(struct seq_file
*m
, loff_t
*pos
)
921 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
;
924 list_for_each_entry_rcu(entry
, ima_rules
, list
) {
934 void *ima_policy_next(struct seq_file
*m
, void *v
, loff_t
*pos
)
936 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
= v
;
939 entry
= list_entry_rcu(entry
->list
.next
, struct ima_rule_entry
, list
);
943 return (&entry
->list
== ima_rules
) ? NULL
: entry
;
946 void ima_policy_stop(struct seq_file
*m
, void *v
)
950 #define pt(token) policy_tokens[token + Opt_err].pattern
951 #define mt(token) mask_tokens[token]
952 #define ft(token) func_tokens[token]
955 * policy_func_show - display the ima_hooks policy rule
957 static void policy_func_show(struct seq_file
*m
, enum ima_hooks func
)
959 char tbuf
[64] = {0,};
963 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_func
), ft(func_file
));
966 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_func
), ft(func_mmap
));
969 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_func
), ft(func_bprm
));
972 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_func
), ft(func_module
));
975 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_func
), ft(func_firmware
));
978 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_func
), ft(func_post
));
980 case KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK
:
981 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_func
), ft(func_kexec_kernel
));
983 case KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK
:
984 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_func
), ft(func_kexec_initramfs
));
987 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_func
), ft(func_policy
));
990 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", func
);
991 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_func
), tbuf
);
997 int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file
*m
, void *v
)
999 struct ima_rule_entry
*entry
= v
;
1001 char tbuf
[64] = {0,};
1005 if (entry
->action
& MEASURE
)
1006 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_measure
));
1007 if (entry
->action
& DONT_MEASURE
)
1008 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_dont_measure
));
1009 if (entry
->action
& APPRAISE
)
1010 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_appraise
));
1011 if (entry
->action
& DONT_APPRAISE
)
1012 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_dont_appraise
));
1013 if (entry
->action
& AUDIT
)
1014 seq_puts(m
, pt(Opt_audit
));
1018 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_FUNC
)
1019 policy_func_show(m
, entry
->func
);
1021 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_MASK
) {
1022 if (entry
->mask
& MAY_EXEC
)
1023 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_mask
), mt(mask_exec
));
1024 if (entry
->mask
& MAY_WRITE
)
1025 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_mask
), mt(mask_write
));
1026 if (entry
->mask
& MAY_READ
)
1027 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_mask
), mt(mask_read
));
1028 if (entry
->mask
& MAY_APPEND
)
1029 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_mask
), mt(mask_append
));
1033 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_FSMAGIC
) {
1034 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "0x%lx", entry
->fsmagic
);
1035 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_fsmagic
), tbuf
);
1039 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_PCR
) {
1040 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", entry
->pcr
);
1041 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_pcr
), tbuf
);
1045 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_FSUUID
) {
1046 seq_printf(m
, "fsuuid=%pU", entry
->fsuuid
);
1050 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_UID
) {
1051 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", __kuid_val(entry
->uid
));
1052 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_uid
), tbuf
);
1056 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_EUID
) {
1057 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", __kuid_val(entry
->uid
));
1058 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_euid
), tbuf
);
1062 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_FOWNER
) {
1063 snprintf(tbuf
, sizeof(tbuf
), "%d", __kuid_val(entry
->fowner
));
1064 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_fowner
), tbuf
);
1068 for (i
= 0; i
< MAX_LSM_RULES
; i
++) {
1069 if (entry
->lsm
[i
].rule
) {
1072 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_obj_user
),
1073 (char *)entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
1076 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_obj_role
),
1077 (char *)entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
1080 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_obj_type
),
1081 (char *)entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
1084 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_subj_user
),
1085 (char *)entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
1088 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_subj_role
),
1089 (char *)entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
1092 seq_printf(m
, pt(Opt_subj_type
),
1093 (char *)entry
->lsm
[i
].args_p
);
1098 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED
)
1099 seq_puts(m
, "appraise_type=imasig ");
1100 if (entry
->flags
& IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO
)
1101 seq_puts(m
, "permit_directio ");
1106 #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */