Commit | Line | Data |
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85c8721f | 1 | /* auditsc.c -- System-call auditing support |
1da177e4 LT |
2 | * Handles all system-call specific auditing features. |
3 | * | |
4 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat Inc., Durham, North Carolina. | |
73241ccc | 5 | * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
b63862f4 | 6 | * Copyright (C) 2005 IBM Corporation |
1da177e4 LT |
7 | * All Rights Reserved. |
8 | * | |
9 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify | |
10 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by | |
11 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or | |
12 | * (at your option) any later version. | |
13 | * | |
14 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, | |
15 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of | |
16 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the | |
17 | * GNU General Public License for more details. | |
18 | * | |
19 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License | |
20 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software | |
21 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA | |
22 | * | |
23 | * Written by Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith@redhat.com> | |
24 | * | |
25 | * Many of the ideas implemented here are from Stephen C. Tweedie, | |
26 | * especially the idea of avoiding a copy by using getname. | |
27 | * | |
28 | * The method for actual interception of syscall entry and exit (not in | |
29 | * this file -- see entry.S) is based on a GPL'd patch written by | |
30 | * okir@suse.de and Copyright 2003 SuSE Linux AG. | |
31 | * | |
b63862f4 DK |
32 | * The support of additional filter rules compares (>, <, >=, <=) was |
33 | * added by Dustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com>, 2005. | |
34 | * | |
73241ccc AG |
35 | * Modified by Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> to collect additional |
36 | * filesystem information. | |
8c8570fb DK |
37 | * |
38 | * Subject and object context labeling support added by <danjones@us.ibm.com> | |
39 | * and <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> for LSPP certification compliance. | |
1da177e4 LT |
40 | */ |
41 | ||
42 | #include <linux/init.h> | |
1da177e4 | 43 | #include <asm/types.h> |
715b49ef | 44 | #include <asm/atomic.h> |
73241ccc AG |
45 | #include <asm/types.h> |
46 | #include <linux/fs.h> | |
47 | #include <linux/namei.h> | |
1da177e4 LT |
48 | #include <linux/mm.h> |
49 | #include <linux/module.h> | |
01116105 | 50 | #include <linux/mount.h> |
3ec3b2fb | 51 | #include <linux/socket.h> |
1da177e4 LT |
52 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
53 | #include <linux/personality.h> | |
54 | #include <linux/time.h> | |
5bb289b5 | 55 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
f5561964 | 56 | #include <linux/compiler.h> |
1da177e4 | 57 | #include <asm/unistd.h> |
8c8570fb | 58 | #include <linux/security.h> |
fe7752ba | 59 | #include <linux/list.h> |
a6c043a8 | 60 | #include <linux/tty.h> |
1da177e4 | 61 | |
fe7752ba | 62 | #include "audit.h" |
1da177e4 | 63 | |
fe7752ba | 64 | extern struct list_head audit_filter_list[]; |
1da177e4 LT |
65 | |
66 | /* No syscall auditing will take place unless audit_enabled != 0. */ | |
67 | extern int audit_enabled; | |
68 | ||
69 | /* AUDIT_NAMES is the number of slots we reserve in the audit_context | |
70 | * for saving names from getname(). */ | |
71 | #define AUDIT_NAMES 20 | |
72 | ||
73 | /* AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED is the number of slots we reserve in the | |
74 | * audit_context from being used for nameless inodes from | |
75 | * path_lookup. */ | |
76 | #define AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED 7 | |
77 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
78 | /* When fs/namei.c:getname() is called, we store the pointer in name and |
79 | * we don't let putname() free it (instead we free all of the saved | |
80 | * pointers at syscall exit time). | |
81 | * | |
82 | * Further, in fs/namei.c:path_lookup() we store the inode and device. */ | |
83 | struct audit_names { | |
84 | const char *name; | |
85 | unsigned long ino; | |
73241ccc | 86 | unsigned long pino; |
1da177e4 LT |
87 | dev_t dev; |
88 | umode_t mode; | |
89 | uid_t uid; | |
90 | gid_t gid; | |
91 | dev_t rdev; | |
8c8570fb | 92 | char *ctx; |
1da177e4 LT |
93 | }; |
94 | ||
95 | struct audit_aux_data { | |
96 | struct audit_aux_data *next; | |
97 | int type; | |
98 | }; | |
99 | ||
100 | #define AUDIT_AUX_IPCPERM 0 | |
101 | ||
102 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl { | |
103 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
104 | struct ipc_perm p; | |
105 | unsigned long qbytes; | |
106 | uid_t uid; | |
107 | gid_t gid; | |
108 | mode_t mode; | |
8c8570fb | 109 | char *ctx; |
1da177e4 LT |
110 | }; |
111 | ||
3ec3b2fb DW |
112 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall { |
113 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
114 | int nargs; | |
115 | unsigned long args[0]; | |
116 | }; | |
117 | ||
118 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr { | |
119 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
120 | int len; | |
121 | char a[0]; | |
122 | }; | |
123 | ||
01116105 SS |
124 | struct audit_aux_data_path { |
125 | struct audit_aux_data d; | |
126 | struct dentry *dentry; | |
127 | struct vfsmount *mnt; | |
128 | }; | |
1da177e4 LT |
129 | |
130 | /* The per-task audit context. */ | |
131 | struct audit_context { | |
132 | int in_syscall; /* 1 if task is in a syscall */ | |
133 | enum audit_state state; | |
134 | unsigned int serial; /* serial number for record */ | |
135 | struct timespec ctime; /* time of syscall entry */ | |
136 | uid_t loginuid; /* login uid (identity) */ | |
137 | int major; /* syscall number */ | |
138 | unsigned long argv[4]; /* syscall arguments */ | |
139 | int return_valid; /* return code is valid */ | |
2fd6f58b | 140 | long return_code;/* syscall return code */ |
1da177e4 LT |
141 | int auditable; /* 1 if record should be written */ |
142 | int name_count; | |
143 | struct audit_names names[AUDIT_NAMES]; | |
8f37d47c DW |
144 | struct dentry * pwd; |
145 | struct vfsmount * pwdmnt; | |
1da177e4 LT |
146 | struct audit_context *previous; /* For nested syscalls */ |
147 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
148 | ||
149 | /* Save things to print about task_struct */ | |
150 | pid_t pid; | |
151 | uid_t uid, euid, suid, fsuid; | |
152 | gid_t gid, egid, sgid, fsgid; | |
153 | unsigned long personality; | |
2fd6f58b | 154 | int arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
155 | |
156 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
157 | int put_count; | |
158 | int ino_count; | |
159 | #endif | |
160 | }; | |
161 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
162 | |
163 | /* Compare a task_struct with an audit_rule. Return 1 on match, 0 | |
164 | * otherwise. */ | |
165 | static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
93315ed6 | 166 | struct audit_krule *rule, |
1da177e4 LT |
167 | struct audit_context *ctx, |
168 | enum audit_state *state) | |
169 | { | |
170 | int i, j; | |
171 | ||
172 | for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) { | |
93315ed6 | 173 | struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i]; |
1da177e4 LT |
174 | int result = 0; |
175 | ||
93315ed6 | 176 | switch (f->type) { |
1da177e4 | 177 | case AUDIT_PID: |
93315ed6 | 178 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->pid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
179 | break; |
180 | case AUDIT_UID: | |
93315ed6 | 181 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->uid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
182 | break; |
183 | case AUDIT_EUID: | |
93315ed6 | 184 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->euid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
185 | break; |
186 | case AUDIT_SUID: | |
93315ed6 | 187 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->suid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
188 | break; |
189 | case AUDIT_FSUID: | |
93315ed6 | 190 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsuid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
191 | break; |
192 | case AUDIT_GID: | |
93315ed6 | 193 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->gid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
194 | break; |
195 | case AUDIT_EGID: | |
93315ed6 | 196 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->egid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
197 | break; |
198 | case AUDIT_SGID: | |
93315ed6 | 199 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->sgid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
200 | break; |
201 | case AUDIT_FSGID: | |
93315ed6 | 202 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->fsgid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
203 | break; |
204 | case AUDIT_PERS: | |
93315ed6 | 205 | result = audit_comparator(tsk->personality, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 | 206 | break; |
2fd6f58b | 207 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
b63862f4 | 208 | if (ctx) |
93315ed6 | 209 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->arch, f->op, f->val); |
2fd6f58b | 210 | break; |
1da177e4 LT |
211 | |
212 | case AUDIT_EXIT: | |
213 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) | |
93315ed6 | 214 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_code, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
215 | break; |
216 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: | |
b01f2cc1 | 217 | if (ctx && ctx->return_valid) { |
93315ed6 AG |
218 | if (f->val) |
219 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_SUCCESS); | |
b01f2cc1 | 220 | else |
93315ed6 | 221 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->return_valid, f->op, AUDITSC_FAILURE); |
b01f2cc1 | 222 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
223 | break; |
224 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: | |
225 | if (ctx) { | |
226 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
93315ed6 | 227 | if (audit_comparator(MAJOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { |
1da177e4 LT |
228 | ++result; |
229 | break; | |
230 | } | |
231 | } | |
232 | } | |
233 | break; | |
234 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: | |
235 | if (ctx) { | |
236 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
93315ed6 | 237 | if (audit_comparator(MINOR(ctx->names[j].dev), f->op, f->val)) { |
1da177e4 LT |
238 | ++result; |
239 | break; | |
240 | } | |
241 | } | |
242 | } | |
243 | break; | |
244 | case AUDIT_INODE: | |
245 | if (ctx) { | |
246 | for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) { | |
93315ed6 AG |
247 | if (audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].ino, f->op, f->val) || |
248 | audit_comparator(ctx->names[j].pino, f->op, f->val)) { | |
1da177e4 LT |
249 | ++result; |
250 | break; | |
251 | } | |
252 | } | |
253 | } | |
254 | break; | |
255 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: | |
256 | result = 0; | |
257 | if (ctx) | |
93315ed6 | 258 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->loginuid, f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
259 | break; |
260 | case AUDIT_ARG0: | |
261 | case AUDIT_ARG1: | |
262 | case AUDIT_ARG2: | |
263 | case AUDIT_ARG3: | |
264 | if (ctx) | |
93315ed6 | 265 | result = audit_comparator(ctx->argv[f->type-AUDIT_ARG0], f->op, f->val); |
1da177e4 LT |
266 | break; |
267 | } | |
268 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
269 | if (!result) |
270 | return 0; | |
271 | } | |
272 | switch (rule->action) { | |
273 | case AUDIT_NEVER: *state = AUDIT_DISABLED; break; | |
274 | case AUDIT_POSSIBLE: *state = AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; break; | |
275 | case AUDIT_ALWAYS: *state = AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT; break; | |
276 | } | |
277 | return 1; | |
278 | } | |
279 | ||
280 | /* At process creation time, we can determine if system-call auditing is | |
281 | * completely disabled for this task. Since we only have the task | |
282 | * structure at this point, we can only check uid and gid. | |
283 | */ | |
284 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk) | |
285 | { | |
286 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
287 | enum audit_state state; | |
288 | ||
289 | rcu_read_lock(); | |
0f45aa18 | 290 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_TASK], list) { |
1da177e4 LT |
291 | if (audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, NULL, &state)) { |
292 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
293 | return state; | |
294 | } | |
295 | } | |
296 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
297 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; | |
298 | } | |
299 | ||
300 | /* At syscall entry and exit time, this filter is called if the | |
301 | * audit_state is not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is | |
23f32d18 | 302 | * also not high enough that we already know we have to write an audit |
b0dd25a8 | 303 | * record (i.e., the state is AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT or AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT). |
1da177e4 LT |
304 | */ |
305 | static enum audit_state audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
306 | struct audit_context *ctx, | |
307 | struct list_head *list) | |
308 | { | |
309 | struct audit_entry *e; | |
c3896495 | 310 | enum audit_state state; |
1da177e4 | 311 | |
351bb722 | 312 | if (audit_pid && tsk->tgid == audit_pid) |
f7056d64 DW |
313 | return AUDIT_DISABLED; |
314 | ||
1da177e4 | 315 | rcu_read_lock(); |
c3896495 | 316 | if (!list_empty(list)) { |
b63862f4 DK |
317 | int word = AUDIT_WORD(ctx->major); |
318 | int bit = AUDIT_BIT(ctx->major); | |
319 | ||
320 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, list, list) { | |
321 | if ((e->rule.mask[word] & bit) == bit | |
322 | && audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, &state)) { | |
323 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
324 | return state; | |
325 | } | |
0f45aa18 DW |
326 | } |
327 | } | |
328 | rcu_read_unlock(); | |
1da177e4 | 329 | return AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT; |
0f45aa18 DW |
330 | } |
331 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
332 | /* This should be called with task_lock() held. */ |
333 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_get_context(struct task_struct *tsk, | |
334 | int return_valid, | |
335 | int return_code) | |
336 | { | |
337 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
338 | ||
339 | if (likely(!context)) | |
340 | return NULL; | |
341 | context->return_valid = return_valid; | |
342 | context->return_code = return_code; | |
343 | ||
21af6c4f | 344 | if (context->in_syscall && !context->auditable) { |
1da177e4 | 345 | enum audit_state state; |
0f45aa18 | 346 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT]); |
1da177e4 LT |
347 | if (state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT) |
348 | context->auditable = 1; | |
349 | } | |
350 | ||
351 | context->pid = tsk->pid; | |
352 | context->uid = tsk->uid; | |
353 | context->gid = tsk->gid; | |
354 | context->euid = tsk->euid; | |
355 | context->suid = tsk->suid; | |
356 | context->fsuid = tsk->fsuid; | |
357 | context->egid = tsk->egid; | |
358 | context->sgid = tsk->sgid; | |
359 | context->fsgid = tsk->fsgid; | |
360 | context->personality = tsk->personality; | |
361 | tsk->audit_context = NULL; | |
362 | return context; | |
363 | } | |
364 | ||
365 | static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context) | |
366 | { | |
367 | int i; | |
368 | ||
369 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
370 | if (context->auditable | |
371 | ||context->put_count + context->ino_count != context->name_count) { | |
73241ccc | 372 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d in_syscall=%d" |
1da177e4 LT |
373 | " name_count=%d put_count=%d" |
374 | " ino_count=%d [NOT freeing]\n", | |
73241ccc | 375 | __FILE__, __LINE__, |
1da177e4 LT |
376 | context->serial, context->major, context->in_syscall, |
377 | context->name_count, context->put_count, | |
378 | context->ino_count); | |
8c8570fb | 379 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
1da177e4 LT |
380 | printk(KERN_ERR "names[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, |
381 | context->names[i].name, | |
73241ccc | 382 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); |
8c8570fb | 383 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
384 | dump_stack(); |
385 | return; | |
386 | } | |
387 | #endif | |
388 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
389 | context->put_count = 0; | |
390 | context->ino_count = 0; | |
391 | #endif | |
392 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
393 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
394 | char *p = context->names[i].ctx; | |
395 | context->names[i].ctx = NULL; | |
396 | kfree(p); | |
1da177e4 LT |
397 | if (context->names[i].name) |
398 | __putname(context->names[i].name); | |
8c8570fb | 399 | } |
1da177e4 | 400 | context->name_count = 0; |
8f37d47c DW |
401 | if (context->pwd) |
402 | dput(context->pwd); | |
403 | if (context->pwdmnt) | |
404 | mntput(context->pwdmnt); | |
405 | context->pwd = NULL; | |
406 | context->pwdmnt = NULL; | |
1da177e4 LT |
407 | } |
408 | ||
409 | static inline void audit_free_aux(struct audit_context *context) | |
410 | { | |
411 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; | |
412 | ||
413 | while ((aux = context->aux)) { | |
01116105 SS |
414 | if (aux->type == AUDIT_AVC_PATH) { |
415 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
416 | dput(axi->dentry); | |
417 | mntput(axi->mnt); | |
418 | } | |
8c8570fb DK |
419 | if ( aux->type == AUDIT_IPC ) { |
420 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; | |
421 | if (axi->ctx) | |
422 | kfree(axi->ctx); | |
423 | } | |
424 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
425 | context->aux = aux->next; |
426 | kfree(aux); | |
427 | } | |
428 | } | |
429 | ||
430 | static inline void audit_zero_context(struct audit_context *context, | |
431 | enum audit_state state) | |
432 | { | |
433 | uid_t loginuid = context->loginuid; | |
434 | ||
435 | memset(context, 0, sizeof(*context)); | |
436 | context->state = state; | |
437 | context->loginuid = loginuid; | |
438 | } | |
439 | ||
440 | static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state) | |
441 | { | |
442 | struct audit_context *context; | |
443 | ||
444 | if (!(context = kmalloc(sizeof(*context), GFP_KERNEL))) | |
445 | return NULL; | |
446 | audit_zero_context(context, state); | |
447 | return context; | |
448 | } | |
449 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
450 | /** |
451 | * audit_alloc - allocate an audit context block for a task | |
452 | * @tsk: task | |
453 | * | |
454 | * Filter on the task information and allocate a per-task audit context | |
1da177e4 LT |
455 | * if necessary. Doing so turns on system call auditing for the |
456 | * specified task. This is called from copy_process, so no lock is | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
457 | * needed. |
458 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
459 | int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) |
460 | { | |
461 | struct audit_context *context; | |
462 | enum audit_state state; | |
463 | ||
464 | if (likely(!audit_enabled)) | |
465 | return 0; /* Return if not auditing. */ | |
466 | ||
467 | state = audit_filter_task(tsk); | |
468 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) | |
469 | return 0; | |
470 | ||
471 | if (!(context = audit_alloc_context(state))) { | |
472 | audit_log_lost("out of memory in audit_alloc"); | |
473 | return -ENOMEM; | |
474 | } | |
475 | ||
476 | /* Preserve login uid */ | |
477 | context->loginuid = -1; | |
478 | if (current->audit_context) | |
479 | context->loginuid = current->audit_context->loginuid; | |
480 | ||
481 | tsk->audit_context = context; | |
482 | set_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); | |
483 | return 0; | |
484 | } | |
485 | ||
486 | static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) | |
487 | { | |
488 | struct audit_context *previous; | |
489 | int count = 0; | |
490 | ||
491 | do { | |
492 | previous = context->previous; | |
493 | if (previous || (count && count < 10)) { | |
494 | ++count; | |
495 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit(:%d): major=%d name_count=%d:" | |
496 | " freeing multiple contexts (%d)\n", | |
497 | context->serial, context->major, | |
498 | context->name_count, count); | |
499 | } | |
500 | audit_free_names(context); | |
501 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
502 | kfree(context); | |
503 | context = previous; | |
504 | } while (context); | |
505 | if (count >= 10) | |
506 | printk(KERN_ERR "audit: freed %d contexts\n", count); | |
507 | } | |
508 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
509 | static void audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask) |
510 | { | |
511 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
512 | ssize_t len = 0; | |
513 | ||
514 | len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", NULL, 0); | |
515 | if (len < 0) { | |
516 | if (len != -EINVAL) | |
517 | goto error_path; | |
518 | return; | |
519 | } | |
520 | ||
521 | ctx = kmalloc(len, gfp_mask); | |
7306a0b9 | 522 | if (!ctx) |
8c8570fb | 523 | goto error_path; |
8c8570fb DK |
524 | |
525 | len = security_getprocattr(current, "current", ctx, len); | |
526 | if (len < 0 ) | |
527 | goto error_path; | |
528 | ||
529 | audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx); | |
7306a0b9 | 530 | return; |
8c8570fb DK |
531 | |
532 | error_path: | |
533 | if (ctx) | |
534 | kfree(ctx); | |
7306a0b9 | 535 | audit_panic("error in audit_log_task_context"); |
8c8570fb DK |
536 | return; |
537 | } | |
538 | ||
539 | static void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab, gfp_t gfp_mask) | |
219f0817 SS |
540 | { |
541 | char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; | |
542 | struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; | |
543 | struct vm_area_struct *vma; | |
544 | ||
545 | get_task_comm(name, current); | |
99e45eea DW |
546 | audit_log_format(ab, " comm="); |
547 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, name); | |
219f0817 SS |
548 | |
549 | if (!mm) | |
550 | return; | |
551 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
552 | /* |
553 | * this is brittle; all callers that pass GFP_ATOMIC will have | |
554 | * NULL current->mm and we won't get here. | |
555 | */ | |
219f0817 SS |
556 | down_read(&mm->mmap_sem); |
557 | vma = mm->mmap; | |
558 | while (vma) { | |
559 | if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && | |
560 | vma->vm_file) { | |
561 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "exe=", | |
562 | vma->vm_file->f_dentry, | |
563 | vma->vm_file->f_vfsmnt); | |
564 | break; | |
565 | } | |
566 | vma = vma->vm_next; | |
567 | } | |
568 | up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); | |
8c8570fb | 569 | audit_log_task_context(ab, gfp_mask); |
219f0817 SS |
570 | } |
571 | ||
9796fdd8 | 572 | static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context, gfp_t gfp_mask) |
1da177e4 LT |
573 | { |
574 | int i; | |
575 | struct audit_buffer *ab; | |
7551ced3 | 576 | struct audit_aux_data *aux; |
a6c043a8 | 577 | const char *tty; |
1da177e4 | 578 | |
f5561964 | 579 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_SYSCALL); |
1da177e4 LT |
580 | if (!ab) |
581 | return; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
bccf6ae0 DW |
582 | audit_log_format(ab, "arch=%x syscall=%d", |
583 | context->arch, context->major); | |
1da177e4 LT |
584 | if (context->personality != PER_LINUX) |
585 | audit_log_format(ab, " per=%lx", context->personality); | |
586 | if (context->return_valid) | |
2fd6f58b | 587 | audit_log_format(ab, " success=%s exit=%ld", |
588 | (context->return_valid==AUDITSC_SUCCESS)?"yes":"no", | |
589 | context->return_code); | |
a6c043a8 SG |
590 | if (current->signal->tty && current->signal->tty->name) |
591 | tty = current->signal->tty->name; | |
592 | else | |
593 | tty = "(none)"; | |
1da177e4 LT |
594 | audit_log_format(ab, |
595 | " a0=%lx a1=%lx a2=%lx a3=%lx items=%d" | |
326e9c8b SG |
596 | " pid=%d auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u" |
597 | " euid=%u suid=%u fsuid=%u" | |
a6c043a8 | 598 | " egid=%u sgid=%u fsgid=%u tty=%s", |
1da177e4 LT |
599 | context->argv[0], |
600 | context->argv[1], | |
601 | context->argv[2], | |
602 | context->argv[3], | |
603 | context->name_count, | |
604 | context->pid, | |
605 | context->loginuid, | |
606 | context->uid, | |
607 | context->gid, | |
608 | context->euid, context->suid, context->fsuid, | |
a6c043a8 | 609 | context->egid, context->sgid, context->fsgid, tty); |
8c8570fb | 610 | audit_log_task_info(ab, gfp_mask); |
1da177e4 | 611 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1da177e4 | 612 | |
7551ced3 | 613 | for (aux = context->aux; aux; aux = aux->next) { |
c0404993 | 614 | |
ef20c8c1 | 615 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, aux->type); |
1da177e4 LT |
616 | if (!ab) |
617 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
618 | ||
1da177e4 | 619 | switch (aux->type) { |
c0404993 | 620 | case AUDIT_IPC: { |
1da177e4 LT |
621 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux; |
622 | audit_log_format(ab, | |
8c8570fb DK |
623 | " qbytes=%lx iuid=%u igid=%u mode=%x obj=%s", |
624 | axi->qbytes, axi->uid, axi->gid, axi->mode, axi->ctx); | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
625 | break; } |
626 | ||
627 | case AUDIT_SOCKETCALL: { | |
628 | int i; | |
629 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *axs = (void *)aux; | |
630 | audit_log_format(ab, "nargs=%d", axs->nargs); | |
631 | for (i=0; i<axs->nargs; i++) | |
632 | audit_log_format(ab, " a%d=%lx", i, axs->args[i]); | |
633 | break; } | |
634 | ||
635 | case AUDIT_SOCKADDR: { | |
636 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *axs = (void *)aux; | |
637 | ||
638 | audit_log_format(ab, "saddr="); | |
639 | audit_log_hex(ab, axs->a, axs->len); | |
640 | break; } | |
01116105 SS |
641 | |
642 | case AUDIT_AVC_PATH: { | |
643 | struct audit_aux_data_path *axi = (void *)aux; | |
644 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "path=", axi->dentry, axi->mnt); | |
01116105 SS |
645 | break; } |
646 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
647 | } |
648 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1da177e4 LT |
649 | } |
650 | ||
8f37d47c | 651 | if (context->pwd && context->pwdmnt) { |
ef20c8c1 | 652 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_CWD); |
8f37d47c DW |
653 | if (ab) { |
654 | audit_log_d_path(ab, "cwd=", context->pwd, context->pwdmnt); | |
655 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
656 | } | |
657 | } | |
1da177e4 | 658 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) { |
73241ccc AG |
659 | unsigned long ino = context->names[i].ino; |
660 | unsigned long pino = context->names[i].pino; | |
661 | ||
ef20c8c1 | 662 | ab = audit_log_start(context, gfp_mask, AUDIT_PATH); |
1da177e4 LT |
663 | if (!ab) |
664 | continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ | |
8f37d47c | 665 | |
1da177e4 | 666 | audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); |
73241ccc AG |
667 | |
668 | audit_log_format(ab, " name="); | |
669 | if (context->names[i].name) | |
83c7d091 | 670 | audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name); |
73241ccc AG |
671 | else |
672 | audit_log_format(ab, "(null)"); | |
673 | ||
674 | if (pino != (unsigned long)-1) | |
675 | audit_log_format(ab, " parent=%lu", pino); | |
676 | if (ino != (unsigned long)-1) | |
677 | audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu", ino); | |
678 | if ((pino != (unsigned long)-1) || (ino != (unsigned long)-1)) | |
679 | audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" | |
680 | " ouid=%u ogid=%u rdev=%02x:%02x", | |
681 | MAJOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
682 | MINOR(context->names[i].dev), | |
683 | context->names[i].mode, | |
684 | context->names[i].uid, | |
685 | context->names[i].gid, | |
686 | MAJOR(context->names[i].rdev), | |
1da177e4 | 687 | MINOR(context->names[i].rdev)); |
8c8570fb DK |
688 | if (context->names[i].ctx) { |
689 | audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", | |
690 | context->names[i].ctx); | |
691 | } | |
692 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
693 | audit_log_end(ab); |
694 | } | |
695 | } | |
696 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
697 | /** |
698 | * audit_free - free a per-task audit context | |
699 | * @tsk: task whose audit context block to free | |
700 | * | |
701 | * Called from copy_process and __put_task_struct. | |
702 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
703 | void audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk) |
704 | { | |
705 | struct audit_context *context; | |
706 | ||
4023e020 IM |
707 | /* |
708 | * No need to lock the task - when we execute audit_free() | |
709 | * then the task has no external references anymore, and | |
710 | * we are tearing it down. (The locking also confuses | |
711 | * DEBUG_LOCKDEP - this freeing may occur in softirq | |
712 | * contexts as well, via RCU.) | |
713 | */ | |
1da177e4 | 714 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, 0, 0); |
1da177e4 LT |
715 | if (likely(!context)) |
716 | return; | |
717 | ||
718 | /* Check for system calls that do not go through the exit | |
f5561964 DW |
719 | * function (e.g., exit_group), then free context block. |
720 | * We use GFP_ATOMIC here because we might be doing this | |
721 | * in the context of the idle thread */ | |
f7056d64 | 722 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable) |
f5561964 | 723 | audit_log_exit(context, GFP_ATOMIC); |
1da177e4 LT |
724 | |
725 | audit_free_context(context); | |
726 | } | |
727 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
728 | /** |
729 | * audit_syscall_entry - fill in an audit record at syscall entry | |
730 | * @tsk: task being audited | |
731 | * @arch: architecture type | |
732 | * @major: major syscall type (function) | |
733 | * @a1: additional syscall register 1 | |
734 | * @a2: additional syscall register 2 | |
735 | * @a3: additional syscall register 3 | |
736 | * @a4: additional syscall register 4 | |
737 | * | |
738 | * Fill in audit context at syscall entry. This only happens if the | |
1da177e4 LT |
739 | * audit context was created when the task was created and the state or |
740 | * filters demand the audit context be built. If the state from the | |
741 | * per-task filter or from the per-syscall filter is AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT, | |
742 | * then the record will be written at syscall exit time (otherwise, it | |
743 | * will only be written if another part of the kernel requests that it | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
744 | * be written). |
745 | */ | |
2fd6f58b | 746 | void audit_syscall_entry(struct task_struct *tsk, int arch, int major, |
1da177e4 LT |
747 | unsigned long a1, unsigned long a2, |
748 | unsigned long a3, unsigned long a4) | |
749 | { | |
750 | struct audit_context *context = tsk->audit_context; | |
751 | enum audit_state state; | |
752 | ||
753 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
754 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
755 | /* |
756 | * This happens only on certain architectures that make system | |
1da177e4 LT |
757 | * calls in kernel_thread via the entry.S interface, instead of |
758 | * with direct calls. (If you are porting to a new | |
759 | * architecture, hitting this condition can indicate that you | |
760 | * got the _exit/_leave calls backward in entry.S.) | |
761 | * | |
762 | * i386 no | |
763 | * x86_64 no | |
2ef9481e | 764 | * ppc64 yes (see arch/powerpc/platforms/iseries/misc.S) |
1da177e4 LT |
765 | * |
766 | * This also happens with vm86 emulation in a non-nested manner | |
767 | * (entries without exits), so this case must be caught. | |
768 | */ | |
769 | if (context->in_syscall) { | |
770 | struct audit_context *newctx; | |
771 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
772 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG |
773 | printk(KERN_ERR | |
774 | "audit(:%d) pid=%d in syscall=%d;" | |
775 | " entering syscall=%d\n", | |
776 | context->serial, tsk->pid, context->major, major); | |
777 | #endif | |
778 | newctx = audit_alloc_context(context->state); | |
779 | if (newctx) { | |
780 | newctx->previous = context; | |
781 | context = newctx; | |
782 | tsk->audit_context = newctx; | |
783 | } else { | |
784 | /* If we can't alloc a new context, the best we | |
785 | * can do is to leak memory (any pending putname | |
786 | * will be lost). The only other alternative is | |
787 | * to abandon auditing. */ | |
788 | audit_zero_context(context, context->state); | |
789 | } | |
790 | } | |
791 | BUG_ON(context->in_syscall || context->name_count); | |
792 | ||
793 | if (!audit_enabled) | |
794 | return; | |
795 | ||
2fd6f58b | 796 | context->arch = arch; |
1da177e4 LT |
797 | context->major = major; |
798 | context->argv[0] = a1; | |
799 | context->argv[1] = a2; | |
800 | context->argv[2] = a3; | |
801 | context->argv[3] = a4; | |
802 | ||
803 | state = context->state; | |
804 | if (state == AUDIT_SETUP_CONTEXT || state == AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT) | |
0f45aa18 | 805 | state = audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY]); |
1da177e4 LT |
806 | if (likely(state == AUDIT_DISABLED)) |
807 | return; | |
808 | ||
ce625a80 | 809 | context->serial = 0; |
1da177e4 LT |
810 | context->ctime = CURRENT_TIME; |
811 | context->in_syscall = 1; | |
812 | context->auditable = !!(state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT); | |
813 | } | |
814 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
815 | /** |
816 | * audit_syscall_exit - deallocate audit context after a system call | |
817 | * @tsk: task being audited | |
818 | * @valid: success/failure flag | |
819 | * @return_code: syscall return value | |
820 | * | |
821 | * Tear down after system call. If the audit context has been marked as | |
1da177e4 LT |
822 | * auditable (either because of the AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT state from |
823 | * filtering, or because some other part of the kernel write an audit | |
824 | * message), then write out the syscall information. In call cases, | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
825 | * free the names stored from getname(). |
826 | */ | |
2fd6f58b | 827 | void audit_syscall_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, int valid, long return_code) |
1da177e4 LT |
828 | { |
829 | struct audit_context *context; | |
830 | ||
831 | get_task_struct(tsk); | |
832 | task_lock(tsk); | |
2fd6f58b | 833 | context = audit_get_context(tsk, valid, return_code); |
1da177e4 LT |
834 | task_unlock(tsk); |
835 | ||
836 | /* Not having a context here is ok, since the parent may have | |
837 | * called __put_task_struct. */ | |
838 | if (likely(!context)) | |
413a1c75 | 839 | goto out; |
1da177e4 | 840 | |
f7056d64 | 841 | if (context->in_syscall && context->auditable) |
f5561964 | 842 | audit_log_exit(context, GFP_KERNEL); |
1da177e4 LT |
843 | |
844 | context->in_syscall = 0; | |
845 | context->auditable = 0; | |
2fd6f58b | 846 | |
1da177e4 LT |
847 | if (context->previous) { |
848 | struct audit_context *new_context = context->previous; | |
849 | context->previous = NULL; | |
850 | audit_free_context(context); | |
851 | tsk->audit_context = new_context; | |
852 | } else { | |
853 | audit_free_names(context); | |
854 | audit_free_aux(context); | |
1da177e4 LT |
855 | tsk->audit_context = context; |
856 | } | |
413a1c75 | 857 | out: |
1da177e4 LT |
858 | put_task_struct(tsk); |
859 | } | |
860 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
861 | /** |
862 | * audit_getname - add a name to the list | |
863 | * @name: name to add | |
864 | * | |
865 | * Add a name to the list of audit names for this context. | |
866 | * Called from fs/namei.c:getname(). | |
867 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
868 | void audit_getname(const char *name) |
869 | { | |
870 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
871 | ||
872 | if (!context || IS_ERR(name) || !name) | |
873 | return; | |
874 | ||
875 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
876 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
877 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): ignoring getname(%p)\n", | |
878 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
879 | dump_stack(); | |
880 | #endif | |
881 | return; | |
882 | } | |
883 | BUG_ON(context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES); | |
884 | context->names[context->name_count].name = name; | |
885 | context->names[context->name_count].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
886 | ++context->name_count; | |
8f37d47c DW |
887 | if (!context->pwd) { |
888 | read_lock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
889 | context->pwd = dget(current->fs->pwd); | |
890 | context->pwdmnt = mntget(current->fs->pwdmnt); | |
891 | read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock); | |
892 | } | |
893 | ||
1da177e4 LT |
894 | } |
895 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
896 | /* audit_putname - intercept a putname request |
897 | * @name: name to intercept and delay for putname | |
898 | * | |
899 | * If we have stored the name from getname in the audit context, | |
900 | * then we delay the putname until syscall exit. | |
901 | * Called from include/linux/fs.h:putname(). | |
902 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
903 | void audit_putname(const char *name) |
904 | { | |
905 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
906 | ||
907 | BUG_ON(!context); | |
908 | if (!context->in_syscall) { | |
909 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG == 2 | |
910 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): __putname(%p)\n", | |
911 | __FILE__, __LINE__, context->serial, name); | |
912 | if (context->name_count) { | |
913 | int i; | |
914 | for (i = 0; i < context->name_count; i++) | |
915 | printk(KERN_ERR "name[%d] = %p = %s\n", i, | |
916 | context->names[i].name, | |
73241ccc | 917 | context->names[i].name ?: "(null)"); |
1da177e4 LT |
918 | } |
919 | #endif | |
920 | __putname(name); | |
921 | } | |
922 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
923 | else { | |
924 | ++context->put_count; | |
925 | if (context->put_count > context->name_count) { | |
926 | printk(KERN_ERR "%s:%d(:%d): major=%d" | |
927 | " in_syscall=%d putname(%p) name_count=%d" | |
928 | " put_count=%d\n", | |
929 | __FILE__, __LINE__, | |
930 | context->serial, context->major, | |
931 | context->in_syscall, name, context->name_count, | |
932 | context->put_count); | |
933 | dump_stack(); | |
934 | } | |
935 | } | |
936 | #endif | |
937 | } | |
938 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
939 | void audit_inode_context(int idx, const struct inode *inode) |
940 | { | |
941 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
7306a0b9 | 942 | const char *suffix = security_inode_xattr_getsuffix(); |
8c8570fb DK |
943 | char *ctx = NULL; |
944 | int len = 0; | |
945 | ||
7306a0b9 DK |
946 | if (!suffix) |
947 | goto ret; | |
8c8570fb | 948 | |
7306a0b9 DK |
949 | len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, NULL, 0, 0); |
950 | if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP) | |
951 | goto ret; | |
8c8570fb DK |
952 | if (len < 0) |
953 | goto error_path; | |
954 | ||
955 | ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
956 | if (!ctx) | |
957 | goto error_path; | |
958 | ||
7306a0b9 | 959 | len = security_inode_getsecurity(inode, suffix, ctx, len, 0); |
8c8570fb DK |
960 | if (len < 0) |
961 | goto error_path; | |
962 | ||
963 | kfree(context->names[idx].ctx); | |
964 | context->names[idx].ctx = ctx; | |
7306a0b9 | 965 | goto ret; |
8c8570fb DK |
966 | |
967 | error_path: | |
968 | if (ctx) | |
969 | kfree(ctx); | |
970 | audit_panic("error in audit_inode_context"); | |
7306a0b9 | 971 | ret: |
8c8570fb DK |
972 | return; |
973 | } | |
974 | ||
975 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
976 | /** |
977 | * audit_inode - store the inode and device from a lookup | |
978 | * @name: name being audited | |
979 | * @inode: inode being audited | |
980 | * @flags: lookup flags (as used in path_lookup()) | |
981 | * | |
982 | * Called from fs/namei.c:path_lookup(). | |
983 | */ | |
73241ccc | 984 | void __audit_inode(const char *name, const struct inode *inode, unsigned flags) |
1da177e4 LT |
985 | { |
986 | int idx; | |
987 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
988 | ||
989 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
990 | return; | |
991 | if (context->name_count | |
992 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name | |
993 | && context->names[context->name_count-1].name == name) | |
994 | idx = context->name_count - 1; | |
995 | else if (context->name_count > 1 | |
996 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name | |
997 | && context->names[context->name_count-2].name == name) | |
998 | idx = context->name_count - 2; | |
999 | else { | |
1000 | /* FIXME: how much do we care about inodes that have no | |
1001 | * associated name? */ | |
1002 | if (context->name_count >= AUDIT_NAMES - AUDIT_NAMES_RESERVED) | |
1003 | return; | |
1004 | idx = context->name_count++; | |
1005 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1006 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1007 | ++context->ino_count; | |
1008 | #endif | |
1009 | } | |
ae7b961b DW |
1010 | context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; |
1011 | context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1012 | context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1013 | context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1014 | context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
8c8570fb | 1015 | audit_inode_context(idx, inode); |
73241ccc AG |
1016 | if ((flags & LOOKUP_PARENT) && (strcmp(name, "/") != 0) && |
1017 | (strcmp(name, ".") != 0)) { | |
1018 | context->names[idx].ino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
1019 | context->names[idx].pino = inode->i_ino; | |
1020 | } else { | |
1021 | context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1022 | context->names[idx].pino = (unsigned long)-1; | |
1023 | } | |
1024 | } | |
1025 | ||
1026 | /** | |
1027 | * audit_inode_child - collect inode info for created/removed objects | |
1028 | * @dname: inode's dentry name | |
1029 | * @inode: inode being audited | |
1030 | * @pino: inode number of dentry parent | |
1031 | * | |
1032 | * For syscalls that create or remove filesystem objects, audit_inode | |
1033 | * can only collect information for the filesystem object's parent. | |
1034 | * This call updates the audit context with the child's information. | |
1035 | * Syscalls that create a new filesystem object must be hooked after | |
1036 | * the object is created. Syscalls that remove a filesystem object | |
1037 | * must be hooked prior, in order to capture the target inode during | |
1038 | * unsuccessful attempts. | |
1039 | */ | |
1040 | void __audit_inode_child(const char *dname, const struct inode *inode, | |
1041 | unsigned long pino) | |
1042 | { | |
1043 | int idx; | |
1044 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1045 | ||
1046 | if (!context->in_syscall) | |
1047 | return; | |
1048 | ||
1049 | /* determine matching parent */ | |
1050 | if (dname) | |
1051 | for (idx = 0; idx < context->name_count; idx++) | |
1052 | if (context->names[idx].pino == pino) { | |
1053 | const char *n; | |
1054 | const char *name = context->names[idx].name; | |
1055 | int dlen = strlen(dname); | |
1056 | int nlen = name ? strlen(name) : 0; | |
1057 | ||
1058 | if (nlen < dlen) | |
1059 | continue; | |
1060 | ||
1061 | /* disregard trailing slashes */ | |
1062 | n = name + nlen - 1; | |
1063 | while ((*n == '/') && (n > name)) | |
1064 | n--; | |
1065 | ||
1066 | /* find last path component */ | |
1067 | n = n - dlen + 1; | |
1068 | if (n < name) | |
1069 | continue; | |
1070 | else if (n > name) { | |
1071 | if (*--n != '/') | |
1072 | continue; | |
1073 | else | |
1074 | n++; | |
1075 | } | |
1076 | ||
1077 | if (strncmp(n, dname, dlen) == 0) | |
1078 | goto update_context; | |
1079 | } | |
1080 | ||
1081 | /* catch-all in case match not found */ | |
1082 | idx = context->name_count++; | |
1083 | context->names[idx].name = NULL; | |
1084 | context->names[idx].pino = pino; | |
1085 | #if AUDIT_DEBUG | |
1086 | context->ino_count++; | |
1087 | #endif | |
1088 | ||
1089 | update_context: | |
1090 | if (inode) { | |
1091 | context->names[idx].ino = inode->i_ino; | |
1092 | context->names[idx].dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; | |
1093 | context->names[idx].mode = inode->i_mode; | |
1094 | context->names[idx].uid = inode->i_uid; | |
1095 | context->names[idx].gid = inode->i_gid; | |
1096 | context->names[idx].rdev = inode->i_rdev; | |
8c8570fb | 1097 | audit_inode_context(idx, inode); |
73241ccc | 1098 | } |
1da177e4 LT |
1099 | } |
1100 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1101 | /** |
1102 | * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values | |
1103 | * @ctx: audit_context for the task | |
1104 | * @t: timespec to store time recorded in the audit_context | |
1105 | * @serial: serial value that is recorded in the audit_context | |
1106 | * | |
1107 | * Also sets the context as auditable. | |
1108 | */ | |
bfb4496e DW |
1109 | void auditsc_get_stamp(struct audit_context *ctx, |
1110 | struct timespec *t, unsigned int *serial) | |
1da177e4 | 1111 | { |
ce625a80 DW |
1112 | if (!ctx->serial) |
1113 | ctx->serial = audit_serial(); | |
bfb4496e DW |
1114 | t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; |
1115 | t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; | |
1116 | *serial = ctx->serial; | |
1117 | ctx->auditable = 1; | |
1da177e4 LT |
1118 | } |
1119 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1120 | /** |
1121 | * audit_set_loginuid - set a task's audit_context loginuid | |
1122 | * @task: task whose audit context is being modified | |
1123 | * @loginuid: loginuid value | |
1124 | * | |
1125 | * Returns 0. | |
1126 | * | |
1127 | * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_loginuid_write(). | |
1128 | */ | |
456be6cd | 1129 | int audit_set_loginuid(struct task_struct *task, uid_t loginuid) |
1da177e4 | 1130 | { |
456be6cd | 1131 | if (task->audit_context) { |
c0404993 SG |
1132 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1133 | ||
9ad9ad38 | 1134 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_LOGIN); |
c0404993 SG |
1135 | if (ab) { |
1136 | audit_log_format(ab, "login pid=%d uid=%u " | |
326e9c8b | 1137 | "old auid=%u new auid=%u", |
c0404993 SG |
1138 | task->pid, task->uid, |
1139 | task->audit_context->loginuid, loginuid); | |
1140 | audit_log_end(ab); | |
1141 | } | |
456be6cd | 1142 | task->audit_context->loginuid = loginuid; |
1da177e4 LT |
1143 | } |
1144 | return 0; | |
1145 | } | |
1146 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1147 | /** |
1148 | * audit_get_loginuid - get the loginuid for an audit_context | |
1149 | * @ctx: the audit_context | |
1150 | * | |
1151 | * Returns the context's loginuid or -1 if @ctx is NULL. | |
1152 | */ | |
1da177e4 LT |
1153 | uid_t audit_get_loginuid(struct audit_context *ctx) |
1154 | { | |
1155 | return ctx ? ctx->loginuid : -1; | |
1156 | } | |
1157 | ||
8c8570fb DK |
1158 | static char *audit_ipc_context(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
1159 | { | |
1160 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1161 | char *ctx = NULL; | |
1162 | int len = 0; | |
1163 | ||
1164 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1165 | return NULL; | |
1166 | ||
1167 | len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, NULL, 0); | |
1168 | if (len == -EOPNOTSUPP) | |
1169 | goto ret; | |
1170 | if (len < 0) | |
1171 | goto error_path; | |
1172 | ||
1173 | ctx = kmalloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC); | |
1174 | if (!ctx) | |
1175 | goto error_path; | |
1176 | ||
1177 | len = security_ipc_getsecurity(ipcp, ctx, len); | |
1178 | if (len < 0) | |
1179 | goto error_path; | |
1180 | ||
1181 | return ctx; | |
1182 | ||
1183 | error_path: | |
1184 | kfree(ctx); | |
1185 | audit_panic("error in audit_ipc_context"); | |
1186 | ret: | |
1187 | return NULL; | |
1188 | } | |
1189 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1190 | /** |
1191 | * audit_ipc_perms - record audit data for ipc | |
1192 | * @qbytes: msgq bytes | |
1193 | * @uid: msgq user id | |
1194 | * @gid: msgq group id | |
1195 | * @mode: msgq mode (permissions) | |
1196 | * | |
1197 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1198 | */ | |
8c8570fb | 1199 | int audit_ipc_perms(unsigned long qbytes, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, mode_t mode, struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) |
1da177e4 LT |
1200 | { |
1201 | struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *ax; | |
1202 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1203 | ||
1204 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1205 | return 0; | |
1206 | ||
8c8570fb | 1207 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); |
1da177e4 LT |
1208 | if (!ax) |
1209 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1210 | ||
1211 | ax->qbytes = qbytes; | |
1212 | ax->uid = uid; | |
1213 | ax->gid = gid; | |
1214 | ax->mode = mode; | |
8c8570fb | 1215 | ax->ctx = audit_ipc_context(ipcp); |
1da177e4 | 1216 | |
c0404993 | 1217 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC; |
1da177e4 LT |
1218 | ax->d.next = context->aux; |
1219 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1220 | return 0; | |
1221 | } | |
c2f0c7c3 | 1222 | |
b0dd25a8 RD |
1223 | /** |
1224 | * audit_socketcall - record audit data for sys_socketcall | |
1225 | * @nargs: number of args | |
1226 | * @args: args array | |
1227 | * | |
1228 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1229 | */ | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
1230 | int audit_socketcall(int nargs, unsigned long *args) |
1231 | { | |
1232 | struct audit_aux_data_socketcall *ax; | |
1233 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1234 | ||
1235 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1236 | return 0; | |
1237 | ||
1238 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + nargs * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_KERNEL); | |
1239 | if (!ax) | |
1240 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1241 | ||
1242 | ax->nargs = nargs; | |
1243 | memcpy(ax->args, args, nargs * sizeof(unsigned long)); | |
1244 | ||
1245 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKETCALL; | |
1246 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1247 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1248 | return 0; | |
1249 | } | |
1250 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1251 | /** |
1252 | * audit_sockaddr - record audit data for sys_bind, sys_connect, sys_sendto | |
1253 | * @len: data length in user space | |
1254 | * @a: data address in kernel space | |
1255 | * | |
1256 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1257 | */ | |
3ec3b2fb DW |
1258 | int audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a) |
1259 | { | |
1260 | struct audit_aux_data_sockaddr *ax; | |
1261 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1262 | ||
1263 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1264 | return 0; | |
1265 | ||
1266 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax) + len, GFP_KERNEL); | |
1267 | if (!ax) | |
1268 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1269 | ||
1270 | ax->len = len; | |
1271 | memcpy(ax->a, a, len); | |
1272 | ||
1273 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_SOCKADDR; | |
1274 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1275 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1276 | return 0; | |
1277 | } | |
1278 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1279 | /** |
1280 | * audit_avc_path - record the granting or denial of permissions | |
1281 | * @dentry: dentry to record | |
1282 | * @mnt: mnt to record | |
1283 | * | |
1284 | * Returns 0 for success or NULL context or < 0 on error. | |
1285 | * | |
1286 | * Called from security/selinux/avc.c::avc_audit() | |
1287 | */ | |
01116105 SS |
1288 | int audit_avc_path(struct dentry *dentry, struct vfsmount *mnt) |
1289 | { | |
1290 | struct audit_aux_data_path *ax; | |
1291 | struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context; | |
1292 | ||
1293 | if (likely(!context)) | |
1294 | return 0; | |
1295 | ||
1296 | ax = kmalloc(sizeof(*ax), GFP_ATOMIC); | |
1297 | if (!ax) | |
1298 | return -ENOMEM; | |
1299 | ||
1300 | ax->dentry = dget(dentry); | |
1301 | ax->mnt = mntget(mnt); | |
1302 | ||
1303 | ax->d.type = AUDIT_AVC_PATH; | |
1304 | ax->d.next = context->aux; | |
1305 | context->aux = (void *)ax; | |
1306 | return 0; | |
1307 | } | |
1308 | ||
b0dd25a8 RD |
1309 | /** |
1310 | * audit_signal_info - record signal info for shutting down audit subsystem | |
1311 | * @sig: signal value | |
1312 | * @t: task being signaled | |
1313 | * | |
1314 | * If the audit subsystem is being terminated, record the task (pid) | |
1315 | * and uid that is doing that. | |
1316 | */ | |
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1317 | void audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) |
1318 | { | |
1319 | extern pid_t audit_sig_pid; | |
1320 | extern uid_t audit_sig_uid; | |
c2f0c7c3 | 1321 | |
582edda5 | 1322 | if (unlikely(audit_pid && t->tgid == audit_pid)) { |
c2f0c7c3 SG |
1323 | if (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP) { |
1324 | struct audit_context *ctx = current->audit_context; | |
1325 | audit_sig_pid = current->pid; | |
1326 | if (ctx) | |
1327 | audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid; | |
1328 | else | |
1329 | audit_sig_uid = current->uid; | |
1330 | } | |
1331 | } | |
1332 | } |