UCHAR OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01};
UCHAR OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02};
UCHAR OUI_WPA2_WEP104[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x05};
-// MSA OUI
-UCHAR OUI_MSA_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x05}; // Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
-UCHAR OUI_MSA_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x06}; // Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
+
+
+
+static VOID ConstructEapolKeyData(
+ IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
+ IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR keyDescVer,
+ IN UCHAR MsgType,
+ IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
+ IN UCHAR *GTK,
+ IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
+ IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN,
+ OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg);
+
+static VOID CalculateMIC(
+ IN UCHAR KeyDescVer,
+ IN UCHAR *PTK,
+ OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPPacketAction(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLLogoffAction(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLStartAction(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem);
+
+static VOID WpaEAPOLKeyAction(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem);
/*
- ========================================================================
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ association state machine init, including state transition and timer init
+ Parameters:
+ S - pointer to the association state machine
+ ==========================================================================
+ */
+VOID WpaStateMachineInit(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN STATE_MACHINE *S,
+ OUT STATE_MACHINE_FUNC Trans[])
+{
+ StateMachineInit(S, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC *)Trans, MAX_WPA_PTK_STATE, MAX_WPA_MSG, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)Drop, WPA_PTK, WPA_MACHINE_BASE);
- Routine Description:
- The pseudo-random function(PRF) that hashes various inputs to
- derive a pseudo-random value. To add liveness to the pseudo-random
- value, a nonce should be one of the inputs.
+ StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPPacket, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPPacketAction);
+ StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLStart, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLStartAction);
+ StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLLogoff, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLLogoffAction);
+ StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLKey, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLKeyAction);
+ StateMachineSetAction(S, WPA_PTK, MT2_EAPOLASFAlert, (STATE_MACHINE_FUNC)WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction);
+}
- It is used to generate PTK, GTK or some specific random value.
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ this is state machine function.
+ When receiving EAP packets which is for 802.1x authentication use.
+ Not use in PSK case
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaEAPPacketAction(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+}
+
+VOID WpaEAPOLASFAlertAction(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+}
+
+VOID WpaEAPOLLogoffAction(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ Start 4-way HS when rcv EAPOL_START which may create by our driver in assoc.c
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaEAPOLStartAction(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+ MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry;
+ PHEADER_802_11 pHeader;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("WpaEAPOLStartAction ===> \n"));
+
+ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg;
+
+ //For normaol PSK, we enqueue an EAPOL-Start command to trigger the process.
+ if (Elem->MsgLen == 6)
+ pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, Elem->Msg);
+ else
+ {
+ pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, pHeader->Addr2);
+ }
+
+ if (pEntry)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" PortSecured(%d), WpaState(%d), AuthMode(%d), PMKID_CacheIdx(%d) \n", pEntry->PortSecured, pEntry->WpaState, pEntry->AuthMode, pEntry->PMKID_CacheIdx));
+
+ if ((pEntry->PortSecured == WPA_802_1X_PORT_NOT_SECURED)
+ && (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKSTART)
+ && ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) || ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) && (pEntry->PMKID_CacheIdx != ENTRY_NOT_FOUND))))
+ {
+ pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilter8021xWEP;
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_INITPSK;
+ pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_NOT_SECURED;
+ NdisZeroMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, sizeof(pEntry->R_Counter));
+ pEntry->ReTryCounter = PEER_MSG1_RETRY_TIMER_CTR;
+
+ WPAStart4WayHS(pAd, pEntry, PEER_MSG1_RETRY_EXEC_INTV);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ This is state machine function.
+ When receiving EAPOL packets which is for 802.1x key management.
+ Use both in WPA, and WPAPSK case.
+ In this function, further dispatch to different functions according to the received packet. 3 categories are :
+ 1. normal 4-way pairwisekey and 2-way groupkey handshake
+ 2. MIC error (Countermeasures attack) report packet from STA.
+ 3. Request for pairwise/group key update from STA
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaEAPOLKeyAction(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+ MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry;
+ PHEADER_802_11 pHeader;
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pEapol_packet;
+ KEY_INFO peerKeyInfo;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("WpaEAPOLKeyAction ===>\n"));
+
+ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg;
+ pEapol_packet = (PEAPOL_PACKET)&Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+
+ NdisZeroMemory((PUCHAR)&peerKeyInfo, sizeof(peerKeyInfo));
+ NdisMoveMemory((PUCHAR)&peerKeyInfo, (PUCHAR)&pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.KeyInfo, sizeof(KEY_INFO));
+
+ hex_dump("Received Eapol frame", (unsigned char *)pEapol_packet, (Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H));
+
+ *((USHORT *)&peerKeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*((USHORT *)&peerKeyInfo));
+
+ do
+ {
+ pEntry = MacTableLookup(pAd, pHeader->Addr2);
+
+ if (!pEntry || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+ break;
+
+ if (pEntry->AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA)
+ break;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPoL-Key frame from STA %02X-%02X-%02X-%02X-%02X-%02X\n", PRINT_MAC(pEntry->Addr)));
+
+ if (((pEapol_packet->ProVer != EAPOL_VER) && (pEapol_packet->ProVer != EAPOL_VER2)) ||
+ ((pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.Type != WPA1_KEY_DESC) && (pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.Type != WPA2_KEY_DESC)))
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Key descripter does not match with WPA rule\n"));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ // The value 1 shall be used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when
+ // neither the group nor pairwise ciphers are CCMP for Key Descriptor 1.
+ if ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) && (peerKeyInfo.KeyDescVer != DESC_TYPE_TKIP))
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Key descripter version not match(TKIP) \n"));
+ break;
+ }
+ // The value 2 shall be used for all EAPOL-Key frames to and from a STA when
+ // either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES-CCMP for Key Descriptor 2.
+ else if ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) && (peerKeyInfo.KeyDescVer != DESC_TYPE_AES))
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("Key descripter version not match(AES) \n"));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ // Check if this STA is in class 3 state and the WPA state is started
+ if ((pEntry->Sst == SST_ASSOC) && (pEntry->WpaState >= AS_INITPSK))
+ {
+ // Check the Key Ack (bit 7) of the Key Information to determine the Authenticator
+ // or not.
+ // An EAPOL-Key frame that is sent by the Supplicant in response to an EAPOL-
+ // Key frame from the Authenticator must not have the Ack bit set.
+ if (peerKeyInfo.KeyAck == 1)
+ {
+ // The frame is snet by Authenticator.
+ // So the Supplicant side shall handle this.
+
+ if ((peerKeyInfo.Secure == 0) && (peerKeyInfo.Request == 0) &&
+ (peerKeyInfo.Error == 0) && (peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY))
+ {
+ // Process 1. the message 1 of 4-way HS in WPA or WPA2
+ // EAPOL-Key(0,0,1,0,P,0,0,ANonce,0,DataKD_M1)
+ // 2. the message 3 of 4-way HS in WPA
+ // EAPOL-Key(0,1,1,1,P,0,KeyRSC,ANonce,MIC,DataKD_M3)
+ if (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 0)
+ PeerPairMsg1Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+ else
+ PeerPairMsg3Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+ }
+ else if ((peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1) &&
+ (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 1) &&
+ (peerKeyInfo.Request == 0) &&
+ (peerKeyInfo.Error == 0))
+ {
+ // Process 1. the message 3 of 4-way HS in WPA2
+ // EAPOL-Key(1,1,1,1,P,0,KeyRSC,ANonce,MIC,DataKD_M3)
+ // 2. the message 1 of group KS in WPA or WPA2
+ // EAPOL-Key(1,1,1,0,G,0,Key RSC,0, MIC,GTK[N])
+ if (peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY)
+ PeerPairMsg3Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+ else
+ PeerGroupMsg1Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // The frame is snet by Supplicant.
+ // So the Authenticator side shall handle this.
+ if ((peerKeyInfo.Request == 0) &&
+ (peerKeyInfo.Error == 0) &&
+ (peerKeyInfo.KeyMic == 1))
+ {
+ if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 0 && peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY)
+ {
+ // EAPOL-Key(0,1,0,0,P,0,0,SNonce,MIC,Data)
+ // Process 1. message 2 of 4-way HS in WPA or WPA2
+ // 2. message 4 of 4-way HS in WPA
+ if (CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pEapol_packet->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen) == 0)
+ {
+ PeerPairMsg4Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ PeerPairMsg2Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+ }
+ }
+ else if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1 && peerKeyInfo.KeyType == PAIRWISEKEY)
+ {
+ // EAPOL-Key(1,1,0,0,P,0,0,0,MIC,0)
+ // Process message 4 of 4-way HS in WPA2
+ PeerPairMsg4Action(pAd, pEntry, Elem);
+ }
+ else if (peerKeyInfo.Secure == 1 && peerKeyInfo.KeyType == GROUPKEY)
+ {
+ // EAPOL-Key(1,1,0,0,G,0,0,0,MIC,0)
+ // Process message 2 of Group key HS in WPA or WPA2
+ PeerGroupMsg2Action(pAd, pEntry, &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11], (Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }while(FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Copy frame from waiting queue into relative ring buffer and set
+ appropriate ASIC register to kick hardware encryption before really
+ sent out to air.
Arguments:
- UCHAR *key, - the key material for HMAC_SHA1 use
- INT key_len - the length of key
- UCHAR *prefix - a prefix label
- INT prefix_len - the length of the label
- UCHAR *data - a specific data with variable length
- INT data_len - the length of a specific data
- INT len - the output lenght
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+ PNDIS_PACKET Pointer to outgoing Ndis frame
+ NumberOfFrag Number of fragment required
Return Value:
- UCHAR *output - the calculated result
+ None
Note:
- 802.11i-2004 Annex H.3
========================================================================
*/
-VOID PRF(
- IN UCHAR *key,
- IN INT key_len,
- IN UCHAR *prefix,
- IN INT prefix_len,
- IN UCHAR *data,
- IN INT data_len,
- OUT UCHAR *output,
- IN INT len)
+VOID RTMPToWirelessSta(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
+ IN PUCHAR pHeader802_3,
+ IN UINT HdrLen,
+ IN PUCHAR pData,
+ IN UINT DataLen,
+ IN BOOLEAN bClearFrame)
{
- INT i;
- UCHAR *input;
- INT currentindex = 0;
- INT total_len;
+ PNDIS_PACKET pPacket;
+ NDIS_STATUS Status;
- // Allocate memory for input
- os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&input, 1024);
+ if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+ return;
- if (input == NULL)
+ do {
+ // build a NDIS packet
+ Status = RTMPAllocateNdisPacket(pAd, &pPacket, pHeader802_3, HdrLen, pData, DataLen);
+ if (Status != NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
+ break;
+
+
+ if (bClearFrame)
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_CLEAR_EAP_FRAME(pPacket, 1);
+ else
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_CLEAR_EAP_FRAME(pPacket, 0);
+ {
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_SOURCE(pPacket, PKTSRC_NDIS);
+
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_NET_DEVICE_MBSSID(pPacket, MAIN_MBSSID); // set a default value
+ if(pEntry->apidx != 0)
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_NET_DEVICE_MBSSID(pPacket, pEntry->apidx);
+
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_WCID(pPacket, (UCHAR)pEntry->Aid);
+ RTMP_SET_PACKET_MOREDATA(pPacket, FALSE);
+ }
+
+ {
+ // send out the packet
+ Status = STASendPacket(pAd, pPacket);
+ if (Status == NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS)
+ {
+ UCHAR Index;
+
+ // Dequeue one frame from TxSwQueue0..3 queue and process it
+ // There are three place calling dequeue for TX ring.
+ // 1. Here, right after queueing the frame.
+ // 2. At the end of TxRingTxDone service routine.
+ // 3. Upon NDIS call RTMPSendPackets
+ if((!RTMP_TEST_FLAG(pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_BSS_SCAN_IN_PROGRESS)) &&
+ (!RTMP_TEST_FLAG(pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_RESET_IN_PROGRESS)))
+ {
+ for(Index = 0; Index < 5; Index ++)
+ if(pAd->TxSwQueue[Index].Number > 0)
+ RTMPDeQueuePacket(pAd, FALSE, Index, MAX_TX_PROCESS);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ } while (FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ This is a function to initilize 4-way handshake
+
+ Return:
+
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WPAStart4WayHS(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
+ IN ULONG TimeInterval)
+{
+ UCHAR Header802_3[14];
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ PUINT8 pBssid = NULL;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> WPAStart4WayHS\n"));
+
+ if (RTMP_TEST_FLAG(pAd, fRTMP_ADAPTER_RESET_IN_PROGRESS | fRTMP_ADAPTER_HALT_IN_PROGRESS))
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : The interface is closed...\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+
+ if (pBssid == NULL)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : No corresponding Authenticator.\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Check the status
+ if ((pEntry->WpaState > AS_PTKSTART) || (pEntry->WpaState < AS_INITPMK))
{
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!PRF: no memory!!!\n"));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("[ERROR]WPAStart4WayHS : Not expect calling\n"));
return;
}
- // Generate concatenation input
- NdisMoveMemory(input, prefix, prefix_len);
- // Concatenate a single octet containing 0
- input[prefix_len] = 0;
+ // Increment replay counter by 1
+ ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter);
- // Concatenate specific data
- NdisMoveMemory(&input[prefix_len + 1], data, data_len);
- total_len = prefix_len + 1 + data_len;
+ // Randomly generate ANonce
+ GenRandom(pAd, (UCHAR *)pBssid, pEntry->ANonce);
- // Concatenate a single octet containing 0
- // This octet shall be update later
- input[total_len] = 0;
- total_len++;
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 1
+ // EAPOL-Key(0,0,1,0,P,0,0,ANonce,0,DataKD_M1)
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+ group_cipher,
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1,
+ 0, // Default key index
+ pEntry->ANonce,
+ NULL, // TxRSC
+ NULL, // GTK
+ NULL, // RSNIE
+ 0, // RSNIE length
+ &EAPOLPKT);
- // Iterate to calculate the result by hmac-sha-1
- // Then concatenate to last result
- for (i = 0; i < (len + 19) / 20; i++)
- {
- HMAC_SHA1(input, total_len, key, key_len, &output[currentindex]);
- currentindex += 20;
- // update the last octet
- input[total_len - 1]++;
- }
- os_free_mem(NULL, input);
+ // Make outgoing frame
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL);
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3,
+ LENGTH_802_3, (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4,
+ (pEntry->PortSecured == WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED) ? FALSE : TRUE);
+
+ // Trigger Retry Timer
+ RTMPModTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, TimeInterval);
+
+ // Update State
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKSTART;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== WPAStart4WayHS: send Msg1 of 4-way \n"));
+
}
/*
========================================================================
Routine Description:
- It utilizes PRF-384 or PRF-512 to derive session-specific keys from a PMK.
- It shall be called by 4-way handshake processing.
+ Process Pairwise key Msg-1 of 4-way handshaking and send Msg-2
Arguments:
- pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
- PMK - pointer to PMK
- ANonce - pointer to ANonce
- AA - pointer to Authenticator Address
- SNonce - pointer to SNonce
- SA - pointer to Supplicant Address
- len - indicate the length of PTK (octet)
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+ Elem Message body
Return Value:
- Output pointer to the PTK
+ None
Note:
- Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 8.5.1.2
========================================================================
*/
-VOID WpaCountPTK(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UCHAR *PMK,
- IN UCHAR *ANonce,
- IN UCHAR *AA,
- IN UCHAR *SNonce,
- IN UCHAR *SA,
- OUT UCHAR *output,
- IN UINT len)
+VOID PeerPairMsg1Action(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
{
- UCHAR concatenation[76];
- UINT CurrPos = 0;
- UCHAR temp[32];
- UCHAR Prefix[] = {'P', 'a', 'i', 'r', 'w', 'i', 's', 'e', ' ', 'k', 'e', 'y', ' ',
- 'e', 'x', 'p', 'a', 'n', 's', 'i', 'o', 'n'};
+ UCHAR PTK[80];
+ UCHAR Header802_3[14];
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg1;
+ UINT MsgLen;
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ PUINT8 pCurrentAddr = NULL;
+ PUINT8 pmk_ptr = NULL;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+ PUINT8 rsnie_ptr = NULL;
+ UCHAR rsnie_len = 0;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg1Action \n"));
+
+ if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+ return;
- // initiate the concatenation input
- NdisZeroMemory(temp, sizeof(temp));
- NdisZeroMemory(concatenation, 76);
+ if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+ return;
- // Get smaller address
- if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1)
- NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, AA, 6);
- else
- NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, SA, 6);
- CurrPos += 6;
+ {
+ pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress;
+ pmk_ptr = pAd->StaCfg.PMK;
+ group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+ rsnie_ptr = pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE;
+ rsnie_len = pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len;
+ }
- // Get larger address
- if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1)
- NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SA, 6);
- else
- NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], AA, 6);
+ // Store the received frame
+ pMsg1 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+ MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
- // store the larger mac address for backward compatible of
- // ralink proprietary STA-key issue
- NdisMoveMemory(temp, &concatenation[CurrPos], MAC_ADDR_LEN);
- CurrPos += 6;
+ // Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 1 - Replay Counter
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg1, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1, pEntry) == FALSE)
+ return;
- // Get smaller Nonce
- if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0)
- NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32); // patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue
- else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1)
- NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32);
+ // Store Replay counter, it will use to verify message 3 and construct message 2
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pMsg1->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+ // Store ANonce
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->ANonce, pMsg1->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
+
+ // Generate random SNonce
+ GenRandom(pAd, (UCHAR *)pCurrentAddr, pEntry->SNonce);
+
+ {
+ // Calculate PTK(ANonce, SNonce)
+ WpaDerivePTK(pAd,
+ pmk_ptr,
+ pEntry->ANonce,
+ pEntry->Addr,
+ pEntry->SNonce,
+ pCurrentAddr,
+ PTK,
+ LEN_PTK);
+
+ // Save key to PTK entry
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PTK, PTK, LEN_PTK);
+ }
+
+ // Update WpaState
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING;
+
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 2
+ // EAPOL-Key(0,1,0,0,P,0,0,SNonce,MIC,DataKD_M2)
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+ group_cipher,
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2,
+ 0, // DefaultKeyIdx
+ pEntry->SNonce,
+ NULL, // TxRsc
+ NULL, // GTK
+ (UCHAR *)rsnie_ptr,
+ rsnie_len,
+ &EAPOLPKT);
+
+ // Make outgoing frame
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL);
+
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+ Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3), (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4, TRUE);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerPairMsg1Action: send Msg2 of 4-way \n"));
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ When receiving the second packet of 4-way pairwisekey handshake.
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerPairMsg2Action(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+ UCHAR PTK[80];
+ BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+ PHEADER_802_11 pHeader;
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg2;
+ UINT MsgLen;
+ UCHAR Header802_3[LENGTH_802_3];
+ UCHAR TxTsc[6];
+ PUINT8 pBssid = NULL;
+ PUINT8 pmk_ptr = NULL;
+ PUINT8 gtk_ptr = NULL;
+ UCHAR default_key = 0;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+ PUINT8 rsnie_ptr = NULL;
+ UCHAR rsnie_len = 0;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg2Action \n"));
+
+ if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+ return;
+
+ if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+ return;
+
+ // check Entry in valid State
+ if (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKSTART)
+ return;
+
+
+
+ // pointer to 802.11 header
+ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg;
+
+ // skip 802.11_header(24-byte) and LLC_header(8)
+ pMsg2 = (PEAPOL_PACKET)&Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+ MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+ // Store SNonce
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->SNonce, pMsg2->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
+
+ {
+ // Derive PTK
+ WpaDerivePTK(pAd,
+ (UCHAR *)pmk_ptr,
+ pEntry->ANonce, // ANONCE
+ (UCHAR *)pBssid,
+ pEntry->SNonce, // SNONCE
+ pEntry->Addr,
+ PTK,
+ LEN_PTK);
+
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PTK, PTK, LEN_PTK);
+ }
+
+ // Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 2 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg2, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2, pEntry) == FALSE)
+ return;
+
+ do
+ {
+ // delete retry timer
+ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+
+ // Change state
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING;
+
+ // Increment replay counter by 1
+ ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter);
+
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 3
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+ group_cipher,
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3,
+ default_key,
+ pEntry->ANonce,
+ TxTsc,
+ (UCHAR *)gtk_ptr,
+ (UCHAR *)rsnie_ptr,
+ rsnie_len,
+ &EAPOLPKT);
+
+ // Make outgoing frame
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL);
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry, Header802_3, LENGTH_802_3,
+ (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4,
+ (pEntry->PortSecured == WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED) ? FALSE : TRUE);
+
+ pEntry->ReTryCounter = PEER_MSG3_RETRY_TIMER_CTR;
+ RTMPSetTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, PEER_MSG3_RETRY_EXEC_INTV);
+
+ // Update State
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING;
+ }while(FALSE);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerPairMsg2Action: send Msg3 of 4-way \n"));
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Process Pairwise key Msg 3 of 4-way handshaking and send Msg 4
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+ Elem Message body
+
+ Return Value:
+ None
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerPairMsg3Action(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+ PHEADER_802_11 pHeader;
+ UCHAR Header802_3[14];
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg3;
+ UINT MsgLen;
+ PUINT8 pCurrentAddr = NULL;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg3Action \n"));
+
+ if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+ return;
+
+ if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+ return;
+
+ {
+ pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress;
+ group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+
+ }
+
+ // Record 802.11 header & the received EAPOL packet Msg3
+ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11) Elem->Msg;
+ pMsg3 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+ MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+ // Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 3 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg3, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3, pEntry) == FALSE)
+ return;
+
+ // Save Replay counter, it will use construct message 4
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pMsg3->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+ // Double check ANonce
+ if (!NdisEqualMemory(pEntry->ANonce, pMsg3->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE))
+ {
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Pairwise Msg 4
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+ group_cipher,
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4,
+ 0, // group key index not used in message 4
+ NULL, // Nonce not used in message 4
+ NULL, // TxRSC not used in message 4
+ NULL, // GTK not used in message 4
+ NULL, // RSN IE not used in message 4
+ 0,
+ &EAPOLPKT);
+
+ // Update WpaState
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINITDONE;
+
+ // Update pairwise key
+ {
+ PCIPHER_KEY pSharedKey;
+
+ pSharedKey = &pAd->SharedKey[BSS0][0];
+
+ NdisMoveMemory(pAd->StaCfg.PTK, pEntry->PTK, LEN_PTK);
+
+ // Prepare pair-wise key information into shared key table
+ NdisZeroMemory(pSharedKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY));
+ pSharedKey->KeyLen = LEN_TKIP_EK;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->Key, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[32], LEN_TKIP_EK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->RxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48], LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->TxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48+LEN_TKIP_RXMICK], LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+
+ // Decide its ChiperAlg
+ if (pAd->StaCfg.PairCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_TKIP;
+ else if (pAd->StaCfg.PairCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_AES;
+ else
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_NONE;
+
+ // Update these related information to MAC_TABLE_ENTRY
+ pEntry = &pAd->MacTab.Content[BSSID_WCID];
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.Key, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[32], LEN_TKIP_EK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.RxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48], LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.TxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.PTK[48+LEN_TKIP_RXMICK], LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = pSharedKey->CipherAlg;
+
+ // Update pairwise key information to ASIC Shared Key Table
+ AsicAddSharedKeyEntry(pAd,
+ BSS0,
+ 0,
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg,
+ pSharedKey->Key,
+ pSharedKey->TxMic,
+ pSharedKey->RxMic);
+
+ // Update ASIC WCID attribute table and IVEIV table
+ RTMPAddWcidAttributeEntry(pAd,
+ BSS0,
+ 0,
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg,
+ pEntry);
+
+ }
+
+ // open 802.1x port control and privacy filter
+ if (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK ||
+ pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2)
+ {
+ pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED;
+ pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll;
+
+ STA_PORT_SECURED(pAd);
+ // Indicate Connected for GUI
+ pAd->IndicateMediaState = NdisMediaStateConnected;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("PeerPairMsg3Action: AuthMode(%s) PairwiseCipher(%s) GroupCipher(%s) \n",
+ GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+ GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+ GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ }
+
+ // Init 802.3 header and send out
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL);
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+ Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3),
+ (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4, TRUE);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerPairMsg3Action: send Msg4 of 4-way \n"));
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ When receiving the last packet of 4-way pairwisekey handshake.
+ Initilize 2-way groupkey handshake following.
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerPairMsg4Action(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg4;
+ PHEADER_802_11 pHeader;
+ UINT MsgLen;
+ BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerPairMsg4Action\n"));
+
+ do
+ {
+ if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+ break;
+
+ if (Elem->MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2 ) )
+ break;
+
+ if (pEntry->WpaState < AS_PTKINIT_NEGOTIATING)
+ break;
+
+
+ // pointer to 802.11 header
+ pHeader = (PHEADER_802_11)Elem->Msg;
+
+ // skip 802.11_header(24-byte) and LLC_header(8)
+ pMsg4 = (PEAPOL_PACKET)&Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+ MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+ // Sanity Check peer Pairwise message 4 - Replay Counter, MIC
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg4, MsgLen, EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4, pEntry) == FALSE)
+ break;
+
+ // 3. uses the MLME.SETKEYS.request to configure PTK into MAC
+ NdisZeroMemory(&pEntry->PairwiseKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY));
+
+ // reset IVEIV in Asic
+ AsicUpdateWCIDIVEIV(pAd, pEntry->Aid, 1, 0);
+
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.KeyLen = LEN_TKIP_EK;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.Key, &pEntry->PTK[32], LEN_TKIP_EK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.RxMic, &pEntry->PTK[TKIP_AP_RXMICK_OFFSET], LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->PairwiseKey.TxMic, &pEntry->PTK[TKIP_AP_TXMICK_OFFSET], LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+
+ // Set pairwise key to Asic
+ {
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = CIPHER_NONE;
+ if (pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = CIPHER_TKIP;
+ else if (pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg = CIPHER_AES;
+
+ // Add Pair-wise key to Asic
+ AsicAddPairwiseKeyEntry(
+ pAd,
+ pEntry->Addr,
+ (UCHAR)pEntry->Aid,
+ &pEntry->PairwiseKey);
+
+ // update WCID attribute table and IVEIV table for this entry
+ RTMPAddWcidAttributeEntry(
+ pAd,
+ pEntry->apidx,
+ 0,
+ pEntry->PairwiseKey.CipherAlg,
+ pEntry);
+ }
+
+ // 4. upgrade state
+ pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll;
+ pEntry->WpaState = AS_PTKINITDONE;
+ pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED;
+
+
+ if (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 ||
+ pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK)
+ {
+ pEntry->GTKState = REKEY_ESTABLISHED;
+ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+
+
+ // send wireless event - for set key done WPA2
+ if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA2_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF, ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA2, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n",
+ pEntry->AuthMode, GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+ pEntry->WepStatus, GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+ group_cipher,
+ GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // 5. init Group 2-way handshake if necessary.
+ WPAStart2WayGroupHS(pAd, pEntry);
+
+ pEntry->ReTryCounter = GROUP_MSG1_RETRY_TIMER_CTR;
+ RTMPModTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, PEER_MSG3_RETRY_EXEC_INTV);
+ }
+ }while(FALSE);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ This is a function to send the first packet of 2-way groupkey handshake
+ Return:
+
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WPAStart2WayGroupHS(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry)
+{
+ UCHAR Header802_3[14];
+ UCHAR TxTsc[6];
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+ UCHAR default_key = 0;
+ PUINT8 gnonce_ptr = NULL;
+ PUINT8 gtk_ptr = NULL;
+ PUINT8 pBssid = NULL;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> WPAStart2WayGroupHS\n"));
+
+ if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+ return;
+
+
+ do
+ {
+ // Increment replay counter by 1
+ ADD_ONE_To_64BIT_VAR(pEntry->R_Counter);
+
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Group Msg 1
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+ group_cipher,
+ EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1,
+ default_key,
+ (UCHAR *)gnonce_ptr,
+ TxTsc,
+ (UCHAR *)gtk_ptr,
+ NULL,
+ 0,
+ &EAPOLPKT);
+
+ // Make outgoing frame
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pBssid, EAPOL);
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+ Header802_3, LENGTH_802_3,
+ (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4, FALSE);
+
+
+
+ }while (FALSE);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== WPAStart2WayGroupHS : send out Group Message 1 \n"));
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Process Group key 2-way handshaking
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+ Elem Message body
+
+ Return Value:
+ None
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerGroupMsg1Action(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
+ IN MLME_QUEUE_ELEM *Elem)
+{
+ UCHAR Header802_3[14];
+ EAPOL_PACKET EAPOLPKT;
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pGroup;
+ UINT MsgLen;
+ BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+ UCHAR default_key = 0;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+ PUINT8 pCurrentAddr = NULL;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerGroupMsg1Action \n"));
+
+ if ((!pEntry) || ((!pEntry->ValidAsCLI) && (!pEntry->ValidAsApCli)))
+ return;
+
+ {
+ pCurrentAddr = pAd->CurrentAddress;
+ group_cipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+ default_key = pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId;
+ }
+
+ // Process Group Message 1 frame. skip 802.11 header(24) & LLC_SNAP header(8)
+ pGroup = (PEAPOL_PACKET) &Elem->Msg[LENGTH_802_11 + LENGTH_802_1_H];
+ MsgLen = Elem->MsgLen - LENGTH_802_11 - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+ // Sanity Check peer group message 1 - Replay Counter, MIC, RSNIE
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pGroup, MsgLen, EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1, pEntry) == FALSE)
+ return;
+
+ // delete retry timer
+ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+
+ // Save Replay counter, it will use to construct message 2
+ NdisMoveMemory(pEntry->R_Counter, pGroup->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+ // Construct EAPoL message - Group Msg 2
+ NdisZeroMemory(&EAPOLPKT, sizeof(EAPOL_PACKET));
+ ConstructEapolMsg(pEntry,
+ group_cipher,
+ EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2,
+ default_key,
+ NULL, // Nonce not used
+ NULL, // TxRSC not used
+ NULL, // GTK not used
+ NULL, // RSN IE not used
+ 0,
+ &EAPOLPKT);
+
+ // open 802.1x port control and privacy filter
+ pEntry->PortSecured = WPA_802_1X_PORT_SECURED;
+ pEntry->PrivacyFilter = Ndis802_11PrivFilterAcceptAll;
+
+ STA_PORT_SECURED(pAd);
+ // Indicate Connected for GUI
+ pAd->IndicateMediaState = NdisMediaStateConnected;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("PeerGroupMsg1Action: AuthMode(%s) PairwiseCipher(%s) GroupCipher(%s) \n",
+ GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+ GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+ GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+
+ // init header and Fill Packet and send Msg 2 to authenticator
+ MAKE_802_3_HEADER(Header802_3, pEntry->Addr, pCurrentAddr, EAPOL);
+ RTMPToWirelessSta(pAd, pEntry,
+ Header802_3, sizeof(Header802_3),
+ (PUCHAR)&EAPOLPKT,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(EAPOLPKT.Body_Len) + 4, FALSE);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("<=== PeerGroupMsg1Action: sned group message 2\n"));
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ When receiving the last packet of 2-way groupkey handshake.
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PeerGroupMsg2Action(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
+ IN VOID *Msg,
+ IN UINT MsgLen)
+{
+ UINT Len;
+ PUCHAR pData;
+ BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+ PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg2;
+ UCHAR group_cipher = Ndis802_11WEPDisabled;
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> PeerGroupMsg2Action \n"));
+
+ do
+ {
+ if ((!pEntry) || (!pEntry->ValidAsCLI))
+ break;
+
+ if (MsgLen < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H + sizeof(KEY_DESCRIPTER) - MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE - 2))
+ break;
+
+ if (pEntry->WpaState != AS_PTKINITDONE)
+ break;
+
+
+ pData = (PUCHAR)Msg;
+ pMsg2 = (PEAPOL_PACKET) (pData + LENGTH_802_1_H);
+ Len = MsgLen - LENGTH_802_1_H;
+
+ // Sanity Check peer group message 2 - Replay Counter, MIC
+ if (PeerWpaMessageSanity(pAd, pMsg2, Len, EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2, pEntry) == FALSE)
+ break;
+
+ // 3. upgrade state
+
+ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->RetryTimer, &Cancelled);
+ pEntry->GTKState = REKEY_ESTABLISHED;
+
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
+ {
+ // send wireless event - for set key done WPA2
+ if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA2_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF, ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA2, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n",
+ pEntry->AuthMode, GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+ pEntry->WepStatus, GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+ group_cipher, GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // send wireless event - for set key done WPA
+ if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_SET_KEY_DONE_WPA1_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_OFF, ("AP SETKEYS DONE - WPA1, AuthMode(%d)=%s, WepStatus(%d)=%s, GroupWepStatus(%d)=%s\n\n",
+ pEntry->AuthMode, GetAuthMode(pEntry->AuthMode),
+ pEntry->WepStatus, GetEncryptType(pEntry->WepStatus),
+ group_cipher, GetEncryptType(group_cipher)));
+ }
+ }while(FALSE);
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Classify WPA EAP message type
+
+ Arguments:
+ EAPType Value of EAP message type
+ MsgType Internal Message definition for MLME state machine
+
+ Return Value:
+ TRUE Found appropriate message type
+ FALSE No appropriate message type
+
+ IRQL = DISPATCH_LEVEL
+
+ Note:
+ All these constants are defined in wpa.h
+ For supplicant, there is only EAPOL Key message avaliable
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN WpaMsgTypeSubst(
+ IN UCHAR EAPType,
+ OUT INT *MsgType)
+{
+ switch (EAPType)
+ {
+ case EAPPacket:
+ *MsgType = MT2_EAPPacket;
+ break;
+ case EAPOLStart:
+ *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLStart;
+ break;
+ case EAPOLLogoff:
+ *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLLogoff;
+ break;
+ case EAPOLKey:
+ *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLKey;
+ break;
+ case EAPOLASFAlert:
+ *MsgType = MT2_EAPOLASFAlert;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ The pseudo-random function(PRF) that hashes various inputs to
+ derive a pseudo-random value. To add liveness to the pseudo-random
+ value, a nonce should be one of the inputs.
+
+ It is used to generate PTK, GTK or some specific random value.
+
+ Arguments:
+ UCHAR *key, - the key material for HMAC_SHA1 use
+ INT key_len - the length of key
+ UCHAR *prefix - a prefix label
+ INT prefix_len - the length of the label
+ UCHAR *data - a specific data with variable length
+ INT data_len - the length of a specific data
+ INT len - the output lenght
+
+ Return Value:
+ UCHAR *output - the calculated result
+
+ Note:
+ 802.11i-2004 Annex H.3
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PRF(
+ IN UCHAR *key,
+ IN INT key_len,
+ IN UCHAR *prefix,
+ IN INT prefix_len,
+ IN UCHAR *data,
+ IN INT data_len,
+ OUT UCHAR *output,
+ IN INT len)
+{
+ INT i;
+ UCHAR *input;
+ INT currentindex = 0;
+ INT total_len;
+
+ // Allocate memory for input
+ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&input, 1024);
+
+ if (input == NULL)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!PRF: no memory!!!\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Generate concatenation input
+ NdisMoveMemory(input, prefix, prefix_len);
+
+ // Concatenate a single octet containing 0
+ input[prefix_len] = 0;
+
+ // Concatenate specific data
+ NdisMoveMemory(&input[prefix_len + 1], data, data_len);
+ total_len = prefix_len + 1 + data_len;
+
+ // Concatenate a single octet containing 0
+ // This octet shall be update later
+ input[total_len] = 0;
+ total_len++;
+
+ // Iterate to calculate the result by hmac-sha-1
+ // Then concatenate to last result
+ for (i = 0; i < (len + 19) / 20; i++)
+ {
+ HMAC_SHA1(key, key_len, input, total_len, &output[currentindex], SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ currentindex += 20;
+
+ // update the last octet
+ input[total_len - 1]++;
+ }
+ os_free_mem(NULL, input);
+}
+
+/*
+* F(P, S, c, i) = U1 xor U2 xor ... Uc
+* U1 = PRF(P, S || Int(i))
+* U2 = PRF(P, U1)
+* Uc = PRF(P, Uc-1)
+*/
+
+static void F(char *password, unsigned char *ssid, int ssidlength, int iterations, int count, unsigned char *output)
+{
+ unsigned char digest[36], digest1[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ int i, j;
+
+ /* U1 = PRF(P, S || int(i)) */
+ memcpy(digest, ssid, ssidlength);
+ digest[ssidlength] = (unsigned char)((count>>24) & 0xff);
+ digest[ssidlength+1] = (unsigned char)((count>>16) & 0xff);
+ digest[ssidlength+2] = (unsigned char)((count>>8) & 0xff);
+ digest[ssidlength+3] = (unsigned char)(count & 0xff);
+ HMAC_SHA1((unsigned char*) password, (int) strlen(password), digest, ssidlength+4, digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); // for WPA update
+
+ /* output = U1 */
+ memcpy(output, digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ for (i = 1; i < iterations; i++)
+ {
+ /* Un = PRF(P, Un-1) */
+ HMAC_SHA1((unsigned char*) password, (int) strlen(password), digest1, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); // for WPA update
+ memcpy(digest1, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ /* output = output xor Un */
+ for (j = 0; j < SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; j++)
+ {
+ output[j] ^= digest[j];
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+* password - ascii string up to 63 characters in length
+* ssid - octet string up to 32 octets
+* ssidlength - length of ssid in octets
+* output must be 40 octets in length and outputs 256 bits of key
+*/
+int PasswordHash(PSTRING password, PUCHAR ssid, INT ssidlength, PUCHAR output)
+{
+ if ((strlen(password) > 63) || (ssidlength > 32))
+ return 0;
+
+ F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 1, output);
+ F(password, ssid, ssidlength, 4096, 2, &output[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ It utilizes PRF-384 or PRF-512 to derive session-specific keys from a PMK.
+ It shall be called by 4-way handshake processing.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ PMK - pointer to PMK
+ ANonce - pointer to ANonce
+ AA - pointer to Authenticator Address
+ SNonce - pointer to SNonce
+ SA - pointer to Supplicant Address
+ len - indicate the length of PTK (octet)
+
+ Return Value:
+ Output pointer to the PTK
+
+ Note:
+ Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 8.5.1.2
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaDerivePTK(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR *PMK,
+ IN UCHAR *ANonce,
+ IN UCHAR *AA,
+ IN UCHAR *SNonce,
+ IN UCHAR *SA,
+ OUT UCHAR *output,
+ IN UINT len)
+{
+ UCHAR concatenation[76];
+ UINT CurrPos = 0;
+ UCHAR temp[32];
+ UCHAR Prefix[] = {'P', 'a', 'i', 'r', 'w', 'i', 's', 'e', ' ', 'k', 'e', 'y', ' ',
+ 'e', 'x', 'p', 'a', 'n', 's', 'i', 'o', 'n'};
+
+ // initiate the concatenation input
+ NdisZeroMemory(temp, sizeof(temp));
+ NdisZeroMemory(concatenation, 76);
+
+ // Get smaller address
+ if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1)
+ NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, AA, 6);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, SA, 6);
+ CurrPos += 6;
+
+ // Get larger address
+ if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1)
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SA, 6);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], AA, 6);
+
+ // store the larger mac address for backward compatible of
+ // ralink proprietary STA-key issue
+ NdisMoveMemory(temp, &concatenation[CurrPos], MAC_ADDR_LEN);
+ CurrPos += 6;
+
+ // Get smaller Nonce
+ if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0)
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32); // patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue
+ else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1)
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32);
+ CurrPos += 32;
+
+ // Get larger Nonce
+ if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0)
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32); // patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue
+ else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1)
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32);
+ CurrPos += 32;
+
+ hex_dump("concatenation=", concatenation, 76);
+
+ // Use PRF to generate PTK
+ PRF(PMK, LEN_MASTER_KEY, Prefix, 22, concatenation, 76, output, len);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Generate random number by software.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ macAddr - pointer to local MAC address
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+ 802.1ii-2004 Annex H.5
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID GenRandom(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR *macAddr,
+ OUT UCHAR *random)
+{
+ INT i, curr;
+ UCHAR local[80], KeyCounter[32];
+ UCHAR result[80];
+ ULONG CurrentTime;
+ UCHAR prefix[] = {'I', 'n', 'i', 't', ' ', 'C', 'o', 'u', 'n', 't', 'e', 'r'};
+
+ // Zero the related information
+ NdisZeroMemory(result, 80);
+ NdisZeroMemory(local, 80);
+ NdisZeroMemory(KeyCounter, 32);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
+ {
+ // copy the local MAC address
+ COPY_MAC_ADDR(local, macAddr);
+ curr = MAC_ADDR_LEN;
+
+ // concatenate the current time
+ NdisGetSystemUpTime(&CurrentTime);
+ NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &CurrentTime, sizeof(CurrentTime));
+ curr += sizeof(CurrentTime);
+
+ // concatenate the last result
+ NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], result, 32);
+ curr += 32;
+
+ // concatenate a variable
+ NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &i, 2);
+ curr += 2;
+
+ // calculate the result
+ PRF(KeyCounter, 32, prefix,12, local, curr, result, 32);
+ }
+
+ NdisMoveMemory(random, result, 32);
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Build cipher suite in RSN-IE.
+ It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+ WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
+ bMixCipher - a boolean to indicate the pairwise cipher and group
+ cipher are the same or not
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeCipher(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR ElementID,
+ IN UINT WepStatus,
+ IN BOOLEAN bMixCipher,
+ IN UCHAR FlexibleCipher,
+ OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
+ OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+{
+ UCHAR PairwiseCnt;
+
+ *rsn_len = 0;
+
+ // decide WPA2 or WPA1
+ if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
+ {
+ RSNIE2 *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE2*)pRsnIe;
+
+ // Assign the verson as 1
+ pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
+
+ switch (WepStatus)
+ {
+ // TKIP mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
+ break;
+
+ // AES mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
+ if (bMixCipher)
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
+ break;
+
+ // TKIP-AES mix mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+
+ PairwiseCnt = 1;
+ // Insert WPA2 TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ // Insert WPA2 AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ PairwiseCnt = 2;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // Insert WPA2 AES as the first pairwise cipher
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ }
+
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ((pAd->OpMode == OPMODE_STA) &&
+ (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) &&
+ (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled))
+ {
+ UINT GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+ switch(GroupCipher)
+ {
+ case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_WEP40, 4);
+ break;
+ case Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_WEP104, 4);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // swap for big-endian platform
+ pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ RSNIE *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE*)pRsnIe;
+
+ // Assign OUI and version
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->oui, OUI_WPA_VERSION, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
+
+ switch (WepStatus)
+ {
+ // TKIP mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
+ break;
+
+ // AES mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
+ if (bMixCipher)
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
+ break;
+
+ // TKIP-AES mix mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+
+ PairwiseCnt = 1;
+ // Insert WPA TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ // Insert WPA AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ PairwiseCnt = 2;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // Insert WPA AES as the first pairwise cipher
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ }
+
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if ((pAd->OpMode == OPMODE_STA) &&
+ (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) &&
+ (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled))
+ {
+ UINT GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
+ switch(GroupCipher)
+ {
+ case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_WEP40, 4);
+ break;
+ case Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_WEP104, 4);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // swap for big-endian platform
+ pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Build AKM suite in RSN-IE.
+ It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+ AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
+ apidx - indicate the interface index
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeAKM(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR ElementID,
+ IN UINT AuthMode,
+ IN UCHAR apidx,
+ OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
+ OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+{
+ RSNIE_AUTH *pRsnie_auth;
+ UCHAR AkmCnt = 1; // default as 1
+
+ pRsnie_auth = (RSNIE_AUTH*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
+
+ // decide WPA2 or WPA1
+ if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
+ {
+
+ switch (AuthMode)
+ {
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+ default:
+ AkmCnt = 0;
+ break;
+
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ switch (AuthMode)
+ {
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+ default:
+ AkmCnt = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pRsnie_auth->acount = AkmCnt;
+ pRsnie_auth->acount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_auth->acount);
+
+ // update current RSNIE length
+ (*rsn_len) += (sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH) + (4 * (AkmCnt - 1)));
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Build capability in RSN-IE.
+ It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+ apidx - indicate the interface index
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+static VOID RTMPMakeRsnIeCap(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR ElementID,
+ IN UCHAR apidx,
+ OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
+ OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+{
+ RSN_CAPABILITIES *pRSN_Cap;
+
+ // it could be ignored in WPA1 mode
+ if (ElementID == WpaIe)
+ return;
+
+ pRSN_Cap = (RSN_CAPABILITIES*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
+
+
+ pRSN_Cap->word = cpu2le16(pRSN_Cap->word);
+
+ (*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES); // update current RSNIE length
+
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Build RSN IE context. It is not included element-ID and length.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
+ WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
+ apidx - indicate the interface index
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UINT AuthMode,
+ IN UINT WepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR apidx)
+{
+ PUCHAR pRsnIe = NULL; // primary RSNIE
+ UCHAR *rsnielen_cur_p = 0; // the length of the primary RSNIE
+ UCHAR *rsnielen_ex_cur_p = 0; // the length of the secondary RSNIE
+ UCHAR PrimaryRsnie;
+ BOOLEAN bMixCipher = FALSE; // indicate the pairwise and group cipher are different
+ UCHAR p_offset;
+ WPA_MIX_PAIR_CIPHER FlexibleCipher = WPA_TKIPAES_WPA2_TKIPAES; // it provide the more flexible cipher combination in WPA-WPA2 and TKIPAES mode
+
+ rsnielen_cur_p = NULL;
+ rsnielen_ex_cur_p = NULL;
+
+ {
+ {
+ if (pAd->StaCfg.WpaSupplicantUP != WPA_SUPPLICANT_DISABLE)
+ {
+ if (AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA)
+ return;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // Support WPAPSK or WPA2PSK in STA-Infra mode
+ // Support WPANone in STA-Adhoc mode
+ if ((AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
+ (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
+ (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone)
+ )
+ return;
+ }
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("==> RTMPMakeRSNIE(STA)\n"));
+
+ // Zero RSNIE context
+ pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len = 0;
+ NdisZeroMemory(pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE, MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE);
+
+ // Pointer to RSNIE
+ rsnielen_cur_p = &pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len;
+ pRsnIe = pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE;
+
+ bMixCipher = pAd->StaCfg.bMixCipher;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // indicate primary RSNIE as WPA or WPA2
+ if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA) ||
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) ||
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone) ||
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2) ||
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK))
+ PrimaryRsnie = WpaIe;
else
- NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32);
- CurrPos += 32;
+ PrimaryRsnie = Wpa2Ie;
- // Get larger Nonce
- if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0)
- NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32); // patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue
- else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1)
- NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32);
+ {
+ // Build the primary RSNIE
+ // 1. insert cipher suite
+ RTMPMakeRsnIeCipher(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, WepStatus, bMixCipher, FlexibleCipher, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+
+ // 2. insert AKM
+ RTMPMakeRsnIeAKM(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, AuthMode, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+
+ // 3. insert capability
+ RTMPMakeRsnIeCap(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+ }
+
+ // 4. update the RSNIE length
+ *rsnielen_cur_p = p_offset;
+
+ hex_dump("The primary RSNIE", pRsnIe, (*rsnielen_cur_p));
+
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ Check whether the received frame is EAP frame.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ pEntry - pointer to active entry
+ pData - the received frame
+ DataByteCount - the received frame's length
+ FromWhichBSSID - indicate the interface index
+
+ Return:
+ TRUE - This frame is EAP frame
+ FALSE - otherwise
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
+ IN PUCHAR pData,
+ IN ULONG DataByteCount,
+ IN UCHAR FromWhichBSSID)
+{
+ ULONG Body_len;
+ BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+
+
+ if(DataByteCount < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H))
+ return FALSE;
+
+
+ // Skip LLC header
+ if (NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_802_1H, pData, 6) ||
+ // Cisco 1200 AP may send packet with SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL
+ NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL, pData, 6))
+ {
+ pData += 6;
+ }
+ // Skip 2-bytes EAPoL type
+ if (NdisEqualMemory(EAPOL, pData, 2))
+ {
+ pData += 2;
+ }
+ else
+ return FALSE;
+
+ switch (*(pData+1))
+ {
+ case EAPPacket:
+ Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAP-Packet frame, TYPE = 0, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
+ break;
+ case EAPOLStart:
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Start frame, TYPE = 1 \n"));
+ if (pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning != EAPOL_START_DISABLE)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Cancel the EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning \n"));
+ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->EnqueueStartForPSKTimer, &Cancelled);
+ pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning = EAPOL_START_DISABLE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case EAPOLLogoff:
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLLogoff frame, TYPE = 2 \n"));
+ break;
+ case EAPOLKey:
+ Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Key frame, TYPE = 3, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
+ break;
+ case EAPOLASFAlert:
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLASFAlert frame, TYPE = 4 \n"));
+ break;
+ default:
+ return FALSE;
+
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ Report the EAP message type
+
+ Arguments:
+ msg - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4
+ EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1
+ EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2
+
+ Return:
+ message type string
+
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+PSTRING GetEapolMsgType(CHAR msg)
+{
+ if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+ return "Pairwise Message 1";
+ else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2)
+ return "Pairwise Message 2";
+ else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ return "Pairwise Message 3";
+ else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)
+ return "Pairwise Message 4";
+ else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+ return "Group Message 1";
+ else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
+ return "Group Message 2";
+ else
+ return "Invalid Message";
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Check Sanity RSN IE of EAPoL message
+
+ Arguments:
+
+ Return Value:
+
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN PUCHAR pData,
+ IN UCHAR DataLen,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
+ OUT UCHAR *Offset)
+{
+ PUCHAR pVIE;
+ UCHAR len;
+ PEID_STRUCT pEid;
+ BOOLEAN result = FALSE;
+
+ pVIE = pData;
+ len = DataLen;
+ *Offset = 0;
+
+ while (len > sizeof(RSNIE2))
+ {
+ pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) pVIE;
+ // WPA RSN IE
+ if ((pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, WPA_OUI, 4)))
+ {
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
+ (NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
+ (pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2)))
+ {
+ result = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ *Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
+ }
+ // WPA2 RSN IE
+ else if ((pEid->Eid == IE_RSN) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet + 2, RSN_OUI, 3)))
+ {
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
+ (pEid->Eid == pEntry->RSN_IE[0]) &&
+ ((pEid->Len + 2) >= pEntry->RSNIE_Len) &&
+ (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, &pEntry->RSN_IE[2], pEntry->RSNIE_Len - 2)))
+ {
+
+ result = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ *Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
+ }
else
- NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32);
- CurrPos += 32;
+ {
+ break;
+ }
- hex_dump("concatenation=", concatenation, 76);
+ pVIE += (pEid->Len + 2);
+ len -= (pEid->Len + 2);
+ }
- // Use PRF to generate PTK
- PRF(PMK, LEN_MASTER_KEY, Prefix, 22, concatenation, 76, output, len);
-}
+ return result;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Parse KEYDATA field. KEYDATA[] May contain 2 RSN IE and optionally GTK.
+ GTK is encaptulated in KDE format at p.83 802.11i D10
+
+ Arguments:
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+ 802.11i D10
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN PUCHAR pKeyData,
+ IN UCHAR KeyDataLen,
+ IN UCHAR GroupKeyIndex,
+ IN UCHAR MsgType,
+ IN BOOLEAN bWPA2,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry)
+{
+ PKDE_ENCAP pKDE = NULL;
+ PUCHAR pMyKeyData = pKeyData;
+ UCHAR KeyDataLength = KeyDataLen;
+ UCHAR GTKLEN = 0;
+ UCHAR DefaultIdx = 0;
+ UCHAR skip_offset;
+
+ // Verify The RSN IE contained in pairewise_msg_2 && pairewise_msg_3 and skip it
+ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ {
+ // Check RSN IE whether it is WPA2/WPA2PSK
+ if (!RTMPCheckRSNIE(pAd, pKeyData, KeyDataLen, pEntry, &skip_offset))
+ {
+ // send wireless event - for RSN IE different
+ if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_RSNIE_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("RSN_IE Different in msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));
+ hex_dump("Receive RSN_IE ", pKeyData, KeyDataLen);
+ hex_dump("Desired RSN_IE ", pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len);
+
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ {
+ WpaShowAllsuite(pMyKeyData, skip_offset);
+
+ // skip RSN IE
+ pMyKeyData += skip_offset;
+ KeyDataLength -= skip_offset;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> WPA2/WPA2PSK RSN IE matched in Msg 3, Length(%d) \n", skip_offset));
+ }
+ else
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ }
-/*
- ========================================================================
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> KeyDataLength %d without RSN_IE \n", KeyDataLength));
+ //hex_dump("remain data", pMyKeyData, KeyDataLength);
- Routine Description:
- Generate random number by software.
- Arguments:
- pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
- macAddr - pointer to local MAC address
+ // Parse EKD format in pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 && group_msg_1_WPA2
+ if (bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ {
+ if (KeyDataLength >= 8) // KDE format exclude GTK length
+ {
+ pKDE = (PKDE_ENCAP) pMyKeyData;
- Return Value:
- Note:
- 802.1ii-2004 Annex H.5
+ DefaultIdx = pKDE->GTKEncap.Kid;
- ========================================================================
-*/
-VOID GenRandom(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UCHAR *macAddr,
- OUT UCHAR *random)
-{
- INT i, curr;
- UCHAR local[80], KeyCounter[32];
- UCHAR result[80];
- ULONG CurrentTime;
- UCHAR prefix[] = {'I', 'n', 'i', 't', ' ', 'C', 'o', 'u', 'n', 't', 'e', 'r'};
+ // Sanity check - KED length
+ if (KeyDataLength < (pKDE->Len + 2))
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: The len from KDE is too short \n"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
- // Zero the related information
- NdisZeroMemory(result, 80);
- NdisZeroMemory(local, 80);
- NdisZeroMemory(KeyCounter, 32);
+ // Get GTK length - refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 p.82
+ GTKLEN = pKDE->Len -6;
+ if (GTKLEN < LEN_AES_KEY)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key length is too short (%d) \n", GTKLEN));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
- for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
+ }
+ else
{
- // copy the local MAC address
- COPY_MAC_ADDR(local, macAddr);
- curr = MAC_ADDR_LEN;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: KDE format length is too short \n"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
- // concatenate the current time
- NdisGetSystemUpTime(&CurrentTime);
- NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &CurrentTime, sizeof(CurrentTime));
- curr += sizeof(CurrentTime);
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK in KDE format ,DefaultKeyID=%d, KeyLen=%d \n", DefaultIdx, GTKLEN));
+ // skip it
+ pMyKeyData += 8;
+ KeyDataLength -= 8;
- // concatenate the last result
- NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], result, 32);
- curr += 32;
+ }
+ else if (!bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+ {
+ DefaultIdx = GroupKeyIndex;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK DefaultKeyID=%d \n", DefaultIdx));
+ }
- // concatenate a variable
- NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &i, 2);
- curr += 2;
+ // Sanity check - shared key index must be 1 ~ 3
+ if (DefaultIdx < 1 || DefaultIdx > 3)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key index(%d) is invalid in %s %s \n", DefaultIdx, ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
- // calculate the result
- PRF(KeyCounter, 32, prefix,12, local, curr, result, 32);
+ {
+ PCIPHER_KEY pSharedKey;
+
+ // set key material, TxMic and RxMic
+ NdisMoveMemory(pAd->StaCfg.GTK, pMyKeyData, 32);
+ pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId = DefaultIdx;
+
+ pSharedKey = &pAd->SharedKey[BSS0][pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId];
+
+ // Prepare pair-wise key information into shared key table
+ NdisZeroMemory(pSharedKey, sizeof(CIPHER_KEY));
+ pSharedKey->KeyLen = LEN_TKIP_EK;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->Key, pAd->StaCfg.GTK, LEN_TKIP_EK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->RxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.GTK[16], LEN_TKIP_RXMICK);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pSharedKey->TxMic, &pAd->StaCfg.GTK[24], LEN_TKIP_TXMICK);
+
+ // Update Shared Key CipherAlg
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_NONE;
+ if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_TKIP;
+ else if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_AES;
+ else if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher == Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_WEP64;
+ else if (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher == Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled)
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg = CIPHER_WEP128;
+
+
+ // Update group key information to ASIC Shared Key Table
+ AsicAddSharedKeyEntry(pAd,
+ BSS0,
+ pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId,
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg,
+ pSharedKey->Key,
+ pSharedKey->TxMic,
+ pSharedKey->RxMic);
+
+ // Update ASIC WCID attribute table and IVEIV table
+ RTMPAddWcidAttributeEntry(pAd,
+ BSS0,
+ pAd->StaCfg.DefaultKeyId,
+ pSharedKey->CipherAlg,
+ NULL);
}
- NdisMoveMemory(random, result, 32);
+ return TRUE;
+
}
+
/*
========================================================================
Routine Description:
- Build cipher suite in RSN-IE.
- It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+ Construct EAPoL message for WPA handshaking
+ Its format is below,
+
+ +--------------------+
+ | Protocol Version | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Protocol Type | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Body Length | 2 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Descriptor Type | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Information | 2 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Length | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Repaly Counter | 8 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Nonce | 32 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key IV | 16 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key RSC | 8 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key ID or Reserved | 8 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key MIC | 16 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Data Length | 2 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Data | n octets
+ +--------------------+
+
Arguments:
- pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
- ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
- WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
- bMixCipher - a boolean to indicate the pairwise cipher and group
- cipher are the same or not
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
Return Value:
+ None
Note:
========================================================================
*/
-static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UCHAR ElementID,
- IN UINT WepStatus,
- IN BOOLEAN bMixCipher,
- IN UCHAR FlexibleCipher,
- OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
- OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+VOID ConstructEapolMsg(
+ IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
+ IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR MsgType,
+ IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
+ IN UCHAR *KeyNonce,
+ IN UCHAR *TxRSC,
+ IN UCHAR *GTK,
+ IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
+ IN UCHAR RSNIE_Len,
+ OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
{
- UCHAR PairwiseCnt;
+ BOOLEAN bWPA2 = FALSE;
+ UCHAR KeyDescVer;
- *rsn_len = 0;
+ // Choose WPA2 or not
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) ||
+ (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
+ bWPA2 = TRUE;
- // decide WPA2 or WPA1
- if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
- {
- RSNIE2 *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE2*)pRsnIe;
+ // Init Packet and Fill header
+ pMsg->ProVer = EAPOL_VER;
+ pMsg->ProType = EAPOLKey;
- // Assign the verson as 1
- pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
+ // Default 95 bytes, the EAPoL-Key descriptor exclude Key-data field
+ SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->Body_Len, LEN_EAPOL_KEY_MSG);
- switch (WepStatus)
- {
- // TKIP mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
- break;
+ // Fill in EAPoL descriptor
+ if (bWPA2)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA2_KEY_DESC;
+ else
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA1_KEY_DESC;
- // AES mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
- if (bMixCipher)
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ // Key Descriptor Version (bits 0-2) specifies the key descriptor version type
+ {
+ // Fill in Key information, refer to IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 page 78
+ // When either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES, the DESC_TYPE_AES(2) shall be used.
+ KeyDescVer = (((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) ||
+ (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) ? (DESC_TYPE_AES) : (DESC_TYPE_TKIP));
+ }
+
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer = KeyDescVer;
+
+ // Specify Key Type as Group(0) or Pairwise(1)
+ if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = GROUPKEY;
else
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
- break;
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = PAIRWISEKEY;
- // TKIP-AES mix mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ // Specify Key Index, only group_msg1_WPA1
+ if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex = DefaultKeyIdx;
- PairwiseCnt = 1;
- // Insert WPA2 TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
- if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
- {
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
- // Insert WPA2 AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
- if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Install = 1;
+
+ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyAck = 1;
+
+ if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyMic = 1;
+
+ if ((bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)) ||
+ (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
{
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
- PairwiseCnt = 2;
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Secure = 1;
}
- }
- else
+
+ if (bWPA2 && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) ||
+ (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
{
- // Insert WPA2 AES as the first pairwise cipher
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.EKD_DL = 1;
}
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
- break;
- }
+ // key Information element has done.
+ *(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo));
- if ((pAd->OpMode == OPMODE_STA) &&
- (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) &&
- (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled))
+ // Fill in Key Length
{
- UINT GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
- switch(GroupCipher)
+ if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
{
- case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_WEP40, 4);
- break;
- case Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_WEP104, 4);
- break;
- }
- }
-
- // swap for big-endian platform
- pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
+ // the length of group key cipher
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? TKIP_GTK_LENGTH : LEN_AES_KEY);
}
else
{
- RSNIE *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE*)pRsnIe;
-
- // Assign OUI and version
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->oui, OUI_WPA_VERSION, 4);
- pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
-
- switch (WepStatus)
- {
- // TKIP mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
- break;
+ // the length of pairwise key cipher
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((pEntry->WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? LEN_TKIP_KEY : LEN_AES_KEY);
+ }
+ }
- // AES mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
- if (bMixCipher)
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
- else
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
- break;
+ // Fill in replay counter
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, pEntry->R_Counter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
- // TKIP-AES mix mode
- case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ // Fill Key Nonce field
+ // ANonce : pairwise_msg1 & pairwise_msg3
+ // SNonce : pairwise_msg2
+ // GNonce : group_msg1_wpa1
+ if ((MsgType <= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || ((!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))))
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
- PairwiseCnt = 1;
- // Insert WPA TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
- if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
- {
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
- // Insert WPA AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
- if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+ // Fill key IV - WPA2 as 0, WPA1 as random
+ if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
{
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
- PairwiseCnt = 2;
- }
+ // Suggest IV be random number plus some number,
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, &KeyNonce[16], LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv[15] += 2;
}
- else
+
+ // Fill Key RSC field
+ // It contains the RSC for the GTK being installed.
+ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
{
- // Insert WPA AES as the first pairwise cipher
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyRsc, TxRSC, 6);
}
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
- *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
- break;
- }
-
- if ((pAd->OpMode == OPMODE_STA) &&
- (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) &&
- (pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher != Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled))
- {
- UINT GroupCipher = pAd->StaCfg.GroupCipher;
- switch(GroupCipher)
+ // Clear Key MIC field for MIC calculation later
+ NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+
+ ConstructEapolKeyData(pEntry,
+ GroupKeyWepStatus,
+ KeyDescVer,
+ MsgType,
+ DefaultKeyIdx,
+ GTK,
+ RSNIE,
+ RSNIE_Len,
+ pMsg);
+
+ // Calculate MIC and fill in KeyMic Field except Pairwise Msg 1.
+ if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
{
- case Ndis802_11GroupWEP40Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_WEP40, 4);
- break;
- case Ndis802_11GroupWEP104Enabled:
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_WEP104, 4);
- break;
- }
+ CalculateMIC(KeyDescVer, pEntry->PTK, pMsg);
}
- // swap for big-endian platform
- pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
- pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
- }
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> ConstructEapolMsg for %s %s\n", ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Body length = %d \n", CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->Body_Len)));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Key length = %d \n", CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength)));
+
+
}
/*
========================================================================
Routine Description:
- Build AKM suite in RSN-IE.
- It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+ Construct the Key Data field of EAPoL message
Arguments:
- pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
- ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
- AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
- apidx - indicate the interface index
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+ Elem Message body
Return Value:
+ None
Note:
========================================================================
*/
-static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UCHAR ElementID,
- IN UINT AuthMode,
- IN UCHAR apidx,
- OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
- OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+VOID ConstructEapolKeyData(
+ IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
+ IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR keyDescVer,
+ IN UCHAR MsgType,
+ IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
+ IN UCHAR *GTK,
+ IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
+ IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN,
+ OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
{
- RSNIE_AUTH *pRsnie_auth;
+ UCHAR *mpool, *Key_Data, *Rc4GTK;
+ UCHAR ekey[(LEN_KEY_DESC_IV+LEN_EAP_EK)];
+ ULONG data_offset;
+ BOOLEAN bWPA2Capable = FALSE;
+ PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd = pEntry->pAd;
+ BOOLEAN GTK_Included = FALSE;
+
+ // Choose WPA2 or not
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) ||
+ (pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
+ bWPA2Capable = TRUE;
+
+ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 ||
+ MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 ||
+ MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
+ return;
- pRsnie_auth = (RSNIE_AUTH*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
+ // allocate memory pool
+ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, 1500);
- // decide WPA2 or WPA1
- if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
+ if (mpool == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /* Rc4GTK Len = 512 */
+ Rc4GTK = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(mpool, 4);
+ /* Key_Data Len = 512 */
+ Key_Data = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(Rc4GTK + 512, 4);
+
+ NdisZeroMemory(Key_Data, 512);
+ SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen, 0);
+ data_offset = 0;
+
+ // Encapsulate RSNIE in pairwise_msg2 & pairwise_msg3
+ if (RSNIE_LEN && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)))
+ {
+ PUINT8 pmkid_ptr = NULL;
+ UINT8 pmkid_len = 0;
+
+
+ RTMPInsertRSNIE(&Key_Data[data_offset],
+ &data_offset,
+ RSNIE,
+ RSNIE_LEN,
+ pmkid_ptr,
+ pmkid_len);
+ }
+
+
+ // Encapsulate KDE format in pairwise_msg3_WPA2 & group_msg1_WPA2
+ if (bWPA2Capable && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
+ {
+ // Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43w and Table-20h
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
+
+ if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ {
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x16;// 4+2+16(OUI+DataType+DataField)
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x26;// 4+2+32(OUI+DataType+DataField)
+ }
+
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0x00;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0x0F;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0xAC;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0x01;
+
+ // GTK KDE format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43x
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 6] = (DefaultKeyIdx & 0x03);
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 7] = 0x00; // Reserved Byte
+
+ data_offset += 8;
+ }
+
+
+ // Encapsulate GTK
+ // Only for pairwise_msg3_WPA2 and group_msg1
+ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ {
+ // Fill in GTK
+ if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, LEN_AES_KEY);
+ data_offset += LEN_AES_KEY;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, TKIP_GTK_LENGTH);
+ data_offset += TKIP_GTK_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ GTK_Included = TRUE;
+ }
+
+
+ // This whole key-data field shall be encrypted if a GTK is included.
+ // Encrypt the data material in key data field with KEK
+ if (GTK_Included)
{
- switch (AuthMode)
- {
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2:
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
- pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM, 4);
- break;
+ //hex_dump("GTK_Included", Key_Data, data_offset);
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK:
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
- pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM, 4);
- break;
+ if (
+ (keyDescVer == DESC_TYPE_AES))
+ {
+ UCHAR remainder = 0;
+ UCHAR pad_len = 0;
+
+ // Key Descriptor Version 2 or 3: AES key wrap, defined in IETF RFC 3394,
+ // shall be used to encrypt the Key Data field using the KEK field from
+ // the derived PTK.
+
+ // If the Key Data field uses the NIST AES key wrap, then the Key Data field
+ // shall be padded before encrypting if the key data length is less than 16
+ // octets or if it is not a multiple of 8. The padding consists of appending
+ // a single octet 0xdd followed by zero or more 0x00 octets.
+ if ((remainder = data_offset & 0x07) != 0)
+ {
+ INT i;
+
+ pad_len = (8 - remainder);
+ Key_Data[data_offset] = 0xDD;
+ for (i = 1; i < pad_len; i++)
+ Key_Data[data_offset + i] = 0;
+
+ data_offset += pad_len;
}
+
+ AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(&pEntry->PTK[16], Key_Data, data_offset, Rc4GTK);
+ // AES wrap function will grow 8 bytes in length
+ data_offset += 8;
}
else
{
- switch (AuthMode)
- {
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA:
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
- pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM, 4);
- break;
-
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK:
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
- pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM, 4);
- break;
+ /* Key Descriptor Version 1: ARC4 is used to encrypt the Key Data field
+ using the KEK field from the derived PTK. */
+
+ // PREPARE Encrypted "Key DATA" field. (Encrypt GTK with RC4, usinf PTK[16]->[31] as Key, IV-field as IV)
+ // put TxTsc in Key RSC field
+ pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = PPPINITFCS32; //Init crc32.
+
+ // ekey is the contanetion of IV-field, and PTK[16]->PTK[31]
+ NdisMoveMemory(ekey, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
+ NdisMoveMemory(&ekey[LEN_KEY_DESC_IV], &pEntry->PTK[16], LEN_EAP_EK);
+ ARCFOUR_INIT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, ekey, sizeof(ekey)); //INIT SBOX, KEYLEN+3(IV)
+ pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = RTMP_CALC_FCS32(pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32, Key_Data, data_offset);
+ WPAARCFOUR_ENCRYPT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, Rc4GTK, Key_Data, data_offset);
+ }
- case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone:
- pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
- NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM, 4);
- break;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Rc4GTK, data_offset);
}
+ else
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Key_Data, data_offset);
}
- pRsnie_auth->acount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_auth->acount);
+ // Update key data length field and total body length
+ SET_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen, data_offset);
+ INC_UINT16_TO_ARRARY(pMsg->Body_Len, data_offset);
- (*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH); // update current RSNIE length
+ os_free_mem(NULL, mpool);
}
========================================================================
Routine Description:
- Build capability in RSN-IE.
- It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+ Calcaulate MIC. It is used during 4-ways handsharking.
Arguments:
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
- ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
- apidx - indicate the interface index
+ PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
Return Value:
========================================================================
*/
-static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UCHAR ElementID,
- IN UCHAR apidx,
- OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
- OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+static VOID CalculateMIC(
+ IN UCHAR KeyDescVer,
+ IN UCHAR *PTK,
+ OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
{
- RSN_CAPABILITIES *pRSN_Cap;
+ UCHAR *OutBuffer;
+ ULONG FrameLen = 0;
+ UCHAR mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC];
+ UCHAR digest[80];
- // it could be ignored in WPA1 mode
- if (ElementID == WpaIe)
+ // allocate memory for MIC calculation
+ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&OutBuffer, 512);
+
+ if (OutBuffer == NULL)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!CalculateMIC: no memory!!!\n"));
return;
+ }
- pRSN_Cap = (RSN_CAPABILITIES*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
+ // make a frame for calculating MIC.
+ MakeOutgoingFrame(OutBuffer, &FrameLen,
+ CONV_ARRARY_TO_UINT16(pMsg->Body_Len) + 4, pMsg,
+ END_OF_ARGS);
+ NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic));
- pRSN_Cap->word = cpu2le16(pRSN_Cap->word);
+ // Calculate MIC
+ if (KeyDescVer == DESC_TYPE_AES)
+ {
+ HMAC_SHA1(PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ HMAC_MD5(PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, mic, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ }
- (*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES); // update current RSNIE length
+ // store the calculated MIC
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+ os_free_mem(NULL, OutBuffer);
}
-
/*
========================================================================
Routine Description:
- Build RSN IE context. It is not included element-ID and length.
+ Some received frames can't decrypt by Asic, so decrypt them by software.
Arguments:
pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
- AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
- WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
- apidx - indicate the interface index
+ PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
Return Value:
-
- Note:
+ NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS - decryption successful
+ NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE - decryption failure
========================================================================
*/
-VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
+NDIS_STATUS RTMPSoftDecryptBroadCastData(
IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN UINT AuthMode,
- IN UINT WepStatus,
- IN UCHAR apidx)
+ IN RX_BLK *pRxBlk,
+ IN NDIS_802_11_ENCRYPTION_STATUS GroupCipher,
+ IN PCIPHER_KEY pShard_key)
{
- PUCHAR pRsnIe = NULL; // primary RSNIE
- UCHAR *rsnielen_cur_p = 0; // the length of the primary RSNIE
- UCHAR *rsnielen_ex_cur_p = 0; // the length of the secondary RSNIE
- UCHAR PrimaryRsnie;
- BOOLEAN bMixCipher = FALSE; // indicate the pairwise and group cipher are different
- UCHAR p_offset;
- WPA_MIX_PAIR_CIPHER FlexibleCipher = WPA_TKIPAES_WPA2_TKIPAES; // it provide the more flexible cipher combination in WPA-WPA2 and TKIPAES mode
+ PRXWI_STRUC pRxWI = pRxBlk->pRxWI;
+
- rsnielen_cur_p = NULL;
- rsnielen_ex_cur_p = NULL;
+ // handle WEP decryption
+ if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption1Enabled)
{
+ if (RTMPSoftDecryptWEP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, pShard_key))
{
- if (pAd->StaCfg.WpaSupplicantUP != WPA_SUPPLICANT_DISABLE)
+
+ //Minus IV[4] & ICV[4]
+ pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 8;
+ }
+ else
{
- if (AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA)
- return;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : Software decrypt WEP data fails.\n"));
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+ // handle TKIP decryption
+ else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+ {
+ if (RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, 0, pShard_key))
+ {
+
+ //Minus 8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV, 4 bytes ICV
+ pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 20;
}
else
{
- // Support WPAPSK or WPA2PSK in STA-Infra mode
- // Support WPANone in STA-Adhoc mode
- if ((AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
- (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
- (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone)
- )
- return;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP Failed\n"));
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
}
+ }
+ // handle AES decryption
+ else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ {
+ if (RTMPSoftDecryptAES(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount , pShard_key))
+ {
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("==> RTMPMakeRSNIE(STA)\n"));
+ //8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV (CCMP Header)
+ pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 16;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptAES Failed\n"));
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+ }
- // Zero RSNIE context
- pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len = 0;
- NdisZeroMemory(pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE, MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE);
+ return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
- // Pointer to RSNIE
- rsnielen_cur_p = &pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len;
- pRsnIe = pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE;
+}
- bMixCipher = pAd->StaCfg.bMixCipher;
- }
+
+PUINT8 GetSuiteFromRSNIE(
+ IN PUINT8 rsnie,
+ IN UINT rsnie_len,
+ IN UINT8 type,
+ OUT UINT8 *count)
+{
+ PEID_STRUCT pEid;
+ INT len;
+ PUINT8 pBuf;
+ INT offset = 0;
+ PRSNIE_AUTH pAkm;
+ UINT16 acount;
+ BOOLEAN isWPA2 = FALSE;
+
+ pEid = (PEID_STRUCT)rsnie;
+ len = rsnie_len - 2; // exclude IE and length
+ pBuf = (PUINT8)&pEid->Octet[0];
+
+
+
+ // set default value
+ *count = 0;
+
+ // Check length
+ if ((len <= 0) || (pEid->Len != len))
+ {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length is invalid\n", __func__));
+ return NULL;
}
- // indicate primary RSNIE as WPA or WPA2
- if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA) ||
- (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) ||
- (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone) ||
- (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2) ||
- (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK))
- PrimaryRsnie = WpaIe;
- else
- PrimaryRsnie = Wpa2Ie;
+ // Check WPA or WPA2
+ if (pEid->Eid == IE_WPA)
+ {
+ PRSNIE pRsnie = (PRSNIE)pBuf;
+ UINT16 ucount;
+ if (len < sizeof(RSNIE))
{
- // Build the primary RSNIE
- // 1. insert cipher suite
- RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, WepStatus, bMixCipher, FlexibleCipher, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length is too short for WPA\n", __func__));
+ return NULL;
+ }
- // 2. insert AKM
- RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, AuthMode, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+ // Get the count of pairwise cipher
+ ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie->ucount);
+ if (ucount > 2)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The count(%d) of pairwise cipher is invlaid\n",
+ __func__, ucount));
+ return NULL;
+ }
- // 3. insert capability
- RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+ // Get the group cipher
+ if (type == GROUP_SUITE)
+ {
+ *count = 1;
+ return pRsnie->mcast;
+ }
+ // Get the pairwise cipher suite
+ else if (type == PAIRWISE_SUITE)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The count of pairwise cipher is %d\n",
+ __func__, ucount));
+ *count = ucount;
+ return pRsnie->ucast[0].oui;
}
- // 4. update the RSNIE length
- *rsnielen_cur_p = p_offset;
+ offset = sizeof(RSNIE) + (4 * (ucount - 1));
- hex_dump("The primary RSNIE", pRsnIe, (*rsnielen_cur_p));
+ }
+ else if (pEid->Eid == IE_RSN)
+ {
+ PRSNIE2 pRsnie = (PRSNIE2)pBuf;
+ UINT16 ucount;
+ isWPA2 = TRUE;
-}
+ if (len < sizeof(RSNIE2))
+ {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length is too short for WPA2\n", __func__));
+ return NULL;
+ }
-/*
- ==========================================================================
- Description:
- Check whether the received frame is EAP frame.
+ // Get the count of pairwise cipher
+ ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie->ucount);
+ if (ucount > 2)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The count(%d) of pairwise cipher is invlaid\n",
+ __func__, ucount));
+ return NULL;
+ }
- Arguments:
- pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
- pEntry - pointer to active entry
- pData - the received frame
- DataByteCount - the received frame's length
- FromWhichBSSID - indicate the interface index
+ // Get the group cipher
+ if (type == GROUP_SUITE)
+ {
+ *count = 1;
+ return pRsnie->mcast;
+ }
+ // Get the pairwise cipher suite
+ else if (type == PAIRWISE_SUITE)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The count of pairwise cipher is %d\n",
+ __func__, ucount));
+ *count = ucount;
+ return pRsnie->ucast[0].oui;
+ }
- Return:
- TRUE - This frame is EAP frame
- FALSE - otherwise
- ==========================================================================
-*/
-BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
- IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
- IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
- IN PUCHAR pData,
- IN ULONG DataByteCount,
- IN UCHAR FromWhichBSSID)
-{
- ULONG Body_len;
- BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+ offset = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (4 * (ucount - 1));
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : Unknown IE (%d)\n", __func__, pEid->Eid));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ // skip group cipher and pairwise cipher suite
+ pBuf += offset;
+ len -= offset;
- if(DataByteCount < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H))
- return FALSE;
+ if (len < sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH))
+ {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The length of RSNIE is too short\n", __func__));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ // pointer to AKM count
+ pAkm = (PRSNIE_AUTH)pBuf;
- // Skip LLC header
- if (NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_802_1H, pData, 6) ||
- // Cisco 1200 AP may send packet with SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL
- NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL, pData, 6))
+ // Get the count of pairwise cipher
+ acount = cpu2le16(pAkm->acount);
+ if (acount > 2)
{
- pData += 6;
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The count(%d) of AKM is invlaid\n",
+ __func__, acount));
+ return NULL;
}
- // Skip 2-bytes EAPoL type
- if (NdisEqualMemory(EAPOL, pData, 2))
+
+ // Get the AKM suite
+ if (type == AKM_SUITE)
{
- pData += 2;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("%s : The count of AKM is %d\n",
+ __func__, acount));
+ *count = acount;
+ return pAkm->auth[0].oui;
}
- else
- return FALSE;
+ offset = sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH) + (4 * (acount - 1));
- switch (*(pData+1))
+ pBuf += offset;
+ len -= offset;
+
+ // The remaining length must larger than (RSN-Capability(2) + PMKID-Count(2) + PMKID(16~))
+ if (len >= (sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES) + 2 + LEN_PMKID))
{
- case EAPPacket:
- Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAP-Packet frame, TYPE = 0, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
- break;
- case EAPOLStart:
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Start frame, TYPE = 1 \n"));
- if (pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning != EAPOL_START_DISABLE)
+ // Skip RSN capability and PMKID-Count
+ pBuf += (sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES) + 2);
+ len -= (sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES) + 2);
+
+ // Get PMKID
+ if (type == PMKID_LIST)
{
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Cancel the EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning \n"));
- RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->EnqueueStartForPSKTimer, &Cancelled);
- pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning = EAPOL_START_DISABLE;
+ *count = 1;
+ return pBuf;
}
- break;
- case EAPOLLogoff:
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLLogoff frame, TYPE = 2 \n"));
- break;
- case EAPOLKey:
- Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Key frame, TYPE = 3, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
- break;
- case EAPOLASFAlert:
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLASFAlert frame, TYPE = 4 \n"));
- break;
- default:
- return FALSE;
-
}
- return TRUE;
+ else
+ {
+ DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : it can't get any more information beyond AKM \n", __func__));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ *count = 0;
+ //DBGPRINT_ERR(("%s : The type(%d) doesn't support \n", __func__, type));
+ return NULL;
+
}
-/*
- ========================================================================
+VOID WpaShowAllsuite(
+ IN PUINT8 rsnie,
+ IN UINT rsnie_len)
+{
+ PUINT8 pSuite = NULL;
+ UINT8 count;
- Routine Description:
- Misc function to decrypt AES body
+ hex_dump("RSNIE", rsnie, rsnie_len);
- Arguments:
+ // group cipher
+ if ((pSuite = GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, GROUP_SUITE, &count)) != NULL)
+ {
+ hex_dump("group cipher", pSuite, 4*count);
+ }
- Return Value:
+ // pairwise cipher
+ if ((pSuite = GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, PAIRWISE_SUITE, &count)) != NULL)
+ {
+ hex_dump("pairwise cipher", pSuite, 4*count);
+ }
- Note:
- This function references to RFC 3394 for aes key unwrap algorithm.
+ // AKM
+ if ((pSuite = GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, AKM_SUITE, &count)) != NULL)
+ {
+ hex_dump("AKM suite", pSuite, 4*count);
+ }
- ========================================================================
-*/
-VOID AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(
- IN UCHAR *key,
- OUT UCHAR *plaintext,
- IN UCHAR c_len,
- IN UCHAR *ciphertext)
+ // PMKID
+ if ((pSuite = GetSuiteFromRSNIE(rsnie, rsnie_len, PMKID_LIST, &count)) != NULL)
+ {
+ hex_dump("PMKID", pSuite, LEN_PMKID);
+ }
-{
- UCHAR A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
- UCHAR xor;
- INT i, j;
- aes_context aesctx;
- UCHAR *R;
- INT num_blocks = c_len/8; // unit:64bits
+}
+VOID RTMPInsertRSNIE(
+ IN PUCHAR pFrameBuf,
+ OUT PULONG pFrameLen,
+ IN PUINT8 rsnie_ptr,
+ IN UINT8 rsnie_len,
+ IN PUINT8 pmkid_ptr,
+ IN UINT8 pmkid_len)
+{
+ PUCHAR pTmpBuf;
+ ULONG TempLen = 0;
+ UINT8 extra_len = 0;
+ UINT16 pmk_count = 0;
+ UCHAR ie_num;
+ UINT8 total_len = 0;
+ UCHAR WPA2_OUI[3]={0x00,0x0F,0xAC};
+
+ pTmpBuf = pFrameBuf;
+
+ /* PMKID-List Must larger than 0 and the multiple of 16. */
+ if (pmkid_len > 0 && ((pmkid_len & 0x0f) == 0))
+ {
+ extra_len = sizeof(UINT16) + pmkid_len;
- os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&R, 512);
+ pmk_count = (pmkid_len >> 4);
+ pmk_count = cpu2le16(pmk_count);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_WARN, ("%s : The length is PMKID-List is invalid (%d), so don't insert it.\n",
+ __func__, pmkid_len));
+ }
- if (R == NULL)
+ if (rsnie_len != 0)
{
- DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP: no memory!!!\n"));
- return;
- } /* End of if */
+ ie_num = IE_WPA;
+ total_len = rsnie_len;
- // Initialize
- NdisMoveMemory(A, ciphertext, 8);
- //Input plaintext
- for(i = 0; i < (c_len-8); i++)
+ if (NdisEqualMemory(rsnie_ptr + 2, WPA2_OUI, sizeof(WPA2_OUI)))
{
- R[ i] = ciphertext[i + 8];
+ ie_num = IE_RSN;
+ total_len += extra_len;
}
- rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);
+ /* construct RSNIE body */
+ MakeOutgoingFrame(pTmpBuf, &TempLen,
+ 1, &ie_num,
+ 1, &total_len,
+ rsnie_len, rsnie_ptr,
+ END_OF_ARGS);
+
+ pTmpBuf += TempLen;
+ *pFrameLen = *pFrameLen + TempLen;
- for(j = 5; j >= 0; j--)
+ if (ie_num == IE_RSN)
{
- for(i = (num_blocks-1); i > 0; i--)
+ /* Insert PMKID-List field */
+ if (extra_len > 0)
{
- xor = (num_blocks -1 )* j + i;
- NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
- BIN[7] = A[7] ^ xor;
- NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[(i-1)*8], 8);
- rtmp_aes_decrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
- NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
- NdisMoveMemory(&R[(i-1)*8], &BOUT[8], 8);
+ MakeOutgoingFrame(pTmpBuf, &TempLen,
+ 2, &pmk_count,
+ pmkid_len, pmkid_ptr,
+ END_OF_ARGS);
+
+ pTmpBuf += TempLen;
+ *pFrameLen = *pFrameLen + TempLen;
}
}
-
- // OUTPUT
- for(i = 0; i < c_len; i++)
- {
- plaintext[i] = R[i];
}
-
- os_free_mem(NULL, R);
+ return;
}
projects / deliverable / linux.git / blobdiff